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Abstract	  	  This	   thesis	   considers	   how	   the	   law	   should	   manage	   conflicts	   between	   religious	  freedom	  and	  the	  prohibition	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination.	  It	  starts	  from	  the	  basis	   that	   both	   these	   rights	   are	   valuable	   and	  worthy	   of	   protection,	   but	   that	   such	  disputes	   are	   often	   characterised	   by	   animosity.	   It	   contends	   that	   a	   proportionality	  analysis	   provides	   the	   best	   method	   for	   resolving	   these	   conflicts.	   In	   particular,	   it	  argues	   that	   proportionality	   is	   a	   conciliatory	   method	   of	   reasoning	   because	   it	  provides	  context-­‐dependent	  and	  nuanced	  answers	  to	  these	  issues,	  providing	  scope	  for	   re-­‐assessment	   in	   future	   cases,	   and	   because	   it	   accepts	   losing	   claims	   as	   in	  principle	   as	   worthy	   of	   protection.	   It	   is	   also	   argued	   that	   proportionality	   is	  advantageous	   because	   it	   inherently	   demands	   justification	   where	   rights	   are	  infringed.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  takes	  a	  comparative	  approach,	  examining	  the	  law	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  Canada	  and	  the	  USA	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  clash	  of	  rights	  and	  to	  compare	  how	  these	  issues	   have	   been	   dealt	   with	   by	   courts	   and	   legislatures.	   It	   considers	   these	   issues	  with	   reference	   to	   four	   areas	   of	   law.	   The	   first	   assesses	   how	   far	   employees	   with	  discriminatory	   religious	   beliefs	   should	   be	   accommodated	   in	   the	   workplace,	  including	  whether	   they	   should	  have	   a	   right	   not	   to	  perform	  aspects	   of	   their	  work	  that	   are	   contrary	   to	   their	   beliefs	   and	  whether	   they	   should	   be	  permitted	   to	   share	  their	   discriminatory	   views	   at	   work.	   The	   second	   considers	   whether	   and	   when	  religious	   organisations	   should	   be	   permitted	   to	   discriminate	   in	   their	   employment	  decisions.	  The	  third	  examines	  how	  far	  religious	  organisations	  should	  be	  permitted	  to	  discriminate	  in	  providing	  services,	  such	  as	  charitable	  services	  or	  when	  hiring	  out	  premises,	   and	   the	   fourth	   whether	   religious	   individuals	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	  discriminate	  in	  the	  secular	  marketplace.	  	  
	   	  
	   4	  
	  
Acknowledgments	  	  A	  PhD	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  thing	  to	  do	  and	  would	  be	   impossible	  without	   the	  support	  of	  many	  people.	   I	   am	   very	   grateful	   to	  my	   supervisors,	   Conor	  Gearty	   and	  Kai	  Möller	  who	  have	  been	  so	  thoughtful,	  patient	  and	  generous	  with	  their	  time	  and	  attention,	  even	  when	  I	  was	  completely	  lost	  at	  the	  beginning.	  Thanks	  also	  to	  Linda	  Mulcahy	  for	  broadening	  my	  legal	  horizons	  in	  my	  first	  year	  and	  to	  everyone	  I	  have	  met	  at	  LSE	  for	  making	  it	  such	  a	  diverse	  and	  interesting	  place	  to	  be.	  I	  am	  also	  grateful	  to	  the	  Arts	  and	  Humanities	  Research	  Council	  for	  providing	  funding.	  	  Thanks	  also	  to	  all	  my	  friends	  for	  their	  forbearance	  with	  me	  over	  the	  last	  three	  and	  a	  bit	  years,	  when	  I	  have	  alternated	  between	  either	  ignoring	  you	  because	  I	  have	  been	  too	  busy	  or	  demanded	  that	  you	  entertain	  me	  immediately	  because	  I	  was	  in	  need	  of	  a	   break.	   In	   particular	   I	   would	   like	   to	   thank	   all	   the	   members	   of	   KCL	   Gilbert	   and	  Sullivan	  Society	  for	  providing	  such	  a	  welcome	  distraction	  and	  for	  never	  holding	  it	  against	  me	  that	  I	  attended	  a	  rival	  university.	  	  Most	  thanks	  though	  must	  go	  to	  my	  parents	  and	  my	  sister,	  especially	  to	  my	  mother,	  and	  to	  Graham,	  who	  became	  my	  husband	  during	  the	  writing	  of	  this	  thesis.	   I	   think	  they	  have	  vicariously	  experienced	  all	  the	  ups	  and	  downs	  of	  a	  PhD,	  without	  having	  the	  benefit	  of	  actually	  doing	  one	  and	  for	  this	  I	  apologise.	  	   	  
	   5	  
	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  .......................................................................................................	  7	  
Freedom	  of	  Religion	  .........................................................................................................	  9	  
Non-­‐Discrimination	  ........................................................................................................	  18	  
Conflict	  of	  Rights	  .............................................................................................................	  25	  
Thesis	  Perspective	  ..........................................................................................................	  26	  
Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................................	  31	  
Chapter	  2:	  Potential	  Strategies	  for	  Resolving	  Conflicts	  Between	  Religious	  and	  
Other	  Claims	  ..........................................................................................................................	  33	  
Conduct/Belief	  .................................................................................................................	  33	  
Public/Private	  ..................................................................................................................	  41	  
Core/Periphery	  ................................................................................................................	  49	  
Neutral	  Laws	  of	  General	  Applicability	  .....................................................................	  52	  
Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................................	  58	  
Chapter	  3:	  Proportionality	  ...............................................................................................	  60	  
Proportionality:	  An	  Analysis	  .......................................................................................	  60	  Interference	  ...................................................................................................................................	  63	  Legitimate	  Aim	  .............................................................................................................................	  70	  Rational	  Connection	  ...................................................................................................................	  76	  Necessity	  .........................................................................................................................................	  77	  Balancing	  ........................................................................................................................................	  78	  
Proportionality	  and	  Conflicts	  Between	  Freedom	  of	  Religion	  and	  Non-­‐
Discrimination	  .................................................................................................................	  80	  Conflicting	  Claims	  .......................................................................................................................	  80	  Proportionality’s	  Relevance	  ...................................................................................................	  81	  Proportionality	  as	  Part	  of	  the	  Culture	  of	  Justification	  ................................................	  86	  Further	  Benefits	  and	  Potential	  Objections	  .......................................................................	  89	  Proportionality	  in	  the	  US,	  England	  and	  Canada	  .............................................................	  94	  
Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................................	  98	  
Chapter	  4:	  Religious	  Claims	  in	  Secular	  Employment	  ...............................................	  99	  
Disputes	  around	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  .......................................................................	  99	  Interference	  ................................................................................................................................	  101	  Legitimate	  Aim	  ..........................................................................................................................	  103	  Rational	  Connection	  ................................................................................................................	  104	  No	  Less	  Restrictive	  Means	  ...................................................................................................	  105	  Justification	  .................................................................................................................................	  106	  Balancing	  .....................................................................................................................................	  110	  
Other	  ‘Conscientious	  Objection’	  Cases	  ..................................................................	  115	  
Discriminatory	  Religious	  Expression	  and	  the	  Workplace	  .............................	  124	  
Proportionality	  and	  Belief	  ........................................................................................	  128	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  130	  
Chapter	  5:	  Discrimination	  and	  Religious	  Employment	  .......................................	  132	  
Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................	  132	  
Religious	  Ministers	  ......................................................................................................	  136	  Balancing	  the	  Interests	  ..........................................................................................................	  142	  Biblical	  Chain	  of	  Command	  ..................................................................................................	  146	  Religious	  Ministers:	  Conclusion	  ........................................................................................	  147	  
Other	  Religious	  Employment	  ...................................................................................	  147	  
	   6	  
Teachers	  ..........................................................................................................................	  147	  English,	  US	  and	  Canadian	  Approaches	  ...........................................................................	  149	  Proportionality	  ..........................................................................................................................	  155	  
Social	  Service	  Organisations	  ....................................................................................	  159	  
Secular	  Function	  Employees	  ....................................................................................	  164	  
Islands	  of	  Exclusivity?	  ................................................................................................	  166	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  168	  
Chapter	  6:	  Religious	  Organisations	  and	  Services	  ..................................................	  170	  
Religious	  Activities	  ......................................................................................................	  170	  
Services	  Provided	  to	  Co-­‐Religionists	  .....................................................................	  177	  
Non-­‐members	  and	  Services	  ......................................................................................	  185	  Hiring	  of	  Religion-­‐Owned	  Premises	  .................................................................................	  185	  Services	  Provided	  to	  the	  General	  Public	  ........................................................................	  191	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  201	  
Chapter	  7:	  The	  Secular	  Marketplace	  and	  Religious	  Claims	  ................................	  202	  
Interference	  ...................................................................................................................	  202	  Interference:	  Conclusion	  .......................................................................................................	  214	  
Legitimate	  Aim	  ..............................................................................................................	  215	  
Rational	  Connection	  ....................................................................................................	  215	  
No	  Less	  Restrictive	  Means	  .........................................................................................	  217	  
Balancing	  ........................................................................................................................	  219	  One-­‐off	  Commercial	  Services	  ..............................................................................................	  220	  Healthcare	  ...................................................................................................................................	  223	  Housing	  ........................................................................................................................................	  226	  Bed	  and	  Breakfast	  Accommodation	  .................................................................................	  229	  
Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  231	  
Chapter	  8:	  Conclusion	  .....................................................................................................	  232	  
Concluding	  Thoughts	  ..................................................................................................	  239	  
Bibliography	  .......................................................................................................................	  241	  
Table	  of	  Cases	  .....................................................................................................................	  259	  	  	   	  
	   7	  
	  
Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
	  This	   thesis	   considers	   how	   conflicts	   between	   religious	   claims	   to	   be	   free	   to	   act	   in	  discriminatory	   ways	   and	   the	   right	   not	   to	   be	   subjected	   to	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	  should	  be	  addressed	  in	  law.	  It	  uses	  cases	  and	  issues	  that	  have	  arisen	  in	   three	   jurisdictions:	   the	   US,	   Canada	   and	   England,1	  to	   demonstrate	   the	   clash	   of	  rights	  that	  can	  result	  and	  to	  compare	  how	  these	  have	  been	  dealt	  with	  by	  courts	  and	  legislatures	  in	  order	  to	  propose	  a	  method	  of	  resolution	  for	  this	  conflict.	  These	  cases	  include	   the	   refusal	   of	   some	   religious	   organisations	   to	   hire	   out	   their	   premises	   for	  same-­‐sex	   weddings,	   the	   refusal	   of	   some	   registrars	   or	   town	   clerks	   to	   perform	  marriages	  or	  give	  marriage	   licences	   to	  gay	   couples	  and	   the	   refusal	  of	   some	   faith-­‐based	  social	  welfare	  organisations	  to	  employ	  gay	  people,	  among	  many	  others.	  	  	  Such	   disputes	   raise	   important	   but	   difficult	   issues.	   They	   can	   cause	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  controversy,	   characterised	   in	   some	   contexts	   by	   bitterness	   and	   animosity,	   often	  accompanied	   by	  much	   public	   and	  media	   interest.	   American	   scholarship	   has	   long	  pointed	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   ‘culture	   wars’	   with	   deep	   and	   stark	   divisions	   between	  social	  groups,	  whereby	  ‘moral’	  issues	  become	  flashpoints	  for	  cultural	  and	  political	  disagreements.2	  In	  such	  a	  culture	  war,	  ‘the	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  go	  on	  living	  with	  [the	  other	  side]	  but	  under	  a	  new	  arrangement.	   It	   is	  somehow	  to	  root	  them	  out,	  or	  subjugate	  them,	   so	   that	   one	  does	  not	  have	   to	  deal	  with	  what	   they	   stand	   for	   anymore.’3	  The	  question	  of	   gay	   rights,	   including	  non-­‐discrimination	   laws,	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  broader	   claims	   for	   social	   recognition,	   has	   become	   part	   of	   this	   culture	   war	   and	  indeed	   perhaps	   one	   of	   its	   most	   contested	   issues.4	  An	   interesting	   aspect	   of	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  By	  England	  I	  mean	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  The	  thesis	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  Scottish	  or	  Northern	  Irish	  law	  specifically,	  but	  the	  same	  law	  may	  apply	  to	  these	  jurisdictions.	  See	  infra	  at	  p30.	  2	  Literature	   includes:	   J.	   Hunter,	   Culture	  Wars:	   The	   Struggle	   to	  Define	  America	   (New	   York:	  Basic	   Books,	   1991),	   Before	   the	   Shooting	   Begins:	   Searching	   for	   Democracy	   in	   America’s	  
Culture	  War	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1994);	   J.	  Hunter	  and	  A.	  Wolfe	  (eds),	   Is	  there	  a	  Culture	  
War?	  A	  Dialogue	  on	  Values	  and	  American	  Public	  Life	  (Washington	  D.C:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2006);	  G.	  Layman,	  The	  Great	  Divide:	  Religious	  and	  Cultural	  Conflict	  in	  American	  Party	  
Politics	   (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2001);	   J.	  Nolan	  (ed.),	  The	  American	  Culture	  
Wars:	  Current	  Contests	  and	  Future	  Prospects	   (Charlottesville:	   University	   Press	   of	   Virginia,	  1996);	  J.	  Uecker	  and	  G.	  Lucke,	  ‘Protestant	  Clergy	  and	  the	  Culture	  Wars:	  An	  Empirical	  Test	  of	  Hunter’s	  Thesis’	  (2011)	  50	  J	  Sci	  Study	  Relig	  692.	  3	  C.	   Taylor,	   ‘Living	  with	  Difference’	   in	   A.	   Allen	   and	  M.	   Regan	   (eds),	  Debating	  Democracy’s	  
Discontent:	   Essays	   on	   American	   Politics,	   Law	   and	   Public	   Philosophy	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  222.	  4	  A.	  Wolfe,	  ‘The	  Culture	  War	  that	  Never	  Came’	  in	  Hunter	  and	  Wolfe	  supra	  n.	  2	  (arguing	  that	  while	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   culture	   war	   is	   exaggerated	   on	   other	   issues,	   gay	   rights,	   and	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conflict	  is	  that	  an	  issue	  may	  become	  highly	  contested,	  not	  necessarily	  because	  of	  its	  practical	   importance	  but	  because	   it	   is	   symbolically	   significant	  or	  because	  of	   fears	  that	   it	   signals	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   slippery	   slope.	  While	   the	   culture	  war	  may	   only	  involve	  a	  small	  number	  of	  participants,	  even	  in	  the	  US,5	  and	  may	  be	  less	  evident	  in	  the	  other	  jurisdictions,6	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  the	  ‘religious	  right’	  as	  a	  powerful	  social	   and	   political	   force,7	  this	   analysis	   is	   still	   relevant.	   In	   all,	   disputes	   over	   gay	  rights	  or	   religious	  exemptions	  have	   sometimes	  become	   ‘high	   stakes’	   issues	   and	  a	  matter	  of	  identity	  politics,	  where	  cases	  and	  issues	  can	  be	  used	  ‘not	  simply,	  or	  even	  primarily,	   to	   settle	   ordinary	   individual	   disputes,	   but	   rather	   to	   pursue	   social	   and	  political	  causes’.8	  	  	  We	   should	   be	   careful	   though	   not	   to	   overly	   simplify	   or	   misinterpret	   this	  controversy.	  Evidently,	  there	  is	  no	  straightforward	  religious/secular	  divide.	  There	  is	   no	   intrinsic	   reason	   why	   religious	   belief	   should	   necessarily	   be	   discriminatory	  towards	  gay	  people.	  There	  are	  many	  devoutly	  religious	  people	  who	  see	  no	  conflict	  between	   their	   religious	   beliefs	   and	   a	   belief	   that	   same-­‐sex	   emotional/sexual	  relationships 9 	  are	   as	   morally	   worthy	   as	   heterosexual	   ones.	   Some	   organised	  religions’	   teachings	   do	   not	   argue	   there	   is	   any	  moral	   difference	   between	   the	   two,	  and	   indeed	   there	   are	   some	   such	   organisations	   particularly	   aimed	   at	   gay	   people,	  such	   as	   the	   Metropolitan	   Community	   Church. 10 	  Additionally,	   many	   religious	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  would	  not	  wish	  to	  discriminate	  in	  providing	  services	  to	  gay	  people	  for	  example,	  regardless	  of	  their	  beliefs	  or	  teaching	  on	  sexual	  morality	  and	   therefore	   do	   not	   seek	   exemptions	   from	   equality	   laws.	   The	   number	   of	   those	  who	   do	   wish	   to	   discriminate,	   that	   is	   to	   treat	   differently	   those	   who	   have	   a	   non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  particularly	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   remain	   very	   controversial.)	   See	   also	   K.	   Hull,	   Same-­‐Sex	  
Marriage:	   The	  Cultural	   Politics	   of	   Love	   and	  Law	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  2006).	  5	  M.	  Fiorina,	  Culture	  War?	  The	  Myth	  of	  a	  Polarized	  America	  (3rd	  ed,	  Boston:	  Longman,	  2010).	  6	  D.	  Rayside	  and	  C.	  Wilcox,	  ‘The	  Difference	  that	  a	  Border	  Makes:	  The	  Political	  Intersection	  of	  Sexuality	  and	  Religion	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  in	  D.	  Rayside	  and	  C.	  Wilcox	  	  (eds),	  
Faith,	  Politics	  and	  Sexual	  Diversity	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Vancouver:	  UBC	  Press,	  2011).	  7	  J.	  Malloy,	  ‘Bush/Harper?	  Canadian	  and	  American	  Evangelical	  Politics	  Compared’	  (2009)	  39	  
American	   Review	   of	   Canadian	   Studies	   352;	   A.	   Walton	   et	   al,	   Is	   there	   a	   ‘Religious	   Right’	  
Emerging	  in	  Britain?	  (London:	  Theos,	  2013).	  8	  D.	   Hoover	   and	   K.	   Den	   Dulk,	   ‘Christian	   Conservatives	   Go	   to	   Court:	   Religion	   and	   Legal	  Mobilization	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada’	  (2004)	  25	  Int	  Polit	  Sci	  Rev	  9,	  11.	  	  9	  This	   phrasing	   is	   used	   in	   N.	   Bamforth,	   ‘Legal	   Protection	   of	   Same-­‐Sex	   Partnerships	   and	  Comparative	   Constitutional	   Law’	   in	   T.	   Ginsburg	   and	   R.	   Dixon	   (eds),	   Comparative	  
Constitutional	  Law	  (Cheltenham:	  Edward	  Elgar	  Publishing,	  2011).	  10	  See	  Metropolitan	  Community	  Church	  	  ‘Who	  We	  Are’,	  Available	  at:	  http://mccchurch.org/overview/.	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	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heterosexual	   sexual	   orientation	   from	   those	   with	   a	   heterosexual	   one, 11 	  may	  therefore	  be	  small	  and	  the	  number	  of	  those	  with	  discriminatory	  views	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  decreasing.12	  Even	   so,	  numerous	   conflicts	  have	  arisen	  and	   continue	   to	  arise	  and	  can	  arouse	  strong	  feelings.	  
	  From	  a	  political	  and	  social	  perspective	  this	  is	  therefore	  a	  controversial	  and	  difficult	  issue.	   It	   also	   poses	   problems	   from	   a	   legal	   perspective.	   Both	   freedom	   of	   religion,	  which	  may	   include	   the	   freedom	   to	  express	  and	  act	  on	  discriminatory	  beliefs,	   and	  freedom	  from	  discrimination	  are	  important	  rights	  in	  a	  liberal	  society.	  Therefore,	  as	  Stychin	   puts	   it,	   ‘liberal	   democracies	   are	   faced	   with	   what	   appears	   to	   be	   an	  irreconcilable	  clash	  of	  two	  conflicting	  rights’.13	  In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  this	  point,	  more	  will	  now	  be	  said	  about	  the	  legal	  protection	  of	  both	  rights	  in	  the	  jurisdictions	  in	  question	  and	  the	  underlying	  values	  on	  which	  such	  legal	  protection	  is	  based.	  
Freedom	  of	  Religion	  	  Freedom	   of	   religion	   is	   an	   important	   legal	   right	   in	   the	   three	   jurisdictions	   and	   is	  protected	   by	   constitutional	   or	   other	   law	   in	   all.	   In	   Canada,	   s.2	   of	   the	   Charter	   of	  Fundamental	   Rights	   and	   Freedoms	   protects	   freedom	   of	   conscience	   and	   religion.	  S.15	  of	  the	  Charter	  also	  prohibits	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  religion	  and	  this	  includes	   a	   right	   of	   reasonable	   accommodation,	   unless	   this	   would	   cause	   undue	  hardship.14	  Employees	   may	   therefore	   be	   able	   to	   claim	   for	   example	   that	   their	  discriminatory	   beliefs	   and	   practices	   should	   be	   accommodated,	   perhaps	   by	   the	  rearrangement	  of	  duties.	  	  In	  the	  UK,	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR)	  protects	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  This	  gives	  an	  absolute	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  ‘thought,	  conscience	  and	  religion’	  and	  a	  limited	  right	  to	  ‘manifest	  one’s	  religion	  or	  beliefs’.	  Additionally,	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  forbids	  direct	  and	  indirect	  discrimination	  in	  employment	  and	  the	   provision	   of	   services	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   religion.	   Indirect	   discrimination	  concerns	  the	  situation	  where	  a	  ‘provision,	  criterion	  or	  practice’	  places	  people	  who	  share	   a	   protected	   characteristic	   (such	   as	   a	   religious	   belief)	   at	   a	   disadvantage	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Because	  I	  will	  use	  ‘discriminatory’	  to	  refer	  to	  any	  difference	  in	  treatment,	  this	  should	  not	  always	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  pejorative	  meaning.	  12	  D.	  Hoover	  and	  K.	  Den	  Dulk	  supra	  n.8.	  13	  C.F.	  Stychin,	  ‘Faith	  in	  the	  Future:	  Sexuality,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere’	  (2009)	  29	  
OJLS	  729,	  729.	  14	  British	  Columbia	  (Public	  Service	  Employee	  Relations	  Commission)	  v	  BCGSEU	  [1999]	  3	  SCR	  3.	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compared	   to	  others,	  and	   the	  practice	   is	  not	  a	  proportionate	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  legitimate	  aim.	  For	  example	   if	  an	  employer	  forbids	  employees	  from	  wearing	  head	  coverings	  this	  will	  disadvantage	  Muslim	  women	  more	  heavily	  than	  those	  who	  are	  not	   Muslim	   and	   the	   employer	   has	   the	   burden	   of	   demonstrating	   that	   this	  requirement	  is	  proportionate.	  While	  unlike	  Canada	  there	  is	  no	  right	  to	  reasonable	  accommodation	  per	  se,	  such	  an	  enquiry	   is	   likely	   to	   involve	  similar	  considerations	  as	   whether	   an	   employee’s	   wish	   to	   wear	   a	   headscarf	   could	   be	   reasonably	  accommodated.	   It	   can	   therefore	   be	   argued	   that	   failure	   to	   accommodate	  discriminatory	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  constitutes	  indirect	  discrimination.15	  There	  are	  however	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   concepts:	   reasonable	   accommodation	  may	  place	   a	   greater	   demand	   on	   employers	   to	   modify	   their	   practices	   than	   indirect	  discrimination,	   since	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	   accommodation.	   Furthermore,	   unlike	  reasonable	   accommodation,	   indirect	   discrimination	   is	   conceptually	   focused	   on	  ameliorating	   group	   disadvantage	   rather	   than	   protecting	   individual	   believers.	  Courts	  may	  therefore	  have	  difficulties	  in	  considering	  indirect	  discrimination	  cases	  involving	  religious	  beliefs	  that	  are	  not	  widely	  shared.16	  	  In	   the	   US,	   the	   First	   Amendment	   protects	   the	   ‘free	   exercise’	   of	   religion.	   The	  Religious	   Freedom	   Restoration	   Act	   (RFRA)	   also	   requires	   laws	   imposing	   a	  substantial	  burden	  on	  religious	  practices	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  strict	  scrutiny:	  that	  is	  that	  the	  state	  must	  demonstrate	  a	  compelling	  government	   interest	  and	  that	   the	   law	   is	  narrowly	   tailored	   to	   achieve	   this	   aim.	   Although	   in	   City	   of	   Boerne	   v	   Flores17	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  RFRA	  was	  unconstitutional	  as	  far	  as	  it	  related	  to	  state	  law,	  since	  Congress	  had	  exceeded	   its	  authority	  under	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  to	  control	  state	   law,	   it	  still	  applies	   to	   federal	  action.18	  Additionally,	  18	  states	  have	  state	  RFRAs,	  providing	  equivalent	  protection	  to	  the	  federal	  RFRA	  to	  state	  laws,	  and	  some	  state	  constitutions	  provide	  similar	  protection.	  In	  employment,	  Title	  VII	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  1964	  prohibits	  certain	  employers	  from	  discriminating	  on,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  basis	  of	  religion.19	  This	  includes	  a	  minimal	  right	  to	  reasonable	  accommodation.	  	  	  Freedom	   of	   religion	   is	   therefore	   legally	   protected	   in	   each	   of	   the	   jurisdictions	   in	  question.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  general	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  protections	  mentioned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  E.g.	  Islington	  London	  Borough	  Council	  v	  Ladele	  [2010]	  1	  WLR	  955.	  16	  See	  Mba	  v	  Merton	  LBC	  [2014]	  1	  WLR	  1501.	  17	  521	  US	  507	  (1997).	  18	  Gonzales	  v	  O	  Centro	  Espirita	  Beneficente	  Uniao	  do	  Vegetal	  546	  US	  418	  (2006).	  19	  Codified	  at	  42	  U.S.C.§	  2000e.	  It	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  religious	  organisations	  or	  to	  employers	  with	  fewer	  than	  15	  employees.	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above,	   there	   are	   also	   numerous	   laws	   protecting	   religious	   freedom	   in	   specific	  contexts,	   such	   as	   the	   exemption	   in	  English	   law	   for	   Sikhs	   from	  wearing	  hard	  hats	  when	  working	  on	   construction	   sites.20	  This	  protection	  of	   religious	   freedom	   is	  not	  merely	   a	   matter	   of	   historical	   accident,	   but	   also	   rests	   on	   important	   principles.	  Although	   this	   is	   not	   the	   main	   focus	   of	   the	   thesis,	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   why	  conflicts	   between	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   rights	   pose	   hard	  questions,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  at	   least	  partly	  understand	  why	   freedom	  of	  religion	   is	  protected.	  Since	  my	  thesis	  only	  considers	  beliefs	  that	  are	  clearly	  religious	  in	  nature,	  I	  leave	  aside	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  non-­‐religious	  beliefs	  should	  be	  treated	  and	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  religious	  belief.	  	  There	   are	   firstly	   instrumental	   justifications	   for	   freedom	   of	   religion.	   It	   has	   for	  example	   been	   argued	   that	   failure	   to	   tolerate	   religious	   practices	   will	   lead	   to	  dissatisfaction	   and	   societal	   disorder.21	  While	   there	   may	   be	   some	   truth	   to	   this	   at	  various	  historical	  moments,	   it	   is	  not	  evidently	   true	  at	  present	   in	   the	   jurisdictions	  discussed	  here.	  As	  Rivers	  points	  out,	  those	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  religious	  oppression	  tend	  to	  be	  minorities	  who	  would	  not	  have	  sufficient	  power	  to	  challenge	  the	  state.22	  This	   merely	   pragmatic	   argument	   is	   contingent	   on	   particular	   circumstances	   and	  does	   not	   provide	   justification	  when	   they	   do	   not	   apply.	   Similarly,	   arguments	   that	  religion	  encourages	  ‘civic	  virtue’	  fail	  because,	  as	  Ahdar	  and	  Leigh	  put	  it,	   ‘there	  are	  religions	   and	   religions’.23	  While	   many	   religions	   may	   promote	   widely	   accepted	  virtues	   in	  some	  respects,	   it	   could	  hardly	  be	  said	   that	  all	   religions	  will	  do	  so	  at	  all	  times.	  Furthermore,	  such	  arguments	  could	  well	  lead	  to	  the	  co-­‐option	  of	  religion	  for	  government	  purposes	  rather	  than	  religious	  freedom.	  	  A	   still	   instrumental,	   but	   less	   contingent,	   potential	   justification	   is	  Mill’s	   argument	  that	   religious	   liberty	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	   the	   discovery	   of	   truth	   than	  authoritarianism	  because	   it	  permits	  the	  pursuit	  of	  many	  competing	   lifestyles,	  and	  therefore	   allows	   others	   to	   assess	   the	   success	   of	   such	   ideas.	  While	   there	  may	   be	  some	  value	   in	   this	   idea,	   it	   fails	   to	  grasp	   the	   importance	  of	   freedom	  of	  religion	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Employment	  Act	  1989	  s.11.	  21	  Locke	  for	  example	  put	  forward	  this	  argument	  in	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration,	  reproduced	  in	  J.	  Horton	  and	  S.	  Mendus	  (eds)	  John	  Locke:	  A	  Letter	  Concerning	  Toleration	  –	  In	  
Focus	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1991).	  22	  J.	  Rivers	  ‘Justifying	  Freedom	  of	  Religion:	  Does	  Dignity	  Help?’	  in	  C.	  McCrudden	  (ed)	  
Understanding	  Human	  Dignity	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  23	  R.	  Ahdar	  and	  I.	  Leigh,	  Religious	  Freedom	  in	  the	  Liberal	  State	  2nd	  ed.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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individuals	   and	   groups	  who	   share	   particular	   beliefs,	   since	   it	   only	   focuses	   on	   the	  utilitarian	  benefits	  for	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  More	   important	   and	   persuasive	   is	   that	   religion	   may	   be	   of	   great	   importance	   to	  people’s	   lives.	  Nussbaum	  argues	   that	   it	  has	  an	   important	   role,	   ‘in	  people’s	   search	  for	   the	  ultimate	  meaning	  of	   life;	   in	   consoling	  people	   for	   the	  deaths	  of	   loved	  ones	  and	   in	   helping	   them	   face	   their	   own	   mortality;	   in	   transmitting	   moral	   values;	   in	  giving	   people	   a	   sense	   of	   community	   and	   civic	   dignity	   [and]	   in	   giving	   them	  imaginative	  and	  emotional	  fulfillment’.24	  Perhaps	  because	  of	  these	  benefits,	  religion	  can	  have	  an	   ‘identity-­‐generative’25	  nature.	   It	   can	  be	   experienced	  not	   simply	   as	   an	  activity,	  but	  as	  central	  to	  a	  person’s	  identity.	  Religion	  can	  ‘form	  a	  core	  aspect	  of	  the	  individual’s	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  purpose	  in	  the	  world.’26	  For	  some,	  religion	  is	  a	  nomos:	  ‘a	   normative	   universe’	   providing	   its	   own	   source	   of	   ‘law’,	   which	   because	   of	   its	  mixture	   of	   a	   ‘divinely	   ordained	   normative	   corpus,	   common	   ritual	   and	   strong	  interpersonal	   obligations’	   may	   be	   a	   ‘potent’	   combination. 27 	  For	   this	   reason,	  interferences	  with	  religious	  practices	  may	  be	  experienced	  as	  intensely	  burdensome	  and	  disorientating.	  	  	  Freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  also	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  value	  of	  autonomy,	  which	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  There	  is	  an	  important	  norm	  that	  all	  should	  be	  free	  to	  seek	  their	  own	  ultimate	  convictions	  without	  state	   interference	  and	  that	  they	  should	  be	  able	   to	   live	   in	   accordance	   with	   these	   convictions,	   where	   possible	   and	   where	  compatible	   with	   others’	   rights.	   This	   idea	   has	   been	   expressed	   by	   a	   number	   of	  writers	   who	   argue	   that	   seeking	   such	   convictions	   is	   a	   common	   and	   important	  human	  trait.	  Maclure	  and	  Taylor	  argue	  that,	   ‘it	  is	  in	  choosing	  values,	  hierarchizing	  or	  reconciling	  them,	  and	  in	  clarifying	  the	  projects	  based	  on	  them	  that	  human	  beings	  manage	   to	   structure	   their	   existence,	   to	   exercise	   their	   judgment,	   and	   to	   conduct	  their	   life’.28	  Nussbaum	  similarly	   argues	   that	   there	   should	  be	  a	   ‘special	   respect	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  M.	  Nussbaum,	   ‘A	  Plea	   for	  Difficulty’	   in	   S.	  Okin	   (ed),	   Is	  Multiculturalism	  Bad	  for	  Women?	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  106.	  25	  D.	   Salmons,	   ‘Toward	   a	   Fuller	   Understanding	   of	   Religious	   Exercise:	   Recognizing	   the	  Identity-­‐Generative	   and	   Expressive	  Nature	   of	   Religious	  Devotion’	   	   (1996)	   62	  U	  Chi	  L	  Rev	  1243.	  26	  C.	  Feldblum,	  ‘Moral	  Conflict	  and	  Liberty:	  Gay	  Rights	  and	  Religion’	  (2006)	  72	  Brook	  L	  Rev	  61.	  	  27	  R.	   Cover,	   ‘The	   Supreme	   Court	   1982	   Term	   Foreword:	   Nomos	   and	   Narrative’	   (1983)	   97	  
Harv	  L	  Rev	  4,	  14.	  28	  J.	  Maclure	  and	  C.	  Taylor,	  Secularism	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Conscience	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  11-­‐12.	  See	  also	  Planned	  Parenthood	  v	  Casey	  505	  US	  833,	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the	  faculty	   in	  human	  beings	  with	  which	  they	  search	  for	   life’s	  ultimate	  meaning.’	  29	  Plant	   uses	  Williams’	   ideas	   of	   ‘ground	   projects’	   to	   argue	   that	   people	   have	   ‘beliefs	  that	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  meaning	  and	  significance	  to	  their	  lives	  and	  that	  may	  indeed	  give	  them	   the	   best	   reasons	   they	   have	   for	  wanting	   to	   live	   at	   all.’30	  All	   such	   arguments	  have	  at	  the	  core	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  and	  maintain	  such	  beliefs	  is	   valuable.	   This	   does	   not	   necessarily	   rest	   on	   a	   positive	   approval	   of	   the	   beliefs	  themselves.	  As	  Waldron	  argues,	  rights	  exist	  at	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  generality31	  which	  means	  that	  ‘the	  right	  is	  not	  justified	  by	  the	  value	  of	  the	  particular	  choice	  I	  make,	  but	  rather	  by	   the	  value	  of	  being	  able	   to	   choose	   for	  myself	   in	   this	  particular	  aspect	  of	  life’.32	  	  	  Since	  religions	   typically	   lay	  down	  not	  only	  patterns	  of	  belief,	  but	  requirements	   to	  act	   in	   accordance	  with	   these	  beliefs,	   an	   interference	  with	   religious	  practices	  may	  affect	  the	  conscientious	  choices	  people	  have	  made.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  discuss	  in	  more	   detail	   whether	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   protect	   religious	   belief	   only,	   or	   whether	  conduct	  based	  on	  this	  belief	  must	  also	  be	  protected.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that,	  given	  the	  importance	   of	   this	   interest,	   while	   it	   would	   of	   course	   be	   impossible	   and	   highly	  undesirable	   to	   protect	   every	   religious	   practice,	   there	   should	   be	   consideration	   of	  whether	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   protect	   people’s	   conscientious	   actions	   and,	   further,	   that	  these	  should	  be	  permitted	  unless	  the	  state	  has	  ‘good	  reason’	  to	  intervene.	  33	  	  Acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  beliefs	   is,	  as	  Feldblum	  points	  out,	   intrinsically	  part	  of	  being	  religious	   and	   is	   ‘an	   essential	   way	   of	   bringing	   meaning	   to	   such	   beliefs’.34	  Perry	  perceives	   that	   banning	   religious	   practices	   ‘causes	   serious	   human	   suffering:	   the	  emotional	  (psychological)	  suffering…	  that	  attends	  one’s	  being	   legally	   forbidden	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  integrity…	  to	  live	  one’s	  life	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  yield	  of	  one’s	  religious	  conscience.’	  35	  As	  Childress	  argues,	  the	  infringement	  of	  conscience	  that	  results	  from	  being	   required	   to	   act	   contrary	   to	   one’s	   core	   ideals,	   ‘result[s]	   not	   only	   in	   such	  unpleasant	   feelings	   as	   guilt	   and/or	   shame	   but	   also	   in	   a	   fundamental	   loss	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  851	  (1992)	  (‘At	  the	  heart	  of	  liberty	  is	  the	  right	  to	  define	  one's	  own	  concept	  of	  existence,	  of	  meaning,	  of	  the	  universe,	  and	  of	  the	  mystery	  of	  human	  life.’).	  29	  M.	  Nussbaum,	  Liberty	  of	  Conscience	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2008)	  19.	  30	  R.	  Plant,	  ‘Religion,	  Identity	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Expression’	  (2011)	  17	  Res	  Publica	  7.	  31	  J.	  Waldron,	  ‘A	  Right	  to	  do	  Wrong’	  (1981)	  92	  Ethics	  21.	  32	  J.	  Quong,	  ‘The	  Rights	  of	  Unreasonable	  Citizens’	  (2004)	  12	  J	  Polit	  Philos	  314,	  330	  referring	  to	  Waldron	  ibid.	  33	  M.	  Perry,	  The	  Political	  Morality	  Of	  Liberal	  Democracy	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  71.	  34	  Feldblum	  supra	  n.	  26	  at	  104.	  35	  Supra	  n.	  33	  at	  70-­‐1.	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integrity,	  wholeness,	  and	  harmony	  in	  the	  self.’36	  Perry	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  is	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  try	  and	  prevent	  this	  harm	  in	  some	  cases	  because	  each	  person	  has	  inherent	   dignity	   and	   should	   be	   treated	   in	   accordance	   with	   this.	   He	   argues	   that	  causing	   unnecessary	   severe	   emotional	   suffering	   infringes	   a	   person’s	   dignity	   and	  therefore	   ‘we	  have	  conclusive	  reason	  to	  do	  what	  we	  can,	  all	   things	  considered,	   to	  prevent	   human	   beings	   from	   doing	   things	   that…	   cause	   [others]	   unwarranted	  suffering.’ 37 	  Since	   preventing	   a	   person	   from	   acting	   in	   accordance	   with	   their	  religious	   belief	  would,	   he	  maintains,	   cause	   them	   suffering,	   there	   is	   a	   prima	   facie	  reason	  to	  seek	  to	  avoid	  this.	  	  
	  Freedom	  of	  religion	  therefore	  protects	  autonomy,	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  important	  relationships,	   as	   well	   as	   being	   part	   of	   freedom	   of	   conscience.38	  Discriminatory	  beliefs,	  which,	  as	  stated	  above,	   include	  any	  belief	   that	  same-­‐sex	  emotional/sexual	  relationships	  are	  not	  as	  morally	  worthy	  as	  opposite	  sex	  ones,	  may	   form	  part	  of	  a	  matrix	  of	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  which	  constitute	  a	  person’s	  ground	  project	  and	  are	  therefore	  prima	  facie	  worthy	  of	  protection.	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  from	  what	  has	  been	  said	   above	   that	   these	   arguments	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   the	   merit	   of	   any	   particular	  religious	  belief	  or	  on	  any	  sympathy	   for	   it,	  but	  on	  a	  more	  general	  benefit	  of	  being	  able	  to	  live	  in	  accordance	  with	  one’s	  deeply	  felt	  convictions.	  	  	  However,	  because	  this	  justification	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  ultimate	  convictions,	  in	  making	  a	  claim	  for	  protection	  there	   is	  a	  minimum	  obligation	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  such	  discriminatory	  views	  are	  part	  of	  broader	  conscientious	  beliefs,	  although	  this	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	   impose	  too	  great	  a	  burden.	  While	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  a	  non-­‐religious	  justification	  could	  amount	  to	  a	  conscientious	  claim,	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases	  which	  have	  reached	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  relevant	  jurisdictions,	  a	  clear	  religious	  motivation	   is	   present,	   or	   at	   least	   there	   has	   been	   a	  mixture	   of	   religious	   and	   non-­‐religious	  motivations.39	  For	  this	  reason,	  only	  religious	  objections	  to	  equality	  claims	  will	  be	  considered.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  J.	  Childress	  ‘Appeals	  to	  Conscience’	  (1979)	  89	  Ethics	  315.	  37	  Supra	  n.	  33	  at	  19	  (emphasis	  added).	  38	  Reasons	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  collective	  religious	  freedom	  are	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  39	  E.g.	  McClintock	  v	  Department	  of	  Constitutional	  Affairs	  [2008]	  IRLR	  29	  (EAT),	  [2008]	  EWCA	  Civ	  167	  (CA).	  McClintock	  was	  a	  magistrate	  on	  the	   family	  panel	  who	  did	  not	  want	  to	  place	  children	  with	  gay	  adoptive	  couples.	  Although	  he	  was	  a	  Christian,	  the	  reasons	  he	  gave	  were	  factually	  based,	  in	  that	  he	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  this	  was	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  child.	  This	  was	   not	   accepted	   as	   a	   ‘belief’.	   This	   conclusion	   is	   criticised	   in	   A.	   Hambler,	   ‘A	   No-­‐Win	  Situation	  for	  Public	  Officials	  with	  Faith	  Convictions’	  (2010)	  12	  Ecc	  LJ	  3.	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  The	  question	  arises,	  though,	  as	  to	  whether	  there	  should	  be	  some	  substantive	  limit	  as	   to	   what	   beliefs	   should	   be	   protected.	   In	   R(Williamson)	   v	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	  
Education	  and	  Employment,40	  for	  example,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  protected	  under	  Article	  9	  ECHR,	  a	  belief,	  or	  at	   least	  a	  manifestation	  of	  that	  belief,41	  must	  be,	  among	   other	   things,	   ‘worthy	   of	   respect	   in	   a	   democratic	   society’	   and	   ‘compatible	  with	   human	   dignity’.	   Limiting	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   right	   though	   is	   potentially	  problematic.	   As	   Rix	   LJ	   argued	   in	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   judgment	   in	   Williamson,	  ‘religion	  is	  a	  controversial	  subject…	  It	  is	  in	  part	  to	  guard	  against	  such	  controversy	  that	  the	  Convention	  guarantees	  religious	  freedom’.42	  Furthermore,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  in	   Chapter	   3	   that	   there	   are	   benefits	   in	   interpreting	   rights	   broadly,	   thus	  meaning	  that	   attention	   is	   focused	   on	   justification	   for	   the	   infringement,	   rather	   than	   the	  preliminary	  question	  of	   the	  breadth	  of	   the	  right.	   In	  particular,	   the	  requirement	  to	  ‘respect’	   these	   beliefs	   may	   be	   too	   high	   a	   bar.	   Religious	   beliefs	   may	   well	   be	  unpopular,	  perceived	  as	  odd	  or	  even	  dangerous,	  and	  not	  worthy	  of	  respect	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  positive	  approval,	  but	  should	  still	  be	  tolerated	  as	  part	  of	  a	  diverse	  society.	  As	   Lord	   Walker	   remarked	   in	   Williamson,	   ‘the	   state	   should	   not	   show	   liberal	  tolerance	  only	  to	  tolerant	  liberals’.43	  	  	  The	  tests	  discussed	  in	  Williamson	  originated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  interpreting	  the	  very	  different	  question	  of	  what	  counted	  as	  ‘philosophical	  convictions’	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  Protocol	  1	  Article	  2	  ECHR,	  which	  requires	  states	  to	  respect	  the	  rights	  of	  parents	  in	  ensuring	   that	   education	   and	   teaching	   is	   in	   conformity	   with	   their	   convictions.	   In	  contrast,	   Article	   9	   case-­‐law	   disclaims	   a	   role	   for	   assessing	   the	   respectability	   of	  religious	   beliefs.	   For	   example,	   in	  Manoussakis	   v	   Greece	   the	   ECtHR	   held	   that	   ‘the	  right	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   as	   guaranteed	   under	   the	   Convention	   excludes	   any	  discretion	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   State	   to	   determine	   whether	   religious	   beliefs…	   are	  legitimate.’	  44	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   as	   Taylor	   argues,	   we	   should	   be	   able	   to	   reject	   some	   demands	   in	   a	  ‘quick	  way’,	  which	   ‘cuts	   off	   all	   conversation	   from	   the	   start’	   rather	   than	   considers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  [2005]	  2	  AC	  246.	  41	  Whether	  these	  restrictions	  applied	  only	  to	  manifestations	  of	  beliefs,	  rather	  than	  beliefs	  themselves,	  was	  not	  made	  clear,	  although	  Islington	  London	  Borough	  Council	  v	  Ladele	  [2010]	  1	  WLR	  955	  appears	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  beliefs	  per	  se.	  	  42	  R	  (Williamson)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Education	  and	  Employment	  [2003]	  QB	  1300.	  43	  Supra	  n.	  40	  at	  268.	  44	  (1995)	  23	  EHRR	  387	  at	  para	  47.	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whether	   a	   right	   can	   be	   protected	   in	   practice.45	  As	   he	   argues,	   calls	   to	   kill	   Salman	  Rushdie	   because	   of	   his	   authorship	   of	  The	  Satanic	  Verses,	   for	   example,	   have	   to	   be	  outlawed	   as	   incitement	   to	   murder.	   Although	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   criterion	   of	  ‘worthy	  of	  respect	  in	  a	  democratic	  society’	  is	  too	  restrictive,	  the	  requirement	  that	  a	  belief	   should	   be	   compatible	   with	   human	   dignity	   is	   more	   justifiable.	   Since	   the	  fundamental	   purpose	   of	   protecting	   rights,	   including	   freedom	   of	   religion,	   is	   to	  protect	  human	  dignity,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  used	  to	  undermine	  this	  purpose.	  	  	  Of	   course	   though,	   deciding	   what	   dignity	   means	   or	   requires	   is	   extremely	  contentious.	  46	  Even	  here,	   care	   should	  be	   taken	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	   right	   is	  not	   too	  narrowly	  defined	  or	  that	  references	  to	  dignity	  are	  not	  used	  as	  a	  way	  of	  ‘imposing	  a	  normative	   or	   ethical	   value	   onto	   individual	   behaviour	   or	   choice’.47	  As	   far	   as	   this	  relates	   to	   discriminatory	   beliefs,	   the	   requirement	   that	   a	   belief	   should	   be	  compatible	  with	  human	  dignity	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  individuals	  owe	  each	  other	  an	  obligation	  of	  equal	  respect,	  which	  the	  state	  owes	  to	  individuals,	  but	  entails	  merely	  an	  idea	  of	   ‘personhood’:	  that	  they	  must	  act	  as	  if	  all	  are	  worthy	  of	  inherent	  dignity	  simply	   because	   they	   are	   human.	   An	   individual	   is	   free	   to	   act	   in	   partisan	   ways.	  However,	  neither	  the	  state	  nor	  individuals	  could	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  beliefs	  that	  a	  person	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  violence,	  or	  excluded	  from	  society	  merely	  because	  of	  their	  opinions,	  because	  this	  fundamentally	  ignores	  their	  basic	  rights.	  	  	  A	  further	  requirement	  I	  will	  adopt,	  which	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  Williamson,	  but	  which	  is	   connected	   to	   the	   requirement	   of	   being	   compatible	   with	   human	   dignity	   is,	   as	  Taylor	  argues,	   that	   the	  belief	  must	  be	  compatible	  with	  reasonable	  co-­‐existence	   in	  society	   with	   those	   who	   share	   different	   views.	   This	   is	   a	   demand	   of	   reciprocity.	  Otherwise	  the	  group	  claims	  a	  right	  to	  exist	  for	  itself,	  even	  though	  others	  oppose	  it,	  but	  refuses	  to	  accept	  that	  others	  should	  have	  this	  right.	  General	  acceptance	  of	  this	  idea	   is	   required	   for	   a	   liberal	   democracy	   to	   function	   and	   thus	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	  limited	  containment	  of	  some	  views.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  requirement	  that	  groups	  must	   think	   that	   a	   state	   of	   coexistence	   is	   desirable.	   Sala	   gives	   the	   example	   of	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  who	  would,	   ideally,	   like	  everyone	   to	  be	   Jehovah’s	  Witnesses,	  but	  since	  this	   is	  not	   the	  case,	   live	  peacefully	   in	  co-­‐existence	  with	  others,	  although	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Supra	  n.3	  at	  219.	  46	  See	  e.g.	  C.	  McCrudden	  ‘Human	  Dignity	  and	  Judicial	  Interpretation	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  (2008)	  19	  EJIL	  655.	  	  47	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  S	  v	  Jordan	  6	  SA	  642	  (CC)	  (2002)	  in	  E.	  Cameron	  ‘Moral	  Citizenship	  and	  Constitutional	  Protection’	  in	  C.	  McCrudden	  (ed),	  Understanding	  Human	  Dignity,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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they	  seek	  to	  convert	  those	  around	  them.48	  This	  is	  acceptable.	  All	  that	  is	  excluded	  is	  the	  refusal	   to	  accept	   the	  situation	  of	  coexistence	  that	  does	  exist,	  given	   freedom	  of	  conscience	  and	  religion.	  	  	  These	  two	  principles,	  of	  compatibility	  with	  human	  dignity	  and	  acceptance	  of	  a	  state	  of	  reasonable	  coexistence,	  will	  exclude	  calls	  to	  violence	  as	  well	  as	  some	  hate	  speech	  and	  discrimination.49	  However,	  the	  claim	  to	  discriminate	  may	  be	  limited.	  It	  may	  be	  a	   claim	   to	   protect	   personal	   conscience,	   rather	   than	   a	   claim	   as	   to	   how	   all	   society	  should	   act.	   The	   reasoning	   behind	   it	   may	   be	   not	   that	   ‘gay	   people	   should	   never	  receive	  this	  service	  because	  they,	  or	  their	  behaviour,	  should	  not	  be	  tolerated	  in	  any	  right-­‐thinking	   society’,	   but	   rather,	   ‘I	   cannot	   in	   good	   conscience	   provide	   it,	   given	  that	   my	   beliefs	   place	   this	   obligation	   on	   me,	   although	   I	   understand	   others	   have	  different	   views’.	   As	   the	   English	   courts	   have	   suggested,	   such	   a	   claim	   is	   consistent	  with	   co-­‐existence	   and	   with	   accepting	   that	   gay	   people	   are	   worthy	   of	   inherent	  dignity.50	  	  This	  section	  has	  concluded	  that	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  an	  important	  moral	  and	  legal	  right,	   and	   that	   this	   is	   recognised	   by	   the	   legal	   systems	   of	   all	   three	   jurisdictions.	  However,	   quite	   clearly,	   it	   may	   conflict	   with	   other	   rights	   and	   with	   the	   state’s	  interests.	   This	   difficulty,	   and	   the	   attitude	   which	   the	   state	   should	   take	   to	   these	  dilemmas	  was	  well	  expressed	  by	  Sachs	  J	  in	  the	  South	  African	  Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  has	  since	  been	  quoted	  elsewhere.51	  He	  stated	  that:	  	   ‘The	  underlying	  problem	  in	  any	  open	  and	  democratic	  society	  based	  on	  human	  dignity,	   equality	   and	   freedom	   in	  which	   conscientious	   and	   religious	   freedom	  has	   to	  be	  regarded	  with	  appropriate	  seriousness,	   is	  how	   far	  such	  democracy	  can	  and	  must	  go	   in	  allowing	  members	  of	  religious	  communities	   to	  define	   for	  themselves	  which	  laws	  they	  will	  obey	  and	  which	  not…	  Believers	  cannot	  claim	  an	  automatic	  right	  to	  be	  exempted	  by	  their	  beliefs	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  land.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   the	  state	  should,	  wherever	  reasonably	  possible,	  seek	  to	  avoid	  putting	   believers	   to	   extremely	   painful	   and	   intensely	   burdensome	   choices	   of	  either	  being	  true	  to	  their	  faith	  or	  else	  respectful	  of	  the	  law.’52	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  R.	   Sala,	   ‘The	   Place	   of	   Unreasonable	   People	   Beyond	   Rawls’	   (2013)	   12	   European	   J	   of	  
Political	  Theory	  253.	  49	  See	  infra	  at	  p71-­‐3	  for	  further	  discussion.	  There	  may	  of	  course	  be	  pragmatic	  reasons	  not	  to	  prohibit	  hate	  speech.	  50	  E.g.	  McFarlane	  v	  Relate	  Avon	  Ltd	  [2010]	  EWCA	  Civ	  880	  at	  paras	  18-­‐19	  and	  Bull	  and	  Bull	  v	  
Hall	  and	  Preddy	  [2012]	  1	  WLR	  2514,	  2528.	  51	  E.g.	  Ladele	  supra	  n.15,	  Williamson	  supra	  n.40.	  52	  Christian	  Education	  South	  Africa	  v	  Minister	  of	  Education	  [2000]	  ZACC	  11	  at	  para	  35.	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Non-­‐Discrimination	  	  One	   of	   the	   rights	   which	   freedom	   of	   religion	   may	   conflict	   with	   is	   that	   of	   non-­‐discrimination,	  by	  which	  as	  stated	  above,	  I	  mean	  any	  differential	  treatment	  on	  the	  grounds	   of	   sexual	   orientation,	   outside	   the	   sphere	   of	   personal	   relationships.	   This	  too	   is	   an	   important	   right,	   again	   both	   theoretically	   and	   legally.	   Within	   all	   three	  states,	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination	   is	   at	   least	   partially	   prohibited,	   and	   the	  trend	  is	  towards	  greater	  protection.	  	  	  Challenges	   to	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination	   began	   with	   challenges	   to	   laws	  prohibiting	   ‘sodomy’.	  Decriminalisation	  took	  place	   in	  1967	   in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  in	  Scotland	  in	  1980,	  in	  1982	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,53	  and	  1969	  in	  Canada.	  	  In	  contrast,	  although	  many	  US	  states	  overturned	  such	  laws	  much	  earlier,	  and	  such	  bans	  were	  in	  any	   case	   rarely	   enforced,	   it	  was	  not	   until	   2003	   in	  Lawrence	  v	  Texas54	  that	   the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  ruled	  that	  prohibiting	   ‘sodomy’	  violated	  the	  Due	  Process	  Clause	  of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	   and	  even	   then	   there	  were	   three	  dissents.	  One	  of	   the	  dissenters,	  Scalia	  J	  argued	  that:	  	  	   ‘Many	   Americans	   do	   not	   want	   persons	   who	   openly	   engage	   in	   homosexual	  conduct	   as	   partners	   in	   their	   business,	   as	   scoutmasters	   for	   their	   children,	   as	  teachers	   in	   their	   children's	   schools,	  or	  as	  boarders	   in	   their	  home.	  They	  view	  this	   as	   protecting	   themselves	   and	   their	   families	   from	   a	   lifestyle	   that	   they	  believe	  to	  be	  immoral	  and	  destructive.’55	  	  In	  an	  earlier	  case,	  Bowers	  v	  Hardwick,	  56	  decided	  as	  recently	  as	  1986,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  upheld	  the	  prohibition.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Burger	  CJ	  stated	  that,	  ‘condemnation	  of	   those	  practices	   is	   firmly	  rooted	   in	   Judeo-­‐Christian	  moral	  and	  ethical	  standards’	  and	   quoted	   Blackstone	   who	   described	   ‘sodomy’	   as	   "the	   infamous	   crime	   against	  nature"	   as	   an	   offense	   of	   "deeper	   malignity"	   than	   rape,	   a	   heinous	   act	   "the	   very	  mention	   of	   which	   is	   a	   disgrace	   to	   human	   nature,"	   and	   "a	   crime	   not	   fit	   to	   be	  named”.57	  It	   was	   a	   prominent	   example	   of	   a	   legal	   failure	   to	   recognise	   even	   basic	  interests	   in	   privacy	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	   Although	   such	   laws	   were	   rarely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Decriminalisation	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  though	  only	  took	  place	  following	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  in	  Dudgeon	  v	  UK	  [1981]	  4	  EHRR	  149	  that	  a	  criminal	  prohibition	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  8	  ECHR.	  	  54	  539	  US	  558	  (2003).	  	  55	  Ibid.	  at	  604.	  56	  478	  US	  186	  (1986).	  57	  Ibid.	  at	  197.	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enforced,	  Bowers	  v	  Hardwick	  served	   as	   justification	   for	   discriminatory	   treatment,	  for	  example,	  to	  deny	  custody	  of	  children	  to	  gay	  parents.58	  	  	  Calls	   to	   prohibit	   discrimination	   in	   contexts	   such	   as	   employment	   have	   followed	  decriminalisation,	  and	  each	  of	  the	  jurisdictions	  has	  accepted	  this	  at	  different	  points	  and	  to	  different	  extents.	   In	  Canada,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	   in	  Egan	  v	  Canada59	  in	  1995	   that	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination	   was	   a	   prohibited	   ground	   of	  discrimination	  under	  s.15	  of	  the	  Charter,	  which	  grants	  every	  individual	  the	  right	  to	  equal	   protection	   and	   equal	   benefit	   of	   the	   law.	   It	   further	   held	   in	   1998	   in	  Vriend	  v	  
Alberta60	  that	  each	  province	  or	   territory’s	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  must	  prohibit	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  by	  private	  actors.	  There	  was	  therefore	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Charter	  as	  Vriend	  had	  no	  cause	  of	  action	  to	  challenge	  his	  dismissal	  due	  to	  his	  sexual	  orientation,	  from	  a	  private	  religious	  college.	  	  In	  Britain,	  protection	  against	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  in	  employment	  was	  introduced	  by	  the	  Employment	  Equality	  (Sexual	  Orientation)	  Regulations	  2003,	  as	  a	   result	   of	   an	   EU	   directive.61	  The	   Regulations	   were	   later	   incorporated	   into	   the	  Equality	  Act	  2010,	  which	  also	  prohibits	  discrimination	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  and	  similar	  contexts.	  Such	  statutory	  protection	  lies	  alongside	  that	  given	  by	  Article	  14	  ECHR	  which	   requires	   states	  not	   to	  discriminate	  when	  another	   right	  protected	  by	  the	  Convention	  is	  engaged,	  and	  Art	  8,	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  private	  and	  family	  life.	  The	  ECtHR	  held	  in	  Lustig-­‐Prean	  v	  UK62	  that	  it	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Convention	  for	   army	  personnel	   to	  be	  discharged	  because	  of	   their	  homosexuality.	   It	   has	   since	  extended	   such	   reasoning	   to	   hold	   that	   ‘very	   weighty	   reasons’63	  are	   required	   to	  justify	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination.	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   other	   two	   jurisdictions	   though,	   in	   the	   US	   the	   protection	   given	  against	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  is	  extremely	  limited.	  A	  bill	   known	   as	   the	   Employment	   Non-­‐Discrimination	   Act,	   which	   would	   give	  protection	  in	  private	  employment,	  although	  with	  blanket	  exemptions	  for	  religious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  W.	  Eskridge,	  Gaylaw:	  Challenging	  the	  Apartheid	  of	  the	  Closet	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  59	  [1995]	  2	  SCR	  513.	  60	  [1998]	  1	  SCR	  493.	  61	  Council	  Directive	  2000/78/EC	  of	  27	  November	  establishing	  a	  General	  Framework	  for	  Equal	  Treatment	  in	  Employment	  and	  Occupation.	  62	  (2000)	  29	  ECHR	  548.	  63	  E,g,	  L	  and	  V	  v	  Austria	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  55.	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organisations	  and	  small	  businesses,	  has	  not	  yet	  gained	  the	  necessary	  support	  to	  be	  passed,	   despite	   being	   introduced	   in	   every	   Congress	   apart	   from	   one	   since	   1994.	  However,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   is	  moving	  towards	  greater	  protection	  against	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination.	  Although	  it	  has	  not	  accepted	  that	  it	  is	  a	  ‘suspect	  ground’	  of	   discrimination,	   in	   2013	   it	   held	   that	   the	   Defense	   of	   Marriage	   Act,64 	  which	  prohibited	  the	  recognition	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  by	  the	  federal	  government,	  was	  unconstitutional. 65 Furthermore,	   since	   the	   District	   of	   Columbia	   prohibited	  discrimination	   in	   employment	   and	   ‘public	   accommodations’	   in	   1973,	   a	   growing	  number	  of	  states	  have	  prohibited	  such	  discrimination.	  Currently	  21	  states,	  plus	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia,	  and	  many	  local	  laws,	  applying	  to	  cities	  and	  counties,	  prohibit	  such	   discrimination	   in	   employment	   and	   ‘public	   accommodations’.	   In	   addition	   of	  course,	   many	   private	   employers	   require	   employees	   not	   to	   discriminate	   against	  fellow	  employees	  or	  customers.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   non-­‐discrimination	   rights,	   more	   recently,	   there	   have	   calls	   for	  marriage,	  or	  at	   least	  other	   legal	   forms	  of	  partnership,	   to	  be	  available	   to	  same-­‐sex	  couples.	   It	   currently	   only	   exists	   in	   17	   states	   plus	   the	   District	   of	   Columbia	   in	   the	  US,66 	  although	   further	   states	   have	   forms	   of	   civil	   partnership	   falling	   short	   of	  marriage,	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  comes	  into	  force	  in	  March	  2014	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  a	  date	  yet	  to	  be	  set	  in	  Scotland,67	  although	  it	  has	  existed	  in	  Canada	  since	  2003.68	  	  As	   with	   freedom	   of	   religion,	   the	   prohibition	   of	   discrimination,	   including	   sexual	  orientation	   discrimination,	   rests	   on	   important	   considerations.	   Most	   obviously,	  discrimination	   can	   deprive	   a	   person	   of	   tangible	   goods,	   such	   as	   particular	  employment,	   thus	   leading	   to	   economic	   disadvantage,	   and	   through	   that	   social	  disadvantage.	  This	  though	  is	  only	  a	  partial	  explanation	  and	  cannot	  explain	  why	  this	  right	   may	   be	   violated	   where	   there	   is	   no	   tangible	   loss	   caused	   apart	   from	   mild	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  1	  USC	  §7	  and	  28	  USC	  §1738C.	  65	  See	  United	  States	  v	  Windsor	  and	  Hollingsworth	  v	  Perry	  570	  US	  12	  (2013).	  66	  Illinois’	  law	  granting	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  does	  not	  come	  into	  effect	  until	  June	  2014.	  In	  addition,	  a	  District	  Court	  struck	  down	  the	  prohibition	  on	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Utah	  in	  
Kitchen	  v	  Herbert	  2013	  WL	  6697874	  (D.	  Utah)	  but	  the	  order	  permitting	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  stayed	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  pending	  the	  state’s	  appeal	  (Order	  in	  Pending	  Case	  13A687,	  6th	  Jan	  2014).	  	  	  67	  Civil	  partnerships	  have	  though	  existed	  throughout	  the	  UK	  though	  since	  2004.	  68	  In	  Halpern	  v	  Canada	  [2003]	  65	  OR(3d)	  161	  Ontario	  courts	  held	   that	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  a	  requirement	  of	   the	  Charter,	  which	  was	   followed	  by	  decisions	   in	  other	   jurisdictions:	  
Hendricks	  v	  Quebec	   [2002]	   RJQ	   2506;	  Barbeau	  v	  British	  Columbia	   2003	   BCCA	   251.	   It	  was	  legalised	  throughout	  the	  jurisdiction	  by	  the	  Civil	  Marriage	  Act	  S.C.	  2005,	  c.33.	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inconvenience,	  since	  a	  person	  has	  acquired	  the	  service	  from	  someone	  else.	  There	  is	  evidently	   a	  moral	   difference	   between	   being	   told	   ‘we	   don’t	   make	   wedding	   cakes’	  and	  ‘we	  won’t	  make	  a	  wedding	  cake	  for	  you’,	  even	  if	  the	  practical	  result	  is	  the	  same.	  	  	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  right	  is	  not	  necessarily	  recognised	  by	  all	  writers	  on	   the	   conflict	  between	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  and	   freedom	  of	  religion.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  whether	  there	  should	  be	  exemptions	  for	  those	   who	   refuse	   on	   religious	   grounds	   to	   provide	   services	   relating	   to	   same-­‐sex	  marriage,	   Laycock	   considers	   discrimination	   to	   involve	   a	   practical	   loss	   and	   ‘the	  insult	   of	   being	   refused	   service.’69	  Since	   he	   argues	   that	   insult	   is	   not	   a	   recognised	  interest	   under	   US	   law,	   he	   sees	   it	   as	   an	   easy	   decision	   to	   protect	   discriminatory	  refusals	   of	   service	   related	   to	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   because	   there	   is	   little	   to	   weigh	  against	   the	   infringement	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion.	   This	   though	   is	   not	   an	   adequate	  explanation	   of	   what	   is	   at	   stake.	   A	   person	   may	   of	   course	   feel	   insulted	   in	   such	   a	  situation	  but	  this	  suggests	  that	  only	  hurt	  pride	  is	  affected.	  	  Rather,	   such	   discrimination	   undermines	   a	   person’s	   sense	   of	   self	   worth	   and	  inclusion	   and	  denies	   them	  equal	   respect.	   This	   is	   partly	   because	   of	   its	   cumulative	  nature.	   Discriminatory	   beliefs	   are	   often	   widely	   shared.	   Repeated	   discrimination	  causes	   harm	   which	   ‘occasional	   idiosyncratic	   prejudice’70	  does	   not,	   even	   if	   this	   is	  entirely	  arbitrary	  and	  unjustified.	  If	  a	  person	  is	  denied	  a	  job	  because	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  company	  dislikes	  people	  with	   large	  earlobes71	  they	  of	  course	  suffer	  harm,	  but	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  isolated	  occurrence.	  However,	  repeated	  discrimination	  leads	  to	   a	   sense	   of	   exclusion:72	  a	   person	   cannot	   feel	   that	   they	   are	   an	   ‘equal	   citizen’73	  where	   they	   fear	  constant	  discrimination	   in	  performing	  everyday	   tasks,	   in	  seeking	  access	   to	   benefits	   or	   services	   given	   by	   the	   state	   or	   in	   access	   to	   social	   activities.	  Widespread	   discrimination	   may	   also	   have	   a	   stigmatic	   effect:	   if	   a	   person	   is	  discriminated	  against,	   it	  may	   lead	  others	   to	  believe	   that	   this	   is	   acceptable	   and	   to	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  why	  a	  certain	  group	  is	  stigmatised.74	  Discrimination	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  D.	   Laycock,	   ‘Afterword’,	   in	   D.	   Laycock	   et	   al.	   (eds),	   Same-­‐Sex	   Marriage	   and	   Religious	  
Liberty,	  (Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2008)	  197.	  70	  A.	   Koppelman,	   ‘Justice	   for	   Large	   Earlobes!	   A	   Comment	   on	   Richard	   Arneson’s	   “What	   is	  
Wrongful	  Discrimination?”’	  (2006)	  43	  San	  Diego	  L	  Rev	  809.	  71	  Ibid.	  72	  The	  exclusion	  may	  be	  literal	  e.g.	  from	  some	  organisations	  or	  places.	  73	  K.	   Karst,	   ‘The	   Supreme	   Court	   1976	   Term-­‐	   Foreword:	   Equal	   Citizenship	   Under	   the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment’	  (1977)	  91	  Harv	  L	  Rev	  1.	  	  74	  K.	  Karst,	   ‘Private	  Discrimination	  and	  Public	  Responsibility:	  Patterson	   in	  Context’	   [1989]	  
Sup	  Court	  Rev	  1.	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is	   thus	   mutually	   reinforcing:	   the	   more	   pervasive	   it	   is,	   the	   more	   ‘natural’	   it	   may	  seem	   and	   thus	   the	   more	   likely	   it	   is	   to	   continue	   to	   occur.	   The	   stigma	   of	  discrimination	   may	   also	   be	   internalised,	   leading	   to	   low	   self-­‐esteem	   and	   higher	  rates	  of	  mental	   illness.75	  Sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	  may	  also	   lead	   to	  other	  pressures	  because,	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  avoid	  discrimination	  or	  social	  ostracism,	  a	  non-­‐heterosexual	  orientation	  may	  be	  hidden	  in	  contexts	  such	  as	  work.	  Maintaining	  this	  may	   lead	   to	   ‘significant	   stress	   and	   disengagement’. 76 	  The	   non-­‐discrimination	  principle	   therefore	   ‘presumptively	   insists	   that	   the	   organized	   society	   treat	   each	  individual	  as	  a	  person,	  one	  who	  is	  worthy	  of	  respect,	  one	  who	  "belongs”’.77	  It	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  principle	   that	   the	  state	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	   treat	  all	   its	  citizens	  with	  ‘equal	  concern	  and	  respect’.78	  	  	  As	  private	  actors	  control	  much	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  opportunities	  in	  society	  and	  make	  up	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  public	  life,79	  this	  obligation	  means	  that	  the	  state	  must	  not	  only	  refrain	  from	  acting	  in	  discriminatory	  ways	  itself	  but	  also	  prevent	  private	  actors	  from	  acting	  in	  discriminatory	  ways	  in	  many	  contexts	  too.	  As	  Dworkin	  puts	  it,	  ‘a	   political	   and	   economic	   system	   that	   allows	   prejudice	   to	   destroy	   some	   people’s	  lives	  does	  not	  treat	  all	  members	  of	  the	  community	  with	  equal	  concern’.80	  To	  permit	  private	   discrimination	   in	   public	   and	   social	   life	   where	   there	   is	   pervasive	  discrimination	  demonstrates	  either	  an	  impermissible	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  welfare	  of	  its	  citizens	  or,	  probably	  more	  likely,	  that	  the	  discriminatory	  views	  are	  tacitly,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  explicitly,	  agreed	  with.	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  through	  the	  state’s	  choice	  not	  to	  prohibit	  it	  that	  such	  discrimination	  may	  legally	  continue.81	  	  	  Epstein,	  though,	  argues	  from	  a	  libertarian	  perspective	  that,	  while	  the	  state	  should	  not	  discriminate,	  anti-­‐discrimination	  law	  should	  not	  apply	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors.82	  He	  contends	  that	  there	  is	  a	  right	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  which	  should	  mean	  that	  people	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  See	  e.g.	  M.	  Hatzenbuehler,	  ‘How	  Does	  Sexual	  Minority	  Stigma	  “Get	  Under	  the	  Skin”?	  A	  Psychological	  Mediation	  Framework’	  [2009]	  Psychol	  Bull	  135.	  	  76	  N.	   Buddel,	   ‘Queering	   the	  Workplace’	   (2011)	   23	   Journal	  of	  Gay	  &	  Lesbian	  Social	  Services	  131,	  136.	  77	  Karst	  supra	  n.	  74	  at	  6.	  78	  R.	  Dworkin,	  Taking	  Rights	  Seriously	   (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1977).	  This	  principle	  also	  partly	  explains	  why	  freedom	  of	  religion	  must	  be	  protected.	  79	  Karst	   argues	   that	   ‘respected	   participation	   in	   the	   community's	   life	   implies	   access	   to	   all	  those	   activities	   and	   places,	   whether	   managed	   directly	   by	   government	   or	   not,	   that	   are	  normally	  open	  to	  the	  public	  at	  large.’	  Supra	  n.	  74	  at	  35.	  80	  R.	  Dworkin,	  ‘What	  is	  Equality?	  Part	  3:	  The	  Place	  of	  Liberty’	  (1987)	  73	  Iowa	  L	  Rev	  1,	  36-­‐7.	  	  81	  S.	  Gardblum,	  ‘The	  “Horizontal	  Effect”	  of	  Constitutional	  Rights’	  (2003)	  102	  Mich	  L	  Rev	  387.	  82	  R.	  Epstein,	  Forbidden	  Grounds:	  The	  Case	  Against	  Employment	  Discrimination	  Laws	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1992).	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free	  to	  contract	  their	   labour	  with	  whoever	  they	  choose	  and	  at	  whatever	  price.	  He	  also	   argues	   that	  market	   forces	  will	   ameliorate	   invidious	   discrimination,	   although	  leaving	   some	   rationally-­‐based	   discrimination, 83 	  if	   it	   is	   allowed	   to	   function	  unhindered	  by,	   for	   example,	  minimum	  wage	   laws.	  However,	   in	   this	   argument,	   he	  does	   not	   account	   for	   the	   effects	   of	   stigma	   and	   stereotyping,	   which	   lead	   to	   the	  continuation	   of	   discrimination	   even	   where	   this	   is	   not	   economically	   rational.	  Discrimination	   laws	  also	  have	   a	   cultural	   effect,	  meaning	   that	   they	  help	   to	   change	  attitudes. 84 Legally	   prohibiting	   employment	   discrimination	   does	   reduce	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  people.85	  For	  these	  reasons,	  although	  they	  are	  far	  from	  a	  perfect	  mechanism,	  the	  law	  has	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play	  in	  ending	  discrimination.	  Indeed,	   all	   three	   jurisdictions	   recognise	   that	  prohibiting	  private	  discrimination	   is	  necessary	   in	   order	   to	   combat	   discrimination	   and	   that	   the	   state	   is	   required	   to	  prohibit	  it	  in	  some	  circumstances.86	  	  	  In	   the	   three	   jurisdictions	   under	   discussion	   here,	   discrimination	   is	   usually	  addressed	   by	   the	   prohibition	   of	   discrimination	   on	   specific	   grounds,	   where	  discrimination	  is	  particularly	  prevalent.87	  It	  can	  easily	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  sexual	  orientation	  should	  be	  one	  of	  these	  grounds.	  Gay	  people	  have	  certainly	  been	  subject	  to	   appalling	   historical	   disadvantage	   in	   the	   three	   jurisdictions.88	  This	   history	   is	  important	  because	   it	  can	  continue	  to	  have	  psychological	  effects,	   leading	  to	   fear	  of	  discrimination	  or	  ill	  treatment,	  which	  can	  in	  turn	  affect	  behaviour.89	  Furthermore,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  See	  ibid.	  at	  269-­‐74,	  arguing	  that	  there	  are	  biological	  and	  other	  factors	  which	  mean	  women	  and	  men	  will	  choose	  to	  specialise	  in	  different	  jobs.	  84	  Indeed	  Epstein	  recognises	  this	  at	  302-­‐6,	  but	  argues	  that	  it	  makes	  the	  government	  intervention	  inherent	  in	  non-­‐discrimination	  laws	  even	  more	  problematic.	  85	  L.	  Barron	  et	   al,	   ‘The	  Force	  of	   Law:	  The	  Effects	  of	   Sexual	  Orientation	  Antidiscrimination	  Legislation	   on	   Interpersonal	  Discrimination	   in	   Employment’	   (2013)	   19	  Psychology,	  Public	  
Policy,	  and	  Law	  191.	  86	  Cases	  prohibiting	  discrimination	  between	  private	  parties	  include	  Ghaidan	  v	  Godin-­‐
Mendoza	  [2004]	  2	  AC	  557	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Shelley	  v	  Kraemer	  334	  US	  1	  (1948)	  in	  the	  US.	  In	  Canada	  in	  Retail	  Wholesale	  and	  Department	  Store	  Union	  Local	  580	  v	  Dolphin	  Delivery	  
Ltd	  (1985)	  33	  DLR	  (4th)	  174	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  Charter	  could	  not	  be	  asserted	  against	  a	  private	  party,	  although	  the	  common	  law	  will	  be	  developed	  consistently	  with	  ‘Charter	  values’,	  as	  in	  Ontario	  (Human	  Rights	  Commission)	  v	  Brockie	  (2002)	  22	  DLR	  (4th)	  174.	  An	  individual	  can	  also	  claim	  that	  the	  state	  has	  breached	  the	  Charter	  by	  not	  prohibiting	  discrimination:	  Vriend	  v	  Alberta.	  See	  Ahdar	  and	  Leigh,	  supra	  n.23	  at	  185-­‐192.	  87	  The	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  has	  a	  list	  of	  ‘protected	  characteristics’	  (s.4).	  The	  US	  uses	  concepts	  of	  suspect	  and	  quasi-­‐suspect	  grounds	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  discrimination	  and	  Canada	  lists	  various	  grounds	  as	  part	  of	  its	  equality	  right	  in	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  s.15,	  although	  these	  are	  not	  comprehensive.	  88	  Eskridge	  supra	  n.	  14.	  89	  G.	   Ellison	   and	   B.	   Gunstone,	   Sexual	   Orientation	   Explored:	   A	   Study	   of	   Identity,	   Attraction,	  
Behaviour	   and	   Attitudes	   in	   2009	   (Manchester:	   Equality	   and	   Human	   Rights	   Commission,	  2009)	  (Finding	  that	  fear	  of	  discrimination	  affects	  choice	  of	  career).	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although	  there	  has	  clearly	  been	  an	  overall	  trend	  towards	  greater	  protection	  against	  discrimination,	  some	  of	  this	  history	  is	  very	  recent,	  as	  demonstrated	  above.	  	  	  	  Moreover	  in	  fairly	  recent	  studies,	  high	  levels	  of	  discrimination	  are	  still	  reported	  in	  all	  three	  jurisdictions.	  In	  the	  US,	  a	  large	  meta-­‐analysis	  found	  that	  55%	  of	  gay	  people	  reported	   suffering	   verbal	   harassment	   and	   41%	   discrimination.90	  In	   England	   and	  Wales,	   according	   to	   one	   study,	   51%	   of	   gay	   men,	   61%	   of	   lesbians	   and	   25%	   of	  bisexual	   people	   felt	   that	   they	   had	   experienced	   disadvantage	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	  sexual	  orientation.91	  In	  Canada	  in	  one	  study,	  44%	  of	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians	  and	  41%	  of	  bisexuals	  reported	  some	   form	  of	  workplace	  discrimination	   in	   the	  previous	   five	  years.92	  Even	   more	   serious	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   violent	   hate	   crime	   against	   gay	  people.93	  Given	  this	  evidence,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  demonstrable	  need	  for	  the	  prohibition	  of	  discrimination.	  	  Such	  a	  prohibition	   though	   is	  not	  sufficient	   to	  challenge	   ingrained	  attitudes.	  There	  may	   therefore	   be	   a	   claim	   for	   more:	   to	   challenge	   the	   ‘cultural	   heterosexism’	   in	  society:	  the	  process	  whereby	  heterosexuality	  is	  the	  norm	  and	  other	  sexualities	  are	  marginalised,94	  by	  ‘a	  heterosexual	  assumption’95	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  invisibility	  of	  gay	  people.	  Such	  policies	  do	  not	   fall	  strictly	  under	  the	  right	   to	  non-­‐discrimination	  but	  are	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   public	   policy.	   They	   may	   include	   efforts	   to	   challenge	   the	  heterosexual	   norm	   in	   education	   and	   in	   other	   training,	   and	   for	   workplaces	   to	  promote	   inclusivity.96	  These	   types	  of	  policies	  may	  pose	  greater	  conflicts	   for	   those	  who	   have	   discriminatory	   views	   than	   the	   mere	   obligation	   not	   to	   discriminate	  because	  they	  may	  suggest	  positive	  approval	  of	  gay	  people	  and	  relationships,	  rather	  than	  a	  merely	  negative	  requirement	  not	  to	  discriminate.	  Thus	  when	  a	  School	  Board	  in	  British	  Columbia	  decided	  not	  to	  approve	  three	  books	  which	  portrayed	  same-­‐sex	  parenting	  positively,	  this	  led	  to	  serious	  disputes,	  with	  claims	  on	  the	  one	  side	  about	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  S.	   Katz-­‐Wise	   and	   J.	   Hyde,	   ‘Victimization	   Experiences	   of	   Lesbian,	   Gay,	   and	   Bisexual	  Individuals:	  A	  Meta	  Analysis’	  (2012)	  49	  J	  Sex	  Res	  142.	  91	  Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  Beyond	  Tolerance:	  Making	  Sexual	  Orientation	  A	  
Public	  Matter	  (Manchester:	  Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  2009).	  92	  Buddel	  supra	  n.76.	  93	  See	   e.g.	   G.	   Herek,	   Hate	   Crimes	   and	   Stigma-­‐Related	   Experiences	   Among	   Sexual	   Minority	  
Adults	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  Prevalence	  Estimates	  from	  a	  National	  Probability	  Sample	  (2009)	  24	  J	  Interpers	  Violence	  54.	  The	  report	  by	  Ellison	  and	  Gunstone	  (supra	  n.	  89)	  found	  that	  19%	  of	  gay	  men	  in	  the	  study	  reported	  being	  physically	  assaulted	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  their	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  94	  J.	  Schacter,	  ‘Romer	  v.	  Evans:	  Democracy’s	  Domain’	  (1997)	  50	  Vanderbilt	  Law	  Rev	  411.	  95	  G.	  Herek	   ‘Confronting	  Sexual	  Stigma	  and	  Prejudice:	  Theory	  and	  Practice’	   (2007)	  4	   J	  Soc	  
Issues	  905.	  96	  E.g.	  Paterson	  v	  Hewlett-­‐Packard	  358	  F.3d	  (9th	  Cir.,	  2004).	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the	   use	   of	   schools	   to	   ‘indoctrinate	   children’	   against	   parents’	   wishes	   and	   on	   the	  other	  the	  need	  of	  state	  schools	  ‘to	  mirror	  the	  diversity	  of	  the	  community	  and	  teach	  tolerance	   and	   understanding	   of	   difference’.97	  Eventually,	   the	   Canadian	   Supreme	  Court	   quashed	   the	   decision	   to	   refuse	   to	   approve	   the	   books.98	  These	   types	   of	  disputes	  mirrored	  arguments	   in	  England	  about	  the	  repeal	  of	   ‘Section	  28’	   that	  had	  forbidden	   local	   authorities	   to	   promote	   homosexuality	   or	   to	   ‘promote	   the	  acceptability	  of	  homosexuality	  as	  a	  pretended	  family	  relationship’	  in	  schools.	  It	  was	  finally	   repealed	   in	   2003,	   following	   an	   earlier	   attempt	  which	  was	   defeated	   in	   the	  House	  of	  Lords	  in	  2001.	  99	  	  	  	  This	  section	  has	  established	  that	  non-­‐discrimination,	   in	  particular	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  a	  vital	  right.	  However,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  the	  value	  of	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  how	  far	  non-­‐discrimination	  can	  be	  applied.	  As	  Koppelman	  puts	  it:	  	  	   ‘The	  antidiscrimination	  project	  represents	  a	  claim	  of	  enormous	  moral	  power:	  the	  demand	  that	  society	  recognize	  the	  human	  worth	  of	  all	  its	  members,	  that	  no	  person	  arbitrarily	  be	  despised	  or	  devalued.	  Yet	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  begin	  to	  try	  to	  carry	   it	   out,	   we	   find	   ourselves	   in	   collision	   with	   other	  moral	   considerations,	  equally	  powerful,	  that	  demand	  that	  the	  project	  be	  a	  limited	  one.’100	  	  
	  
Conflict	  of	  Rights	  	  So	   far	   it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	   that	  conflicts	  between	  religious	   freedom	  and	   the	  prohibition	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination	   are	   not	   merely	   likely	   but	   also	  potentially	  serious	  because	  both	  rights	  are	  important	  and	  worthy	  of	  protection,	  in	  both	   a	  moral	   and	   legal	   sense.	   This	  means	   that	   a	   choice	  must	   therefore	   be	  made	  about	  which	  right	  to	  protect,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  infringing	  another	  important	  right.	  It	  is	  this	  difficulty	  which	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  thesis.	  As	  Minow	  puts	  it,	  ‘always	  granting	  exemptions	   subverts	   the	   civil	   rights	   norms.	   Never	   granting	   them	   disparages	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97 	  D.	   Collins,	   ‘Culture,	   Religion	   and	   Curriculum:	   Lessons	   From	   the	   ‘Three	   Books’	  Controversy	   in	   Surrey,	   BC’	   (2006)	   50	   Can	   Geogr-­‐Geogr	   Can	   342;	   Chamberlain	   v	   Surrey	  
School	  District	  No.	  36	  (2002)	  221	  DLR	  (4th)	  156	  at	  para	  3.	  98	  Ibid.	  99	  Similar	  disputes	  continue	  to	  arise	  though.	  See	  N.	  Morris,	  ‘The	  Return	  of	  Section	  28:	  Schools	  and	  Academies	  Practising	  Homophobic	  Policy	  that	  was	  Outlawed	  Under	  Tony	  Blair’,	  
The	  Independent	  20	  Aug	  2013.	  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/the-­‐return-­‐of-­‐section-­‐28-­‐schools-­‐and-­‐academies-­‐practising-­‐homophobic-­‐policy-­‐that-­‐was-­‐outlawed-­‐under-­‐tony-­‐blair-­‐8775249.html	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  100	  	  A.	  Koppelman,	  Antidiscrimination	  Law	  And	  Social	  Equality	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  10.	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religious	   beliefs	   and	   coerces	   religious	   believers.’ 101 The	   choice	   is	   made	  paradoxically	   both	   harder,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   a	   straightforward	   binary	   answer	   is	  unlikely	   to	  be	   sufficient,	   and	  easier,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   there	   is	   some	  way	   to	   avoid	  stalemate	  situations,	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  claims	  may	  not	  be	  of	  identical	  strength	  in	  particular	   situations.	   Any	   method	   of	   resolving	   this	   conflict	   must	   be	   sufficiently	  nuanced	   to	   appreciate	   these	   points	   and	   should	   also	   accept	   that,	   given	   that	   both	  these	   rights	   are	  valuable,	   it	   should	   seek	   to	  protect	  both	  as	   far	   as	  possible,	   rather	  than	  protecting	  one	  entirely	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  other.	  	  Because	   these	   rights	   are	   both	   important,	   and	   because	   co-­‐existence	   in	   society	  between	  people	  who	  have	  very	  different	  views	  on	  this	  matter	  is	  required,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	   that	   the	   method	   used	   to	   resolve	   this	   conflict	   should	   promote	   respect,	  although	  of	  a	  very	  limited	  kind.	  To	  be	  clear,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  argument	  that	  gay	  people	  should	   respect,	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   approve	  of,	   those	  who	   they	  may	  see	  as	   seeking	   to	  undo	  hard	  fought	  and	  precarious	  rights,	  or	  alternatively	  that	  religious	  people	  must	  approve	   of	   those	   who	   they	   think	   are	   behaving	   in	   fundamentally	   immoral	   ways.	  Rather,	  as	  Darwall	  argues,	  it	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  respect,	  which	   he	   calls	   moral	   recognition	   respect	   and	   appraisal	   respect.	   It	   is	   the	   former	  which	   is	  of	  use	  here.	  Having	  moral	   recognition	   respect	   for	   something	  means	   that	  the	  ‘inappropriate	  consideration	  or	  weighing	  of	  that	  fact	  or	  feature	  would	  result	  in	  behavior	  that	  is	  morally	  wrong’.102	  Thus	  when	  considering	  whether	  discrimination	  should	   be	   prohibited,	   whether	   and	   how	   this	   affects	   religious	   freedom	   should	   be	  taken	   into	   account.	   Similarly	   if	   a	   religious	   organisation	  wishes	   to	   discriminate	   in	  providing	   a	   service,	   there	   must	   be	   consideration	   of	   how	   this	   affects	   those	  discriminated	  against.	  Appraisal	  respect,	  or	  a	  ‘positive	  appraisal	  of	  a	  person	  or	  his	  character-­‐related	  features,’103	  is	  not	  needed.	  
Thesis	  Perspective	  	  This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   an	   approach	   based	   on	   proportionality	   is	   the	   best	  way	   to	  resolve	   the	   conflict	   between	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	   freedom	   of	   religion,	   taking	  into	   account	   the	   considerations	   raised	   so	   far.	   Proportionality	   requires	   that	   any	  interference	  with	   the	   right	   under	   examination	  must	   have	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   and	   a	  rational	  connection	  between	  the	  aim	  and	  the	  action	  taken.	  The	  policy	  must	  be	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  M.	  Minow,	  ‘Should	  Religious	  Groups	  Be	  Exempt	  from	  Civil	  Rights	  Laws?’	  (2007)	  48	  BCL	  
Rev	  780,	  827.	  102	  S.	  Darwall,	  ‘Two	  Kinds	  of	  Respect’	  (1977)	  88	  Ethics	  36,	  41.	  103	  Ibid.	  at	  46.	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least	   restrictive	  means	  of	  achieving	   the	  aim	  and	   it	  must	  be	  proportionate	  overall.	  Under	  proportionality,	  rights	  do	  not	  operate	  in	  an	  all	  or	  nothing	  way,	  but	  can	  apply	  to	  different	  extents,	  with	   the	  purpose	  being	   to	  optimise	   the	   rights	   to	   the	  greatest	  extent	   possible.	   Proportionality	   therefore	   balances	   the	   relevant	   interests,	   rather	  than	   imposing	  a	  categorical	  rule.	   It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  has	   two	  main	  benefits	  in	  this	  context.	  	  
The	  first	  is	  that	  it	  is	  fact	  specific	  and	  nuanced.	  As	  both	  claims	  are	  legitimate,	  it	  is	  not	  appropriate	  for	  one	  automatically	  to	  win	  over	  the	  other.	  The	  proportionality	  test	  is	  not	  about	  whether	  a	  right	  generally	  is	  more	  important	  than	  another.	  It	  only	  leads	  to	  a	   judgment	   for	   a	   particular	   fact	   situation.	   It	   will	   be	   demonstrated	   that	   this	  therefore	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   actual	   dispute	   in	   issue	   and	   recognises	   that	   the	  rights	  may	  not	  have	  equal	  value	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  	  
Proportionality	  can	  also	  ‘fractionate’	  conflicts	  because	  of	  this	  fact-­‐specific	  nature.	  If	  conflicts	  over	  a	  large	  issue,	  here	  say	  the	  role	  and	  position	  of	  religion	  in	  society,	  can	  be	   broken	   down	   into	   smaller	   issues,	   progress	   is	  more	   likely.104	  This	  may	   help	   to	  reduce	   the	   ‘culture	  wars’	   problem	  where	   every	   dispute,	   on	   a	   perhaps	  minor	   and	  probably	  narrow	  issue,	  is	  taken	  as	  standing	  for	  a	  more	  fundamental	  disagreement	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  society.	  More	  intangible	  benefits	  of	  proportionality,	  such	  that	  it	  is	  a	  conciliatory	  form	  of	  reasoning,	  will	  also	  be	  demonstrated.	  	  It	   will	   be	   argued	   that	   proportionality’s	   other	   major	   benefit	   is	   that	   it	   necessarily	  requires	   justification	   when	   rights	   are	   restricted.	   This	   is	   evidently	   important	  practically	   in	   ensuring	   that	   rights	   are	   not	   unnecessarily	   restricted,	   but	   is	   also	  important	   less	   tangibly	   in	   that	   it	   treats	   each	   party	   in	   a	   dispute	   as	   worthy	   of	  justification:	  as	  people	  who	  can	  be	  expected	   to	  accept	   the	  process	  of	   justification,	  even	  though	  they	  disagree	  with	  the	  result.	  	  In	  order	  to	  make	  these	  arguments,	  this	  thesis	  uses	  a	  doctrinal	  methodology	  and	  a	  comparative	  approach,	  examining,	  as	  earlier	  indicated,	  the	  law	  in	  the	  USA,	  Canada	  and	   England	   to	   illustrate	   the	   conflict	   of	   rights.	   A	   comparative	   approach	   is	   used	  because	   the	   legal	  problem	   in	  a	  basic	   sense,	   that	  of	  whether	  and	  how	   to	   reconcile	  the	  conflicting	  rights,	  has	  arisen	   in	  all	   three	  places.	   In	  each	  the	  problem	  has	  been	  litigated,	   leading	   to	  a	   significant	  amount	  of	   case-­‐law,	   in	  addition	   to	  often	  detailed	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legislation.	   Indeed,	   some	   of	   the	   same	   situations	   have	   arisen	   in	   the	   different	  jurisdictions,	   such	   as	   the	   claim	   of	   some	   Catholic	   adoption	   agencies	   not	   to	   place	  children	   with	   gay	   couples	   or	   the	   demand	   of	   some	   owners	   of	   bed	   and	   breakfast	  accommodation	   to	   be	   permitted	   not	   to	   allow	   gay	   couples	   to	   stay,	   although	  evidently	  the	  broader	  social	  and	  legal	  context	  in	  which	  these	  disputes	  have	  arisen	  is	  not	  identical.	  	  
Although	   the	   situations	   and	   legal	   problems	   that	   have	   arisen	   are	   similar,	   these	  jurisdictions’	   legal	   tests	   and	   methods	   of	   analysis,	   and	   in	   particular	   their	   use	   of	  proportionality,	  varies.	  This	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  greater	  detail	   in	  Chapter	  3	  but	  in	  summary,	  proportionality	   is	  becoming	  a	  widely	  used	  test	   in	  English	   law,	  although	  this	  is	  a	  fairly	  recent	  introduction.	  In	  Canada,	  proportionality	  is	  an	  established	  and	  major	  concept	  in	  its	  human	  rights	  and	  discrimination	  law.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  US	  tends	  to	   use	   either	   categorical	   tests	   or	   tiered	   standards	   of	   review	   (strict	   scrutiny,	  intermediate	  scrutiny,	  rational	  basis),	  based	  on	  the	  type	  of	  interest	  at	  stake.	  It	  does	  not	  generally	  use	  proportionality,	   although	   I	  will	   consider	  whether	   these	   tests	  or	  their	  variations	  in	  fact	  implicitly	  use	  it.	  Importantly	  though,	  since	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court’s	   judgment	   in	  Employment	  Division	  v	  Smith105	  in	  1990,	  strict	  scrutiny,	  which	  requires	  a	  compelling	  government	  interest	  to	  be	  shown	  where	  a	  right	  is	  infringed,	  only	  applies	  to	  religious	  freedom	  claims	  where	  a	  law	  or	  action	  deliberately	  targets	  a	   religious	   practice	   and	   does	   not	   apply	  where	   there	   is	   ‘a	   neutral	   rule	   of	   general	  applicability’.	   The	   current	   constitutional	   protection	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   is	  therefore	  narrow,	  although	  the	  Religious	  Freedom	  Restoration	  Act	  or	  similar	  state	  laws	  may	  give	  greater	  protection.	  There	  are	  therefore	  a	  number	  of	  contrasts	  which	  can	  be	  made	  between	  these	   legal	   tests,	  and	  the	  overall	  protection	  they	  provide	  of	  both	   rights,	   and	   proportionality	   thereby	   highlighting	   the	   advantages	   and	  disadvantages	  of	  both.	  	  In	  addition	   to	  different	  uses	  of	  proportionality,	   there	  are	  other	   factors	  relating	   to	  particular	   aspects	   of	   Canada	   and	   the	   USA’s	   legal	   culture	   which	   make	   these	  jurisdictions	   of	   interest.	   Canada	   has	   a	   self-­‐perception	   as	   an	   ‘inclusive-­‐accommodative’	  106	  culture,	   seeing	   itself	   as	   upholding	   tolerance,	   pluralism	   and	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  494	  US	  872	  (1990).	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  B.	  MacDougall,	   ‘Refusing	   to	  Officiate	  at	  Same-­‐Sex	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   (2006)	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multiculturalism	   in	   its	   rights’	   analysis.107	  Interestingly	   too,	   whilst	   its	   courts	   in	  particular	  have	  been	  active	   in	   reducing	   legal	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  people108	  they	  have	  also	  sought	  to	  protect	  religious	  people,	  particularly	  those	  from	  minority	  religions,	  in	  maintaining	  their	  way	  of	  life.109	  	  
In	  the	  US,	  religious	  liberty	  has	  a	  long	  history	  and	  is	  given	  high	  priority	  as	  part	  of	  its	  constitutional	   order,	   although	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	   always	   translate	   into	  greater	   protection	   for	   religious	   rights.	   However,	   religious	   organisations	   have	   a	  great	   deal	   of	   autonomy,	   particularly	   in	   the	   field	   of	   employment,	   meaning	   that	  employees	   of	   such	   organisations	  may	   have	   only	   very	   limited	   anti-­‐discrimination	  rights.	   Although	   the	   different	   approaches	   between	  protection	   for	   individuals	   and	  for	  organisations	  are	  not	  necessarily	  inconsistent,	  these	  cases	  will	  be	  re-­‐examined	  under	   a	   proportionality	   analysis.	   Unlike	   Canada	   or	   England,	   there	   is	   also	   a	  constitutional	   separation	   of	   church	   and	   state,	   which	  may	   raise	   particular	   issues.	  More	   general	   legal-­‐cultural	   differences	   also	   create	   contrasts,	   for	   example	   ‘cause	  lawyering’110	  as	   a	   strategic	  method	   of	   legal	   and	   cultural	   change	   has	   been	  used	   in	  the	   US	   to	   a	   greater	   extent	   and	   for	   a	   longer	   period	   than	   the	   other	   jurisdictions,	  leading	  to	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  cases.	  
Whilst	   the	   jurisdictions	   therefore	   have	   similar	   basic	   understandings	   of	   the	   two	  rights,	   the	   differences	   between	   them	   create	   an	   opportunity	   to	   explore	   different	  legal	   tests	   and	  methods	   of	   analysis	   as	   they	   relate	   to	   this	   context.	   A	   comparative	  approach	   can	  demonstrate	   how	  proportionality	   can	   be	   used	   in	   jurisdictions	  with	  different	  legal	  cultures	  and	  demonstrate	  its	  benefits	  across	  such	  jurisdictions.	  This	  thesis	   does	   not	   aim	   to	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	   description	   of	   the	   law	   in	   each	  jurisdiction,	  but	  rather	  selects	  cases	  to	  give	  examples	  of	  situations	  that	  have	  arisen,	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  general	  approach	  of	  each	  jurisdiction	  and	  to	  contrast	  different	  approaches	   for	   the	   resolution	   of	   these	   issues.	   These	   jurisdictions	   are	   therefore	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  supra	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used,	  ‘with	  a	  view	  towards	  constructing	  general	  theory,	  using	  various	  legal	  sources	  as	  examples	  to	  help	  to	  refine,	  and	  to	  clarify,	  the	  analytics	  of	  a	  general	  problem.’	  111	  	  	  I	   have	   referred	   to	   the	   three	   jurisdictions	   as	   England,	   Canada	   and	   the	   USA.	   By	  England,	  as	  I	  have	  already	  indicated,	  I	  mean	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  although	  much	  law,	  such	  as	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010,	  applies	  to	  Scotland	  as	  well.	  The	  particular	  situation	  relating	  to	  Northern	  Ireland	  will	  not	  be	  discussed,	  although	  in	  some	   cases,	   such	   as	   when	   discussing	   case-­‐law	   on	   the	   ECHR,	   the	   law	   will	   be	  applicable	   throughout	   the	  UK.	   I	  will	   therefore	  refer	   to	  Britain	  or	   to	   the	  UK	  rather	  than	   to	  England	  where	   this	   is	  appropriate.	   Secondly,	  both	  Canada	  and	   the	  US	  are	  federal	   systems	   and	   therefore	   the	   relevant	   law	   is	   somewhat	   complex,	   although	  state	  law	  of	  course	  is	  subject	  to	  federal	  law.	  This	  does	  not	  though	  pose	  problems	  of	  scope	  for	  the	  thesis	  because	  I	  am	  not	  intending	  to	  provide	  a	  full	  outline	  of	  the	  law.	  However,	   as	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	   to	   examine	   situations	   where	   there	   is	   a	  clash	  of	  rights,	  it	  will	  only	  rarely	  address	  the	  situation	  in	  those	  US	  states	  that	  do	  not	  prohibit	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination.	  	  	  In	  making	  its	  argument,	  this	  thesis	  will	  refer	  to	  two	  main	  fields	  of	  scholarship.	  The	  first	   relates	   to	   proportionality,	   including	   its	   nature,	   use	   and	   benefits	   or	  disadvantages.	  While	   this	   literature	   is	   large	   and	   detailed,	   it	   does	   not	   specifically	  focus	   on	   the	   situation	   under	   discussion	   here.	   The	   second	   relates	   to	   the	   conflict	  between	   religious	   freedom	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   rights	   or	   discusses	   religious	  freedom	   more	   generally.	   While	   this	   literature	   contains	   some	   reference	   to	  proportionality	   as	   a	   method	   of	   resolving	   these	   disputes,112 	  or	   an	   analysis	   of	  proportionality	  as	  it	  has	  been	  used	  in	  particular	  circumstances,113	  none	  makes	  it,	  or	  the	   specific	   benefits	   the	   method	   of	   analysis	   brings,	   its	   focus,	   although	   there	   are	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  University	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  Discrimination	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  I.	  Leigh,	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  Denial	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  in	  I.	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  and	  J.	  Weinstein	  (eds),	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  University	  Press	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more	  general	  arguments	  for	  balancing	  approaches.114	  	  	  As	   stated	   above,	   this	   thesis	   considers	   an	   important	   theoretical	   and	   practical	  problem.	   It	   draws	   on	   a	   broad	   comparative	   understanding	   of	   these	   conflicts	   and	  how	   they	   are	   addressed	   in	   law	   to	   develop	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   for	  consideration	  of	   these	   issues	  and	  gives	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  how	  proportionality	  could	   be	   used	   in	   numerous	   cases	   and	   situations	   across	   different	   jurisdictions.	   In	  doing	   so	   it	   provides	   a	   workable	   and	   advantageous	   solution	   to	   this	   problem.	   It	  therefore	  makes	  a	  substantial	  and	  original	  contribution	  to	  the	  literature.	  	  The	   structure	   of	   the	   work	   is	   as	   follows.	   The	   thesis	   first	   provides	   a	   theoretical	  discussion	   of	   methods	   for	   resolving	   this	   conflict	   and	   then	   examines	   particular	  issues	   that	   have	   arisen	   in	   the	   three	   jurisdictions	   and	   how	   proportionality	   has	  successfully	   resolved	   them,	  or	  could	  have	  done	  so.	  To	  explain	   this	   in	  more	  detail,	  Chapter	   2	   discusses	   various	   tests	   that	   have	   been	   suggested	   or	   used	   for	   deciding	  when	   religious	   freedom	   should	   be	   protected,	   since	   it	   evidently	   cannot	   be	   an	  absolute	  right,	  but	  will	  conclude	  that	  none	  of	  these	  is	  appropriate.	  Chapter	  3	  is	  the	  theoretical	  heart	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  explains	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test,	  its	  advantages	   in	   this	   context	   and	  proposes	   it	   as	   a	  method	  of	   resolving	   these	   issues.	  Chapters	  4-­‐7	  are	  case	  study	  chapters.	  Chapter	  4	  looks	  at	  the	  situation	  of	  employees	  in	  secular	  organisations	  who	  claim	  that	  they	  face	  conflicts	  between	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  part	  of	  their	  work,	  or	  claim	  a	  right	  to	  express	  discriminatory	  views	  in	  a	  work	   related	   context.	   Chapter	   5	   discusses	   whether	   religious	   organisations,	  including	  faith-­‐based	  social	  service	  organisations,	  can	  require	  that	  their	  employees	  are	  not	  gay	  or	  in	  same-­‐sex	  relationships.	  Chapter	  6	  considers	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  religious	   organisations,	   including	   social	   service	   organisations	   and	   providers	   of	  rented	  premises,	  can	  refuse	  to	  provide	  services	  to	  gay	  people.	  Chapter	  7	  discusses	  the	  same	  issue	  with	  regard	  to	  religious	  individuals,	  particularly	  relating	  to	  services	  relating	   to	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   housing	   and	   other	  accommodation.	  
Conclusion	  	  Full	   agreement	   over	   conflicts	   between	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination	   and	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  ‘When	  Rights	  Collide:	  Liberalism,	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  and	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  of	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  (2008)	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  A.	  Koppelman,	  ‘You	  Can't	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  Love:	  Why	  Antidiscrimination	  Protections	  for	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  People	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  Have	  Religious	  Exemptions’	  (2006)	  72	  Brook	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  Rev	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freedom	   of	   religion	   is	   extremely	   unlikely	   and	   there	   is	   no	  widely	   accepted	  moral	  answer	   to	   this	   question.	   Since	   neither	   side	   is	   likely	   to	   completely	   withdraw	   its	  demands	   and	   therefore	   disputes	   and	   cases	   are	   likely	   to	   continue	   to	   arise,	   these	  conflicts	   have	   to	   be	   resolved	  by	   the	   law.	  This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   both	   freedom	  of	  religion,	  which	  can	   include	   the	   right	   to	  express	  and	  act	  on	  discriminatory	  beliefs,	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  are	  important	  rights.	  The	  aim	  is	  therefore	  to	  find	  a	  way	  for	  the	  law	  to	  protect	  both	  sides’	  rights	  as	  fully	  as	  possible,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  impact	  on	   the	   other,	   ideally	   in	   a	   way	  which	   does	   not	   exacerbate	   existing	   tensions.	   This	  thesis	  will	  argue	  that	  reliance	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  is	  a	  suitable	  way	  of	   adjudicating	   the	   balance	   between	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	  given	  these	  considerations.	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Chapter	  2:	  Potential	  Strategies	  for	  Resolving	  Conflicts	  Between	  
Religious	  and	  Other	  Claims	  	  Clearly	   there	   can	   be	   no	   absolute	   right	   to	   follow	   the	   dictates	   of	   one’s	   religious	  conscience	   since	   this	   would	   strongly	   conflict	   with	   the	   rights	   of	   others.	   Various	  ‘limiting	  strategies’1	  have	  been	  suggested	  or	  used	  as	  ways	  of	  restricting	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  thereby	  ensuring	  that	  it	  does	  not	  encroach	  too	  heavily	  on	  other	  rights.	  Four	   approaches	   will	   be	   outlined	   in	   this	   chapter,	   three	   of	   which	   rest	   on	   a	  dichotomy	   between	   different	   forms	   of	   religious	   expression.	   All	   draw	   categorical	  distinctions,	  rather	  than	  balance	  the	  various	  interests.	  It	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  while	   they	  may	  highlight	   factors	   that	  should	  be	   taken	   into	  account,	  none	  of	   these	  approaches	  is	  sufficient	  by	  itself,	  and	  that	  a	  more	  nuanced	  account	  is	  needed.	  	  	  The	  problem	  of	  determining	  how	   to	  decide	   conflicts	  between	   freedom	  of	   religion	  and	   other	   rights	   or	   the	   public	   interest,	   is	   a	   not	   a	   new	   one,	   although	   the	   specific	  context	   relating	   to	   conflicts	   between	   this	   right	   and	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	   is.	   This	   chapter	   therefore	   takes	   a	   step	   back	   from	   the	   specific	  question	   addressed	   by	   this	   thesis,	   and	   considers	   more	   generally	   what	   criteria	  should	  be	  used	  to	  decide	  when	  religious	  claims	  should	  be	  protected.	  Since	  the	  US	  has	   the	   longest	   constitutional	   protection	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   in	   the	   three	  jurisdictions	   discussed,	   and	   a	   concomitant	   history	   of	   disputes	   over	   what	   this	  constitutional	  protection	  requires,	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  will	  use	  case-­‐law	  drawn	  from	   this	   jurisdiction.	   This	   chapter	   will	   consider	   tests	   based	   on	   distinctions	  between	   conduct	   and	   belief,	   public	   and	   private,	   core	   and	   non-­‐core	   religious	  activities,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   current	   test	   in	   US	   constitutional	   law	   that	   requires	  justification	   for	   infringing	   religious	   practices	   only	   where	   a	   law	   is	   not	   neutral	   or	  generally	  applicable.	  	  
Conduct/Belief	  
	  The	  first	  possible	  test	  distinguishes	  between	  conduct	  and	  belief	  and	  provides	  that	  while	   freedom	   of	   belief	   is	   protected,	   no	   special	   protection	   should	   be	   given	   to	  conduct	  motivated	  by	  that	  belief.	  Such	  an	  analysis	  would	  therefore	  permit	  people	  to	   hold	   discriminatory	   views	   but	   would	   not	   protect	   conduct	   based	   on	   this.	   This	  understanding	   of	   religious	   freedom	   has	   deep	   historical	   roots.	   It	   is	   for	   example	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  R.	  Ahdar	  and	  I.	  Leigh,	  Religious	  Freedom	  in	  the	  Liberal	  State,	  2nd	  ed,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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crucial	   to	   Thomas	   Jefferson’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   First	   Amendment	   and	   has	  proved	  to	  be	  extremely	  influential	  in	  its	  interpretation.2	  	  Jefferson	  argued	  that:	  	  	   ‘Religion	  is	  a	  matter	  which	  lies	  solely	  between	  man	  and	  his	  God;	  that	  he	  owes	  account	  to	  none	  other	  for	  his	  faith	  or	  his	  worship:	  that	  the	  legislative	  powers	  of	  the	  government	  reach	  actions	  only,	  and	  not	  opinions.’3	  
	  Hamilton	   outlines	   how	   this	   distinction	   was	   central	   to	   the	   US	   Supreme	   Court’s	  understanding	  of	  religious	  freedom	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  centuries.4	  The	   distinction	   is	   particularly	   noticeable	   in	   the	   first	   case	   on	   the	   free	  exercise	   clause5	  decided	   by	   the	  US	   Supreme	   Court,	  Reynolds	  v	  US.6	  The	   Church	   of	  Latter	   Day	   Saints	   (Mormons)	   claimed	   there	   was	   a	   religious	   obligation	   for	   male	  members	   of	   the	   church	   to	   practice	   polygamy.	   Following	   a	   prosecution	   of	   one	  eminent	  member	   of	   the	   church,	   Reynolds,	   for	   bigamy,	   he	   claimed	   the	   law	  was	   a	  violation	   of	   his	   free	   exercise	   of	   religion.	   His	   argument	   failed.	   In	   its	   decision,	   the	  Supreme	   Court	   made	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   ‘legislative	   power	   over	   mere	  opinion’	  and	  ‘actions	  which	  were	  in	  violation	  of	  social	  duties	  or	  subversive	  of	  good	  order’.7	  It	  held	   that	   ‘laws	  are	  made	   for	   the	  government	  of	  actions,	  and	  while	   they	  cannot	  interfere	  with	  mere	  religious	  belief	  and	  opinions,	  they	  may	  with	  practices.’8	  Since	   the	  case	   involved	  religious	  conduct	  and	  did	  not	   in	   theory	  affect	   the	  right	   to	  religious	  belief,	  it	  received	  no	  protection.	  	  
The	  result	   itself	   is	  unsurprising.	  Polygamy	  was	  an	  extremely	  shocking	  practice	  by	  the	   standards	  of	   the	   time,	   considered	   to	  be	  particularly	  barbaric	   and,	   through	   its	  challenge	  to	  monogamy	  and	  to	  established	  Christian	  morality,	  perceived	  as	  capable	  of	  undermining	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  society.9	  Even	  now,	  with	  a	  far	  greater	  acceptance	  of	   different	   forms	   of	   relationships	   beyond	   heterosexual	   monogamous	   marriage,	  protecting	   the	   interests	   of	   women	   (since	   polygamy	   seems	   usually	   to	   mean	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A	  clear	  distinction	  between	  belief	  and	  action	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  approach	  taken	  in	  Art	  9	  ECHR	  which	  gives	  absolute	  protection	  to	  religious	  belief	  and	  only	  limited	  protection	  to	  the	  manifestation	  of	  this	  belief.	  3	  T.	  Jefferson,	  ‘Letter	  to	  the	  Danbury	  Baptists’	  available	  from	  Library	  of	  Congress	  website:	  http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  4	  M.	  Hamilton,	  ‘The	  Belief/	  Conduct	  Paradigm	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Free	  Exercise	  Jurisprudence’	  (1993)	  54	  Ohio	  St	  LJ	  713.	  5	  The	  First	  Amendment	  states	  ‘Congress	  shall	  make	  no	  law	  respecting	  an	  establishment	  of	  religion,	  or	  prohibiting	  the	  free	  exercise	  thereof’.	  6	  98	  US	  145	  (1879).	  7	  Ibid.	  at	  164.	  8	  Ibid.	  at	  166.	  9	  S.B.	  Gordon,	  The	  Mormon	  Question:	  Polygamy	  and	  Constitutional	  Conflict	  in	  Nineteenth	  
Century	  America	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2012).	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polygyny)	   appears	   to	   be	   sufficient	   justification	   for	   its	   prohibition.10	  The	   major	  importance	   of	   Reynolds	   though	   in	   terms	   of	   precedent	   is	   in	   its	   strictness	   of	   the	  division	  between	  belief	  and	  practices	  and	  the	  refusal	  to	  protect	  the	  latter.	  Since	  it	  is	  held	  that	  a	  government	  could	  clearly	  intervene	  if	  for	  example	  a	  religion	  claimed	  it	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  perform	  human	  sacrifices,	  it	  is	  held	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  exemptions	  from	   laws	   regulating	   religious	   practice.	   Any	   form	   of	   balancing	   the	   importance	   of	  the	   act	   to	   the	   religion	   against	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   government	   interest	   is	   not	  considered.	  	  
Mormonism	  was	  a	  new	  and	  startlingly	  different	   religion,	  and	   it	   led	   to	   real	   fear	  of	  the	   challenge	   Utah	   could	   pose	   to	   the	   federal	   government,	   if	   Mormons	   were	  permitted	   to	   control	   the	   state’s	   government.11	  Even	   so,	   the	   campaign	  against	   it	   is	  noteworthy.	  Following	  Reynolds,	  much	  greater	  infringements	  of	  rights	  were	  upheld	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  did	  not	  affect	  religious	  belief,	  but	  only	  conduct.	  The	  Edmunds	  Act	  of	  188712	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  to	  any	  person	  who	  refused	  to	  state	  that	  they	  did	   not	   practise	   polygamy	   and	   were	   not	   married	   to	   a	   polygamist.	   A	   later	   act13	  extended	  the	  meaning	  of	  polygamy	  to	  cover	  cohabitation	  and:	  
‘Disincorporated	   the	   LDS	   Church,	   transferred	   all	   its	   property	   to	   the	  government,	   and	   dissolved	   the	   company	   that	   had	   funded	   and	   overseen	   all	  Mormon	  emigration	  to	  Utah…	  Witnesses	  had	  to	  attend	  trials	  without	  benefit	  of	  subpoena.	  Federal	  officials	  could	  prosecute	  adultery	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  spouse	  filed	  a	  complaint.	  Wives	  could	  be	  called	  to	  testify	  against	  their	  husbands.’14	  	  The	   denial	   of	   the	   right	   to	   vote	  was	   challenged	   but	   upheld	   in	  Murphy	  v	  Ramsey.15	  This	   decision	   again	   rested	   on	   the	   conduct/belief	   distinction.	   It	   was	   held	   to	   be	  constitutional	  as	  the	  law	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  no	  person	  could	  be	  denied	  the	  vote	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This	  issue	  was	  reconsidered	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Reference	  re:	  Section	  293	  
of	  the	  Criminal	  Code	  of	  Canada	  2011	  BCSC	  1588,	  which	  decided	  that	  a	  prohibition	  was	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Charter.	  For	  opposing	  opinions	  on	  whether	  a	  prohibition	  would	  survive	  current	  US	  constitutional	  review	  see	  R.	  Vazquez,	  ‘The	  Practice	  of	  Polygamy:	  Legitimate	  Free	  Exercise	  of	  Religion	  or	  Legitimate	  Public	  Menace?’	  (2001)	  5	  NYU	  J	  Legis	  &	  Pub	  Pol’y	  225	  and	  K.	  Berberick,	  ‘Marrying	  into	  Heaven:	  The	  Constitutionality	  of	  Polygamy	  Bans	  Under	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause’	  (2007)	  44	  Willamette	  L	  Rev	  105.	  For	  nuanced	  accounts	  of	  polygamy	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  women	  who	  practiced	  it	  see	  A.	  Campbell,	  ‘Bountiful’s	  Plural	  Marriages’	  (2010)	  Int	  JLC	  343	  and	  ‘Bountiful	  Voices’	  (2009)	  47	  Osgoode	  Hall	  LJ	  183.	  11	  Gordon	  supra	  n.	  9.	  12	  Act	  of	  Mar	  22,	  1882,	  ch.	  47,	  §	  8,	  22	  Stat.	  30	  (1882).	  13	  Edmunds-­‐Tucker	  Act	  of	  Mar	  3,	  1887,	  ch.	  397,	  §§	  13,	  17,	  24	  Stat.	  635,	  637,	  638	  (1887).	  14	  E.	  Harmer-­‐Dionne,	  ‘Once	  a	  Peculiar	  People:	  Cognitive	  Dissonance	  and	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Mormon	  Polygamy	  as	  a	  Case	  Study	  Negating	  the	  Belief-­‐Action	  Distinction’	  (1998)	  50	  Stan	  L	  
Rev	  1295,	  1327.	  See	  also	  W.	  Eskridge,	  ‘A	  Jurisprudence	  of	  “Coming	  Out”:	  Religion,	  Homosexuality,	  and	  Collisions	  of	  Liberty	  and	  Equality	  in	  American	  Public	  Law	  (1997)	  106	  
Yale	  LJ	  2411.	  15	  114	  US	  15	  (1885).	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because	   of	   his	   opinion	   of	   polygamy	   but	   only	   because	   of	   a	   refusal	   to	   disclaim	  particular	  conduct.	   	  Similar	  cases	  held	  that	  the	  free	  exercise	  clause	  only	  protected	  against	  attempts	   ‘to	  control	   ‘the	  mental	  operations	  of	  persons’.16	  Eventually,	   faced	  with	   such	   pressure,	   the	   Mormons	   retracted	   their	   belief	   in	   religiously	   obligated	  polygamy,	  although	  there	  remain	  breakaway	  fundamentalist	  sects	  that	  still	  believe	  and	  practise	  it.	  	  
The	  action/belief	  distinction	  continued	  to	  be	  applied	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  In	  
Minersville	   School	   District	   v	   Gobitis,17	  decided	   in	   1940,	   two	   Jehovah’s	   Witness	  children	   refused	   to	   take	   a	  pledge	  of	   allegiance	   to	   the	  US	   flag	   as	   required	   in	   their	  public	  school,	  as	  they	  considered	  the	  pledge	  to	  be	  a	  form	  of	  idolatry	  and	  therefore	  contrary	  to	  their	  religious	  beliefs.	  The	  children	  were	  expelled	  for	  refusing	  to	  do	  so	  and	  challenged	  this	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  their	  free	  exercise	  rights.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  however	   considered	   this	   to	   be	   a	   case	   about	   conduct,	   where	   the	   children	   were	  seeking	  an	  exception	  from	  a	  law	  that	  their	  school	  board	  had	  considered	  necessary	  to	   maintain	   national	   unity	   and	   cohesion.	   This	   aim	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   of	  fundamental	   importance	   by	   the	   Court,	   who	   also	   held	   it	   should	   be	   deferential	   in	  assessing	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   flag	   salute	   contributed	   to	   this	   aim.	   It	   therefore	   held	  there	  need	  be	  no	  exemption.	  	  	  
Reynolds	   and	   Gobitis	   demonstrate	   the	   distinction’s	   lack	   of	   protection.	   It	   allows	  states	  to	  prohibit	  religious	  conduct	  for	  little	  or	  no	  reason,	  even	  ‘for	  no	  reason	  other	  than	   the	   legislature’s	   religious	   preference.’18	  The	   challenge	   the	   Gobitis	   children	  really	  posed	  to	  the	   interests	  of	  national	  security	  was	  extremely	  minimal,	  but	   they	  were	   still	   required	   to	  break	  a	  basic	   tenet	  of	   their	   religion.	   Such	  protection	  as	   the	  distinction	   grants	   is	   therefore	   fundamentally	   underinclusive.	   It	   is	   particularly	  problematic	   because	   a	   state	   is	   likely	   to	   use	   its	   power	   to	   act	   against	   unpopular	  minority	  groups,	   thus	  encouraging	   further	  discrimination.	  Both	   the	  Mormons	  and	  the	   Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  were	   a	   group	   that	   faced	  heavy	   social	   discrimination	   and	  indeed	  after	  Gobitis	  there	  was	  mob	  violence	  against	  the	  latter,	  which	  the	  authorities	  did	  not	  prevent.19	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Davis	  v	  Beason	  133	  US	  333,	  342	  (1890).	  17	  310	  US	  586	  (1940).	  18	  T.	  McCoy,	  ‘A	  Coherent	  Methodology	  For	  First	  Amendment	  Speech	  and	  Religion	  Clause	  Cases’	  (1995)	  48	  Vand.	  L	  Rev	  1335,	  1345.	  19	  M.	  Nussbaum,	  Liberty	  of	  Conscience	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2008)	  211-­‐2.	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The	  kind	  of	  protection	  the	  belief/conduct	  distinction	  brings	  is	  in	  protection	  against	  mind	   control	   and	   against	   deliberate	   attempts	   to	   ensure	   internal	   conformity	   to	  religious	   orthodoxy.	   This	   is	   certainly	   a	   valuable	   right20	  but	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient.	   As	  was	  said	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  acting	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  beliefs	  is	  the	  natural	  result	  of	   having	   them.	   The	   distinction	   is	   compatible	   with	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   unjustified,	  repressive	  government	  action.	  	  	  Evidently	  a	  test	  based	  on	  such	  a	  distinction	  can	  be	  oppressive	  to	  individuals.	  It	  also	  fails	   to	   protect	   religious	   pluralism	   in	   society.	   This	   is	   partly	   because,	   as	  Reynolds	  demonstrates,	  coercion	  of	  religious	  practices	  can	  change	  belief.	  Faced	  with	  extreme	  state	   pressure,	   the	   Mormons	   renounced	   their	   belief	   in	   religiously	   mandated	  polygamy.	  This	  though	  is	  potentially	  problematic.	  As	  Harmer	  Dionne	  puts	  it,	  there	  is	  a	  ‘marked	  philosophical	  difference	  between	  theological	  developments	  that	  result	  from	  organic	  evolution	  and	  those	  that	  result	  from	  massive	  persecution	  and	  forced	  cessation	   of	   social	   customs	   and	   marital	   practices.’21	  Similarly,	   while	   it	   could	   be	  argued	  that	  a	  religious	  organisation	  could	  maintain	  a	  teaching	  that	  homosexuality	  was	   immoral	   and	   be	   required	   to	   abide	   by	   anti-­‐discrimination	   norms,	   by	   for	  example	   being	   required	   to	   employ	   gay	   people	   as	   clergy,	   in	   practice	   maintaining	  such	  an	  internally	  inconsistent	  teaching	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  considerable	  pressure.	  In	   explaining	   this	   idea	   Harmer-­‐Dionne	   makes	   reference	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   cognitive	  dissonance:	   it	   is	  psychologically	  difficult	   to	  maintain	  a	   situation	  where	  belief	   and	  action	   diverge,	   leading	   to	   pressure	   to	   change	   one	   or	   the	   other.	   A	   prohibition	   on	  permitting	  discrimination	   in	  practice	  may	  well	  change	   the	  underlying	  belief	   in	   its	  necessity.22	  Even	  though	  the	  distinction	  theoretically	  protects	  freedom	  of	  belief	  and	  merely	  affects	  the	  manifestation	  of	  beliefs,	  this	  distinction	  is	  less	  clear	  in	  practice.	  	  	  A	   comparison	   of	  Gobitis	   with	   a	   case	   based	   on	   almost	   identical	   facts	   and	   decided	  only	   three	   years	   later	   demonstrates	   a	   further	   problem.	   In	   West	   Virginia	   v	  
Barnette, 23 	  Jehovah’s	   Witnesses	   challenged	   the	   West	   Virginia’s	   School	   Board	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  As	  Smith	  states,	  ‘Victims	  of	  the	  Inquisition	  might	  have	  been	  profoundly	  grateful	  for	  something	  like	  an	  effective	  right	  or	  freedom	  to	  believe	  or	  disbelieve,	  free	  from	  legal	  investigations	  and	  sanctions’:	  S.	  Smith,	  ‘Religious	  Freedom	  and	  its	  Enemies,	  or	  Why	  the	  
Smith	  Decision	  May	  Be	  a	  Greater	  Loss	  Now	  Than	  it	  Was	  Then’	  (2011)	  32	  Cardozo	  L	  Rev	  2033,	  2036.	  21	  Supra	  n.	  14	  at	  1139.	  22	  C.	  Harper	  and	  B.	  Le	  Beau,	  ‘The	  Social	  Adaptation	  of	  Marginal	  Religious	  Movements	  in	  America’	  (1993)	  54	  Sociology	  of	  Religion	  171.	  However,	  the	  process	  is	  complex	  and	  some	  pressure	  may	  actually	  strengthen	  religious	  belief.	  23	  319	  US	  624	  (1943).	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resolution	  making	  flag	  salutes	  compulsory	  in	  public	  schools.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Gobitis,	  refusing	  to	  perform	  flag	  salutes	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  belief	  or	  speech,	  rather	  than	  conduct.	  The	  challenge	  was	  successful,	  and	  Gobitis	  was	  overruled.	  The	  Court’s	  decision	  is	  a	  ringing	  endorsement	  of	   free	  speech	  and	  opinion.	   It	  held	  that,	  ‘the	   compulsory	   flag	   salute	   and	   pledge	   requires	   affirmation	   of	   a	   belief	   and	   an	  attitude	   of	  mind’24	  and	   that	   ‘compulsory	   unification	   of	   opinion	   achieves	   only	   the	  unanimity	   of	   the	   graveyard…	   If	   there	   is	   any	   fixed	   star	   in	   our	   constitutional	  constellation,	   it	   is	   that	   no	   official,	   high	   or	   petty,	   can	   prescribe	   what	   shall	   be	  orthodox	   in	   politics,	   nationalism,	   religion,	   or	   other	   matters	   of	   opinion,	   or	   force	  citizens	   to	   confess	  by	  word	  or	   act	   their	   faith	   therein.’25	  The	   issue	   in	  Barnette	   has	  therefore	   been	   transformed	   from	   one	   concerning	   an	   exemption	   from	   conduct,	  which	   has	   the	   aim	   of	   promoting	   national	   security,	   to	   one	   of	   religious	   belief.	   The	  burden	  on	  the	  right	  therefore	  appeared	  far	  more	  serious,	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  government	   interest	   correspondingly	   less.	   This	   is	   important	   because	   it	  demonstrates	   that	   ‘the	  Court	  has	  wide	   latitude	  within	   the	  paradigm	  …	   to	   identify	  the	  religious	  interest	  at	  issue	  as	  either	  belief	  or	  conduct.’26	  When	  the	  distinction	  is	  crucial,	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  the	  enquiry	  is	  worrying.	  	  	  This	  arbitrariness	  is	  partly	  because	  the	  distinction	  is	  too	  blunt,	  holding	  that	  belief	  and	  action	  are	  fully	  distinct	  concepts	  and	  furthermore	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  belief	  is	  always	  absolute.	  This	  is	  potentially	  misleading.	  Some	  beliefs	  may	  be	  considered	  incompatible	  with	  certain	  employment	  for	  example,	  even	  if	  the	  person	  claims	  they	  will	   not	   affect	   their	   behaviour	   and	   there	   is	   no	   proof	   that	   they	   have	   in	   the	   past.	  Greenawalt	   gives	   an	   example	   of	   a	   woman	   nominated	   for	   the	   head	   of	   the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  who	  believes	  that	  the	  Book	  of	  Revelation	  reveals	  that	  the	  world	  will	  end	  in	  twenty	  years,	  but	  who	  says	  this	  will	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  her	  job	  performance.27	  It	  would	  be	  entirely	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Senate	  to	  take	  this	  into	  account.	  Indeed	  in	  Hollon	  v	  Pierce28	  a	  public	  school	  bus	  supervisor	  was	  held	  to	  have	  been	   constitutionally	   dismissed	   after	   he	   co-­‐wrote	   ‘a	   religious	   tract	   expressing	  threats,	   violence	   and	   retribution,	   and	   specifically	   referring	   to	   the	   burning	   of	  schools	   and	   the	   death	   of	   school	   children’, 29 	  although	   he	   was	   found	   to	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Ibid.	  at	  633.	  25	  Ibid.	  at	  641-­‐2.	  26	  Hamilton	  supra	  n.	  4	  at	  724.	  27	  K.	  Greenawalt,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Constitution	  Volume	  1:	  Free	  Exercise	  and	  Fairness	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  44.	  28	  257	  Cal	  App	  2d	  468	  (1967).	  29	  Ibid.	  at	  479.	  
	   39	  
psychiatrically	  stable	  and	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  he	  was	  going	  to	  take	  such	  action.	  It	   may	   be	   arguable	   too	   that	   particular	   beliefs	   relating	   to	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   may	   be	   relevant	   to	   particular	   employment,	   for	   example	   as	   a	  minister	  in	  a	  gay-­‐affirming	  Christian	  church.	  	  	  The	  likely	  response	  to	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  while	  freedom	  of	  belief	  is	  an	  absolute	  right,	  there	  is	  no	  right	  to	  a	  particular	  job	  while	  holding	  a	  particular	  belief.	  However,	  the	  response	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  complex	  than	  this.	  It	  would	  presumably	  be	  regarded	  as	   an	   interference	   with	   freedom	   of	   belief,	   and	   not	   the	   more	   limited	   right	   to	  religious	  conduct,	  if	  all	  Muslims,	  for	  example,	  were	  prohibited	  from	  holding	  senior	  positions	   in	   government	   employment.	   Certainly	   in	   the	   US	   case	   of	   Torcaso	   v	  
Watkins30	  it	  was	  held	  that	  a	  requirement	  that	  candidates	  for	  public	  office	  declare	  a	  belief	   in	   the	  existence	  of	  God	  was	  an	   interference	  with	   freedom	  of	  belief.31	  Either	  then,	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘belief’	  is	  extremely	  narrow,	  and	  would	  not	  cover	  even	  broad	  discriminatory	   exclusions,	   or	   more	   complex	   decisions	   about	   the	   relevance	   of	  religious	   beliefs	   to	   employment	   are	   made	   in	   considering	   whether	   there	   is	   a	  violation	  of	  religious	  freedom.	  Therefore	  there	  cannot	  be	  a	  simple	  division	  between	  conduct	  and	  belief	  in	  this	  context.	  	  	  A	   further	  argument	  against	   such	  a	   test	   is	   that	   the	  distinction	  between	  action	  and	  belief	   is	  discriminatory	  because	   it	  embodies	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  Protestant	  belief.	  Hamilton	  argues	  that	  it	  comes	  from	  the	  distinction	  between	  faith	  and	  works	  made	  by	   St	   Paul,	   which	   was	   emphasised	   by	   reformation	   theologians	   who	   considered	  faith,	  and	  not	  works,	   to	  be	  crucial	   to	   religious	  salvation.32	  Indeed	   the	  approach	  of	  the	  US	   Supreme	  Court	   in	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   has	   been	   known	   as	   ‘Republican	  Protestantism’.33	  This	  distinction	  has	  therefore	  been	  subject	  to	  criticism	  from	  other	  religious	   traditions;	   the	   Catholic	   theologian	   John	   Courtney	   Murray	   for	   example	  criticised	  the	  distinction	  as	  ‘an	  irredeemable	  piece	  of	  sectarian	  dogmatism.’34	  	  
Merely	   because	   a	   distinction	   has	   religious	   roots	   does	   not	   automatically	   make	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  367	  US	  488	  (1961).	  31	  Although	  the	  ECtHR	  held	  a	  similar	  law	  was	  an	  interference	  with	  the	  manifestation	  of	  belief	  in	  Buscarini	  v	  San	  Marino	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  208.	  32	  Hamilton	  supra	  n.4.	  Berger	  also	  notes	  the	  connection	  between	  Protestant	  thought	  and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  belief	  rather	  than	  practice.	  See	  B.	  Berger,	  ‘Law’s	  Religion’	  in	  R.	  Moon	  (ed),	  Law	  
and	  Religious	  Pluralism	  in	  Canada	  (Vancouver:	  UBC	  Press,	  2008)	  284.	  33	  P.	  Hammond,	  D.	  Machacek	  and	  E.	  Mazur,	  Religion	  on	  Trial:	  How	  Supreme	  Courts	  Trends	  
Threaten	  Freedom	  of	  Conscience	  in	  America	  (Walnut	  Creek,	  CA:	  Altamira	  Press,	  2004).	  	  34	  J.C.	  Murray,	  ‘Law	  or	  Prepossessions’	  (1949)	  14	  Law	  and	  Contemp	  Probs	  23,	  30.	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suspect	  and	  indeed	  it	  is	  probably	  impossible	  to	  separate	  the	  influence	  of	  Protestant	  thought	   from	   Western	   thought	   more	   generally,	   particularly	   when	   referring	   to	  concepts	  of	  religious	   freedom	  and	   in	  countries	  where	  Protestantism	  has	  been	  the	  dominant	   religious	   tradition.35	  However,	   it	   is	   still	  problematic	  because	   it	   is	  easier	  for	   those	   religious	   traditions	   that	   privilege	   an	   internal	   and	   wholly	   private	  relationship	   with	   the	   divine	   above	   religious	   conduct	   to	   maintain	   this	   distinction	  between	  belief	  and	  action	  in	  favour	  of	  protecting	  the	  former	  but	  not	  the	  latter.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   this	   discriminatory	   aspect	   can	   be	   overstated.	   Given	   that	   almost	   all	  religions	   require	   some	   kind	   of	   external	   practice36	  the	   problem	   is	   more	   one	   of	  under-­‐inclusivity	  rather	  than	  discrimination.	  Conduct	  is	  the	  normal	  result	  of	  belief.	  This	   approach	   does	   though	   have	   difficulty	   in	   comprehending	   religions	  which	   are	  
essentially	  performative,	   that	   is	   that	   the	   religion	   centrally	   consists	   of	   performing	  certain	  actions,	  rather	  than	  in	  individualistic	  reflection,	  since	  it	  assumes	  that	  belief	  is	   inevitably	   more	   important	   than	   conduct.	   Stahl	   argues	   peyote	   religions,	  particularly	   the	   Native	   American	   Church,	   are	   an	   example	   of	   such	   performative	  religions.37	  Peyote	  religions	  revolve	  around	  a	  sacred	  ceremony	  involving	  the	  use	  of	  peyote,	  a	  mild	  hallucinogen,	  but	   its	   importance	  goes	  beyond	  this	  as	  peyote	   is	  also	  considered	  an	   ‘incarnation	  of	  God’.38	  Prohibiting	  peyote	  then	  is,	  he	  argues,	  akin	  to	  prohibiting	   the	   religion.	   Performative	   religions	   are	   also	   common	   in	   a	   different	  sense.	  Sociological	  research	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘lived	  religion’,	  where	  what	   is	   important	   is	  religious	   tradition	  and	  custom,	  which	  may	  be	  engaged	   in	   for	  no	   more	   reflective	   reason	   than	   habit,	   but	   which	   is	   still	   internally	   seen	   as	  fundamentally	  religious.39	  	  
The	  above	  discussion	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  distinction	  in	  providing	  a	  mechanism	  for	  deciding	  cases	  where	  religious	   freedom	  conflicts	  with	  other	  rights	  or	  the	  public	  interest.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  distinction	  is	  not	  of	  some	  use,	  but	  it	  fails	  as	  a	  full	  test	  of	  whether	  religious	  claims	  should	  be	  protected	  or	  not.	  It	  does	  not	  take	   account	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   religious	   freedom	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter,	  since	  it	  holds	  that,	  unless	  there	  is	  an	  attempt	  at	  ‘mind	  control’,	  interference	  with	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   another	   right	   or	   a	   social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  With	  the	  important	  exception	  of	  Quebec.	  36	  As	  Hamilton	  accepts	  supra	  n.4.	  	  37	  R.	  Stahl,	  ‘Carving	  Up	  Free	  Exercise:	  Dissociation	  and	  “Religion”	  in	  Supreme	  Court	  Jurisprudence’	  (2002)	  5	  Rhetoric	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  439.	  38	  Ibid.	  at	  449.	  39	  W.	  F.	  Sullivan,	  The	  Impossibility	  of	  Religious	  Freedom	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2007).	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interest	   will	   always	   be	   justified.	   Furthermore	   the	   distinction	   is	   dominated	   by	  Protestant	  concepts	  and	  subject	  to	  manipulability.	  These	  latter	  two	  disadvantages	  may	  be	  acceptable	  if	  it	  is	  only	  a	  factor	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  but	  are	  problematic	  when	  this	  is	  the	  entire	  basis	  on	  which	  a	  decision	  is	  made.	  	  
The	   next	   distinction	   suggested	   will	   be	   between	   private	   and	   public	   spheres,	   a	  division	   which	   often	   goes	   alongside	   the	   action/belief	   distinction.	   While	   the	  protection	   only	   of	   religious	   belief	   is	   no	   longer	   considered	   appropriate	   in	  US	   law,	  the	  private/public	  distinction	  continues	  to	  have	  great	  relevance	  in	  this	  jurisdiction,	  as	  will	  be	  demonstrated.	  
Public/Private	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  is	  a	  fundamental	  one	  in	  modern	  society.	  It	  is	  therefore	  unsurprising	  that	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  dividing	   line	   on	   this	   basis	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   religious	   claims.	  Under	   this	   interpretation	   of	   religious	   freedom,	   society	   is	   divided	   into	   separate	  spheres	  of	   authority.	  Religion	   is	   confined	   to	   the	  private	   sphere,	   but	   in	   return	   the	  state	   undertakes	   not	   to	   interfere	   in	   its	   domain,	   apart	   from	   in	   narrowly	   defined	  situations	  of	  abuse.	  	  
Collins	  argues	  that:	  	  
‘For	   the	   American	   Civil	   Liberties	   Union	   and	   the	   Canadian	   Civil	   Liberties	  Association	   a	   clear	   and	   inviolable	   boundary	   separates	   the	   secular	   public	  sphere	  of	  government	  and	  politics	  (including	  state	  schools),	   from	  the	  private	  sphere	  of	  conscientious	  belief	  and	  religious	  organizations	  (including	  parochial	  schools)…	  religion	  is	  thoroughly	  privatized	  so	  as	  to	  preserve	  both	  the	   liberty	  of	  individuals…	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  state	  from	  religion.’40	  	  Such	  a	  division	  permits	  religious	  organisations	  and	  individuals	  to	  apply	  their	  own	  rules,	   including	   discriminatory	   rules,	   within	   the	   private	   sphere,	   subject	   only	   to	  minimal	   protection	   for	   individual	   rights,	   but	   no	   religious	   exemptions	   are	   made	  outside	   this.	   It	   has	   particular	   resonance	   in	   the	   US	   context	   since	   it	   fits	   into	   an	  understanding	   of	   a	   strict	   separation	   of	   church	   and	   state.	   Even	   though	   neither	  Canada	   nor	   the	   UK	   shares	   the	   same	   conception	   of	   this	   separation,	   the	   division	  between	  the	  two	  spheres	  is	  still	  an	  element	  within	  public	  and	  legal	  thought	  in	  these	  jurisdictions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  D.	  Collins,	  ‘Culture,	  Religion	  and	  Curriculum:	  Lessons	  From	  the	  ‘Three	  Books’	  Controversy	  in	  Surrey,	  BC’	  (2006)	  50	  Can	  Geogr-­‐Geogr	  Can	  342,	  344.	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The	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  acceptable	  for	  citizens,	  legislators	  and	  officials	  to	  use	  religious	   beliefs	   in	   supporting	   and	   discussing	   political	   opinions	   is	   one	  which	   has	  given	   rise	   to	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   debate41	  but	  will	   not	   be	   discussed	  here.	   This	   section	  instead	  focuses	  on	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  permissible	  to	  live	  out	  religious	  beliefs	  in	  public	  life	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  religion	  should	  be	  left	  unrestricted	  in	  the	  private	  sphere,	   to	   see	  whether	   this	   creates	   an	   appropriate	  division.	   In	   the	   context	   under	  discussion	  in	  this	  thesis,	  such	  a	  distinction	  would	  mean	  that	  religious	  individuals	  or	  organisations	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   discriminate	   in	   the	   public	   sphere,	   but	   that	  discrimination	  would	  be	  permitted	  in	  all	  cases	  in	  the	  private	  sphere.	  
Reference	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Burger	  CJ’s	  declaration	  in	  Lemon	  v	  Kurtzman,42	  the	  seminal	  case	  on	  the	  Establishment	  Clause	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment,	  that	  ‘the	  constitution	  decrees	  that	  religion	  must	  be	  a	  private	  matter	  for	  the	  individual,	  the	  family,	  and	  the	  institutions	  of	  private	  choice.’43	  It	  has	  also	  been	  relevant	  to	  ECHR	  case	  law,	  which	  has	  been	  adopted	  by	  English	  courts.	  In	  
Pichon	  and	   Sajous	   v	   France44	  for	   example,	   the	   ECtHR	   held	   that	   pharmacists	   were	  not	   protected	  by	  Article	   9	  when	   they	   refused	   to	   sell	   contraceptives	  because	   they	  could	  manifest	  their	  beliefs	  outside	  the	  ‘professional	  sphere’.	  	  
The	   first	  question	  the	  distinction	  begs	   is	   in	  deciding	  what	   is	   ‘public’	  and	   ‘private’.	  The	  line	  between	  the	  two	  is	  highly	  contested.	  Collins	  argues	  that,	  ‘in	  discussions	  of	  religious	  liberty	  and	  freedom	  of	  conscience,	  the	  term	  ‘private’	   is	  typically	  equated	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  individuals,	  families,	  and	  religious	  institutions,	  while	  ‘public’	  is	  usually	  synonymous	  with	  governmental	  authority.’45	  His	  reference	  to	  the	  ‘interests	  of	  individuals’	  is	  potentially	  confusing	  though	  since	  it	  only	  refers	  to	  a	  person	  acting	  in	   an	   entirely	   individual	   capacity.	   More	   importantly,	   his	   description	   of	   public	   is	  incomplete	   as	   ‘public’	   is	   often	   used	   to	  mean	  not	   only	   the	   state	   but	   also	   anything	  that	   is	   not	   ‘private’,	   including	   the	   commercial	   sector	   and	   non-­‐religious	  employment.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  See	  e.g.	  R.	  Audi,	  Religious	  Commitment	  and	  Secular	  Reason	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  C.	  Eberle,	  Religious	  Conviction	  in	  Liberal	  Politics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  K.	  Greenawalt,	  Private	  Consciences	  and	  Public	  Reasons	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  	  42	  403	  US	  602	  (1971).	  43	  Ibid.	  at	  625.	  44	  App	  No.	  49853/99	  (2nd	  Oct	  2001).	  	  45	  Collins	  supra	  n.	  40	  at	  344.	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In	   the	   same	   way,	   though,	   as	   the	   distinction	   between	   action	   and	   belief	   can	   be	  contested	   and	   different	   constructions	   of	   the	   distinction	   be	   the	   ground	   on	   which	  such	   decisions	   are	   fought,	   so	   can	   the	   distinction	   between	   public	   and	   private	   be	  subject	   to	   the	  same	  analysis.	   In	   the	  Canadian	  case	  of	  Chamberlain	  v	  Surrey	  School	  
District	  No.	  36,46	  as	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	  a	  School	  Board	  decided	  not	  to	   approve	   three	   books	   for	   kindergarten	   children	   that	   presented	   gay	   parenting	  favourably,	   having	   taken	   into	   account	   the	   religious	   objections	   of	   some	   parents.	  These	   parents	   claimed	   the	   school	   would	   otherwise	   interfere	   with	   the	   private	  matter	  of	   teaching	  children	  about	   controversial	  moral	   issues.	  The	  opposing	  claim	  was	   made	   by	   a	   teacher,	   Chamberlain,	   who	   argued	   that	   the	   private	   matter	   of	  religious	   beliefs	   should	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   influence	   decision-­‐making	   in	   public	  schools,	   especially	   given	   that	   the	  British	   Columbia	   School	  Act	   stated	   that	   schools	  must	   be	   on	   ‘strictly	   secular	   and	   non-­‐sectarian	   principles.’47	  The	   Canadian	   courts	  favoured	  the	  latter	  interpretation	  of	  the	  public/private	  division,	  although	  the	  exact	  meaning	   of	   public	   and	   private	   differed	   with	   each	   court	   decision. 48 	  The	  public/private	  distinction	  is	  therefore	  open	  to	  the	  same	  criticism	  of	  manipulability	  and	  vagueness	  as	  the	  action/belief	  distinction.	  	  	  Even	  if	  an	  appropriate	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  can	  be	  made,	  a	  sharp	  distinction	   between	   the	   two,	  with	   its	   required	   privatisation	   of	   religious	   practice,	  gives	  rise	  to	  more	  fundamental	  problems.	  Firstly,	  the	  private	  sphere	  is	  very	  small	  in	  the	  modern	  regulatory	  welfare	  state,	  particularly	  when	  employment	   is	   taken	   into	  account.	  Even	  those	  unusual	  religions	  that	  seek	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  wider	  society,	   such	   as	   the	   Hutterites	   or	   Amish,	   will	   interact	   with	   the	   public	   sphere	   at	  some	   point,49	  and	   thus	   will	   be	   subject	   to	   state	   control.	   For	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	  religious	   adherents,	   there	   is	  much	   greater	   interaction	   and	   conflicts	   can	   arise	   far	  more	  frequently.	  	  Most	   importantly,	   once	   again	   as	  with	   the	   action/belief	   divide,	   the	   public/private	  distinction	   imposes	   a	   particular	   notion	   of	   religion	   which	   is	   at	   odds	   with	   the	  understanding	   many	   religious	   believers	   have	   of	   their	   religious	   obligations.	   As	  Stychin	   puts	   it,	   for	   many,	   ‘in	   its	   essence,	   religion	   demands	   manifestation	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  [2002]	  4	  SCR	  710.	  47	  School	  Act	  R.S.B.C.	  1996,	  c.	  412.	  48	  Collins	  supra	  n.40.	  49	  E.g.	  Alberta	  v	  Hutterian	  Brethren	  of	  Wilson	  Colony	  [2009]	  2	  SCR	  567;	  United	  States	  v	  Lee	  455	  US	  252	  (1982).	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public	  sphere	  and	  to	  require	  otherwise	  is	  to	  undermine	  its	  core.	  For	  those	  of	  faith,	  to	  demand	  privatization	  is	  in	  practice	  to	  require	  exit	  from	  the	  public	  sphere.’50	  For	  many	   religious	   believers	   it	   may	   be	   nonsensical	   to	   attempt	   to	   divide	   religious	  experience	   into	   a	  privately	   religious	   and	  publicly	  non-­‐religious	   identity	   in	   such	   a	  way.	   Religious	   beliefs	   are	   ‘interwoven’51	  into	   their	   lives.	   The	   public	   nature	   of	  religion	   is	   simply	   inherent	   in	   much	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   what	   religion	   is.	   As	   Cochran	  argues,	   ‘religion	   inclines	   toward	  a	   total	  account	  of	   life,	  organizing,	  explaining	  and	  justifying	  all	  action.	  Therefore	  religions	  often	  generate	  elaborate	  systems	  of	  belief,	  institution	   and	   ritual	   applicable	   to	   all	   areas	   of	   life.’ 52 	  Of	   course,	   this	   is	   not	  necessarily	   so	   for	   all	   believers	   and	   some	   may	   willingly	   and	   unproblematically	  divide	  their	  lives	  into	  such	  spheres.	  However,	  forcing	  a	  person	  to	  so	  divide	  her	  life	  can	   lead	   to	   the	   ‘emotional	   (psychological)	   suffering…that	   attends	   one’s	   being	  legally	   forbidden	   to	   live	   a	   life	   of	   integrity’.53	  It	   may	   appear	   to	   her	   false	   and	  hypocritical	  and	  to	  trivialise	  her	  religious	  belief.54	  Of	  course,	  in	  some	  cases	  this	  will	  clearly	  be	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  a	  greater	  harm,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  so.	  	  	  Such	  a	  person	  is	  therefore	  required	  to	  accept	  an	  ordering	  of	  the	  world	  which	  they	  do	  not	  accept,55	  with	  no	  justification	  or	  consideration	  of	  whether	  this	  is	  necessary	  to	   preserve	   other	   rights	   or	   the	   public	   interest.	   Furthermore,	   this	   division	   is	   not	  required	  for	  those	  who	  do	  not	  have	  such	  beliefs.	  Lupu	  therefore	  argues	  forthrightly	  that	  ‘separationism	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  secular	  privilege’	  and	  amounts	  to	  the	  ‘hegemony	  of	  secular	  ideology	  in	  the	  public	  square’.56	  	  	  A	  further	  argument	  against	  a	  strict	  distinction	  is	  that	  it	   is	  discriminatory	  between	  different	  religions	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  action	  and	  belief.	  It	  is	  arguable	   that	  adherents	  of	   some	  religions,	  particularly	  what	   is	   called	   in	  US	   terms	  Mainline	  Protestantism,	  are	  better	  able	  to	  separate	  their	  identities	  between	  public	  and	   private	   than	   other	   religious	   groups	   because,	   as	   explained,	   it	   holds	   private	  religious	   belief	   to	   be	   of	   central	   religious	   importance.	   Belief,	   by	   itself,	   is	   intensely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  C.F.	  Stychin,	  ‘Faith	  in	  the	  Future:	  Sexuality,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere’	  (2009)	  29	  
OJLS	  729,	  734.	  51	  L.	  Underkuffler-­‐Freund,	  ‘The	  Separation	  of	  the	  Religious	  and	  the	  Secular:	  A	  Foundational	  Challenge	  to	  First	  Amendment	  Theory’	  (1995)	  36	  Wm	  &	  Mary	  L	  Rev	  837,	  843.	  52	  C.	  Cochran,	  Religion	  in	  Public	  and	  Private	  Life	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1990)	  65.	  53	  M.	  Perry,	  The	  Political	  Morality	  of	  Liberal	  Democracy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  71.	  54	  E.g.	  S.	  Carter,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Disbelief	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1993);	  R.	  Trigg,	  Religion	  in	  
Public	  Life:	  Must	  Faith	  be	  Privatized?	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2007).	  55	  R.	  Plant,	  ‘Religion,	  Identity	  and	  Freedom	  of	  Expression’	  (2011)	  17	  Res	  Publica	  7,	  17.	  56	  I.	  Lupu,	  ‘The	  Lingering	  Death	  of	  Separationism’	  (1994)	  62	  Geo	  Wash	  L	  Rev	  230.	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private	   and	   therefore	   religions	   which	   privilege	   belief	   above	   action	   are	   likely	   to	  have	   few	   problems	   with	   keeping	   religion	   as	   a	   private	   matter.	   However,	   as	  discussed	   before,	   to	   a	   greater	   or	   lesser	   extent,	   there	   are	   communal	   and	   social	  aspects	   to	   almost	   all	   religions.	   Religion	   is	   rarely	   solely	   private	   and	   internal	   as	  religions	  typically	  lay	  down	  rules	  of	  public	  behaviour.57	  Again	  the	  problem	  is	  more	  one	  of	  underinclusivity	  than	  discrimination.	  	  So	  far	  this	  discussion	  has	  focused	  on	  religion	  and	  the	  public	  sphere.	  The	  flip	  side	  of	  this	   distinction	   is	   the	   extent	   of	   religion’s	   authority	   in	   the	   private	   sphere,	   in	  particular,	   given	   our	   context,	   to	   what	   extent	   there	   should	   be	   protection	   against	  discrimination	   in	   these	   circumstances.	   Horwitz,	   drawing	   on	   the	   approach	   of	   the	  nineteenth	   century	  Dutch	  neo-­‐Calvinist	  writer	  Kuyper,	   argues	   for	   an	   approach	  of	  ‘sphere	  sovereignty’.58	  Kuyper	  argued	  that	  various	  non-­‐state	  institutions,	  including	  churches,	  should	  largely	  be	  given	  autonomy	  within	  their	  own	  sphere,	  with	  the	  state	  responsible	   for	   ensuring	   the	   institutions	   do	   not	   encroach	   on	   each	   other’s	   sphere	  and	   for	   protecting	   against	   abuses	   of	   power.	   Such	   an	   argument	   has	   also	   been	  historically	   present	  within	   British	   thought	   too,	   notably	  within	   the	  writing	   of	   the	  British	   pluralists. 59 	  Such	   an	   argument	   would	   therefore	   permit	   discrimination	  within	   the	   private	   sphere.	   Evidently	   there	   needs	   to	   be	   some	   human	   rights	  protection:	   violent	   or	   sexual	   abuse	   for	   example	   does	   not	   become	   any	   more	  acceptable	  because	  it	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  religious	  setting	  and	  indeed	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  victims	  may	  make	  it	  more	  serious.	  However,	  laws,	  even	  those	  relating	  to	  human	  rights,	  protect	  a	  huge	  variety	  of	  state	  and	  societal	  interests	  of	  varying	  seriousness	  and	   it	   could	  be	   argued	   that	   the	   state	   should	  not	   intervene	  outside	   a	   very	   limited	  core	  of	   rights.	   	  This	   is	  because	   ‘the	  church’s	  affairs	  are	  not	   the	  state’s	  affairs’	  and	  more	   fundamentally	   because	   ‘it	   simply	   has	   no	   jurisdiction	   to	   entertain	   these	  concerns.’60	  	  	  This	  idea	  though	  is	  extremely	  problematic.	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  church	  and	  state	  affairs.	  However,	  in	  most	  cases,	  disputes	  are	  not	  directly	  between	  the	   state	   and	   a	   religious	   institution	   but	   between	   a	   religious	   institution	   and	   an	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  R.	  McCrea,	  European	  Law,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Public	  Order	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  110-­‐3.	  58	  P.	  Horwitz,	  ‘First	  Amendment	  Institutions:	  Of	  Sovereignty	  and	  Spheres’	  (2009)	  44	  Harv	  
CR-­‐CL	  L	  Rev	  79.	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  J.N.	  Figgis,	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  in	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  (London:	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  Green	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  Co,	  1913).	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  Horwitz	  supra	  n.58	  at	  121.	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individual	  who	  has	   sought	   the	   state’s	  protection	   in	   some	  way.61	  It	   is	  unclear	  why	  the	  church	  should	  always	  win	  such	  disputes.	  As	  Baer	  argues,	  rather	  than	  enhancing	  religious	   freedom,	   it	   can	   merely	   be	   a	   ‘tool	   to	   shield	   [religious]	   elites	   from	  accountability’.	  62	  The	   failure	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church,	   and	   indeed	   other	   religious	  organisations,	   in	   dealing	   with	   child	   abuse,	   acts	   as	   a	   potent	   reminder	   that	   such	  organisations	  can	  act	  in	  particularly	  abhorrent	  ways.63	  	  	  While	   it	   is	  usually	   considered	  obvious	   that	   there	   can	  be	  no	  protection	  of	   a	  direct	  claim	   to	   abuse	   children	   for	   religious	   reasons,	   since	   that	   would	   fall	   within	   the	  limited	   core	   of	   rights	   protected,64	  there	   have	   been	   some	   successful	   US	   claims	  resisting	   government	   intervention	   because	   of	   fears	   of	   interference	   in	   private	  matters.	  65	  In	  Gibson	  v	  Brewer66	  a	  priest	  allegedly	  abused	  a	  child.	  When	  his	  parents	  reported	   this	   to	   the	   diocese,	   it	   failed	   to	   take	   any	   action,	   and	   they	   then	   sued	   the	  priest	  and	  the	  diocese.	  The	  Minnesota	  Supreme	  Court	  struck	  out	  all	  claims	  relating	  to	  the	  diocese	  which	  did	  not	  rest	  on	  the	  intentional	  infliction	  of	  harm.	  It	  ruled	  that	  the	  parents	  could	  not	  sue	   for	  negligent	  supervision	  of	   the	  priest	  because	   it	   ‘could	  not	   adjudicate	   the	   reasonableness	   of	   a	   church’s	   supervision	   of	   a	   cleric’	   as	   ‘this	  would	   create	   an	   excessive	   entanglement,	   inhibit	   religion,	   and	   result	   in	   the	  endorsement	  of	  one	  model	  of	  supervision’.67	  Similarly	  the	  parents	  could	  not	  bring	  a	  claim	   for	   negligent	   hiring	   as	   the	   ‘ordination	   of	   a	   priest	   is	   a	   “quintessentially	  religious”	  matter’.68	  In	  general	   terms	   this	   is	   true:	   it	  would	  be	  a	  great	   interference	  with	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   to	   force	   a	   particular	   leader	   on	   a	   religious	  institution.69	  However,	   it	  does	  not	  demonstrate	  why	  a	  church	  should	  not	  be	   liable	  for	   the	   harm	  perpetrated	   by	   the	   priest	   they	   have	   chosen	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   as	  other	  employers.	  This	  approach	  therefore	  raises	  great	  issues	  over	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  children,	  even	  if	  actual	  abuse	  is	  prohibited.	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The	   issues	   of	   employment	   discrimination	   in	   religious	   organisations	   will	   be	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  it	  will	  be	  noted	  that	  an	  absolute	   right	   to	   dismiss	   religious	   employees	   at	   will	   cannot	   take	   into	   account	  opposing	   rights	   and	   interests,	   such	   as	   non-­‐discrimination	   or	   the	   protection	   of	  children.	  Thus	  in	  the	  US	  case	  of	  Hosanna	  Tabor	  v	  EEOC,70	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  a	  ‘called	  teacher’	  at	  a	  Lutheran	  school	  could	  not	  bring	  a	   retaliation	  claim	  after	  she	  was	  dismissed	   for	   raising	  a	  claim	   for	  disability	   discrimination,	   even	   though	   such	   discrimination	   was	   officially	  condemned	  by	   the	   religion.	  This	  was	  due	   to	   concern	  over	   state	   interference	  with	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  religion	  and	  its	  ministers.	  Since	  then,	  in	  Weiter	  v	  Kurtz71	  it	  has	  been	  held	  that	  a	  bookkeeper/receptionist	  at	  a	  Catholic	  church	  was	  prevented	  by	  the	  First	  Amendment	  from	  pursuing	  claims	  arising	  from	  her	  dismissal	  for	  telling	  parishioners	  that	  a	  priest	  who	  was	  awaiting	  trial	  for	  child	  abuse	  charges	  was	  being	  housed	   by	   the	   parish	   and	   to	   keep	   their	   children	   away	   from	   him.	   Since	   the	   case	  would	  involve	  analysis	  of	  the	  Archdiocese’s	  administrative	  decisions	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  priests	  accused	  of	  child	  abuse,	   it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  case	  could	  not	  be	  brought.	   It	   is	  highly	  questionable	  whether	  such	  a	  categorical	  rule	  really	  draws	  an	  appropriate	  balance	  between	  the	  protection	  of	  children	  and	  religious	  autonomy.	  	  Even	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   motives	   are	   benign,	   excluding	   the	   private	   sphere	   from	  scrutiny	   is	   still	   unwarranted.	   In	   Yoder	   v	   Wisconsin,72	  Amish	   parents	   wanted	   to	  remove	   their	   children	   from	   the	   last	   two	   legally	   required	  years	  of	   education	  since	  they	  believed	  it	  affected	  their	  ability	  to	  transmit	  their	  religion	  and	  distinctive	  way	  of	  life.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  the	  Amish	  were	  entitled	  to	  an	  exemption.	  Formally	  the	  case	  did	  not	  rest	  on	  a	  private/public	  distinction	  but	  rather	  on	  a	  strict	  scrutiny	  test,	   asking	   whether	   there	   was	   a	   compelling	   government	   interest	   in	   the	   policy.	  However,	   the	   private/public	   distinction	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	   case.	   The	   opposing	  interests	   considered	   are	   entirely	   public	   ones:	   the	   likelihood	   of	   the	   Amish	   to	   find	  employment,	  so	  they	  will	  not	  pose	  a	  drain	  on	  state	  resources,	  rather	  than	  ‘private’	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  children.	  Even	  if	  the	  case	  was	  correctly	  decided	  (it	   is	   certainly	   arguable	   that	   it	   failed	   to	   give	   enough	   weight	   to	   the	   interests	   of	  children	   who	   wished	   to	   leave	   the	   Amish	   community,	   as	   many	   do),	   most	   would	  baulk	  at	  the	  idea	  that	  parents	  had	  unlimited	  power	  over	  their	  children.	  If	  the	  Amish	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had	  wanted	  to	  exclude	  their	  children	  from	  more	  than	  two	  years	  of	  public	  education,	  should	  this	  have	  been	  automatically	  permissible?	  	  	  The	  most	  worrying	  exclusion	  of	  scrutiny	  of	  religious	  claims	  because	  of	  the	  division	  of	  public	  and	  private	  is	  the	  exclusion	  from	  child	  neglect	  laws	  for	  those	  who	  refuse	  medical	  care	  for	  their	  children,	  relying	  only	  on	  ‘faith	  healing’.	  No	  fewer	  than	  26	  US	  states	  have	  exemptions	  for	  felonious	  child	  neglect,	  manslaughter,	  murder	  or	  other	  offences	   if	   parents	   fail	   to	   seek	   medical	   care	   for	   their	   children	   because	   of	   their	  religious	   beliefs,73	  although	   there	   are	   no	   such	   exemptions	   in	   Canada	   and	   the	   UK.	  Such	   religious	   practices	   have	   led	   to	   children’s	   deaths	   which	   were	   easily	  preventable.	   The	   public/private	   distinction	   approach	  may	   then	   prevent	   an	   adult	  from	  wearing	  a	  religious	  headscarf	  in	  state	  employment,	  but	  permit	  such	  treatment	  of	  children.	  This	  cannot	  be	  justifiable.	  	  A	   more	   fundamental	   argument	   can	   also	   be	   made	   that	   the	   very	   distinction	  legitimates	   oppression,	   since	   by	   its	   nature	   when	   something	   is	   designated	   as	  private,	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   state	   responsibility	   but	   an	   individual	   one,	   and	   therefore	  does	  not	   require	   any	   state	   action.74	  This	   argument	   is	   particularly	   associated	  with	  feminist	  theories,75	  as	  in	  the	  famous	  slogan	  that	  ‘the	  personal	  is	  the	  political,’	  but	  is	  also	   an	   argument	   within	   critical	   legal	   theory76 	  and	   queer	   theory. 77 	  Cobb	   for	  example,	   writing	   from	   a	   queer	   theory	   perspective,	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	  overemphasis	   given	   in	   British	   political	   and	   legal	   debates	   to	   potential	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  people	  in	  bed	  and	  breakfast	  accommodation,	  when	  it	  is	  intra-­‐familial	  discrimination	  which	   is	  pervasive	  and	  most	  harmful,	   particularly	   to	  gay	   teenagers.78	  The	  particular	  harm	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   since	   this	   is	   viewed	  as	  a	  private	  problem,	  and	  not	  something	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  public	  or	  legal	  interference,	  it	  is	  rendered	  invisible	  or	  unproblematic.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Hamilton	  supra	  n.	  63	  Ch	  2.	  74	  R.	  Gavison,	  ‘Feminism	  and	  the	  Public/Private	  Distinction’	  (1992)	  45	  Stan	  L	  Rev	  1,	  19.	  75	  E.g.	  C.	  MacKinnon,	  Toward	  a	  Feminist	  Theory	  of	  the	  State	  (Harvard:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1989).	  76	  E.g.	  R.	  Mnookin,	  ‘The	  Public/Private	  Dichotomy:	  Political	  Disagreement	  and	  Academic	  Repudiation’	  (1982)	  130	  U	  Pa	  L	  Rev	  1429.	  	  77	  E.g.	  D.	  Richardson,	  ‘Locating	  Sexualities:	  From	  Here	  to	  Normality’	  (2004)	  7	  Sexualities	  391.	  78	  N.	  Cobb,	  ‘”Couple’s	  Break	  Like	  Fawlty	  Towers”:	  Dangerous	  Representations	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Oppression	  in	  an	  Era	  of	  ‘Progressive’	  Law	  Reform’	  (2009)	  18	  Social	  &	  Legal	  Studies	  333.	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This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   there	   is	   no	   distinction	   between	  public	   and	   private	   or	   that	  such	  a	  distinction	  is	  irrelevant.	  Despite	  Cobb’s	  criticism,	  discrimination	  by	  a	  parent	  against	   a	   legally	   adult	   child	   because	   she	   is	   gay	   is	   different	   from	   discrimination	  against	  gay	  people	   in	  state	  employment.	  Partly	  this	   is	  because	  of	   the	  effect	  of	  any	  state	  action.	   It	   seems	  unlikely	   that	   the	   law	  could	  promote	  parental	   love	  or	   family	  reunification,	   but	   it	   can	   ensure	   that	   discrimination	   in	   employment	   is	  met	  with	   a	  legal	  monetary	  remedy.	  	  	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  distinction	  between	  public	  and	  private	  is	  probably	  fundamental	  to	   contemporary	   Western	   society,	   even	   if	   what	   falls	   into	   each	   category	   is	   not	  objectively	   ascertainable.79 	  To	   try	   to	   abandon	   such	   a	   distinction	   is	   therefore	  probably	   impossible	   even	   it	   were	   desirable.	   Even	   those	   who	   have	   criticised	   this	  distinction	   for	   hiding	   oppression	   or	   making	   oppressive	   practices	   appear	   natural	  accept	   that	   some	   distinction	   is	   appropriate. 80 	  As	   with	   the	   belief/conduct	  distinction,	  it	  certainly	  has	  some	  value	  as	  a	  potential	  factor	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	   deciding	   claims.	   However,	   it	   fails	   as	   a	   full	   test.	   This	   is	   partly	   because	   of	   its	  vagueness	  and	  potential	  manipulability,	  but	  mainly	  because	  such	  a	  test	  would	  lead	  to	   tolerating	   oppression	   in	   the	   private	   sphere,	   while	   simultaneously	  underprotecting	  religious	  claims	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  	  
Core/Periphery	  	  The	  third	  dichotomy	  that	  is	  sometimes	  proposed	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  far	  to	  protect	  religious	  freedom	  is	  to	  distinguish	  between	  core	  religious	  activities,	  such	   as	   religious	   worship,	   and	   peripheral	   activities,	   such	   as	   demonstrations	   of	  public	  belief,	  whereby	  only	  core	  activities	  are	  protected.	  This	  argument	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Buxton	  LJ’s	  judgment	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  R(Williamson)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  
for	  Education	  and	  Employment.81	  The	  case	  involved	  parents	  and	  teachers	  at	  private	  Christian	   schools	   who	   claimed	   that	   corporal	   punishment	   was	   integral	   to	   their	  religious	  doctrines	  on	  the	  upbringing	  of	  children	  and	  that	  this	  therefore	  should	  be	  permitted	  at	  the	  schools	  which	  their	  children	  attended.	  Buxton	  LJ	  held	  that	  Article	  9	   only	   protected	   ‘worship,	   proselytism	   and	   possibly…	   mandated	   religious	  “practice”’	  which	  was	   a	   ‘clear,	   uniform	  and	   agreed	   requirement	   of	   the	   religion	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  A.	  Freeman	  and	  E.	  Mensch,	  ‘The	  Public-­‐Private	  Distinction	  in	  American	  Law	  and	  Life’	  (1987)	  36	  Buff	  L	  Rev	  237.	  80	  Gavison	  supra	  n.	  74	  at	  19.	  81	  [2003]	  QB	  1300.	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question’.	  82	  Since	  the	  law	  prohibiting	  corporal	  punishment	  in	  schools	  only	  affected	  a	  peripheral	  rather	  than	  core	  right,	  he	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  interference	  with	  the	  parents’	  rights.	  Similarly	  in	  Ladele	  v	  Islington	  LBC,83	  a	  case	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   it	   was	   held	   that	   when	   a	   registrar	   refused	   to	   perform	   civil	  partnerships	  because	  it	  conflicted	  with	  her	  Christian	  view	  of	  marriage,	  this	  did	  not	  affect	   her	   ‘core’	   beliefs	   and	   she	   could	   not	   be	   accommodated	   in	   her	   refusal	   to	  perform	  them.	  Although	  this	  distinction	  was	  not	  the	  only	  reason	  for	  the	  decision,	  it	  was	  certainly	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  judgment.	  	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  core	  and	  non-­‐core	  beliefs	  was	  also	  important	  in	  the	  recent	  English	   decision	   of	   Mba	   v	   London	   Borough	   of	   Merton,	  84	  where	   a	   care	   worker	  unsuccessfully	  argued	  that	  her	  employer	  should	  have	  given	  her	  an	  exemption	  from	  working	   on	   Sundays	   because	   of	   her	   religious	   beliefs.	   The	   Employment	   Tribunal	  stated	  that,	  ‘her	  belief	  that	  Sunday	  should	  be	  a	  day	  of	  rest	  and	  worship	  upon	  which	  no	  paid	  employment	  was	  undertaken,	  whilst	  deeply	  held,	  is	  not	  a	  core	  component	  of	  the	  Christian	  faith’.	  The	  Employment	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  upheld	  this	  decision,85	  although	  this	  was	   subsequently	   overturned	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal,	   because	   it	   argued	   that	   a	  consideration	  of	  how	  many	  Christians refused	  to	  work	  on	  Sundays	  was	  relevant	  to	  the	  question	   of	   how	   deeply	   the	   ‘provision,	   criterion	   or	   practice’	   of	   requiring	   Sunday	  working	  affected	  Christians	  as	  a	  group.	  	  	  Ahdar	  and	  Leigh	  argue	  that	  the	  distinction	  is	  inappropriate	  because	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  define	  the	  core	  beliefs	  of,	  for	  example,	  Christianity	  and	  this	  would	  in	  any	  case	  be	  a	   theological	  question.86	  However,	  some	  of	   this	  criticism	   is	  misplaced	  and	  their	   (predictably	   difficult)	   attempt	   to	   define	   the	   core	   of	   Christianity	   is	   not	  required,	  since	  the	  distinction	  is	  actually	  about	  religious	  practices.	  A	  minor	  change	  to	  a	  Christian	  liturgy	  may	  be	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  a	  religious	  belief,	  but	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  religious	  practice	  since	  it	  involves	  religious	  worship.	  Core	  then	  is	  really	  taken	  as	  a	  synonym	   for	   private	   religious	   belief	   and	  worship,	  which	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   at	   the	  centre	  of	  all	  religions,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  ‘non-­‐core’	  of	  public	  manifestations	  of	  these	  beliefs.	  If	  this	  is	  accepted	  though,	  the	  distinction	  then	  produces	  the	  same	  problems	  as	   the	   public/private	   distinction.	   A	   typical	   ‘core’	   religious	   practice	   such	   as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Ibid.	  at	  1315.	  83	  [2010]	  1	  WLR	  955.	  84	  [2013]	  ICR	  658	  (EAT);	  [2013]	  EWCA	  Civ	  1562	  (CA).	  85	  Although	  it	  described	  the	  reasoning	  as	  ‘inelegant’.	  86	  Supra	  n.1	  at	  168-­‐9.	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protection	   of	   minor	   aspects	   of	   religious	   worship	   may	   be	   less	   important	   to	   an	  individual	  than	  a	  typically	  ‘non-­‐core’	  claim,	  such	  as	  proselytisation.	  	  	  Alternatively,	  if	  it	  were	  the	  case	  that	  a	  real	  attempt	  was	  made	  to	  understand	  what	  the	   core	   of	   religious	   activity	   was	   for	   each	   person,	   this	   would	   pose	   difficult	  questions	  of	  proof,	  not	  least	  because	  it	  may	  not	  be	  clear	  even	  to	  that	  person	  what	  the	  core	  of	  her	  religion	   is.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  a	  person’s	  religious	  practices	  and	  beliefs	  may	   flow	  seamlessly	   from	  her	   religious	  understanding.	  Expert	   evidence	   is	  therefore	   likely	   to	   be	   demanded	   to	   provide	   more	   evidence	   on	   this	   point.	   The	  problem	   with	   this	   is	   that	   religious	   belief	   is	   often	   personal,	   in	   other	   words	  dependent	  on	  a	  person’s	  own	  understanding	  of	  religious	  doctrines	  and	  authorities.	  Religious	   belief	   may	   vary	   vastly	   between	   people	   even	   within	   the	   same	   religious	  tradition.	   A	   person	   who	   deviates	   from	   the	   mainstream,	   for	   entirely	   sincere	  religious	  reasons,	  may	  therefore	  not	  be	  protected.	  As	  well	  as	  being	  likely	  to	  involve	  ‘deeply	   theological	   questions,	   where	   courts	   have	   little	   expertise’87	  it	   could	   also	  impose	  religious	  orthodoxy,	  which	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  religious	  freedom.	  In	   contrast	   to	   concerns	   raised	   elsewhere	   in	   this	   chapter,	   this	   may	   pose	   most	  problems	  for	  members	  of	  a	  majority	  religion	  because	  judges	  may	  feel	  more	  capable	  of	   adjudicating	   what	   is	   or	   is	   not	   a	   core	   belief	   for	   beliefs	   of	   which	   they	   have	   a	  cultural	   awareness.	   It	   may	   also	   pose	   major	   problems	   for	   religions	   with	   more	  amorphous	  beliefs,	  where	  identifying	  any	  ‘core’	  practices	  will	  be	  difficult.	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  not	  differences	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  religious	  activities.	  Intuitively,	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  a	  sermon	  condemning	  abortion	  and	  an	  employee	  wearing	  a	  badge	  at	  work	  with	  a	  picture	  of	  an	  aborted	  foetus,	  even	  if	   the	   latter	   is	   a	   manifestation	   of	   her	   religious	   beliefs.88	  Similarly,	   discrimination	  appears	   more	   acceptable	   in	   the	   context	   of	   permitting	   access	   to	   religious	  sacraments	   than	   it	   does	   to	   a	   charitable	   service	   provided	   by	   a	   religion,	   such	   as	   a	  food	   bank,	   which,	   while	   motivated	   by	   religious	   beliefs,	   is	   not	   per	   se	   a	   religious	  activity.	   As	  with	   the	   other	   tests	   considered	   so	   far,	   this	   is	   a	   relevant	   factor	  which	  should	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	   However,	   by	   itself	   it	   is	   too	   inflexible.	   An	   absolute	  division	   between	   core	   and	   peripheral	   beliefs	   should	   be	   rejected	   because	   of	   the	  difficulty	   in	   making	   such	   a	   distinction	   when	   religious	   beliefs	   can	   vary	   so	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  Ahdar	  and	  Leigh	  supra	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  at	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  Communications	  58	  F.3d	  1337	  (1995).	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considerably	   between	   individuals,	   and	   also	   because	   some	   ‘peripheral’	   practices	  may	  be	  extremely	  important	  to	  an	  individual.	  	  
Neutral	  Laws	  of	  General	  Applicability	  	  The	  final	  test	  to	  be	  considered	  is	  the	  current	  constitutional	  approach	  taken	  in	  the	  US	  after	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Employment	  Division	  v	  Smith.89	  Smith	  took	  part	   in	  a	  Native	  American	  religious	  ceremony	  which	   involved	  the	  use	  of	  peyote,	  a	  banned	  substance	  under	  Oregon	  law.	  He	  was	  dismissed	  from	  his	  employment	  as	  a	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  counsellor	  as	  a	  result	  and	  was	  then	  denied	  unemployment	  benefit	  as	  he	  was	  considered	  to	  have	  been	  dismissed	  because	  of	  work-­‐related	  misconduct.	  He	   claimed	   this	   decision	   was	   a	   violation	   of	   his	   free	   exercise	   rights.	   Since	   the	  Supreme	   Court	   considered	   that	   it	   was	   impossible	   to	   separate	   the	   question	   of	  whether	  he	  should	  be	  denied	  unemployment	  benefit	   from	  Oregon’s	  prohibition	  of	  peyote	   for	   religious	   activities,	   the	   issue	   became	  whether	   Smith	   could	   demand	   an	  exemption	  from	  the	  law	  prohibiting	  its	  use	  because	  of	  his	  religious	  beliefs.	  	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  a	  law	  would	  only	  be	  subject	  to	  strict	  scrutiny	  if	  it	  was	  not	  ‘neutral’	  or	  ‘generally	  applicable’.	  This	  reversed	  the	  position	  established	  in	   Sherbert	   v	   Verner 90 	  that	   strict	   scrutiny	   was	   required	   whenever	   a	   law	  substantially	   burdened	   the	   free	   exercise	   of	   religion.91	  The	   decision	   was	   highly	  controversial.	   The	   political	   opposition	   to	   it	   was	   such	   that	   it	   led	   to	   the	   Religious	  Freedom	  Restoration	  Act,92	  which	  sought	  to	  reinstate	  the	  compelling	  state	  interest	  test,	  but	  which	  was	  later	  held	  to	  be	  partly	  unconstitutional.	  	  
	  The	   main	   problem	   with	   such	   an	   approach	   is	   that	   it	   permits	   interference	   with	  religious	  practices	   ‘no	  matter	  how	  serious	   the	   interference,	  no	  matter	  how	  trivial	  the	   state's	   nonreligious	   objectives,	   and	   no	   matter	   how	   many	   alternative	  approaches	  were	  available	  to	  the	  state	  to	  pursue	  its	  objectives	  with	  less	  impact	  on	  religion.’93	  It	   provides	   no	   justification	   to	   those	   affected	   by	   the	   interference	   with	  religious	  practices	  other	  than	  that	  the	  religion	  was	  not	  deliberately	  targeted,	  which	  may	  be	  of	  little	  comfort.	  It	  is	  indifferent	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  law	  imposes	  a	  harsher	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  494	  US	  872	  (1990).	  90	  374	  US	  398	  (1963).	  91	  This	  was	  though	  judged	  much	  less	  stringently	  than	  in	  other	  areas	  such	  as	  free	  speech.	  92	  42	  U.S.C.	  §2000bb.	  93	  McCoy	  supra	  n.18	  at	  1346.	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burden	   on	   people	   such	   as	   Smith	   than	   on	   someone	   who	   uses	   peyote	   for	   merely	  recreational	  reasons.	  	  It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   demands	   of	   equality	   require	   that	   Smith	   should	   be	  treated	   the	   same	   as	   others	   and	   cannot	   have	   any	   ‘special’	   rights	   because	   of	   his	  religious	  beliefs.	  This	  though	  is	  a	  cramped	  understanding	  of	  equality.	  Even	  formal	  equality	  only	  mandates	  the	  treating	  of	  like	  cases	  alike,	  which	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  treating	  everyone	  the	  same.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  argument	  that	  Smith	  is	  not	  in	  a	  relevantly	  similar	  position	  to	  recreational	  drug	  users	  because	  the	  presumed	  anti-­‐social	   effects	   of	   such	   drug	   use	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   occur	   in	   the	   tightly	   controlled	  circumstances	  of	  the	  Native	  American	  Church,	  and	  because	  the	  centrality	  of	  peyote	  to	  his	  religion	  means	  that	  it	  places	  a	  much	  greater	  burden	  on	  him	  to	  refrain	  than	  it	  would	  on	  others.	  	  	  Indeed	  the	  demands	  of	  equality	  may	  actually	  require	  an	  exemption.	  The	  ECtHR	  held	  in	  Thlimmenos	  v	  Greece	  that	   ‘the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  discriminated	  against…	  is	  violated	  when	   States	   without	   an	   objective	   and	   reasonable	   justification	   fail	   to	   treat	  differently	   persons	  whose	   situations	   are	   significantly	   different.’94	  Similarly,	   Alexy	  argues	   that	   the	   right	   to	   equality	   includes	   a	   norm	   that:	   ‘If	   there	   is	   an	   adequate	  reason	   for	   requiring	   differential	   treatment,	   then	   differential	   treatment	   is	  required’.95	  Thlimmenos	   involved	   a	   Jehovah’s	   Witness	   who	   was	   prevented	   from	  becoming	  an	  accountant	  because	  of	  a	  criminal	  conviction	  resulting	  from	  his	  refusal	  to	  wear	  military	  uniform	  due	  to	  his	  religiously	  based	  pacifist	  views.	  The	  ECtHR	  held	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  treat	  this	  conviction	  as	  having	  no	  bearing	  on	  his	  suitability	  to	  be	  an	  accountant	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  his	  Art	  9	  rights,	  taken	  with	  Art	  14,	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination.	   This	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   where	   a	   normally	   appropriate	   rule	  imposes	   an	   unjustifiable	   burden	   on	   a	   religious	   belief.	   Smith	   imposes	   formal	  equality	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  substantive	  equality.	  As	  Laycock	  argues,	  it	  means	  that	  ‘a	  soldier	   who	   believes	   he	   must	   cover	   his	   head	   before	   an	   omnipresent	   God	   is	  constitutionally	   indistinguishable	   from	  a	   soldier	  who	  wants	   to	  wear	   a	  Budweiser	  gimme	   cap’ 96 	  leading	   to,	   as	   he	   vividly	   puts	   it,	   ‘the	   equality	   of	   universal	  suppression’.97	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  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	  15.	  	  95	  R.	  Alexy,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Constitutional	  Rights,	  tr	  J.	  Rivers,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  272.	  96	  D.	  Laycock,	  ‘The	  Remnants	  of	  Free	  Exercise’	  [1990]	  Sup	  Ct	  Rev	  1,	  11.	  97	  D.	  Laycock,	  ‘The	  Religious	  Exemption	  Debate’	  (2009)	  11	  Rutgers	  J	  L	  &	  Religion	  139,	  173.	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  Scalia	   J’s	   answer	   to	   this	  problem	   is	   that	   the	  proper	   course	   is	   to	   seek	  a	   legislative	  exemption.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  a	  possibility	  which	  should	  not	  be	  forgotten,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  sufficiently	   protective	   by	   itself. 98 The	   purpose	   of	   having	   legally	   enforceable	  constitutional	  rights	  is	  that	  individuals	  are	  not	  reliant	  on	  the	  will	  of	  the	  legislature	  to	  protect	  them.	  Small,	  unpopular	  or	  new	  religions	  will	  find	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  gain	  legislative	  exemptions,	  either	   through	  deliberate	  discrimination	  or,	  perhaps	  more	  likely,	  through	  ignorance	  of	  or	  indifference	  to	  them.	  Gaining	  an	  exemption	  through	  legislative	  means	  can	  potentially	   require	   far	  greater	  resources,	  both	   financial	  and	  in	   terms	   of	   political	   access,	   than	   bringing	   a	   court	   case.	   In	   any	   case,	   it	   cannot	   be	  raised	  as	  a	  defence	  to	  state	  action.	  This	  discriminatory	  effect	  is	  even	  recognized	  by	  Scalia	   J	   but	   who	   holds	   that	   this	   is	   an	   ‘unavoidable	   consequence	   of	   democratic	  government’.99	  In	  essence	  his	  conclusion	  is	  that	  ‘minorities	  will	  always	  do	  worse	  in	  a	   democracy	   and	   there	   is	   nothing	   to	   be	   done	   about	   this.’100	  This	   seems	   both	  unfeeling	  and	  problematic	  from	  a	  fundamental	  rights	  perspective.	  	  	  An	   inability	   to	   challenge	   restrictions	  unless	   it	   can	  be	  demonstrated	   that	   they	   are	  not	  generally	  applicable	  is	  also	  discriminatory	  for	  another	  reason.	  Those	  who	  have	  minority	   beliefs	   are	   likely	   to	   face	   more	   clashes	   because	   the	   majority,	   probably	  unthinkingly,	   creates	   structures	   to	   suit	   them. 101 	  For	   example,	   in	   all	   three	  jurisdictions,	  while	  a	  Christian	  employee	   is	   likely	   to	  have	  Christmas	  day	  off	   since	  this	   is	   a	  public	  holiday,	   and	   therefore	  no	   clash	  between	   their	   religious	  obligation	  and	  their	  employment	  obligations	  arises,	  this	  is	  not	  so	  for	  a	  Jewish	  employee	  who	  wishes	   to	   have	   time	   off	   for	   Yom	   Kippur.	   They	   will	   be	   unable	   to	   challenge	   a	  generally	  applicable	  rule	  that	  everyone	  has	  to	  work	  on	  that	  day.	  	  	  The	  approach	  in	  Smith	  only	  leaves	  a	  small	  category	  of	  acts	  open	  to	  challenge:	  those	  where	  there	  is	  a	  discriminatory	  motive.	  This	  is	  unlikely	  to	  include	  many	  challenges	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  rights	  since	  these	  will	  normally	  clearly	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	   protect	   the	   rights	   of	   others,	   rather	   than	   to	   discriminate	   against	   those	   with	  particular	   religious	   views.	   However,	   the	   principle	   was	   found	   to	   be	   violated	   in	   a	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  After	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision,	  Oregonian	  law	  was	  changed	  in	  order	  to	  grant	  an	  exemption	  for	  religious	  use	  for	  peyote,	  but	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  this	  legislative	  change	  would	  have	  happened	  without	  the	  publicity	  the	  court	  case	  brought.	  	  99	  At	  890.	  100	  Nussbaum	  supra	  n.19	  at	  119.	  101	  Ibid.	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different	   context	   in	   Church	   of	   the	   Lukumi	   Babalu	   Aye	   v	   City	   of	   Hialeah.102	  In	   this	  case,	   members	   of	   the	   Santeria	   religion,	   which	   requires	   certain	   ritualistic	   animal	  sacrifices,	  challenged	  a	  city	  ordinance	  which	  prohibited	  the	  killing	  of	  animals	   in	  a	  ‘ritual	   or	   ceremony	   not	   for	   the	   primary	   purpose	   of	   food	   consumption’.	   The	  Supreme	   Court	   held	   the	   law	   was	   unconstitutional	   as	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   it	   was	  designed	   only	   to	   prevent	   these	   particular	   killings.	   This	   case	   raises	   a	   number	   of	  issues.	  Firstly,	   it	  demonstrates	  the	   limited	  nature	  of	   the	  exception.	  This	  should	  be	  an	   easy	   case	   under	   the	   Smith	   test,	   but	   the	   claim	   had	   been	   rejected	   by	   both	   the	  District	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeals.	  There	  was	  considerable	  evidence	  that	  Hialeah	  was	  not	  motivated	  by	   concerns	  about	  animal	   cruelty,	  but	   rather	  by	  opposition	   to	  the	  Santeria	   religion.	  This	   can	  even	  be	   seen	   in	   the	   terms	  of	   the	  ordinance,	  which	  makes	   reference	   to	   a	   ‘ritual’	   but	   then,	   presumably	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   exclude	   kosher	  butchering,	  adds	  ‘not	  for	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  food	  consumption’.	  	  	  	  However,	   if	   the	   law	  had	  been	  more	  skilfully	  drafted,	   it	  would	  probably	  have	  been	  considered	  constitutional.	  If	  it	  had	  been	  based	  on	  the	  disposal	  of	  animal	  waste	  for	  example,	  it	  may	  have	  been	  permissible	  without	  any	  consideration	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  law	  or	  the	  burden	  it	  placed	  on	  Santerians	  in	  living	  out	  their	  religion.	  In	  many	  situations	  it	  would	  be	  fairly	  easy	  to	  create	  a	  generally	  applicable	  law	  which	  would	  pass	  constitutional	  scrutiny.	  It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  ‘a	  tax	  on	  wearing	  yarmulkes	  is	  a	  tax	   on	   Jews’:103	  such	   blatant	   discrimination	   is	   therefore	   prohibited.	   However,	   it	  would	  be	  perfectly	  possible	  to	  have	  a	  rule	  forbidding	  any	  head	  coverings	  in	  federal	  employment.	  Although	  this	  would	  have	  a	  much	  more	  severe	  effect	  on	  Jewish	  men	  and	   Muslim	   women	   than	   others,	   this	   differential	   burden	   would	   not	   even	   be	  recognised	  and	  the	  need	  for	  such	  a	  rule	  would	  not	  be	  assessed.	  This	  is	  hardly	  a	  new	  problem,	  as	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  British	  case	  of	  Kruse	  v	  Johnson104	  demonstrates.	  Byelaws	  prohibited	  singing	  in	  a	  public	  place	  within	  50	  yards	  of	  a	  dwelling	  house	  if	  asked	   to	   stop	   by	   a	   policeman	   or	   a	   resident.	   Whilst	   these	   laws	   were	   ostensibly	  aimed	  at	  noise	  pollution,	  they	  were	  in	  fact	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  the	  Salvation	  Army	  from	   holding	   outdoor	   services.	   Despite	   this	   being	   an	   important	   part	   of	   their	  religious	  practice,	   the	   laws	  were	  upheld	  without	  difficulty.	  The	  approach	   in	  Smith	  makes	   discrimination	   the	   only	   important	   factor	   in	   considering	   constitutionality.	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  Bray	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However,	   the	   actual	   effect	   on	   a	   religion	   may	   be	   the	   same	   whether	   the	   law	   is	  directed	  at	  it	  or	  if	  it	  is	  merely	  caught	  by	  a	  general	  rule.	  	  	  	  The	  Court’s	  judgment	  in	  Smith	  appears	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  fear	  of	  anarchy	  to	  which,	  it	  is	   assumed,	   balancing	   will	   inevitably	   lead,	   notwithstanding	   that	   a	   balancing	  approach	  had	  been	  used	  for	  the	  past	  thirty	  years.	  Scalia	  J	  argued	  that	  ‘it	  is	  horrible	  to	  contemplate	  that	  federal	  judges	  will	  regularly	  balance	  against	  the	  importance	  of	  general	   laws	   the	   significance	   of	   religious	  practice’	   and	   thus	   ‘it	  would	   require,	   for	  example,	   the	  same	  degree	  of	  "compelling	  state	   interest"	   to	   impede	  the	  practice	  of	  throwing	  rice	  at	  church	  weddings	  as	   to	   impede	   the	  practice	  of	  getting	  married	   in	  church’.105	  This	  seems	  to	  rest	  on	  a	  perplexing	   lack	  of	   faith	   in	   the	  ability	  of	   federal	  judges	   and	   a	   tenuous	   conclusion	   that	   religions	  would	   prefer	   not	   to	   have	   a	   judge	  decide	   the	  relative	  religious	   importance	  of	   church	  weddings	  and	   throwing	  rice	  at	  weddings,	  to	  being	  permitted	  to	  challenge	  a	  law	  forbidding	  church	  weddings	  at	  all.	  Balancing	  tests	  may	  require	  some	  intrusion	  into	  religious	  matters,	  but	  this	  may	  be	  a	   fair	   trade	  off	   in	   return	   for	  greater	   religious	  protection.	  These	  problems	  and	   the	  benefits	  of	  balancing	  tests	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  An	   underlying	   feature	   of	   the	   approach	   in	   Smith,	   taken	   with	   subsequent	  developments	   in	   US	   law,	   is	   the	   reasserted	   distinction	   of	   the	   public/private	  distinction.	  Smith	  means	  the	  ability	  to	  challenge	  laws	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  is	  very	  limited,	  with	  an	  apparent	  aim	  of	  protecting	  private	  religion,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  state	   assessment	   of	   religious	   belief.	   In	   doing	   so,	   though,	   it	   forces	   religion	   to	   be	  privatised	  when	  this	  may	  be	  quite	  contrary	  to	  the	  religion’s	  precepts:	  a	  much	  larger	  interference	  with	   religious	   belief.	   This	   ironically	   thus	   undermines	   the	   very	   thing	  that	  Scalia	  J	  is	  so	  anxious	  to	  protect.	  Indeed	  in	  an	  earlier	  case	  he	  had	  criticised	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  court	  for	  treating	  religion	  like	  ‘some	  purely	  personal	  avocation	  that	  can	  be	  indulged	  entirely	  in	  secret,	  like	  pornography.’106	  	  
Although	   Smith	   denies	   protection	   in	   the	   public	   sphere,	   in	   the	   private	   sphere	  religions	  have	  much	  greater	  rights	  under	  US	   law,	   including	  rights	  to	  discriminate.	  In	   EEOC	   v	   Hosanna	   Tabor,107	  a	   case	   about	   whether	   a	   religious	   minister	   has	   any	  protection	   from	   discrimination	   law,	   Smith	   was	   simply	   held	   to	   be	   irrelevant.	  Although	  some	  had	  argued	  that	  employment	  discrimination	  laws	  were	  neutral	  and	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general	  laws	  which	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  religious	  organisations	  under	  Smith,108	  this	  approach	   was	   firmly	   rejected.	   The	   Court	   held	   that	   Smith	   involved	   ‘government	  regulation	   of	   only	   outward	   physical	   acts’,	   whereas	   Hosanna	   Tabor	   involved	  ‘interference	  with	  an	  internal	  church	  decision	  that	  affects	  the	  faith	  and	  mission	  of	  the	   church	   itself.’109	  This	   then	   is	   a	   reinvention	   of	   the	   public/private	   distinction,	  with	  all	  the	  problems	  this	  entails.	  
The	  most	  incomprehensible	  part	  of	  the	  rule	  emanating	  from	  Smith	  is	  that	  the	  Court	  held	   that	  claims	  can	  be	  brought	   to	  protect	   ‘hybrid	  rights’.	  The	  exact	  meaning	  of	  a	  hybrid	   right	   is	   unclear,	   but	   the	   idea	   is	   that	   free	   exercise	   combined	  with	   another	  right	   can	   give	   rise	   to	   a	   claim	   against	   a	   generally	   applicable	   law.	   In	  Smith	  Scalia	   J	  stated	   that	   cases	   that	   had	   been	   previously	   considered	   to	   purely	   involve	   free	  exercise	   claims	  were	   actually	   hybrid	   rights	   cases.	   Thus	  when	   discussing	   Yoder	   v	  
Wisconsin,	   Scalia	   J	   asserted	   that	   the	   case	  was	   not	   simply	   about	   free	   exercise,	   but	  also	  the	  rights	  of	  parents	  to	  control	  their	  children’s	  education	  and	  thus	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  hybrid	  right.	  A	  cynical	  explanation	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  a	  concept	  is	  that	  it	  was	   necessary	   to	   explain	   away	   previous	   cases	  where	   a	   violation	   of	   free	   exercise	  had	  been	  found.	  Even	  if	  this	  is	  not	  so,	  it	  is	  a	  very	  unclear	  concept.	  	  	  That	   a	   right	   taken	   with	   another	   right	   can	   lead	   to	   a	   violation	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   an	  incoherent	  idea.	  Under	  the	  ECHR	  for	  example	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  there	  is	  no	  violation	  of	   a	   substantive	   right	   by	   itself,	   but	   there	   is	   a	   violation	   of	   that	   right	   taken	   with	  Article	   14,	   the	   right	   to	   non-­‐discrimination,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   claim	   falls	   within	   the	  ‘ambit’	   of	   the	   right.	   However,	   non-­‐discrimination	   rights	   are	   different	   from	   other	  rights	  as	  they	  can	  only	  be	  measured	  relationally,	  that	  is	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  others	  are	   treated.	   While	   a	   member	   state	   may	   have	   discretion	   in	   whether	   to	   grant	   a	  benefit	  or	  not,	  and	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  violation	  of	  the	  substantive	  article,	  it	  does	  not	   have	   the	   right	   to	   grant	   the	   benefit	   unequally.	   Therefore	   adding	   together	   the	  two	  rights	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  violation.	  	  	  However,	   the	   problem	  with	   this	   idea	   of	   hybrid	   rights	   is	   that	   another	   right	   could	  almost	   always	  be	   considered	   to	  be	   implicated	   in	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	  of	   religion,	  particularly	   freedom	   of	   speech.	   This	   is	   a	   very	   broad	   principle	   in	   US	   law	   and	   the	  concept	   of	   expressive	   speech	   has	   for	   example	   been	   considered	   to	   include	   non-­‐	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obscene	   commercial	   nude	   dancing.110	  Almost	   all	   religious	   practices	   must	   have	  some	  message,	  even	  if	  this	  is	  simply	  to	  identify	  a	  person	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  religion.	  If	   school	   pupils	   are	   protected	   in	   wearing	   black	   armbands	   to	   protest	   against	   the	  Vietnam	  War,111	  then	   it	   seems	   difficult	   to	   see	   why	   wearing	   a	   hijab,	   for	   example,	  could	  not	  be	  considered	  expressive	  speech.	  Smith’s	  claim	  could	  also	  be	  reinvented	  as	  a	   free	  speech	  claim,	   indeed	  possibly	  political	  speech,	  and	  thus	  deserving	  of	   the	  highest	  degree	  of	  protection	  as	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  peyote	  ceremony	  was	  an	  expressive	   reassertion	   of	   a	   Native	   American	   way	   of	   life,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  discrimination	  and	  forced	  assimilation	  and	  Christianisation	  Smith	  had	  faced	  in	  his	  childhood.112	  Claims	  to	  discriminate	  could	  potentially	  also	  be	  re-­‐invented	  as	  speech	  claims113	  and	   indeed	  will	   presumably	   always	   involve	   some	   kind	   of	   speech.	   Given	  then	  that	  cases	  can	  always	  be	  considered	  hybrid	  rights,	  the	  distinction	  is	  arbitrary.	  More	  fundamentally,	  it	  is	  simply	  unclear	  why	  two	  small	  infringements	  of	  different	  rights	  should	  add	  up	  to	  a	  violation	  when	  a	  great	  infringement	  of	  one	  does	  not.	  For	  these	   reasons,	   even	   if	   the	   generally	   applicable	   law	   rule	   is	   accepted,	   the	   hybrid	  rights	  idea	  cannot	  be.	  	  In	  conclusion	   then,	   the	  approach	   in	  Smith	  too	   fails	  as	  a	   test.	  Whilst	   it	   is	  of	   course	  extremely	  problematic	  if	  a	  religion	  is	  deliberately	  targeted,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  restriction	  is	  only	  problematic	  in	  this	  situation.	  Such	  an	  approach	  cannot	  protect	  religious	   freedom	   sufficiently,	   since	   it	   permits	  many	   invasions	   of	   religious	   rights	  without	  consideration	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  is	  justified.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  concluded	   that	  none	  of	   the	   tests	  expressed	  here	  are	  suitable	   for	  deciding	   when	   religious	   claims	   should	   be	   protected	   above	   other	   rights,	   such	   as	  non-­‐discrimination,	   because	   they	   are	   variously	   under	   or	   over	   protective,	   do	   not	  take	   equality	   concerns	   seriously	   or	   give	   too	   much	   power	   to	   religious	   elites.	  Nevertheless	   some	   of	   the	   insights	   they	   bring	   may	   be	   relevant	   in	   pointing	   out	  differences	  in	  the	  circumstances	  and	  types	  of	  religious	  claims:	  that	  a	  case	  involves	  the	  private	  rather	  than	  public	  sphere	  for	  example.	  Scalia	  J	   in	  Smith	  was	  convinced	  that	   balancing	   approaches	   were	   doomed	   to	   turn	   into	   anarchy	   with	   everyone	  asserting	  a	  right	  to	  be	  free	  of	  laws	  with	  which	  they	  disagreed.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  question	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  112	  See	  Nussbaum	  supra	  n.19	  at	  149-­‐150.	  113	  See	  Elane	  Photography	  v	  Willock	  309	  P.3d	  553	  (N.M.,	  2013)	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  7.	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of	   balancing,	   and	   to	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   balancing	   test,	   proportionality,	   that	   this	  thesis	  now	  turns,	  suggesting	  that	  his	  fears	  are	  unfounded.	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Chapter	  3:	  Proportionality	  
	  The	  previous	  chapter	  concluded	  that	  none	  of	  the	  tests	  outlined	  so	  far	  was	  adequate	  to	   adjudicate	   the	   complexities	   of	   claims	   involving	   conflicts	   between	   freedom	   of	  religion	  and	  other	  rights,	  in	  particular	  the	  right	  of	  non-­‐discrimination.	  This	  chapter	  suggests	  a	  different	  method:	  proportionality.	  Proportionality	  lays	  out	  a	  process	  for	  deciding	   cases	   as	   well	   as	   setting	   a	   standard	   of	   review.	   This	   chapter	   will	   first	  describe	   in	   some	   detail	   the	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   test	   and	   then	   will	   consider	   its	  advantages	   in	   the	   context	   of	   resolving	   conflicts	   between	   freedom	  of	   religion	   and	  non-­‐discrimination.	   Throughout	   this	   section	   the	   problems	   described	   in	   the	  Introduction	   should	   be	   borne	   in	   mind:	   the	   difficulty	   of	   legislating	   and	   deciding	  cases	   in	   situations	   of	   social	   divergence.	   The	   chapter	   will	   end	   with	   a	   short	  description	   of	  whether	   and	   how	  proportionality	   is	   used	   in	   the	   Canadian,	   English	  and	  US	   legal	  systems	   in	  order	  to	  place	  the	  discussion	  of	  cases	   in	   later	  chapters	   in	  context.	   It	   will	   be	   argued	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   disadvantages	   of	   the	   previous	  approaches	   discussed,	   proportionality	   provides	   a	   coherent	   method	   for	   resolving	  these	  disputes.	  	  
Proportionality:	  An	  Analysis	  	  Proportionality	   as	   a	   method	   of	   controlling	   government	   action	   originated	   in	  nineteenth	  century	  Prussian	  administrative	  law.	  1	  Despite	  no	  explicit	  mention	  of	   it	  in	   the	   German	   Basic	   Law,	   proportionality	   became	   an	   important	   part	   of	   German	  constitutional	   law	  after	  World	  War	  II.	   Its	  use	  has	  since	  spread	  to	  many	  countries,	  possibly	  becoming	  a	  ‘post-­‐war	  paradigm’	  of	  rights	  analysis.2	  It	  can	  take	  a	  number	  of	  forms,	   but	   all	   contain	   the	   same	   essential	   elements.	   The	   test	   as	   set	   out	   by	   Alexy,	  referring	  to	  German	  law	  is:3	  	   1. Suitability	  –	  the	  aim	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  achieving	  the	  end	  desired.	  2. Necessity	   –	   are	   there	   any	   less	   restrictive	   but	   equally	   effective	   means	   of	  achieving	  this	  aim?	  3. Proportionality	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense,	  involving	  a	  balancing	  exercise.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A.	  Barak,	  Proportionality:	  Constitutional	  Rights	  and	  their	  Limitations	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012)	  Ch	  7.	  2	  L.	  Weinrib,	  ‘Postwar	  Paradigm	  and	  American	  Exceptionalism’	  in	  S.	  Choudhry	  (ed.),	  The	  
Migration	  of	  Constitutional	  Ideas	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  3	  R.	  Alexy,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Constitutional	  Rights,	  tr.	  J.	  Rivers	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002).	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Although	  as	  Brady	  notes,	  ‘the	  application	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test	  has	  not	  always	  been	   uniform,’4	  all	   these	   elements	   are	   present	   in	   the	   British	   case	   law.	   Thus	   a	  measure	  will	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  proportionate	  if:	  	   1. The	   legislative	   objective	   is	   sufficiently	   important	   to	   justify	   limiting	   a	  fundamental	  right.	  	  2. The	   measures	   designed	   to	   meet	   the	   legislative	   objective	   are	   rationally	  connected	  to	  it.	  	  3. The	   means	   used	   to	   impair	   the	   right	   or	   freedom	   are	   no	   more	   than	   is	  necessary	  to	  accomplish	  the	  objective.5	  	  	  
 To	   this	   has	   been	   added	   an	   overall	   consideration	   of	   whether	   the	   measure	   is	  proportionate,	  balancing	  the	  rights	  of	   the	   individual	  against	   the	  needs	  of	  society.6	  The	  Canadian	  test	  is	  slightly	  different.	  7	  The	  test	  as	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  R	  v	  Oakes8	  is:	  	   1. There	   must	   be	   a	   substantial	   aim	   of	   ‘sufficient	   importance	   to	   warrant	  overriding	  a	  constitutionality	  protected	  right…	  an	  objective	  [must]	  relate	  to	  concerns	  which	  are	  pressing	  and	  substantial’.	  	  2. There	  must	  be	  a	  rational	  connection	  between	  the	  aim	  and	  the	  restriction	  of	  the	  right.	  	  3. The	  means	  must	  be	  carefully	  designed	  to	  achieve	  the	  aim	  and	  should	  impair	  the	  right	  or	  freedom	  as	  little	  as	  possible.	  4. Proportionality	   itself	   –	   does	   the	   objective	   justify	   the	   restrictions	   on	   the	  right?	  	  Greater	  weight	  appears	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  first	  step	  of	  legitimate	  aim	  than	  in	  the	  German	   test.	   In	   its	   German	   incarnation,	   questions	   as	   to	   the	   appropriate	   balance	  between	  the	  rights	  and	  interests	  are	  left	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  process.9	  This	  allows	  the	  question	  of	  how	  ‘substantial’	  the	  objective	  is	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  conjunction	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A.	  Brady,	  Proportionality	  and	  Deference	  under	  the	  UK	  Human	  Rights	  Act:	  An	  Institutionally	  
Sensitive	  Approach	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  5	  De	  Freitas	  v	  Permanent	  Secretary	  of	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  Fisheries,	  Lands	  and	  Housing	  [1999]	  1	  AC	  69.	  6	  Huang	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  [2007]	  2	  AC	  167.	  7	  D.	  Grimm,	  ‘Proportionality	  in	  Canadian	  and	  German	  Constitutional	  Jurisprudence’	  (2007)	  57	  U	  Toronto	  LJ	  383.	  	  8	  [1986]	  1	  SCR	  103.	  9	  Barak	  supra	  n.	  1	  at	  281.	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the	   extent	   of	   the	   interference.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  Oakes	   test	   states	   that	   an	   objective	  must	   always	   be	   ‘pressing	   and	   substantial.’	   It	   is	   far	   from	   clear	   why	   this	   should	  necessarily	   always	   be	   so.	   The	   interference	   may	   be	   minimal	   or	   unimportant.10	  Indeed	   in	   later	   cases	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   relaxation	   of	   the	   standard,	   with	   an	  appreciation	  that	  the	  standard	  will	  vary	  according	  to	  the	  particular	  case.	  Trakman	  argues	   that	   in	   practice,	   the	   ‘”sufficiently	   important	   objective”	   test	   has	   played	   a	  limited	   role…	   The	   majority	   of	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada	   found	   that	   the	  government’s	  objective	  was	  sufficiently	  important	  in	  97	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  instances	  in	  which	  Charter	  violations	  were	  considered	  under	  section	  1’.11	  Despite	   the	   terms	  of	  the	  test,	  the	  difference	  seems	  to	  be	  ‘merely	  semantic’.12	  	  	  The	  Canadian	  minimal	  impairment	  test	  is,	  though,	  set	  at	  a	  high	  level.	  This	  is	  where	  most	   cases	   have	   failed,	   rather	   than	   at	   the	   balancing	   stage,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   in	  Germany.13	  The	   question	   is	   whether	   this	   difference	   is	   advantageous.	   Under	   the	  
Oakes	   test,	   the	   minimal	   impairment	   test	   includes	   some	   of	   the	   balancing	  considerations	  dealt	  with	  under	   the	  proportionality	   test	   in	   the	  other.	   It	   has	  been	  criticised	   as	   ‘evolv[ing]	   into	   a	   repository	   for	   under-­‐articulated	  normative	   choices	  that	  should	  properly	  be	  explained	  under	  the	  proportional	  effects	  branch’.14	  	  	  Davidov	  points	  to	  Eldridge	  v	  British	  Columbia15	  as	  an	  example	  of	  where	  the	  courts	  have	  used	  balancing	  considerations	  under	  cover	  of	  the	  minimal	  impairment	  test.16	  The	   case	   concerned	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   government	   to	   provide	   sign-­‐language	  interpreters	   in	   hospitals,	   thus	   negatively	   affecting	   deaf	   patients’	   ability	   to	   access	  medical	  care.	  Whether	  this	  failure	  was	  justified	  by	  the,	  relatively	  small,	  cost	  to	  the	  government	  is	  a	  question	  of	  balancing.	  The	  Court,	  though,	  treated	  it	  as	  a	  question	  of	  minimal	   impairment.	   They	   held	   that	   the	   objective	   of	   ‘controlling	   health	   care	  expenditures’	  could	  be	  protected	  even	  if	  sign-­‐language	  interpreters	  were	  provided.	  This	   ducks	   the	   important	   point	   that	   it	   was	   not	   protected	   to	   the	   same	   extent:	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  P.	  Blache,	  ‘The	  Criteria	  of	  Justification	  under	  Oakes:	  Too	  Much	  Severity	  Generated	  Through	  Formalism’	  (1991)	  20	  Man	  LJ	  437.	  11	  L.	  Trakman	  et	  al.,	  ‘R.	  v	  Oakes	  1986-­‐1997	  Back	  to	  the	  Drawing	  Board’	  (1998)	  36	  Osgoode	  
Hall	  LJ	  83,	  95.	  12	  Grimm	  supra	  n.	  7	  at	  389.	  	  13	  Trakman	  supra	  n.11.	  14	  Ibid.	  at	  102.	  15	  [1997]	  3	  SCR	  624.	  16	  G.	  Davidov,	  ‘Separating	  Minimal	  Impairment	  from	  Balancing:	  A	  Comment	  on	  R	  v	  Sharpe	  
(B.C.C.A)’	  (2000)	  5	  Rev	  Const	  Stud	  195.	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evidently	   cost	   more	   to	   provide	   the	   interpreters	   than	   not.	   The	   real	   question	   is	  whether	  this	  cost	  is	  a	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  deny	  providing	  interpreters.	  	  	  As	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  distinctive	  part	  of	  the	  necessity	  test	  is	  that	  it	  examines	   whether	   there	   are	   less	   restrictive	   means	   for	   achieving	   the	   aim	   to	   the	  
same	   extent.	   It	   is	   not	   about	   weighing	   up	   the	   pros	   and	   cons	   of	   different	   policies.	  Often	  there	  are	  policies	  which	  would	  achieve	  the	  aim	  less	  well,	  but	  which	  create	  a	  lesser	   infringement	   of	   a	   right.	   Which	   one	   is	   chosen	   is	   a	   matter	   for	   the	   original	  decision-­‐maker	   (although	  of	   course	  all	  policies	  must	  also	  be	  proportionate	   in	   the	  strict	  sense).	  It	  is	  therefore	  beneficial	  to	  separate	  the	  no	  less	  restrictive	  means	  test	  from	  the	  balancing	  test.	  	  	  These	   differences	   between	   the	   ways	   proportionality	   is	   applied	   should	   not	   be	  overstated.	   Despite	   the	   minor	   variations	   between	   the	   tests,	   they	   all	   contain	   the	  same	  essential	  elements.	  For	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   thesis	   the	   following	  components	  will	  be	  used:	  	   1. Legitimate	  aim	  2. Rational	  connection	  3. Necessity	  4. Balancing	  	  Interference17	  	  The	   elements	   of	   the	   tests	   will	   be	   considered	   further	   below.	   However,	   the	  preliminary	   question	   in	   applying	   any	   test	   which	   considers	   whether	   the	  interference	  with	  a	  right	  is	  justified,	  is	  evidently	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  interference	  at	  all.	  A	  test	  of	  interference	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  test	  used	  to	  decide	  whether	  there	  is	  a	   violation	   of	   a	   right.	   If	   it	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   justify	   any	   interference	  with	   a	  right,	  an	  interference	  will	  only	  be	  found	  in	  rare	  cases.	  Interference	  is	  then	  the	  most	  important	  hurdle	   that	   claimants	  will	  have	   to	   clear	   if	   they	  are	   to	  be	   successful.	  As	  Mathews	  and	  Stone	  Sweet	  put	  it,	  ‘a	  stingy	  approach	  to	  the	  limitation	  of	  rights	  goes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  This	  section	  draws	  on	  my	  earlier	  article,	  ‘Article	  9	  at	  a	  Crossroads:	  Interference	  Before	  and	  After	  Eweida’	  (2013)	  13	  HRLR	  580.	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hand	   in	   hand	   with	   a	   stingy	   approach	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   rights.’ 18 	  Under	   a	  proportionality	  test	  though,	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  finding	  an	  interference	  certainly	  does	  not	  guarantee	  a	  claim’s	  success.	  There	  can	  therefore	  be	  ‘definitional	  generosity’	  in	  considering	   the	   ambit	   of	   a	   right.19	  Importantly	   also,	   the	   degree	   of	   justification	  required	  by	  proportionality	  depends	  on	   the	  degree	  of	   interference.	  Since	  a	  minor	  interference	  will	   not	   require	   significant	   justification,	   interference	   can	   be	   defined	  broadly.	  	  Even	   so,	   the	   issue	   of	   when	   interference	   with	   a	   right	   begins	   is	   complex.	   This	   is	  particularly	   true	   regarding	   freedom	   of	   religion,	   but	   is	   also	   relevant	   to	   non-­‐discrimination	   rights.	   With	   regard	   to	   religious	   rights,	   since	   society	   contains	   a	  multitude	   of	   religious	   and	  moral	   beliefs	   and	   practices,	   people	   will	   constantly	   be	  faced	   with	   practices	   with	   which	   they	   disagree	   and	   will	   in	   a	   myriad	   of	   ways	   be	  constrained	   from	   creating	   their	   ideal	   society.	   Not	   all	   of	   this	   should	   constitute	   an	  interference	   with	   rights.	   In	   considering	   this	   issue,	   this	   section	   will	   draw	   on	  Greenawalt’s	  analysis	  which	  draws	  distinctions	  between	  religiously	  compelled	  and	  religiously	   motivated	   acts,	   and	   between	   tests	   which	   require	   compliance	   with	  religious	   precepts	   to	   be	   legally	   impossible	   and	   those	   that	  merely	  make	   religious	  compliance	  more	  difficult.20	  It	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  the	  current	  discussion	  is	  only	  about	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  interference	  with	  a	  right	  and	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  justification.	  	  It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   there	  must	   be	   a	   religiously	   required	   act	   which	   is	   legally	  forbidden	   for	   there	   to	   be	   an	   interference.	   The	   ECtHR	   has	   sometimes	   taken	   this	  approach.	  In	  Cha'are	  Shalom	  Ve	  Tsedek	  v	  France21	  for	  example	  there	  was	  held	  to	  be	  no	   interference	  with	   religious	   rights	  where	  compliance	  with	   religious	  beliefs	  was	  not	   impossible.	   The	   applicant	   organisation	   was	   one	   of	   Ultra-­‐Orthodox	   Jews	   who	  required	  meat	  certified	  as	  ‘glatt’	  and	  not	  merely	  kosher.	  They	  were	  denied	  a	  licence	  to	  ritually	  slaughter	  animals	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  there	  was	  a	  licensed	  slaughterer	  in	  the	  area,	  albeit	  one	  that	  only	  produced	  kosher	  meat.	  The	  ECtHR	  held	  there	  was	  no	  interference	  since	  glatt	  meat	  could	  be	  imported	  from	  Belgium.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  J.	  Mathews	  and	  A.	  Stone	  Sweet,	  ‘All	  Things	  in	  Proportion?	  American	  Rights	  Review	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Balancing’	  (2011)	  60	  Emory	  LJ	  797,	  868-­‐9.	  19	  S.	  Tsakyrakis,	  ‘Proportionality:	  An	  Assault	  on	  Human	  Rights?’	  (2009)	  7	  ICON	  468,	  480.	  20	  K.	  Greenawalt,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Constitution	  Vol.	  1	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  21	  9	  BHRC	  27	  (2000).	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Adherence	  to	   this	   test	  would	  mean	  there	  was	  no	   interference	   in	  cases	   like	  Lyng	  v	  
Northwest	   Indian	   Cemetery	   Protective	   Association.22	  In	   this	   case	   the	   government	  wished	  to	  build	  a	  road	  and	  conduct	  logging	  on	  a	  sacred	  Native	  American	  site	  which	  would,	  as	  the	  Court	  noted,	  ‘have	  devastating	  effects	  on	  traditional	  Indian	  practises’.	  This	  though	  would	  not	  be	  enough.	  They	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  practice	  their	  faith.	  It	  would	   not	   be	   outlawed	   in	   any	   way,	   simply	   practically	   difficult.	   There	   was	   no	  coercion.	  	  	  Even	  in	  situations	  where	  a	  government	  more	  directly	  requires	  or	  prohibits	  certain	  behaviour,	   this	   test	   may	   not	   be	   met.	   In	   Bowen	   v	   Roy,23	  a	   Native	   American	   man	  believed	  that	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  social	  security	  number	  for	  his	  daughter	  ‘robbed	  her	   of	   her	   spirit’,	   but	   he	   could	   not	   receive	   social	   security	   benefits,	   including	  Medicaid,	   for	   her	   without	   it.	   This	   too	   did	   not	   involve	   an	   impossibility	   –	   he	   was	  under	   no	   obligation	   to	   claim	   those	   benefits,	   although	   they	   were	   in	   practice	  extremely	  important.	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  Canadian	  case	  of	  Alberta	  v	  Hutterian	  Brethren	  
of	   Wilson	   Colony, 24 	  some	   Hutterites	   objected	   on	   religious	   grounds	   to	   being	  photographed.	   	  A	  new	  requirement	  that	  driving	  licences	  needed	  photographs	  was	  therefore	  a	  violation	  of	   their	  beliefs.	  But,	   again,	  even	   though	  not	  having	  a	  driving	  licence	  would	  make	   their	   rural	   farming	  existence	  very	  difficult,	   this	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient.	   An	   impossibility	   test	  would	   therefore	  permit	   severe	   burdens	   on	  belief,	  without	  requiring	  any	  justification	  to	  be	  given.	  	  	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  remains	  strictly	  possible	  to	  comply	  with	  religious	  beliefs	  has	   also	   been	   considered	   relevant	   to	   whether	   an	   interference	   can	   be	   found	   in	  employment	  since	  an	  employee	  could	  resign	  and	  thus	  avoid	  the	  conflict.	  The	  ECtHR	  has	   found	   this	   issue	   surprisingly	   difficult.	   To	   take	   one	   example,	   in	   Pichon	   and	  
Sajous	   v	   France25	  the	   Court	   held	   that	   requiring	   the	   applicant	   pharmacists	   to	   sell	  contraceptive	  pills	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  their	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  thus	  their	   application	   was	   dismissed	   as	   manifestly	   ill	   founded.	   However,	   the	   Court’s	  reasoning	   was	   essentially	   a	   balancing	   process:	   women	   were	   entitled	   to	   access	  contraception	  with	  ease,	   the	  applicants	  were	  acting	   in	   the	  public	  sphere	  and	  they	  could	  manifest	  their	  beliefs	  in	  other	  ways.	  All	  of	  this	  is	  true	  and	  relevant,	  but	  as	  to	  whether	   the	   infringement	  of	  belief	  was	   justified,	   and	  not	   to	   the	  prior	  question	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  108	  S.Ct.	  1319	  (1988).	  23	  476	  US	  693	  (1986).	  24	  [2009]	  2	  SCR	  567.	  25	  Application	  No.	  49853/99	  (2	  Oct	  2001).	  See	  also	  Kalaç	  v	  Turkey	  (1997)	  27	  EHRR	  552.	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whether	   the	  right	  was	   infringed,	  which	  should	  have	  been	  answered	  affirmatively.	  The	   alternatives	   available	   to	   the	   pharmacists	   were	   to	   perform	   an	   act	   they	   were	  resolutely	  opposed	   to,	  or	   to	  resign.	   If	   resignation	  was	  always	  sufficient	   to	  protect	  rights	   then	   there	   should	   be	   no	   concern	   with	   dress	   codes,	   working	   hours	   or	  religious	  holidays,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  with	  religious	  harassment	   taking	  place	  within	  employment.	  	  	  The	   British	   courts	   have	   in	   the	   past	   accepted	   and	   even	   extended	   the	   ECHR’s	  reasoning.	   In	   R(Begum)	   v	   Denbigh	   High	   School	   Governors26	  the	   majority	   of	   the	  House	   of	   Lords	   accepted	   that	   there	   was	   no	   interference	   where	   a	   pupil	   was	   not	  permitted	  to	  attend	  her	  school	  wearing	  a	  jilbab,	  because	  there	  were	  other	  schools	  she	  could	  have	  attended.	  Lord	  Bingham	  referred	  to	  Cha’are	  Shalom	  Ve	  Tsedek	  in	  his	  judgment	  and	  held	  that	  ‘there	  remains	  a	  coherent	  and	  remarkably	  consistent	  body	  of	   authority	  which	  our	  domestic	   courts	  must	   take	   into	   account	   and	  which	   shows	  that	  interference	  is	  not	  easily	  established’27	  Lord	  Hoffmann	  also	  held	  that	  since	  she	  chose	  the	  school	  knowing	  its	  uniform	  policies	  and	  she	  could	  have	  attended	  another	  school,	   there	   was	   no	   interference	   with	   her	   beliefs.	   As	   Lord	   Nicholls	   pointed	   out	  though,	  such	  an	  approach	  ‘under-­‐estimate[s]	  the	  disruption	  this	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  cause	  to	  her	  education’	  and	  places	  the	  school	  under	  no	  duty	  to	  ‘explain	  and	  justify	  its	   decision’. 28 	  More	   recently	   though	   the	   ECHR	   has	   appeared	   to	   change	   its	  approach.	   It	   held	   there	   was	   a	   violation	   in	   Eweida	   v	   UK,	   which	   concerned	   an	  employee	   who	   was	   prevented	   from	   wear	   a	   cross	   at	   work	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	   her	  Christian	   faith. 29 	  The	   consequences	   of	   this	   decision	   have	   not	   yet	   been	   fully	  considered	   by	   domestic	   courts.	   These	   issues	   regarding	   religious	   freedom	  within	  employment	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	  Although	   the	   clearest	   examples	   of	   a	   religious	   practice	   being	   made	   legally	  impossible	  are	  cases	  where	  a	  religion	  has	  ceremonies	  involving	  illegal	  drugs,	  such	  as	   the	   use	   of	   peyote	   in	   some	   Native	   American	   religions	   or	   cannabis	   in	  Rastafarianism,	   the	   test	   at	   its	   strictest	   also	   requires	   a	   religious	   compulsion.	   Such	  cases	   may	   fail	   since	   a	   judge	   could	   conclude	   that,	   while	   such	   ceremonies	   are	   an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  religion,	  there	  is	  no	  strict	  obligation	  to	  perform	  them.	  Not	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  [2007]	  1	  AC	  100.	  27	  Ibid.	  at	  113-­‐4.	  28	  Ibid.	  at	  119.	  29	  Eweida	  and	  others	  v	  UK	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  8.	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religions	   have	   definite	   rules	   or	   doctrines,	   and	   some	   firmly	   reject	   hierarchy.30	  However,	   there	  may	   still	   be	  practices	  which	   are	   clearly	  part	   of	   the	   religion,	   even	  where	  there	  is	  no	  textual	  or	  other	  authority	  to	  which	  an	  adherent	  can	  point.	  A	  focus	  on	  religious	  obligation	  misses	  these	  practices.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	   defining	   what	   is	   religiously	   motivated	   rather	   than	   religiously	  required	   is	   difficult.31	  A	   compulsion	   requirement	   creates	   an	   impulse	   to	   ‘dutify’	  every	  aspect	  of	  religion.	  This	  may	  be	  quite	  artificial.	  Laycock	  puts	  this	  as	  follows:	  ‘it	  assumes	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	   religion	   consists	   only	   of	   obeying	   the	   rules…	   all	   the	  affirmative	   communal	   and	   spiritual	   aspects	   of	   religion	   are	   assumed	   away…	   for	  many	   believers	   the	   attempt	   to	   distinguish	   what	   is	   required	   from	   what	   grows	  organically	   out	   of	   the	   religious	   experience	   is	   an	   utterly	   alien	   question,	   perhaps	  nonsensical.’32	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  some	  religious	  practices	  are	  put	  in	  terms	  of	  duty	  because	  this	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  accepted	  by	  a	  court.33	  	  	  Even	   if	   there	   were	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   compulsion	   and	   motivation,	  religious	   duties	   may	   be	   less	   important	   to	   a	   believer	   than	   religiously	   motivated	  conduct.	  For	  example,	  most	  Christian	  denominations	  do	  not	   think	   it	   is	  a	   religious	  requirement	  to	  attend	  Bible	  study	  groups,	  but	  for	  some	  it	  may	  be	  an	  important	  part	  of	   their	   religious	   practice.	   It	  would	   be	   a	   nonsense	   to	   say	   that	   a	   law	  which	  made	  studying	   a	   sacred	   text	  with	   others	   a	   criminal	   offence	  did	  not	   interfere	  with	   their	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  It	  is	  therefore	  sufficient	  for	  an	  act	  to	  be	  religiously	  motivated.	  	  However,	  to	  say	  that	  any	  act	  motivated	  by	  a	  sincere	  religious	  conviction,	  however	  indirect,	   is	   protected	  by	   the	   right	   is	   by	   itself	   too	   generous.	   It	  would	   include	   facts	  such	  as	  those	  arising	  in	  Rushton	  v	  Nebraska	  Public	  Power	  District.34	  Two	  employees	  of	  a	  nuclear	  power	  station	  refused	  drug	  testing,	  not	  because	  they	  were	  religiously	  opposed	   to	   it,	   but	   because	   the	   company’s	   drug	   policy	   statement	   stated	   that	  alcoholism	  was	  a	  disease	  that	  could	  be	  treated.	  Contrary	  to	  this,	  they	  believed	  that	  alcoholism	  was	  not	  a	  disease	  but	  a	   sin.	  They	   therefore	  did	  not	  wish	   to	  affirm	   the	  policy.	   Including	   such	  a	   case	  would	  place	  weighty	  burdens	  on	  employers	  and	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  See	  e.g.	  D.	  O’Brien,	  ‘Chant	  Down	  Babylon:	  Freedom	  of	  Religion	  and	  the	  Rastafarian	  Challenge	  to	  Majoritarianism’	  (2002)	  18	  J	  L	  &	  Religion	  219.	  31	  D.	  Laycock,	  ‘The	  Remnants	  of	  Free	  Exercise’	  [1990]	  Sup	  Ct	  Rev	  1.	  32	  Ibid.	  at	  24.	  33	  W.F.	  Sullivan,	  The	  Impossibility	  of	  Religious	  Freedom	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  	  34	  653	  F.Supp.	  1510	  (D.Neb.,	  1987).	  
	   68	  
state	   in	   assessing	   these	   claims.	   It	   may	   encourage	   frivolous	   or	   spurious	   claims.	  Although	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  practice	  would	  be	  assessed	  at	  the	  balancing	  stage,	  and	   therefore	   cases	   involving	   indirect	   unimportant	   interferences	   would	   be	  extremely	   unlikely	   to	   be	   ultimately	   successful,	   there	   is	   still	   benefit	   in	   excluding	  some	  cases	  via	  a	  threshold	  test.	  	  	  An	   intermediate	   requirement	   is	   therefore	  appropriate.	   I	  will	   consider	   there	   to	  be	  an	   interference	   if	   an	   act	   is	  motivated	   by	   a	   sincere	   religious	   conviction,	   provided	  that	  there	  is	  an	  close	  connection	  between	  the	  act	  and	  the	  belief	  and	  there	  is	  more	  than	   a	   de	   minimis	   burden.	   Eweida	   v	   British	   Airways	   is	   difficult	   in	   this	   respect.35	  Although	  Eweida	  wanted	  to	  wear	  a	  cross	  visible	   to	  others	  at	  work	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  her	  Christian	  faith,	  she	  did	  not	  claim	  this	  was	  a	  strict	  religious	  obligation.	  However,	  it	  seemed	  to	  form	  part	  of	  a	  commitment	  to	  publicly	  demonstrating	  her	  faith	  and	  so	  this	  should	  be	  included.	  A	  case	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  line	  is	  that	  of	  some	  Quakers	  refusing	   to	   fill	   in	   the	   2011	   British	   census	   form.	   They	   objected	   because	   the	  processing	   of	   the	   data	  was	   to	   be	   done	   by	   Lockheed	  Martin,	   a	   company	   that	   also	  manufactures	   military	   equipment,	   and	   it	   therefore	   conflicted	   with	   their	   pacifist	  views.36	  In	   this	  case	   the	  obligation	   to	  complete	   the	  census	   is	   too	  remote	   from	  the	  religious	  belief	  in	  pacifism.	  	  	  What	   Lupu	   calls	   ‘atmospheric	   burdens’37	  should	   also	   not	   be	   included.	   Living	   in	   a	  society	   that	   does	   not	   generally	   share	   your	   beliefs	   may	  make	   living	   according	   to	  their	   precepts	   more	   difficult,	   but	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   failure	   to	   change	  society	   to	   conform	   to	   your	  beliefs	   constitutes	   an	   interference	  with	   rights.	  Merely	  being	  aware	  that	  people	  have	  different	  views	  on	  a	  matter	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  a	  right	   even	   if	   this	   causes	   offence.	   Therefore	   the	   mere	   existence	   of	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  cannot	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  religious	  rights.	  Similarly	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  equality	  rights,	  without	  more,	   for	   there	   to	  be	  public	  and	  private	  disapproval	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  [2010]	  ICR	  890.	  The	  case	  was	  taken	  to	  the	  ECtHR	  in	  Eweida	  v	  UK	  supra	  n.29.	  36	  ‘Pacifists	  and	  the	  Census	  Form’,	  The	  Guardian,	  30	  Jan	  2012	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jan/30/pacifists-­‐and-­‐the-­‐census-­‐form	  	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  	  	  37	  I.	  Lupu,	  ‘Where	  Rights	  Begin:	  The	  Problem	  of	  Burdens	  on	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  of	  Religion’	  (1989)	  102	  Harv	  L	  Rev	  933.	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homosexuality	   or	   same-­‐sex	   marriage.	   In	   the	   same	   way,	   mere	   exposure,	   without	  more,	  to	  religion	  or	  to	  anti-­‐religious	  views	  is	  not	  an	  interference.38	  	  	  Finally,	   although	   there	   should	   not	   be	   a	   strict	   rule	   preventing	   claims	   from	   being	  successful	   in	   employment,	   in	   truly	   voluntary	   situations,	   though,	   there	   can	   be	   no	  interference	  with	   freedom	  of	   religion.	   For	   example,	   if	   a	   person	   joins	   a	   university	  Christian	  Union,	  they	  cannot	  then	  complain	  that	  the	  society	  does	  not	  respect	  their	  atheist	   views	   by	   praying	   before	   each	  meeting.	   In	   this	   example	   the	   free	   choice	   to	  join	   and	   leave	   the	   society	   adequately	  protects	   freedom	  of	   religion.	  As	  Pichon	  and	  
Sajous	   illustrates	   though,	  most	   employment	   cannot	   be	   said	   to	   be	   truly	   voluntary,	  especially	   if	   circumstances	   change	   after	   an	   employee	   begins	   employment.	  However,	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   even	   in	   employment,	   there	   should	   not	   be	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  interference.	  For	  example,	   if	  a	  person	  willingly	  takes	  on	  a	   job	  when	  she	  is	  aware	  its	  whole	  nature	  conflicts	  with	  her	  conscience,	  for	  example	  the	  job	  is	  to	  provide	  Sunday	  cover	  or	  to	  work	  in	  an	  abortion	  clinic,	  she	  probably	  cannot	  accept	  it	  and	  subsequently	  claim	  an	  interference.	  	  	  Regarding	   the	   right	   not	   to	   be	   discriminated	   against,	   this	   evidently	   includes	  straightforward	   discrimination.	   For	   example,	   if	   a	   benefit	   is	   given	   to	   heterosexual	  couples	  but	  not	  to	  homosexual	  couples	  then	  there	  is	  an	  interference	  with	  the	  right.	  This	   right	   is	   also	   interfered	   with	   if	   a	   gay	   person	   does	   not	   receive	   the	   same	  treatment,	  even	  though	  she	  ultimately	  receives	  the	  same	  benefit.	  For	  example	   if	  a	  gay	   couple	   applies	   for	   a	   marriage	   licence	   and	   an	   employee	   refuses	   to	   grant	   it	  because	  of	  her	  beliefs	  but	   refers	   the	   application	   to	   a	   colleague,	   the	   couple’s	   right	  has	   still	   been	   infringed	   even	   if	   the	   licence	   is	   granted	  without	   delay.39	  The	   couple	  has	  not	  received	  equal	  treatment	  since	  they	  have	  not	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  have	  the	  licence	  granted	  by	  any	  available	  employee,	  as	  a	  heterosexual	  couple	  would	  have	  had.	  In	  addition	  to	  prohibiting	  discrimination	  by	  the	  state	  itself,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction,	   the	   right	   also	   requires	   the	   state	   to	   provide	   legal	   protection	   against	  some	  kinds	  of	  discrimination	  by	  private	  actors.40	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Other	  country-­‐specific	  constitutional	  rules	  may	  be	  relevant	  though	  –	  exposure	  to	  religious	  teachings	  in	  state	  schools	  may	  not	  violate	  the	  right	  to	  religious	  freedom	  but	  may	  well	  violate	  rules	  about	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state.	  39	  Although	  of	  course	  not	  necessarily	  violated.	  These	  issues	  are	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  40	  See	  e.g.	  Vriend	  v	  Alberta	  [1998]	  1	  SCR	  493.	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In	   the	  same	  way	  as	  atmospheric	  burdens	  against	   religion	  are	  not	   sufficient,	  mere	  disapproval	  of	  homosexuality	  is	  though	  not	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  an	  interference	  with	   rights.	   It	   is	  not	   an	   interference	   to	   receive	   social	  disapprobation,	   although	  of	  course	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  sincere	  and	  understandable	  hurt.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  harassment	  or	  hate	  speech	  that	  is	  so	  pervasive	  that	  it	  prevents	  people	  from	  being	  able	  to	  live	  freely	  could	  not	  be	  an	  interference.41	  	  	  However,	   in	   addition	   to	   protecting	   against	   interferences	   with	   the	   right	   per	   se,	  governments	  may	  also,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  sometimes	  legitimately	  act	  to	  promote	  social	  harmony	  and	  tolerance,	  even	  if	  discriminatory	  attitudes	  have	  not	  reached	  the	   level	  of	  an	   interference.	  As	  mentioned	   in	   the	   Introduction,	   there	  may	  be	  a	  desire	  to	  lessen	  cultural	  heterosexism	  and	  to	  promote	  equality	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  public	   policy.	   The	   state	   may	   seek	   to	   do	   this	   by	   such	   mechanisms	   as	   the	   Public	  Sector	  Equality	  Duty	   in	  British	   law.42	  This	   requires	  public	  authorities	   to	  have	  due	  regard	  to	  the	  need	  to	  eliminate	  discrimination,	  advance	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  and	  foster	  good	  relations	  between	  those	  who	  share	  a	  protected	  characteristic	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  	  	  Legitimate	  Aim	  	  Returning	  then	  to	  the	  proportionality	  test	  proper,	  the	  first	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  right	  has	  been	  infringed	  for	  a	  legitimate	  aim.	  This	  is	  a	  moral	  question	  which	  relies	  for	  answers	  on	  the	  constitutional	  or	  legal	  morality	  of	  a	  state	  and	  more	  generally	  on	  the	  morality	  inherent	  in	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  society.	  Some	  legitimate	  aims	  can	  be	  found	   explicitly	   in	   the	   constitution	   or	   other	   law	   granting	   the	   right.	   Others	   are	  implicit.	   Thus	   under	   the	   ECHR,	   the	   right	   to	  manifest	   a	   religion	   or	   belief	   may	   be	  restricted	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   public	   safety,	   the	   protection	   of	   public	   order,	   health	   or	  morals,	   or	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   and	   freedoms	   of	   others.	   In	   Canada,	   rights	  granted	  by	   the	   Charter	  may	  be	   subject	   to	   reasonable	   limits	   prescribed	  by	   law	   as	  can	   be	   demonstrably	   justified	   in	   a	   free	   and	   democratic	   society.	   In	   contrast,	   US	  constitutional	  rights	  are	  usually	  expressed	  in	  absolute	  terms.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  In	  97	  Members	  of	  the	  Gldani	  Congregation	  of	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  v	  Georgia	  (2008)	  46	  EHRR	  30,	  a	  campaign	  of	  intimidation	  against	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses,	  which	  the	  authorities	  did	  very	  little	  to	  prevent,	  was	  held	  to	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  Art	  9.	  There	  would	  have	  been	  an	  interference	  with	  Art	  8	  (right	  to	  respect	  for	  private	  and	  family	  life)	  if	  this	  had	  been	  aimed	  at	  gay	  people.	  42	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  s.149.	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In	   many	   of	   the	   cases	   discussed	   in	   this	   thesis,	   finding	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   will	   be	  straightforward	   since	   the	   aim	  will	   be	   to	   protect	   a	   right	   or	   at	   least	   an	   interest	   of	  another	  party,	  whether	  this	  is	  non-­‐discrimination	  or	  the	  right	  to	  manifest	  religious	  beliefs.	  In	  some	  cases	  though,	  the	  aim	  will	  be	  not	  to	  directly	  protect	  a	  right,	  but	  for	  example,	  to	  promote	  equality	  or	  tolerance	  more	  generally.	  This	  can	  potentially	  still	  be	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   since	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   better	   protect	   rights	   or	   to	   create	   a	  more	  harmonious	   society.43	  Tolerance,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   putting	   up	   with	   behaviour	   or	  expression	  thought	  wrong	  or	   immoral,	   is	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  a	   liberal	  democratic	  society.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	   it	  would	  be	   legitimate	   to	  require	  everyone	  to	  be	  ‘inclusive’	  and	  ‘non-­‐judgemental’.44	  	  That	  there	  must	  be	  limits	  to	  this	  being	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  becomes	  clearer	  when	  it	  is	  considered	   that	   promoting	   tolerance	   is	   closely	   linked	   to	   preventing	   offence.	   In	   a	  pluralistic	  multicultural	   society	   perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   few	   certainties	   is	   that	   almost	  any	   act	   could	   be	   potentially	   offensive	   to	   somebody.	   Permitting	   offence	   to	   be	   a	  legitimate	   reason	   for	   restricting	   rights	   is	   thus	   problematic.45	  Nevertheless	   there	  may	   be	   good	   reason,	   partly	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   social	   harmony,	   to	   allow	  restrictions	   of	   some	   kinds	   of	   offensive	   acts	   (although	   of	   course	   any	   restriction	  would	  still	  have	  to	  pass	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test).	  	  	  
Hammond	  v	  DPP46	  raises	   these	   issues	  starkly.	  An	  elderly	  street	  preacher	  carried	  a	  sign	   saying	   ‘Stop	   Immorality,	   Stop	  Homosexuality,	   Stop	   Lesbianism’	   and	   ‘Jesus	   is	  Lord’.	   He	   attracted	   a	   very	   hostile	   crowd	   and	  was	   arrested.	   He	  was	   subsequently	  found	  guilty	  of	  displaying	  a	  sign	  which	  is	  ‘threatening,	  abusive	  or	  insulting’	  within	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  person	  ‘likely	  to	  be	  caused	  harassment,	  alarm	  or	  distress’	  under	  s.5	  of	  the	  Public	  Order	  Act	   1986.	   The	  Divisional	   Court	   rejected	  his	   appeal,	   holding	   that	  the	   restriction	   of	   Hammond’s	   Art	   10	   rights	   was	   necessary	   for	   the	   prevention	   of	  disorder	  or	   crime	  because	   the	  police	   feared	  an	  outbreak	  of	   violence,	   given	   that	   a	  group	  of	  30	   to	  40	  people	   ‘arguing	  and	  shouting’	  had	  gathered	  around	  him.	  While	  his	   arrest	   was	   on	   public	   order	   grounds,	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   offence	   focused	   on	  whether	   the	   sign	   was	   ‘insulting’.47	  Although	   the	   Act	   required	   that	   the	   sign	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Barak,	  supra	  n.	  1,	  Ch	  9.	  44	  F.	  Furedi,	  On	  Tolerance:	  A	  Defence	  of	  Moral	  Independence	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2011)	  7.	  45	  See	  S.	  Tsakyrakis	  supra	  n.19.	  46	  [2004]	  EWHC	  69	  (Admin).	  47	  The	  law	  has	  subsequently	  been	  amended	  by	  the	  Crime	  and	  Courts	  Act	  2013	  s.57(2)	  to	  remove	  ‘insulting’	  so	  it	  would	  now	  have	  to	  be	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  sign	  was	  ‘threatening	  or	  abusive’.	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‘within	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  person	  likely	  to	  be	  caused	  harassment,	  alarm	  or	  distress’	  and	  it	  was	   a	   defence	   that	   the	   conduct	  was	   ‘reasonable’,	   such	   a	   focus	   on	   insult	   is	   still	  unsatisfactory.	  	  While	   the	   sign	   was	   offensive,	   this	   in	   itself	   should	   not	   be	   enough	   for	   it	   to	   be	  prohibited.	   As	   Weinstein	   puts	   it,	   ‘building	   a	   tolerant	   society,	   particularly	   about	  matters	   as	   essential	   to	   one’s	   identity	   as	   sexual	   orientation,	   is	   a	   laudable	   societal	  goal.	   But…	   promoting	   tolerance	   is	   insufficient	   grounds	   for	   suppressing	   public	  discourse	  critical	  of	  homosexuality’.48	  In	  an	  often	  quoted	  statement49	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  stated	   that	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	  of	   expression	   includes	   the	   right	   to	   express	   ideas	  which	  ‘shock,	  disturb	  or	  offend’.50	  While	  the	  fear	  of	  public	  disorder	  is	  important	  to	  the	  case,	  the	  magistrates’	  statement	  that	  there	  was	  a	  ‘need	  to	  show	  tolerance	  to	  all	  sections	  of	  society’	  is	  extremely	  questionable	  in	  this	  context,	  even	  leaving	  aside	  the	  moral	   paralysis	   that	   would	   result	   if	   this	  maxim	  were	   to	   be	   taken	   seriously.	   It	   is	  unclear	   why	   individuals,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   state,	   must	   necessarily	   demonstrate	  such	  tolerance	  or	  why	  insult	  should	  necessarily	  be	  prohibited.	  	  	  However,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   all	   hate	   speech	   should	   be	   permissible	   or	   that	  some	  ‘public	  discourse	  critical	  of	  homosexuality’	  should	  not	  be	  suppressed.	  There	  is	   potentially	   a	   legitimate	   state	   interest	   in	   this	   area.	   The	   difficulty	   of	   course	   is	  deciding	  where	  to	  draw	  the	  line.	  The	  concept	  of	  offence	  does	  not	  provide	  adequate	  guidance,	   because	   it	   is	   subjective	   and	   variable.	   Waldron	   instead	   argues	   for	   an	  approach	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  dignity,	  rather	  than	  offensiveness.	  By	  dignity	  he	  means	   ‘upholding	   against	   attack	   a	   shared	   sense	   of	   the	   basic	   elements	   of	   each	  person’s	   status,	   dignity	   and	   reputation	   as	   a	   citizen	  or	  member	  of	   society	   in	   good	  standing.’ 51 	  This	   is	   similar,	   although	   perhaps	   broader,	   to	   the	   ‘personhood’	  argument	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  Introduction.52	  In	  doing	  so,	  Waldron	  prefers	  a	  change	  in	   terminology	   from	   hate	   speech,	   which	   he	   argues	   focuses	   too	   much	   on	   the	  subjective	  emotion	  of	  the	  speaker,	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  group	  libel.	  He	  argues	  this	  better	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  J.	  Weinstein,	  ‘Extreme	  Speech,	  Public	  Order,	  and	  Democracy:	  Lessons	  from	  The	  Masses’	  in	  I.	  Hare	  and	  J.	  Weinstein	  (eds),	  Extreme	  Speech	  and	  Democracy	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009).	  49	  Although	  perhaps	  often	  not	  complied	  with.	  See	  e.g.	  G.	  Letsas,	  ‘Two	  Concepts	  of	  the	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation’	  	  (2006)	  16	  OJLS	  705.	  50	  Handyside	  v	  UK	  (1976)	  1	  EHRR	  737.	  51	  J.	  Waldron,	  The	  Harm	  in	  Hate	  Speech	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2012)	  47.	  52	  See	  supra	  at	  p15-­‐17.	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encompasses	   the	   type	   of	   harm	   that	   should	   be	   prohibited,	   by	   focusing	   on	  fundamental	  obligations	  to	  individuals,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  offence.	  	  	  An	  example	  of	  where	  it	  would	  be	  legitimate	  to	  prohibit	  such	  speech	  is	  in	  Vejdeland	  
v	  Sweden.53	  In	  that	  case,	  four	  men	  were	  convicted	  under	  hate	  speech	  legislation	  for	  placing	   leaflets	   in	   a	   school.	   The	   leaflets	   called	   homosexuality	   a	   ‘deviant	   sexual	  proclivity’	   which	   had	   a	   ‘morally	   destructive	   effect	   on	   the	   substance	   of	   society’,	  stated	  that	  homosexuals	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  spread	  of	  HIV	  and	  AIDS	  and	  that	  ‘homosexual	  lobby	  organisations’	  played	  down	  paedophilia	  and	  wanted	  to	  legalise	  it.	   This	   is	   evidently	   extremely	   offensive,	   particularly	   bearing	   in	   mind	   its	  unauthorised	  distribution	  in	  a	  non-­‐public	  place	  and	  its	  intended	  teenage	  audience.	  It	  also	  undermined	  the	  dignity	  of	  gay	  people	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  Hammond	  does	  not.	  Differing	   opinions	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   something	   is	   immoral,	   even	   something	   as	  important	  as	  sexuality,	  do	  not	  intrinsically	  deny	  dignity	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  abusive	  statements	  do	  in	  Vejdeland.	  	  Preserving	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   acting	   in	   a	   potentially	   offensive	   way	   protects	   both	  sides	  in	  this	  context	  to	  some	  degree.	  As	  the	  ECtHR	  said	  in	  Dudgeon	  v	  UK,54	  ‘although	  members	   of	   the	   public	   who	   regard	   homosexuality	   as	   immoral	   may	   be	   shocked,	  offended	  or	  disturbed	  by	  the	  commission	  by	  others	  of	  private	  homosexual	  acts,	  this	  cannot	  on	  its	  own	  warrant	  the	  application	  of	  penal	  sanctions	  when	  it	  is	  consenting	  adults	   alone	   who	   are	   involved.’ 55 	  Similarly,	   preventing	   all	   religiously	   based	  discussion	  or	   teaching	  opposed	  to	  homosexuality	  or	   legal	  rights	   for	  gay	  people	   in	  order	   to	   prevent	   offence	  would	   not	   be	   legitimate.	   As	  was	   held	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  Equality	   Act	   (Sexual	   Orientation)	   Regulations	   (Northern	   Ireland)	   2006	   in	   Re	  
Christian	   Institute,56	  it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   that	   such	   speech	  may	   involve	   the	  manifestation	   of	   a	   religious	   belief.	   The	   Court	   there	   held	   that	   there	   had	   been	   a	  failure	   to	   consider	   the	   danger	   that	   ‘explanations	   of	   sincerely	   held	   doctrinal	  beliefs’57	  could	  breach	  the	  Regulations	  as	  they	  stood	  at	  the	  time.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Application	  no.	  1813/07	  (9th	  Feb	  2012).	  54	  (1982)	  4	  EHRR	  149.	  55	  Ibid.	  at	  167.	  56	  [2008]	  IRLR	  36.	  57	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  40,	  quoting	  from	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  and	  House	  of	  Commons	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  Human	  Rights	  Sixth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2006-­‐07	  on	  Legislative	  Scrutiny:	  Sexual	  Orientation	  Regulations.	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While	   preventing	   mere	   offence	   is	   not	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   and	   the	   right	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   does	   not	   include	   a	   right	   not	   to	   be	   confronted	   with	   criticism,	   it	  should	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   may	   be	   other	   legitimate	   aims	   in	   some	   situations	  involving	  offensive	  speech	  or	  actions.	  Employers	  for	  example	  may	  have	  legitimate	  interests	  in	  controlling	  the	  actions	  of	  their	  employees	  at	  work	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  efficiency	  or	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  ethos,	  and	  thus	  there	  may	  be	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  in	  prohibiting	  some	  conduct	  or	  expression	  at	  work	  on	  this	  basis.	  	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  protecting	  the	  right	  to	  manifest	  religious	  beliefs,	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  also	  gives	  some	  protection	  against	  discrimination.	  ‘A	  law	  whose	  only	  purpose	  is	  to	  discriminate	  is	  not	  for	  a	  proper	  purpose’.58	  This	  is	  particularly	  clear	  if	  the	   discrimination	   is	   constitutionally	   prohibited,	   but	   applies	   beyond	   this.	   An	  important	   word	   in	   the	   sentence	   quoted	   is	   only.	   A	   law	   providing	   for	   affirmative	  action	   for	   marginalised	   ethnic	   minorities	   in	   jobs	   where	   they	   are	   under-­‐represented,	  discriminates	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  but	  is	  not	  designed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  discrimination.	  Its	  purposes	  are	  social	  inclusion,	  ameliorating	  historic	  injustices	  and	  so	  on.	  That	  a	  law’s	  purpose	  is	  only	  to	  discriminate	  can	  be	  implicit	  in	  its	  terms.	  
Romer	  v	  Evans59	  is	  such	  an	  example.	  An	  amendment	  to	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Colorado	  prohibited	  all	   legislative,	  executive	  or	   judicial	  action	  which	   ‘entitle[d]	  any	   person	   or	   class	   of	   persons	   to	   have	   or	   claim	   any	   minority	   status,	   quota	  preferences,	   protected	   status	   or	   claim	   of	   discrimination’	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   sexual	  orientation.	  Kennedy	  J	  held	  that	  ‘laws	  of	  the	  kind	  now	  before	  us	  raise	  the	  inevitable	  inference	   that	   the	  disadvantage	   imposed	   is	  born	  of	  animosity	   toward	   the	  class	  of	  persons	  affected…	  desire	  to	  harm	  a	  politically	  unpopular	  group	  cannot	  constitute	  a	  
legitimate	  governmental	   interest’.60	  Such	   a	   reason	   violates	   the	   principle	   of	   equal	  respect	  owed	  to	  all	  in	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  	  More	  difficult	  questions	  arise	  over	  when	  it	   is	   legitimate	  to	  enforce	  morality,	  what	  Perry	   has	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘protecting	   moral	   truth’. 61 	  It	   is	   of	   course	   true	   that	  governments	   are	   motivated	   to	   act	   for	   moral	   reasons.	   The	   political	   answer	   that	  something	  must	  be	  prevented	  or	  done	  ‘because	  this	  is	  wrong’	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   laws	   and	   policies	   from	   international	   development	   to	   laws	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Barak	  supra	  n.	  1	  at	  251.	  59	  517	  US	  620	  (1996).	  	  60	  Ibid.	  at	  634	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  61	  M.	  Perry,	  The	  Political	  Morality	  of	  Liberal	  Democracy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010).	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prohibiting	  child	  pornography.	  In	  fact,	  it	  would	  be	  concerning	  if	  government	  action	  was	   not	   taken	   for	   moral	   purposes.	   Therefore	   by	   their	   very	   nature	   governments	  constantly	   demonstrate	   moral	   values.	   As	   Greenawalt	   argues,	   by	   going	   to	   war	   a	  country	   rejects	   the	   religious	   view	   that	   all	   killing	   violates	   God’s	   wishes	   and	   by	  providing	  higher	   education	   equally	   to	  men	  and	  women	   rejects	   the	   religious	   view	  that	   women	   should	   ‘occupy	   themselves	   with	   domestic	   tasks’.62	  These	   principles	  may	  well	  be	  rejected	  explicitly	  as	  well,	  for	  example	  in	  state	  education.	  This	  though	  is	  not	  an	  illegitimate	  basis	  for	  restricting	  relevant	  rights,	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  	  Firstly,	   the	   government	   does	   not	   go	   to	   war	   to	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   the	  wrongness	  of	  a	  moral	  or	  religious	  view.	  As	  before	  when	  discussing	  discrimination,	  this	  discussion	  is	  only	  relevant	  if	  it	  only	  involves	  ‘moral	  disagreements	  that	  do	  not	  implicate	   a	   legitimate	   governmental	   interest’. 63 	  If	   there	   are	   other	   reasons	   a	  government	   can	   point	   to,	   the	   fact	   that	  moral	   concerns	   are	   involved	   is	   irrelevant.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  restriction	  on	  enforcing	  morality	  does	  not	  apply	  where	  actual	  harm	  is	  caused.	  If	  harm	  will	  be	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  caused	  to	  another	  person	  then	  preventing	   it	   will	   always	   be	   a	   legitimate	   aim.	   For	   example,	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	  might	  be	  outlawed	  because	  of	  a	   feeling	   that	  such	  discrimination	   is	  wrong.	   The	   reason	   why	   it	   is	   considered	   wrong	   is	   a	   moral	   reason:	   that	  homosexuality	  is	  a	  morally	  neutral	  trait,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  its	  wrongness	  is	  so	  minor	  that	  it	  does	  not	  justify	  discrimination.	  None	  of	  this,	  though,	  means	  that	  the	  state	  is	  impermissibly	  acting	   for	  moral	  reasons;	   the	  state	  acts	   to	  prevent	  harm	  caused	  by	  that	   discrimination.	   Secondly,	   in	   these	   kinds	   of	   situations	   the	   government	   action	  only	   places	   ‘atmospheric	   burdens’	   on	   the	   belief.	   It	   does	   not	   coerce	   belief	   or	  behaviour.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  atmospheric	  burdens	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  constitute	  an	   interference	  with	   a	   right.	   Finally,	   because	   this	   is	   simply	   an	   inevitable	   part	   of	  governing,	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  violation.	  	  	  However,	  the	  prohibition	  on	  acting	  to	  enforce	  morality	  does	  mean	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	   ‘promoting	   a	   Christian	  way	   of	   life’	   for	   example	  would	   be	   illegitimate.64	  Kumm	  argues	   that,	   ‘there	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   any	   court	   in	   a	   liberal	   constitutional	  democracy	   would	   insist	   that	   any	   reasons	   that	   depend	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  K.	  Greenawalt,	  ‘Five	  Questions	  about	  Religion	  Judges	  are	  Afraid	  to	  Ask’	  in	  N.	  Rosenblum	  (ed),	  Obligations	  of	  Citizenship	  and	  Demands	  of	  Faith:	  Religious	  Accommodation	  in	  Pluralist	  
Democracies	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  63	  Perry	  supra	  n.61	  at	  93.	  64	  M.	  Kumm,	  ‘Political	  Liberalism	  and	  the	  Structure	  of	  Rights’	  in	  G.Pavlakos	  (ed.),	  Law,	  
Rights	  and	  Discourse	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2007)	  142-­‐6.	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Christian	  way	  of	  life	  is	  the	  right	  way	  of	  life	  are	  simply	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  issue’.65	  The	  Introduction	  explained	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  conscience.	  This	  is	  another	   facet	   to	   this	   idea.	   As	   Kumm	   states,	   ‘imposing	   upon	   the	   individual	   a	  particular	   conception	   of	   the	   good	   life	   through	   the	   coercive	   means	   of	   the	   law’	   is	  illegitimate.66	  Perry	   similarly	   argues	   that	   if	   the	   state	  were	   allowed	   to	   legislate	   on	  the	  basis	  of	  morality,	  it	  would	  take	  away	  this	  right.	  These	  two	  arguments	  both	  have	  the	   same	   basic	   idea:	   that	   people	   are	   free	   to	   define	   their	   own	   aims	   and	   thoughts	  about	  the	  deepest	  aspects	  of	  life.	  As	  Kumm	  puts	  it,	  ‘it	  is	  not	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  public	  authorities	  to	  prescribe	  what	  the	  ultimate	  orientations	  and	  commitments	  of	  an	  individual	  should	  be.’67	  	  	  Preventing	   ‘moral	  harm’,	   that	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   certain	  behaviour	   is	  harmful	   to	   the	  ‘moral	   health’	   of	   participants,	   would	   also	   not	   be	   a	   legitimate	   aim.	   This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   only	   precise	   tangible	   harms	   are	   relevant.	   Aiming	   to	   prevent	   symbolic	  harm	  can	  be	  a	  legitimate	  reason.	  For	  example,	  allowing	  the	  redistribution	  of	  tasks	  in	   employment	   because	   an	   employee	   objects	   to	   an	   aspect	   of	   their	   job	   for	  discriminatory	   reasons,	   causes	   no	   tangible	   harm	   where	   this	   does	   not	   affect	   the	  service	  given.	  The	  service	  is	  not	  denied	  or	  delayed.	  However,	  there	  is	  still	  symbolic	  harm	  as	  the	  user	  is	  not	  receiving	  the	  service	  on	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  others	  and	  thus	  is	  denied	  formal	  equality.	  Preventing	  this	  will	  be	  a	  legitimate	  aim.	  	  None	   of	   this	   means	   that	   religious	   exemptions	   to	   non-­‐discrimination	   laws	   are	  necessarily	   illegitimate.	  Crucially	   they	  have	   the	  aim	  not	  of	  advancing	  religion:	   the	  type	   of	   religious	   belief	   in	   question	   is	   usually	   irrelevant.	   Instead	   their	   aim	   is	   to	  advance	   religious	   freedom,	   and	   thereby	   actually	   advance	   the	   type	   of	   freedom	  threatened	  by	  morally	  based	  legislation.	  	  Rational	  Connection	  	  The	  second	   issue	   is	   that	  of	  rational	  connection	  or	  suitability.	  This	   is	  a	   fairly	  weak	  factual	  test:	  is	  the	  measure	  capable	  of	  advancing	  the	  legitimate	  aim	  put	  forward	  for	  it?68	  It	   does	  not	   require	   that	   the	  measure	   completely	   fulfil	   the	  purpose	  or	  matter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Ibid.	  at	  143-­‐4.	  	  66	  Ibid.	  at	  142.	  67	  Ibid.	  	  68	  R.	  Alexy,	  ‘Constitutional	  Rights,	  Balancing	  and	  Rationality’	  (2003)	  16	  Ratio	  Juris	  131.	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that	   another	   measure	   might	   fulfil	   the	   aim	   more	   efficiently.	   This	   compares	   to	  rational	  basis	  review	  in	  US	  law.	  In	  practice,	  cases	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  fail	  at	  this	  stage.	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  failure	  on	  this	  ground,	  however,	  was	  Benner	  v	  Canada	  (Secretary	  of	  
State).69	  The	  citizenship	  rules	  for	  children	  born	  before	  1977	  meant	  that	  the	  child	  of	  a	   Canadian	   father	   or	   unmarried	   mother	   who	   was	   born	   abroad	   could	   acquire	  Canadian	  citizenship	  at	  birth.	  The	  child	  of	  a	  married	  Canadian	  mother	  had	  to	  apply	  for	   citizenship.	   This	   process	   included	   swearing	   an	   oath	   of	   allegiance	   and	  passing	  criminal	   and	   security	   checks.	   Benner	   had	   serious	   criminal	   convictions	   and	   was	  denied	   citizenship.	   The	   legitimate	   aim	   claimed	   was	   to	   help	   ensure	   the	   safety	   of	  Canadian	   citizens,	   which	   was	   clearly	   legitimate.	   However,	   this	   had	   no	   rational	  connection	   to	   a	   discriminatory	   policy:	   there	   was	   no	   reason	   why	   the	   children	   of	  Canadian	   mothers	   would	   pose	   more	   of	   a	   risk	   than	   the	   children	   of	   Canadian	  fathers.70	  	  In	  some	  cases	  though	  there	  may	  be	  arguments	  between	  the	  parties	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  measure	  does	  in	  fact	  advance	  the	  aim.	  Some	  discretion	  will	  be	  given	  to	  the	  government	  but	  the	  amount	  is	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  policy	  question	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  question.71	  	  	  Necessity	  	  The	  third	  issue	  is	  that	  of	  necessity	  or	  no	  less	  restrictive	  means.	  A	  measure	  will	  be	  ‘necessary’	   if	   there	   is	   no	  other	  measure	  which	  would	   impair	   the	   right	   to	   a	   lesser	  degree	  while	  equally	  fulfilling	  the	  conflicting	  purpose.	  However,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  state	  to	  decide	  what	  level	  of	  achievement	  of	  the	  purpose	  they	  wish	  to	  attain.72	  If	  there	  is	  another	  measure	  which	  would	  interfere	  with	  the	  right	  less	  but	  not	  equally	  fulfil	  the	  purpose	   then	   the	   measure	   will	   not	   fail	   this	   test. 73 	  It	   therefore	   requires	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  [1997]	  1	  SCR	  358.	  70	  This	  policy	  existed	  for	  historical	  reasons:	  originally	  only	  fathers	  could	  pass	  citizenship	  onto	  their	  children.	  The	  law	  was	  then	  amended	  to	  somewhat	  remedy	  this.	  However	  as	  Kumm	  argues	  ‘traditions,	  conventions	  and	  preferences’	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  a	  legitimate	  aims	  unless	  they	  are	  linked	  to	  ‘a	  plausible	  policy	  concern’.	  (M.	  Kumm,	  ‘The	  Idea	  of	  Socratic	  Contestation	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Justification:	  The	  Point	  of	  Rights-­‐Based	  Proportionality	  Review’	  (2010)	  4	  Law	  &	  Ethics	  of	  Human	  Rights	  141,	  159)	  Security	  reasons	  were	  all	  that	  was	  left	  for	  the	  Canadian	  government.	  71	  Grimm	  supra	  n.7	  at	  390.	  	  72	  J.	  Rivers,	  ‘Proportionality,	  Discretion	  and	  the	  Second	  Law	  of	  Balancing’,	  in	  G.Pavlakos	  (ed.),	  Law,	  Rights	  and	  Discourse	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2007).	  73	  Alexy,	  supra	  n.3	  at	  397-­‐401.	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consideration	   of	   hypothetical	   solutions.	   As	   discussed	   above	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
Oakes	   test,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   separate	   this	   from	   the	  proportionality	   stage.	   It	  does	  not	  require	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  policies	  which	  affect	  the	  purpose	  to	  differing	  degrees.	   The	   existence	   of	   other	   policies	   which	   are	   not	   as	   effective,	   but	   are	   less	  rights-­‐restrictive,	  may	  though	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  proportionality	  test.	  	  	  Necessity	  is	  aimed	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  overinclusivity.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  prohibit	  overinclusiveness	  if	  this	  is	  necessary	  to	  fulfil	  the	  purpose.	  If	  because	  of	  impossible	  difficulties	  of	  administration	  it	  is	  only	  possible	  to	  be	  under-­‐	  or	  over-­‐	  inclusive,	  over-­‐inclusivity	   is	   permitted.	   For	   example,	   security	  measures	   at	   airports	   such	   as	   body	  and	   luggage	   scanners	   are	   aimed	   at	   preventing	   terrorist	   and	   other	   attacks.	   Since	  there	   is	   no	  way	   a	   priori	   to	   fully	   distinguish	   those	  who	   are	   intent	   on	   committing	  such	  acts	  from	  others,	  such	  a	  policy	  must	  be	  necessarily	  over-­‐inclusive	  and	  there	  is	  no	  less	  restrictive	  means	  that	  can	  be	  used.	  	  	  Balancing	  	  Alexy	   gives	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	   balancing	   stage	   should	   be	   carried	   out.	  The	  most	   important	  aspect	  of	   this	   is	  his	  Law	  of	  Balancing,	  which	   states	   that:	   ‘the	  greater	  the	  degree	  of	  non-­‐satisfaction	  of,	  or	  detriment	  to,	  one	  principle,	  the	  greater	  must	  be	  the	  importance	  of	  satisfying	  the	  other.’74	  Thus	  the	  more	  a	  right	  is	  infringed,	  the	   more	   justification	   there	   must	   be	   for	   doing	   so.75	  Essentially	   then,	  the	   concept	  requires	  the	  extent	  and	  seriousness	  of	  the	  interference	  to	  be	  balanced	  against	  the	  importance	   of	   the	   conflicting	   interests	   and	   prohibits	   measures	   that	   impose	   a	  disproportionate	  burden.	  	  
Klatt	  and	  Meister,	  drawing	  on	  Alexy’s	  work,	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  three	  stages	  to	  the	  balancing	  process.	  These	  are:	  
1. Establishing	  the	  degree	  of	  infringement	  with	  a	  human	  right	  2. Establishing	  the	   importance	  of	  satisfying	  the	  competing	  principle	   [this	  may	  be	  another	  right	  or	  the	  public	  interest]	  3. Establishing	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  importance	  of	  satisfying	  the	  competing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Ibid.	  at	  102.	  75	  Rivers	  supra	  n.72.	  
	   79	  
principle	  justifies	  the	  infringement	  with	  the	  human	  right.76	  	  	  In	   establishing	   the	  degree	   of	   the	   infringement	  with	   the	   right,	   Alexy	  distinguishes	  between	  light,	  moderate	  and	  serious	  interferences.	  There	  is	  though,	  as	  he	  states,	  no	  necessary	   reason	   for	   a	   triadic	   scale,	   other	   than	   ease	   of	   use	   compared	   to	   a	  more	  complex	  one.77	  Therefore,	  while	  the	  thesis	  will	  consider	  the	  degree	  of	  infringement	  of	  the	  right,	   it	  will	  not	  assign	  a	  precise	  category	  to	  this,	  since	  the	  categories	  really	  represent	  points	  on	  a	  sliding	  scale.	  	  	  The	   second	  stage	   requires	  assessment	  not	  only	  of	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  aim,	  but	  also	   how	   likely	   it	   is	   that	   the	   consequences	   sought	   to	   be	   avoided	   will	   result.	   In	  considering	  this,	  Alexy’s	  Second	  Law	  of	  Balancing	  comes	  into	  play.	  This	  states	  that,	  ‘the	  more	  heavily	  an	  interference	  in	  a	  constitutional	  right	  weighs,	  the	  greater	  must	  be	  the	  certainty	  of	  its	  underlying	  premisses’.78	  	  	  At	   the	   third	   stage,	   these	   two	   considerations	   are	   balanced	   against	   each	   other.	  Balancing	   in	   this	  context	   therefore	  clearly	  means	   ‘ad	  hoc’	   rather	   than	   ‘categorical	  balancing’.79	  That	   is,	   the	  enquiry	   is	  not	  about	  whether	  a	  right	  or	  principle	   is	  more	  important	   than	   another	   in	   general,	   but	   which	   right	   is	   more	   important	   in	   this	  specific	   context.	   For	   example,	   the	   right	   to	   life	   is	   generally	   considered	   more	  important	  than	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  a	  family	  life,	  but	  it	  may	  not	  be	  in	  a	  specific	  situation.	   The	   balancing	   test	   therefore	   is	   only	   concerned	   with	   marginal	   benefits	  and	   disbenefits	   –	   the	   marginal	   decrease	   in	   the	   right	   compared	   to	   the	   marginal	  increase	  in	  the	  opposing	  interest	  or	  right.	  	  
In	   summary,	   as	   Grimm	   states,	   the	   balancing	   test	   requires	   consideration	   of	   the	  following:	  
1. How	  deeply	  the	  right	  is	  infringed	  2. How	  serious	  the	  danger	  for	  the	  good	  protected	  by	  the	  law	  is	  	  3. How	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  the	  danger	  will	  materialise	  	  
4. The	   degree	   to	  which	   the	   impugned	   law	  will	   protect	   the	   good	   against	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  M.	  Klatt	  and	  M.	  Meister,	  The	  Constitutional	  Structure	  of	  Proportionality	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012)	  57.	  77	  Alexy	  supra	  n.3	  at	  408.	  78	  Ibid.	  at	  418.	  79	  S.	  Evans	  and	  A.	  Stone	  Sweet,	  ‘Balancing	  and	  Proportionality	  a	  Distinctive	  Ethic?’,	  Paper	  given	  at	  VIIth	  World	  Congress	  of	  the	  International	  Association	  of	  Constitutional	  Law,	  Athens,	  11-­‐15	  June	  2007.	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danger80 
While	   balancing	   is	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   the	   proportionality	   test,	   the	  metaphor	   of	  balancing	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   too	   far.	   Unlike	   the	   necessity	   test	   which	   is	   mainly	  factual,	   the	   balancing	   test	   is	   strongly	   normative.81	  There	   is	   no	   common	   metric	  against	   which	   the	   two	   interests	   are	   balanced.	   It	   is	   not	   like	   judging	   ‘whether	   a	  particular	   line	   is	   longer	   than	   a	   particular	   rock	   is	   heavy’.82	  Rather	   it	   is	   about	  assessing	  ‘normative	  considerations	  of	  comparative	  importance.’83	  	  
Proportionality	  and	  Conflicts	  Between	  Freedom	  of	  Religion	  and	  Non-­‐
Discrimination	  
	  There	   is	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   literature	   about	   the	   benefits	   or	   otherwise	   of	  proportionality.	   I	  will	  primarily	  discuss	   its	  benefits	   for	   the	  present	   context	  of	   the	  relationship	   between	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   although	  more	  general	   advantages	   of	   proportionality	   will	   also	   be	   considered.	   While	  proportionality	   is	   probably	   useful	   in	   many	   more	   contexts	   than	   the	   present,	   this	  would	   require	   examination	   beyond	   what	   is	   offered	   here	   and	   so	   my	   inquiry	   is	  limited.	  	  	  Conflicting	  Claims	  	  This	  discussion	  starts	  on	  the	  basis,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  that	  both	  sides’	  claims	   have	   value,	   but	   also	   that	   this	   issue	   is	   often	   characterised	   by	   distrust	   and	  animosity,	  amounting	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  a	  ‘culture	  war’,	  where	  neither	  side	  is	  likely	  to	  give	  up	  its	  demands.	  	  	  Even	   if	   both	   sides’	   claims	   are	   legitimate,	   this	   of	   course	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   they	  should	  necessarily	  be	  accorded	  equal	  weight	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  Even	  though	  there	  is	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  claim	  to	  live	  in	  accordance	  with	  one’s	  religious	  beliefs,	  that	  does	  not	   necessarily	  mean	   that	   a	   service	  provider	  may	  discriminate	  when	  providing	   a	  general	  service	  which	  is	  not	  obviously	   ‘sexualised’.84	  Similarly,	   the	  claim	  not	  to	  be	  discriminated	  against	  has	  value	  but	  will	  probably	  not	  be	  accepted	  where	  a	  religious	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  Scalia	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  in	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  Enterprises	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  897	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organisation	  wants	   to	  discriminate	   in	  appointing	   its	   religious	   leaders.	  We	  are	   left	  therefore	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   opposing	   valuable	   but	   varying	   claims.	  What	   is	   clear	   is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  full	  agreement	  on	  the	  morality	  of	  homosexuality	  at	  present	  and	  that	  some	   have	   religious	   objections	   to,	   for	   example,	   gay	   relationships.	   Evidently	   also,	  most	  gay	  people	  are	  not	  content	  with	  the	  less	  than	  equal	  situation	  which	  persists	  at	  present.	  What	  is	  also	  in	  flux	  is	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  society,	  including	  perhaps	  the	  diminution	  of	  its	  privileged	  role.	  	  
The	  previous	   chapter	  has	  demonstrated	   the	  problem	  of	  drawing	   categorical	   tests	  which	   only	   protect	   non-­‐discrimination	   or	   religious	   freedom	   rights	   in	   strictly	  defined	  categories,	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  particular	  circumstances	  of	  the	  situation.	  In	  contrast,	   under	   proportionality,	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   ‘optimise’	   the	   rights:	   to	   give	   the	  greatest	  protection	  of	  a	  right	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  other	  rights.	  Since	   these	   rights	   compete,	   each	   ‘limits	   the	   legal	   possibility	   of	   satisfying	   the	  other’.85	  Importantly,	  rights	   like	  non-­‐discrimination	  or	  freedom	  of	  religion	  are	  not	  all	   or	   nothing	   rules,	   but	   rather	   are	   principles	   that	   can	   be	   satisfied	   to	   varying	  degrees.	   When	   these	   rights	   compete,	   ‘this	   means	   neither	   that	   the	   outweighed	  principle	  is	   invalid	  nor	  that	  it	  has	  to	  have	  an	  exception	  built	   into	  it’86	  but	  that	  one	  right	  outweighs	  the	  other,	  according	  to	  its	  weight	  in	  the	  particular	  circumstances.	  	  	  Proportionality’s	  Relevance	  	  Proportionality	  is	  ideally	  suited	  for	  deciding	  these	  cases.	  It	  can	  provide	  a	  structure	  within	  which	   to	   fairly	   adjudicate	   complex	  and	  variable	  decisions	   and	  also	   reduce	  tensions,	  thereby	  lessening	  the	  culture	  wars	  problem.	  One	  of	  its	  main	  advantages	  is	  that	  it	  is	  context	  specific	  and	  fact	  specific.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  decisions	  are	  complex	  and	  variable	  means	  that	  a	  categorical	  rule	  is	   likely	   to	   fail	   to	   address	   the	   different	   nuances	   between	   them,	   as	   has	   been	  demonstrated.	   As	   both	   claims	   have	   value,	   it	   is	   not	   appropriate	   for	   one	   always	   to	  win	  over	  another.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  more	  important	  than	  freedom	  from	  discrimination	  is	  not	  one	  that	  can	  be	  answered	  in	  the	  abstract,	  but	   rather	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   particular	   problem.	   As	   Samuels	   has	   pointed	   out,	  proportionality	   requires	   contexualised	   reasoning,	   which	   ‘moves	   away	   from	   the	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  Alexy	  supra	  n.3	  at	  51.	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idea	   of	   rights	   as	   individualistic	   fixed	   entitlements	   that	   trump	   other	  considerations.’87	  	  As	  explained,	  the	  proportionality	  test	  is	  not	  about	  whether	  a	  right	  generally	  is	  more	  important	   than	   another	   as	   it	   only	   leads	   to	   a	   judgment	   for	   a	   particular	   fact	  situation.88	  Even	   then	   the	   inquiry	   is	   kept	   within	   strict	   bounds,	   since	   it	   only	   asks	  whether	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  of	  a	  particular	  measure	  is	  sufficient	  compared	  to	  the	  interference	   caused	   by	   the	   measure.89	  Such	   an	   approach	   not	   only	   highlights	   the	  actual	   dispute	   in	   issue,	   but	   this	   narrow	   focus	   also	   itself	   helps	   to	   reduce	   tension.	  Negotiation	   theory	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   benefits	   of	   ‘fractionating’	   conflicts.	   If	  conflicts	  over	  a	  large	  issue,	  here	  say	  the	  role	  and	  position	  of	  religion	  in	  society,	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  smaller	  issues,	  progress	  is	  more	  likely.90	  	  	  The	   opposite	   can	   also	   be	   true:	   too	   expansive	   a	   judgment	   can	   also	   spark	   severe	  tensions	   where	   these	   were	   manageable	   before.	   Nussbaum	   refers	   to	   an	   extreme	  example	  in	  the	  reaction	  to	  a	  case	  in	  India	  involving	  the	  rights	  of	  Muslim	  women	  to	  receive	  maintenance	  after	  divorce	  beyond	  the	  period	  of	  iddat	  recognised	  in	  Islamic	  law.91	  The	   Supreme	   Court	   judgment	   not	   only	   awarded	   the	   claimant	  maintenance	  but	  the	  (Hindu)	  Chief	  Justice	  interpreted	  Islamic	  sacred	  texts	  and	  criticised	  Islamic	  practices.	   This	   led	   to	   widespread	   protest,	   some	   violent,	   and	   its	   political	   use	   by	  Hindu	   fundamentalists	   to	   criticise	   Islam.	  92	  This	   is	   of	   course	   an	   unusual	   case,	   but	  the	  possibility	  of	  cases	  being	  used	  in	  such	  a	  way	  remains.	  	  Part	  of	  the	  ‘culture	  wars’	  problem	  is	  that	  one	  small	  decision	  becomes	  a	  marker	  for	  whether	  the	  courts,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  governmental	  and	  political	  system,	   accepts	   or	   rejects	   an	   entire	   way	   of	   thinking.	   However,	   under	  proportionality,	  a	  case	  can	  stand	  for	  only	  its	  own	  facts	  and	  not	  as	  a	  symbol	  for	  an	  entire	   cultural	   disagreement.	   Beatty	   refers	   to	   an	   Israeli	   case,	  Horev	   v	  Minister	   of	  
Transportation,93	  as	   a	   possible	   example	   of	   this.94	  The	   issue	   was	   whether	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  H.	  Samuels,	  ‘Feminizing	  Human	  Rights	  Adjudication:	  Feminist	  Method	  and	  the	  Proportionality	  Principle’	  (2013)	  21	  Fem	  Leg	  Stud	  39,	  44.	  88	  R.	  Alexy,	  ‘On	  Balancing	  and	  Subsumption’	  (2003)	  16	  Ratio	  Juris	  433.	  89	  Barak	  supra	  n.1	  at	  350-­‐2.	  90	  M.	  Benjamin,	  Splitting	  the	  Difference:	  Compromise	  and	  Integrity	  in	  Ethics	  and	  Politics	  (Lawrence:	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  1990).	  91	  Mohd.	  Ahmed	  Khan	  v	  Shah	  Bano	  Begum	  (1985)	  SCR	  (3)	  844.	  92	  M.	  Nussbaum,	  Women	  and	  Human	  Development:	  The	  Capabilities	  Approach	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  Ch	  3.	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  [1997]	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  51(4)	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could	   be	   banned	   in	   an	   ultra-­‐Orthodox	   street	   on	   the	   Sabbath.	   Barak	   J	   used	   an	  extremely	  fact-­‐specific	  proportionality	  analysis	  to	  resolve	  the	  case.	  He	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  street	  was	  closed	  all	  that	  would	  be	  required	  from	  non-­‐religious	  residents	  was	  a	   two-­‐minute	   detour,	   balanced	   against	   the	   right	   of	   the	   religious	   residents	   to	  tranquillity	   during	   prayer	   time.	   He	   did	   not	   permit	   closure	   on	   the	   whole	   of	   the	  Sabbath	  as	  had	  been	  claimed.	  It	  is	  therefore	  possible	  that,	  ‘the	  judicial	  inquiry	  thus	  turned	   a	   dispute	   that	   was	   viewed	   as	   a	   bitter	   cultural	   war	   and	   a	   matter	   of	  fundamental	  principle	   into	   a	   simple	   trade	  off	   that	  most	   reasonable	  people	  would	  accept’.95	  Since	   proportionality	   leads	   to	   a	   limited	   enquiry	  which	   does	   not	   involve	  repeated	  discussion	  of	  (much	   less	   judgment	  on)	  the	  morality	  of	  homosexuality	  or	  the	  morality	  of	  discriminatory	  religious	  beliefs	  generally,	  progress	  is	  more	  likely.96	  	  	  Although	  not	  suggesting	  that	  law	  can	  necessarily	  solve	  every	  problem,	  a	  Solomonic	  judgment,	  which	   looks	   in	  detail	  at	   the	  claims	  made,	  may	   in	  some	  cases	  be	  able	   to	  lessen	   tensions	   and	   resolve	   issues	   to	   the	   satisfaction,	   although	   not	   complete	  satisfaction,	   of	   the	   parties.	   Since	   it	   ‘emphasizes	   facts	   and	   questions	   of	   degree,	  rather	   than	   principles	   and	   categorical	   distinctions…	   [it]	   allows	   the	   judiciary	   to	  moderate	  the	  rhetorical	  exaggeration	  that	  characterizes	  how	  claims	  are	  presented	  in	  the	  political	  sphere’.97	  It	  is,	  as	  Barak	  puts	  it,	  ‘balancing	  writ	  small’.98	  	  	  
Gay	  Rights	  Coalition	  v	  Georgetown	  University99	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  certain	  kinds	  of	  judgments	   can	   reduce	   tensions.	  An	  LBG	  student	   society	  wished	   to	   receive	  official	  recognition	   at	   a	   Catholic	   university.	   This	  was	   opposed	  on	   the	   basis	   that	   it	  would	  endorse	   acts	   contrary	   to	   Catholic	   teaching.	   The	   deciding	   judgment	   separated	   the	  various	  elements	  of	  the	  society’s	  claim	  and	  held	  its	  real	  need	  was	  for	  the	  practical	  benefits	  of	  recognition	  (such	  as	  access	  to	  university	  resources	  in	  the	  form	  of	  room	  bookings,	  a	  postbox	  and	  so	  on),	  but	  that	  this	  could	  be	  achieved	  without	  university	  endorsement	  of	  their	  message.	  Thus	  Eskridge	  argues	  that	  the	  judge,	  by	  preventing	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  The	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  Rule	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  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  58-­‐60.	  95	  M.	  Cohen-­‐Eliya	  and	  I.	  Porat,	  ‘Proportionality	  and	  the	  Culture	  of	  Justification’	  (2011)	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Am	  J	  Comp	  L	  463,	  471.	  96	  C.	  Sunstein,	  ‘Incompletely	  Theorized	  Agreements’	  (1994)	  108	  Harv	  L	  Rev	  1733.	  97	  Cohen-­‐Eliya	  and	  Porat	  supra	  n.95	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  A.	  Barak,	  ‘Proportionality	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the	  case	   from	  being	  dominated	  by	  arguments	  on	   the	  rights	  or	  wrongs	  of	  Catholic	  policy,	  allowed	  a	  compromise	  to	  be	  reached	  which	  benefited	  both	  sides.100	  	  	  Of	   course	   disagreements	   still	   remained	   but	   this	   is	   in	   some	   way	   a	   benefit.	   The	  decision	   did	   not	   artificially	   end	   the	   debate	   by	   imposing	   a	   conclusion.	   Both	   sides	  could	   continue	   to	   express	   their	   different	  moral	   views	   through	   their	   policies	   and	  actions.	  After	  the	  case	  was	  decided,	  and	  after	  some	  extremely	  complicated	  political	  manoeuvring,	   the	   law	   was	   amended	   so	   that	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   law	   did	   not	  cover	   religious	   institutions	   such	  as	  Georgetown.	  Georgetown,	  however,	   still	   stuck	  to	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   agreements.101	  A	   workable	   compromise	   and	   dialogue	   must	  therefore	  have	  been	  established.	  It	  would	  be	  possible	  of	  course	  still	  to	  use	  the	  case	  as	   evidence	   of	   either	   the	   outdated	   homophobia	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church,	   or	   of	   the	  overweening	  power	  of	  the	  liberal	  state	  but	  this	  is	  more	  difficult	  when	  both	  parties	  are	  reconciled.	  	  
As	   Paterson	   puts	   it,	   ‘in	   reconciling	   the	   competing	   claims,	   the	   Court	   sought	   to	  accommodate	  both	  claims	  by	  way	  of	  an	  order	  carefully	  tailored	  to	   lessen	  the	  sum	  total	   of	   interest	   infringement	   such	   that	   the	   final	   result	  was	   as	   respectful	   of	   both	  interests	   as	   possible.’102	  While	   this	   case	   did	   not	   use	   a	   proportionality	   analysis,	  proportionality	  is	  inherently	  capable	  of	  ensuring	  such	  ‘respectful’	  judgments	  result,	  since	  proportionality	   requires	   rights	   to	  be	  optimised	  where	   they	   conflict.	  103	  Thus	  the	   result	   is	  not	   that	  one	   right	   applies	   completely	  and	  another	  does	  not,	  but	   that	  there	  is	  conciliation	  between	  them,	  where	  both	  rights	  are	  protected	  as	  far	  as	  they	  can	  be	  without	  damaging	  the	  other.	  	  	  I	  do	  not	  wish	   to	  hold	   this	  case	  out	  as	  an	  entirely	  unproblematic	  solution.	   It	  dates	  from	   1979	   and	   the	   District	   of	   Columbia	   was	   the	   first	   jurisdiction	   in	   the	   US	   to	  prohibit	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination.	  As	  Eskridge	  notes	  (himself	  previously	  a	  gay	  academic	  at	  Georgetown),	   it	   could	  be	  seen	  as	   leading	   to	  a	   separate	  but	  equal	  situation,	   which	   potentially	   understates	   the	   hurt	   felt	   by	   gay	   students	   in	   being	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treated	   differently.104	  Nevertheless,	   it	   demonstrates	   how	   judgments	   can	   lessen	  social	  tensions	  when	  decided	  on	  ‘minimal’105	  grounds.	  	  
Proportionality’s	  case-­‐specific	  nature	  also	  avoids	  some	  of	   the	  rhetorical	  problems	  associated	  with	  ‘slippery	  slope’	  arguments.	  Without	  underestimating	  the	  power	  of	  particular	  cases	  to	  be	  controversial,	  what	  can	  make	  a	  controversy	  far	  more	  heated	  are	   the,	   real	   or	   imagined,	   consequences	   of	   that	   decision.	   Part	   of	   the	   reason	  why	  these	  cases	  can	  fall	  so	  easily	  into	  the	  narrative	  of	  ‘culture	  wars’	  is	  because	  they	  are	  particularly	   characterised	   by	   rhetorical	   exaggeration.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	  
Horev	  became	  not	  just	  a	  dispute	  about	  the	  use	  of	  one	  street,	  but	  an	  argument	  about	  the	  cultural	  and	  religious	  nature	  of	  Israel,	  so	  a	  conflict	  about	  the	  policies	  of	  one	  Bed	  and	  Breakfast	  business	   for	  example,	  becomes	  a	  symbolic	  high-­‐level	  dispute	  about	  equality	   and	   the	   place	   of	   religion	   in	   the	   public	   sphere.	   However,	   if	   decisions	   are	  case-­‐specific,	   based	  on	   the	  particular	  balancing	  of	   the	   relevant	   facts,	   there	   is	   less	  room	  for	  such	  arguments	  because	  the	  result	  could	  always	  be	  different	  in	  different	  circumstances.	   Evidently	   these	   are	   controversial	   issues	   on	   which	   there	   is	   and	  should	   be	   considerable	   discussion.	   It	   is	   not	   suggested	   that	   proportionality,	   or	  indeed	  any	   legal	   test,	  should	   foreclose	  any	  of	   this	  debate	   in	  the	  public	  or	  political	  arenas.	  However,	  in	  a	  legal	  context,	  narrowing	  the	  debate	  can	  be	  beneficial.	  	  As	  well	  as	  being	  factually	  specific,	  proportionality	  is	  also	  factually	  contingent.	  This	  is	   relevant	   in	   ensuring	   that	   courts	   value	   and	   respect	   claimants,	   even	   if	   they	  ultimately	  lose.	  By	  factually	  contingent	  I	  mean	  that	  a	  decision	  is	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  a	   number	   of	   factors.	   Importantly,	   this	   means	   that	   winners	   and	   losers	   are	   not	  created	  permanently	  –	  the	  result	  may	  always	  be	  different	  in	  another	  case.	  As	  Stone	  Sweet	  and	  Mathews	  put	  it:	  	   ‘The	   move	   to	   balancing	   makes	   it	   clear:	   (a)	   that	   each	   party	   is	   pleading	   a	  constitutionally-­‐legitimate	   norm	   or	   value;	   (b)	   that,	   a	   priori,	   the	   court	   holds	  each	   of	   these	   interests	   in	   equally	   high	   esteem;	   (c)	   that	   determining	   which	  value	   shall	   prevail	   in	   any	   given	   case	   is	   not	   a	   mechanical	   exercise,	   but	   is	   a	  difficult	   judicial	   task	   involving	   complex	   policy	   considerations;	   and	   (d)	   that	  future	  cases	  pitting	  the	  same	  two	  legal	  interests	  against	  one	  another	  may	  well	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  W.	  Eskridge	  and	  G.	  Peller,	  ‘The	  New	  Public	  Law	  Movement:	  Moderation	  as	  a	  Postmodern	  Cultural	  Form’	  (1990)	  89	  Mich	  L	  Rev	  707.	  105	  C.	  Sunstein,	  One	  Case	  at	  a	  Time:	  Judicial	  Minimalism	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1999).	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be	  decided	  differently,	  depending	  on	  the	  facts.’106	  	  In	   deciding	   that	   both	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   freedom	   from	   discrimination	   are	  rights	  and	  therefore	  count	   in	   the	  balance,	  both	  sides	  are	  validated	  and	   feelings	  of	  exclusion	  can	  be	   lessened.	  The	  danger	  of	  a	  more	  categorical	   test	  or	   rule	   is	   that	   it	  not	   only	   creates	   ‘all-­‐out	   winners	   and	   losers’	   but	   also	   that	   it	   ‘delegitimates	   [the	  losing	   side’s]	   demands	   in	  principle,	   as	   against	   showing	  how	   they,	   alas,	   cannot	  be	  accommodated	   in	   practice,	   given	   other	   important	   such	   demands.	   Naturally,	   it	  breeds	  anger	  and	  alienation.’107	  	  	  This	   benefit	   can	   be	   demonstrated	   in	   other	   aspects	   of	   the	   proportionality	   test	   as	  well	   as	   the	   balancing	   test.	   A	   broad	   interpretation	   (although	   not	   part	   of	   the	  proportionality	  test,	  but	  as	  demonstrated	  above,	  linked	  to	  it)	  of	  interference	  means	  that	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  religious	  freedom	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  can	  be	  taken.	  The	  requirement	   of	   legitimate	   aim	   ensures	   that	   these	   rights	   are	   only	   limited	   for	  appropriate	   reasons,	   thus	   preventing	   restrictions	   based	   on	   mere	   animus	   and	  demonstrating	   that	   these	   rights	   are	   important.	   The	   least	   restrictive	   means	   test	  should	   be	   able	   to	   identify	   circumstances	   where	   a	   conflict	   can	   be	   avoided	   or	  lessened.	  Proportionality	   can	   thus	  be	  a	   conciliatory	  and	   ‘wounds-­‐healing’	   form	  of	  argumentation.108	  	  	  Proportionality’s	   fact	   specific	   nature	   is	   thus	   extremely	   important,	   for	   reasons	   of	  principle,	   and	   in	   its	  more	   practical	   effects	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   lessen	   tensions	   and	   to	  validate	  both	  sides’	  claims.	  	  Proportionality	  as	  Part	  of	  the	  Culture	  of	  Justification	  	  Another	  great	  advantage	  of	  proportionality	  is	  that	  it	  requires	  a	  body	  that	  seeks	  to	  restrict	   rights	   to	   provide	   sufficient	   and	   suitable	   justification	   to	   those	   affected	   by	  these	   acts. 109 	  Proportionality	   thus	   inherently	   requires	   deliberation	   and	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  Stone	  Sweet	  and	  J.	  Mathews,	  ‘Proportionality	  Balancing	  and	  Global	  Constitutionalism’	  	  (2008)	  47	  Colum	  J	  Transnat’l	  L	  73,	  88.	  107	  C.	  Taylor,	  ‘Living	  With	  Difference’	  in	  A.	  Allen	  and	  M.	  Regan	  (eds),	  Debating	  Democracy’s	  
Discontent:	  Essays	  on	  American	  Politics,	  Law,	  and	  Public	  Philosophy	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  218.	  108	  W.	  Sadurski,	  ‘”Reasonableness”	  and	  Value	  Pluralism	  in	  Law	  and	  Politics’	  in	  G.	  Bongiovanni	  et	  al.	  (eds),	  Reasonableness	  and	  Law	  (Dordrecht:	  Springer,	  2009)	  140.	  109	  Kumm,	  supra	  n.72.	  Although	  Chan	  has	  noted	  that	  courts	  sometimes	  reverse	  this	  burden	  of	  proof,	  this	  should,	  as	  she	  argues,	  be	  resisted,	  although	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  evidence	  demanded	  will	  vary:	  C.	  Chan,	  ‘Proportionality	  and	  Invariable	  Baseline	  Intensity	  of	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justification.110	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  ‘culture	  of	  justification’.	  What	  matters	  is	  not	   (or	   not	   only)	   who	   has	   the	   power	   to	   make	   a	   decision,	   as	   in	   a	   ‘culture	   of	  authority’,	  but	  why	  the	  decision	  was	  made.111	  	  
Calhoun	   argues	   that	   we	   should	   think	   about	   the	   ‘constitutional	   losers’	   in	  litigation.112	  It	  is	  of	  course	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  there	  will	  be	  winners	  and	   losers,	   and	   this	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   problematic,	   but	   she	   argues	   that	   judges	   have	  obligations	  to	  the	  parties	  beyond	  deciding	  fairly	  who	  should	  win	  and	  lose.	  Calhoun	  links	  this	  to	  the	   idea	  of	   ‘constitutional	  stature’,	  which	  all	   those	  who	  bring	  a	  rights	  case	   possess.	   Since	   they	   possess	   this	   constitutional	   stature,	   judges	   ‘should	   not	  characterize	  constitutional	  losers	  as	  valueless,	  as	  persons	  whose	  consent	  does	  not	  matter	   to	   judicial	   legitimacy,	   as	   wrongdoers	   rather	   than	   worthy	   and	   respected	  proponents	   of	   non-­‐frivolous	   constitutional	   arguments’.113	  Rather,	   the	   loser	   has	  both	   a	   right	   for	   the	   winner’s	   claim	   to	   be	   ‘justified	   on	   some	   ground	   found	  satisfactory	   to	  an	  outside	  arbiter’114	  and	   for	   the	  outside	  arbiter	   to	   justify,	   and	  not	  merely	   enforce,	   their	   decision	   on	   the	   loser.	   Otherwise	   this	   ‘violates	   justices’	  obligations	  to	  citizens’	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  ‘outrage’	  among	  those	  who	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  judgment,	  because	  they	  can	  correctly	  perceive	  that	  their	  claim	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  worthless.115	  	  By	  requiring	   justification,	  proportionality	  preserves	  the	   interests	  of	  constitutional	  losers	  by	  requiring	  that	  the	  state	  justify	  why	  the	  right	  has	  been	  burdened.	  It	  means	  that	   both	   claims	   are	   assessed	   and	   taken	   seriously.	   Furthermore	   the	   language	   of	  justification	  treats	  both	  sides	  as	  worthy	  of	  justification	  and	  takes	  parties’	  concerns	  seriously	  and	  as	  legitimate.116	  Reason	  giving	  treats	  people	  with	  respect	  as	  capable	  of	  making	  and	  understanding	  rational	  arguments.	  
Although	   to	   some	   extent	   justification	   is	   inherent	   in	   the	   idea	   of	   judgment	   giving,	  proportionality	   is	   particularly	   intimately	   connected	   with	   it.	   It	   provides	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Review	  (2013)	  33	  LS	  1.	  110	  R.	  Alexy,	  ‘Balancing,	  Constitutional	  Review,	  and	  Representation’	  (2005)	  3	  ICON	  572.	  See	  also	  Samuels	  supra	  n.87	  who	  argues	  that	  in	  doing	  so,	  proportionality	  has	  commonalities	  with	  feminist	  theory.	  111	  Cohen-­‐Eliya	  and	  Porat	  supra	  n.95.	  112	  E.	  Calhoun,	  Losing	  Twice:	  Harms	  of	  Indifference	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  113	  Ibid.	  at	  4-­‐5.	  114	  R.	  Brown,	  ‘Liberty:	  The	  New	  Equality’	  (2002)	  77	  NYU	  L	  Rev	  1491,1556.	  115	  Calhoun	  supra	  n.112.	  116	  C.f.	  Taylor	  supra	  n.107.	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opportunity	  to	  explain	  the	  difficulties	  inherent	  in	  a	  rule	  or	  its	  application	  compared	  to	   categorical	   tests.	  For	  example,	   in	   the	  US,	  under	  Smith,	  it	  would	  be	   sufficient	   to	  prove	  that	  a	  law	  was	  not	  aimed	  at	  any	  particular	  religious	  group.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  core	  of	  the	  problem.	  A	  religionist	  could	  argue	  with	  some	  justification	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  law	  was	  aimed	  at	  them	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  them:	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  they	  are	  being	  denied	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  something	  or	  are	  required	  to	  do	  something	  to	  which	   they	   have	   a	   religious	   objection.	   This	   core	   objection	   would	   be	   considered	  under	   a	   proportionality	   test,	   but	   not	   under	   that	   test.	   Similarly	   a	   blanket	  constitutional	   rule	   that,	   owing	   to	   a	   requirement	   of	   state	   secularism,	   forbade	   all	  state	  employees	  from	  demonstrating	  any	  religious	  belief	   in	  employment,	  does	  not	  provide	   any	   opportunity	   for	   religious	   people	   to	   challenge	   this	   or	   to	   receive	  justification	  for	  it.	  Indeed,	  since	  any	  challenge	  would	  be	  a	  challenge	  to,	  rather	  than	  under,	  a	  constitutional	  rule,	  as	  Taylor	  vividly	  puts	  it:	  ‘they	  are	  not	  only	  being	  asked	  to	  make	   a	   sacrifice,	   they	   are	   being	   told	   they	   are	   barbarians	   even	   to	   see	   this	   as	   a	  sacrifice.’	  117	  Again,	  this	  affects	  a	  person’s	  status	  as	  a	  constitutional	  loser.	  
Importantly,	   this	  consideration	  of	  the	  respective	  burdens	  and	  benefits	  of	  an	  act	   is	  based	  on	  a	  particular	  set	  of	   facts.	   It	   therefore	  provides	  an	   individualised	  decision	  since	  it	  considers	  the	  justifiability	  of	  the	  interference	  as	  it	  applies	  in	  each	  case.	  As	  Beatty	   argues,	   ‘the	   theory	   behind	   proportionality	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   merely	  categorize	  a	  case	  into	  a	  group	  which	  solves	  the	  problem.	  Rather,	  proportionality	  is	  aimed	   at	   a	   constant	   review	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   rational	   justification	   for	   the	  limitation	   imposed	   on	   the	   right,	   while	   taking	   into	   consideration	   each	   case’s	  circumstances’.118	  It	   makes	   the	   burden	   or	   justification	   central	   to	   the	   process	   of	  deliberation.	   Proportionality	   is	   therefore	   connected	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   reasonable	  accommodation	   since	   the	   requirement	   of	   individualised	   justification	  may	   lead	   to	  accommodation.	  A	  general	  policy,	  such	  as	  a	  school	  uniform	  policy,	  may	  be	  entirely	  defensible.	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  a	  lot	  harder	  to	  show	  why	  the	  policy	  must	  be	  applied	  without	  an	  exception	  in	  a	  particular	  case.119	  	  
Deliberation	  and	  justification	  are	  also	  important	  in	  acting	  as	  a	  counter-­‐majoritarian	  check.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  issues	  under	  discussion	  in	  the	  thesis.	  Both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Taylor	  ibid.	  at	  216.	  118	  Beatty	  supra	  n.94	  at	  459.	  119	  P.	  Bosset,	  ‘Mainstreaming	  Religious	  Diversity	  in	  a	  Secular	  and	  Egalitarian	  State:	  the	  Road(s)	  Not	  Taken	  in	  Leyla	  Sahin	  v.	  Turkey’	  in	  E.	  Brems	  (ed.),	  Diversity	  and	  European	  Human	  
Rights:	  	  Rewriting	  Judgments	  of	  the	  ECHR	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  Also	  see	  Bull	  v	  Hall	  and	  Preddy	  [2013]	  UKSC	  73	  at	  paras	  45-­‐49.	  
	   89	  
conservative	   religious	   groups	   and	   gay	   people	   can	   be	   politically	   unpopular.	   The	  history	  of	  gay	  people	  is	  one	  of	  oppression,	  with	  remaining	  inequality	  in	  many	  areas.	  Paradoxically,	   conservative	   religious	   organisations	   and	   individuals	   can	   also	   be	  unpopular	  because	  of	   their	  wish	   to	  discriminate	  and	  apparent	  wish	   to	  undo	  hard	  fought	   rights.	   Because	   religious	   belief	   may	   rely	   on	   revelation	   or	   adherence	   to	  authority,	   whether	   a	   written	   text	   or	   a	   religious	   hierarchy,	   it	   may	   be	   difficult	   to	  understand	  if	  it	  is	  not	  shared.	  Furthermore,	  simply	  because	  both	  groups	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  minorities,	  and	  therefore	  their	  concerns	  may	  not	  be	  foremost	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  those	  making	  policies,	  a	  strong	  requirement	  of	  justification	  guards	  against	  the	  ‘vice	  of	  thoughtlessness’.	  120	  Policies	  can	  overly	  restrict	  rights	  not	  because	  of	  any	  malice	  but	  because	   their	   impact	  has	  not	  been	   thought	   through	  or	  because	   those	  making	  policies	   over-­‐estimate	   the	   importance	   of	   their	   goals	   merely	   because	   they	   are	  focused	  on	  them.	  Proportionality	  helps	  to	  guard	  against	  this	  danger.	  	  
The	  kind	  of	   justification	   given	   is	   also	   relevant.	  Kumm	   links	   this	   to	  Rawls’	   idea	  of	  public	  reason:	  the	  types	  of	  reasons	  the	  state	  uses	  to	  defend	  a	  policy	  should	  not	  rest	  on	  a	  ‘comprehensive	  conception	  of	  the	  good’,	  which	  is	  a	  reason	  relating	  to	  ‘what	  it	  means	   to	   live	   a	   good,	   authentic	   life’,	   but	   should	   instead	   rely	  on	   ‘public	   reason’.	  A	  public	   reason	   is	   a	   principle	   that	   citizens	   can	   affirm	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   shared	  rationale	   and	   that	   can	   therefore	   be	   accepted	   even	   if	   they	   do	   not	   share	   the	   same	  conception	  of	  a	  ‘good	  life’.	  Reasons	  should	  not	  be	  given	  that	  are	  ‘based	  on	  their	  own	  exclusive	   ‘comprehensive’	   views	   (e.g.	   religious	   beliefs,	   or	   philosophical	   or	   moral	  views),	   that	   those	   with	   alternative	   world	   views	   cannot	   fully	   comprehend.’121	  As	  discussed	  above,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  prohibit	  behaviour	  merely	  because	  it	  is	  thought	  wrong.	  The	  requirement	  of	  public	  reason	  enables	  reciprocity	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  dialogue	  between	  the	  parties	  since	  it	  provides	  a	  shared	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  talk.	  	  
Further	  Benefits	  and	  Potential	  Objections	  	  Proportionality	  also	  has	  many	  benefits	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  cases.	  Firstly,	  proportionality	  allows	  subtle	  distinctions	  to	  be	  made	  between	  cases.	  Issues	  about	   the	   appropriate	   balance	   between	   religious	   liberty	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	  are	  not	   straightforward	   and	   there	   is	   no	   advantage	   in	   artificially	  making	   them	   so.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Kumm	  supra	  n.70	  at	  163.	  121	  P.	  Cumper	  and	  T.	  Lewis,	  ‘Public	  Reason’,	  Judicial	  Deference,	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Freedom	  of	  Religion	  and	  Belief	  (2011)	  22	  KLJ	  131,	  135.	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Proportionality	  ‘combines	  flexibility	  and	  structure’.122	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  responds	  flexibly	  to	  each	  case.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  though,	  this	  flexibility	  is	  not	  unconstrained.	  The	   test	   is	   structured.	  This	   structure	   creates	   a	   ‘division	  of	   argumentative	   labour’	  which	  allows	  ‘the	  parcelling	  of	  various	  opposing	  considerations’123	  and	  means	  that	  the	   reasoning	   is	   transparent.	   It	   requires	   judges	   to	   ‘show	   their	  working	  out’.124	  As	  Coffin	   argues,	   ‘open	   balancing	   restrains	   the	   judge	   and	   minimizes	   hidden	   or	  improper	  personal	  preferences	  by	  revealing	  every	  step	  in	  the	  thought	  process…	  it	  offers	   a	   full	   account	   of	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   for	   subsequent	   professional	  assessment	  and	  public	  appraisal.’125	  	  	  Against	   this	   though,	   balancing	   has	   been	   criticised	   as	   being	   a	   process	   that	   takes	  place	   in	   an	   ‘opaque	   black	   box’,	  126	  where	   it	   is	   unclear	  what	   leads	   to	   the	   decision.	  Habermas	  has	  for	  example	  criticised	  the	  process	  of	  weighing	  rights	  as	  taking	  place	  ‘either	   arbitrarily	   or	   unreflectively,	   according	   to	   customary	   standards	   and	  hierarchies.’127	  Such	  criticisms	  are	  unfair.	  To	  some	  extent,	  moral	   reasoning	  has	   to	  be	   impressionistic,	   especially	   given	   the	   time	   and	   resource	   constraints	   courts	   are	  under,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  particularly	  related	  to	  proportionality.	  A	  judgment	  using	  proportionality	  should	  explain	  the	  reasons	  for	  assigning	  value	  to	  a	  particular	  interest	   or	   argument	   and	   for	   choosing	   one	   value	   over	   another.	   It	   is	   more	  transparent	  than	  many	  categorical	  tests	  where	  it	  may	  not	  be	  apparent	  why	  a	  case	  is	  placed	   in	   one	   category	   rather	   than	   another,	   particularly	   in	   hard	   cases.128	  Indeed	  courts	  may	  not	  be	  clearly	  able	  to	  say	  why	  cases	  are	  placed	  in	  one	  category	  rather	  than	  another.129	  	  In	   any	   case,	   balancing	   is	   often	   inherent	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   even	   with	  categorisation.	  In	  deciding	  when	  rights	  should	  be	  protected,	  the	  rights	  will	  have	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  M.	  Cohen-­‐Eliya	  and	  I.	  Porat,	  ‘The	  Hidden	  Foreign	  Law	  Debate	  in	  Heller:	  The	  Proportionality	  Approach	  in	  American	  Constitutional	  Law’	  (2009)	  46	  San	  Diego	  L	  Rev	  267,	  380.	  123	  C.	  Panaccio,	  ‘In	  Defence	  of	  Two-­‐Step	  Balancing	  and	  Proportionality	  in	  Rights	  Adjudication’	  (2011)	  24	  Can	  J	  L	  &	  Jurisprudence	  109,	  120.	  124	  T.	  Poole,	  ‘Tilting	  at	  Windmills?	  Truth	  and	  Illusion	  in	  ‘The	  Political	  Constitution’’	  (2007)	  70	  Mod	  L	  Rev	  250,	  268.	  125	  F.	  Coffin,	  ‘Judicial	  Balancing:	  the	  Protean	  Scales	  of	  Justice’	  (1988)	  63	  NYU	  L	  Rev	  16,	  25.	  126	  S.	  Gottlieb,	  ‘The	  Paradox	  of	  Balancing	  Significant	  Interests’	  (1994)	  45	  Hastings	  LJ	  825,	  839.	  127	  J.	  Habermas,	  Between	  Facts	  and	  Norms:	  Contributions	  to	  a	  Discourse	  Theory	  of	  Law	  and	  
Democracy,	  tr	  W.	  Rehg	  (Malden	  MA:	  Polity	  Press,	  1996)	  259.	  128	  As	  the	  previous	  chapter	  demonstrated.	  	  129	  See	  Jackson’s	  discussions	  of	  R	  v	  Keegstra	  [1990]	  3	  SCR	  697	  compared	  to	  R.A.V.	  v	  St	  Paul	  505	  US	  377	  (1992)	  in	  ‘Ambivalent	  Resistance	  and	  Comparative	  Constitutionalism:	  Opening	  Up	  the	  Conversation	  on	  Proportionality,	  Rights	  and	  Federalism’	  (1999)	  1	  U	  Pa	  J	  Const	  L	  583.	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be	  balanced	  at	  some	  point,	  otherwise	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  say	  which	  right	  or	  interest	   is	   more	   important	   than	   another.	   For	   example	   in	   US	   free	   speech	   law,	  regulation	   based	   on	   viewpoint	   is	   usually	   prohibited,	   but	   time,	  manner	   and	   place	  requirements	  are	  permitted.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  an	  implicit	  balancing	  that	  freedom	  of	  speech	   is	   more	   important	   than	   the	   harm	   caused	   by	   hate	   speech.	   In	   considering	  categorisation	   the	   court	   will	   have	   thought	   about	   an	   archetypal	   case	   or	   the	  particular	   case	   in	   question,	   but	   this	   ruling	   will	   be	   applied	   in	   many	   different	  contexts.	  However,	   in	   so	  doing	   the	   court	   is	   then	  denied	   the	  benefits	  of	   flexibility.	  Categorisation	  can	  thus	  lead	  to	  overly	  formalised	  rulings.	  	  	  A	  different	  kind	  of	  argument	   is	   that	  proportionality	  makes	   it	   too	  easy	   to	   ‘balance	  away’	   rights130	  or	   that	   it	   fails	   to	   protect	   rights	   because	   it	   does	   not	   treat	   them	  differently	  from	  other	  kinds	  of	  interest.131	  It	  is	  true	  that	  under	  legal	  systems	  which	  use	  proportionality	   rights	   tend	   to	   be	  widely	   drawn	   and,	   as	   can	  be	   seen	   from	   the	  structure	  of	  rights	  provisions	  under	  the	  Charter	  or	  the	  ECHR,	  potentially	  defeated	  by	  public	  interest	  justifications.	  A	  ‘right’	  in	  this	  sense	  may	  therefore	  look	  different	  from	   Dworkin’s	   idea	   of	   rights	   as	   trumps.132	  However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   rights	  become	  meaningless.	  Rights	  are	  still	  given	  priority	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  justification	  is	  required	   for	   their	   infringement	   and	   that	   only	   particular	   types	   of	   reasons	  will	   be	  sufficient	   to	   infringe	   them.	   Furthermore,	   as	   Klatt	   and	   Meister	   point	   out,	   at	   the	  balancing	   stage,	   ‘higher	   abstract	   weights	   can	   be	   given	   to	   rights	   than	   other	  considerations’.133	  	  	  Balancing	  is	  not	  an	  unprincipled	  process.	  If	  rights	  are	  not	  absolute	  (as	  these	  rights	  are	   not)	   then	   balancing	   them	   based	   on	   the	   particular	   circumstances	   is	   the	  most	  principled	  a	  resolution	  could	  be.134	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  balance	  between	  them	  creates	  its	  own	  principle.135	  Having	  a	  wide	  interpretation	  of	  a	  right,	  with	  a	  narrower	  range	  of	   cases	   where	   that	   right	   is	   violated	   is	   coherent.	   It	   is	  more	   honest	   to	   say	   that	   a	  measure	  interferes	  with,	   for	  example	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  but	  that	  the	  interference	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  R.	  Dworkin,	  Is	  Democracy	  Possible	  Here?	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  131	  Tsakyrakis,	  supra	  n.19.	  132	  K.	  Möller,	  The	  Global	  Model	  of	  Constitutional	  Rights	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  133	  M.	  Klatt	  and	  M.	  Meister	  ‘Proportionality	  –	  A	  Benefit	  to	  Human	  Rights?	  Remarks	  on	  the	  ICON	  controversy’	  (2012)	  10	  ICON	  687,	  690.	  134	  R.	  Alexy	  supra	  n.3.	  135	  M.	  Minow,	  ‘Is	  Pluralism	  an	  Ideal	  or	  a	  Compromise?’	  (2008)	  40	  Conn	  L	  Rev	  1287.	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is	   justified,	   rather	   than	   the	   act	   does	   not	   come	   under	   the	   category	   of	   protected	  speech	  at	  all.	  	  	  	  A	   further	   criticism	   is	   that	   proportionality	   is	   too	   subjective	   and	   the	   results	   too	  dependent	   on	   the	   views	   of	   those	   hearing	   them	   because	   it	   does	   not	   provide	  sufficient	  guidance	   to	   judges	  as	   to	  how	  cases	   should	  be	  dealt	  with.136	  It	   is	   argued	  that	   this	   poses	   problems	   of	   legitimacy	   for	   courts.137	  Of	   course	   it	   is	   subjective	   to	  some	   degree,	   but	   the	   high	   requirement	   of	   justification,	   the	   structured	   decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   decisions	   are	  made	  with	   reference	   to	   the	  values	   immanent	   in	   the	   legal	   system	   mean	   that	   this	   problem	   is	   more	   than	  outweighed	   by	   its	   advantages.	  138	  Subjectivity	   is	   inherent	   in	   all	   kinds	   of	   judging,	  particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   constitutional	   issues,	   not	   just	   proportionality.	   This	   is	  particularly	   true	   in	   clash	   of	   rights	   cases	  where	   both	   are	   considered	   by	   the	   legal	  system	  to	  be	  prima	  facie	  valuable.	  	  	  It	   could	   similarly	   be	   argued	   that	   proportionality	   is	   too	   administratively	   complex	  and	  uncertain.	  There	  are	  two	  issues	  here.	  Firstly,	  the	  fear	  is	  that	  by	  giving	  rights	  to	  religious	  conduct,	  authorities	  will	  be	  paralysed	  by	  the	  number	  and	  extent	  of	  claims	  made.	   This	   seems	  unlikely.	   The	  American	   concept	   of	   strict	   scrutiny	   as	   applied	   in	  
Sherbert	   v	   Verner, 139 	  a	   test	   which	   required	   greater	   justification	   than	  proportionality,	  did	  not	  create	  a	  flood	  of	  cases	  or	  make	  administration	  unwieldy.140	  It	   therefore	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   proportionality	   will	   cause	   major	   practical	  problems.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  fear	  that	  authorities	  will	  not	  know	  how	  cases	  will	  be	   decided	   and	   will	   have	   to	   ‘second-­‐guess’	   the	   court’s	   decision.	   Evidently,	   those	  making	   decisions	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   act	   with	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   confidence.	   But	  proportionality	  analysis	  is	  not	  entirely	  freewheeling.	  Over	  time,	  decisions	  will	  build	  up	  which	  will	  show	  the	  main	  parameters	  for	  the	  rights.	  Some	  discretion	  will	  also	  be	  given	  to	  the	  original	  decision-­‐maker.141	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  F.	  Urbina,	  ‘“Balancing	  as	  Reasoning”	  and	  the	  Problems	  of	  Legally	  Unaided	  Adjudication:	  A	  reply	  to	  Kai	  Möller’	  (2014)	  12	  ICON	  214.	  137	  Ibid.	  138	  Alexy	  supra	  n.3;	  Barak	  supra	  n.1	  Ch	  18;	  Beatty	  supra	  n.94.	  	  139	  374	  US	  398	  (1963).	  140	  A.	  Adamczyk	  et	  al.,	  ‘Religious	  Regulation	  and	  the	  Courts:	  Documenting	  the	  effects	  of	  
Smith	  and	  RFRA’	  (2004)	  46	  J	  Church	  &	  St	  237.	  141	  The	  issue	  of	  how	  and	  when	  this	  discretion	  will	  be	  exercised	  is	  complex	  and	  there	  are	  numerous	  points	  in	  the	  proportionality	  test	  at	  which	  deference	  could	  be	  exercised.	  See	  Brady,	  supra	  n.	  4,	  Rivers,	  supra	  n.81	  and	  Chan	  supra	  n.109.	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A	  different	  kind	  of	  criticism	  has	  been	  made	  that	  proportionality	  pretends	  to	  evade	  moral	   reasoning	  by	   creating	   ‘the	   illusion	  of	   some	  kind	  of	  mechanical	  weighing	  of	  values’142	  and	  thus	  it	   ‘depoliticises’	  rights.143	  However	  as	  Möller	  demonstrates,	  the	  opposite	  is	  true:	  proportionality	  is	  centrally	  concerned	  with	  moral	  reasoning.	  The	  aim	   of	   the	   proportionality	   test	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   structured	  way	   of	   identifying	   and	  considering	  the	  relevant	  moral	  considerations.	  As	  should	  have	  been	  made	  clear	  by	  the	   discussion	   of	   balancing	   above,	   although	   the	   balancing	   stage	   does	   involve	  consideration	  of	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  right	  and	  its	  degree	  of	  infringement	  in	  a	  particular	  circumstance,	  these	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  process	  of	  moral	  reasoning.	  There	  is	  nothing	  mechanical	  about	  this	  process.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  a	  simple	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.144	  	  Furthermore,	   contrary	   to	   some	   critics,145	  the	   balancing	   process	   does	   not	   require	  courts	   to	   compare	   incommensurables,	   again	   because	   the	   balancing	   process	   is	  strongly	  normative.	  It	  is	  clearly	  possible	  to	  make	  arguments	  that	  one	  right	  is	  more	  important	   than	   another	   in	   a	   particular	   situation.	   It	   is	   unclear	   how	   any	   decision	  could	   be	   made	   as	   to	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   right	   should	   be	   held	   to	   be	   violated	   in	   a	  particular	   circumstance	   if	   this	   was	   not	   so.	   Importantly,	   proportionality	   does	   not	  require	  all	  rights	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  common	  metric.146	  It	  is	  only	  necessary	  to	  give	  rights	  an	  ordinal	  rather	  than	  a	  cardinal	  value.147	  	  	  Overall	  therefore,	  proportionality	  is	  advantageous	  for	  deciding	  these	  cases.	  Its	  fact-­‐specific	  and	  justification	  based	  nature	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  resolve	  these	  disputes	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  mutual	  respect,	  without	  compromising	  on	  fundamental	  issues.	  It	  promotes	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  give	  and	  take	  and	  acknowledges	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  interests	   of	   both	   sides.	   Most	   importantly,	   it	   engages	   in	   a	   process	   of	   rights	  maximisation,	   rather	   than	   necessarily	   perceiving	   disputes	   as	   winner	   takes	   all.	  Although,	  like	  any	  test,	  it	  has	  disadvantages,	  these	  are	  not	  so	  serious	  as	  to	  render	  it	  unsuitable.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Tsakyrakis	  supra	  n.19	  at	  475.	  Similarly,	  Webber	  argues	  that	  it	  transforms	  questions	  of	  rights	  into	  ‘management	  and	  mathematical	  measurements’:	  G.	  Webber,	  ‘Proportionality,	  Balancing,	  and	  the	  Cult	  of	  Constitutional	  Rights	  Scholarship’	  (2010)	  23	  Can	  J	  L	  Jurisprudence	  179,	  191.	  143	  Webber	  ibid.	  144	  K.	  Möller	  ‘Proportionality:	  Challenging	  the	  Critics’	  (2012)	  10	  ICON	  709.	  145	  E.g.	  Tsakyrakis	  supra	  n.19.	  	  146	  Möller	  supra	  n.146.	  147	  Klatt	  and	  Meister	  supra	  n.134.	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Proportionality	  in	  the	  US,	  England	  and	  Canada	  	  This	  section	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  how	  proportionality	  or	  proportionality	   type	  arguments	  are	  used	  in	  the	  three	  jurisdictions.	  This	  is	  given	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  proportionality	  is	  already	  being	  used	  and	  how	  the	  method	  of	  analysis	  argued	  for	   here	   can	   fit	   into	   constitutional	   or	   other	   legal	   arguments.	   Although	   the	   US,	  England	  and	  Canada	  are	  only	  used	  to	  give	  examples	  of	  cases	  and	  possible	  conflicts	  of	   rights	   and	   therefore	   whether	   they	   do	   or	   do	   not	   use	   proportionality	   is	   in	   one	  sense	   irrelevant	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   my	   thesis,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   have	   some	  understanding	   of	   the	   prevailing	   types	   of	   legal	   reasoning	   given	   in	   order	   to	  understand	  the	  context	  of	   the	  cases.	   It	  also	  builds	  on	  the	  explanation	  given	   in	  the	  Introduction	  of	  why	  these	  jurisdictions	  have	  been	  chosen.	  	  Both	  Canada	  and	  the	  UK	  have	  accepted	  proportionality	  as	  the	  appropriate	  test	  for	  human	  rights	  cases.	  Although	  in	  the	  UK,	  it	  has	  been	  held	  to	  be	  the	  appropriate	  test	  for	  Convention	  rights,	  following	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998,148	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  has	  always	  been	  applied	  or	  always	  applied	  strictly,	  as	  will	  become	  apparent	  in	   the	   next	   few	   chapters.	   Proportionality	   has	   a	   slightly	   longer	   history	   in	   Canada	  than	   in	   the	   UK	   and	  was	   developed	   there	   in	   response	   to	   the	   Canadian	   Charter	   of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms	  1982.	  	  
Proportionality	   has	   become	   relevant	   not	   only	   for	   challenges	   against	   state	   action	  through	   judicial	   review	   but	   also	   between	   private	   parties	   in	   discrimination	   cases.	  Both	   Canada	   and	   the	   UK	   outlaw	   discrimination	   in	   employment	   and	   service	  provision	  and	  much	  of	  this	  law	  uses	  variants	  of	  a	  proportionality	  test.	  For	  example,	  to	   defend	   a	   claim	   of	   indirect	   discrimination	   in	   English	   law,	   a	   policy,	   criterion	   or	  practice	   that	   puts	   persons	   who	   share	   a	   protected	   characteristic	   at	   a	   particular	  disadvantage	  must	  be	  a	  proportionate	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  legitimate	  aim.149	  This	  may	  be	  relevant	  in	  this	  context	  because	  a	  religionist	  may	  claim	  that	  they	  have	  been	  indirectly	   discriminated	   against	   by	   not	   being	   allowed	   an	   exemption	   from	  part	   of	  their	  work.	  
Unlike	  English	  law,	  Canadian	  law	  does	  not	  draw	  a	  stark	  distinction	  between	  direct	  and	   indirect	   discrimination.	   A	   proportionality	   type	   enquiry	   is	   used	   throughout	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  See	  e.g.	  R(Daly)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  [2001]	  2	  AC	  532;	  Huang	  v	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  supra	  n.6.	  149	  See	  A.	  Baker,	  ‘Proportionality	  and	  Employment	  Discrimination	  in	  the	  UK’	  (2008)	  37	  ILJ	  305.	  
	   95	  
discrimination	   law.	   The	   test,	   known	   as	   Meiorin,	   contains	   three	   stages.150	  The	  employer	  must	   have	   adopted	   the	   standard	   for	   a	   purpose	   rationally	   connected	   to	  the	  performance	  of	   the	   job,	   there	  must	  have	  been	  an	  honest	  and	  good	  faith	  belief	  that	   it	   was	   necessary;	   and	   the	   standard	   must	   be	   reasonably	   necessary	   to	   the	  accomplishment	  of	  that	  legitimate	  work-­‐related	  purpose.	  In	  deciding	  whether	  it	   is	  reasonably	   necessary	   it	   must	   be	   shown	   that	   the	   employee	   could	   not	   be	  accommodated	  without	   imposing	  undue	  hardship.	  The	  requirement	  of	  reasonable	  accommodation	  more	  clearly	  shows	  how	  those	  with	  strong	  religious	  beliefs	  could	  use	  discrimination	  laws	  to	  advance	  their	  concerns.	  
In	  contrast,	   the	  US	  does	  not	  explicitly	  refer	  to	  proportionality	   in	   its	  constitutional	  law. 151 	  There	   is	   debate	   on	   whether	   the	   US	   is	   ‘exceptional’ 152 	  in	   not	   using	  proportionality	   or	   whether	   proportionality	   is	   latent	   in	   its	   constitutional	   law.	  Instead,	  US	  constitutional	   law	  does	  not	   rely	  on	  one	   test	  or	  method	  of	  analysis.	   In	  certain	  contexts	   relevant	   to	   this	   thesis	   there	   is	   little	  doubt	   that	  proportionality	   is	  not	  used.	  For	  example,	  when	  deciding	  whether	  the	  establishment	  clause	  has	  been	  breached,	  the	  discussion	  relies	  on	  a	  three	  point	  categorical	  test,	  looking	  at	  purpose,	  effect	   and	   ‘government	   entanglement’	   with	   religion.153	  Further,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  state	   interference	   in	   the	   selection	   of	   religious	   employees	   (by	   laws	   prohibiting	  discrimination	   or	   other	   means)	   a	   categorical	   rather	   than	   proportionality	   test	   is	  used,	   forbidding	   interference	   if	   the	   employee	   falls	   within	   the	   ‘ministerial	  exception’.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   there	   is	   no	   balancing.	   This	   may	   occur	   in	  considering	  which	  category	  a	  case	  should	  be	  placed	  in,	  but	  this	  is	  likely	  only	  to	  be	  about	  specific	  issues	  rather	  than	  an	  ‘all	  things	  considered’	  proportionality	  test.	  For	  example,	   there	  may	   be	   balancing	   in	   deciding	  whether	   a	   job	  was	  mainly	   religious	  rather	  than	  secular	   in	  nature.	  However,	  once	  this	  balancing	   is	  completed	  and	  it	   is	  decided	  whether	  a	  person	  is	  a	  ‘minister’	  or	  not,	  no	  further	  balancing	  takes	  place.	  	  The	   US	   test	   of	   strict	   scrutiny,	   which	   requires	   the	   state	   to	   have	   a	   compelling	  government	   interest,	   and	   to	   have	   narrowly	   tailored	   the	   law	   to	   achieve	   that	   aim,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  British	  Columbia	  (Public	  Service	  Employee	  Relations	  Commission)	  v	  BCGSEU	  [1999]	  3	  SCR	  3.	  See	  G.	  Moon,	  ‘From	  Equal	  Treatment	  to	  Appropriate	  Treatment:	  What	  Lessons	  can	  Canadian	  Equality	  Law	  on	  Dignity	  and	  on	  Reasonable	  Accommodation	  Teach	  the	  United	  Kingdom?’	  (2006)	  6	  EHRLR	  695.	  151	  Although	  there	  some	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  used,	  see	  District	  of	  Columbia	  v	  
Heller	  554	  US	  570	  (2008).	  152	  Weinrib,	  supra	  n.2.	  153	  Lemon	  v	  Kurtzmann	  403	  US	  602	  (1971).	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although	  now	  no	  longer	  widely	  used	  in	   free	  exercise	   law154	  following	  Employment	  
Division	   v	   Smith,155	  does	  bear	   some	   similarities	   to	   proportionality.	   The	   two	   tests	  have	  a	  similar	  purpose:	  to	  permit	  government	  action	  where	  necessary	  in	  the	  public	  interest,	  but	  to	  examine	  the	  necessity	  of	  restrictions	  of	  rights	  rigorously.156	  Its	  basic	  two-­‐step	  structure	  is	  also	  similar:	  a	  first	  stage	  considering	  whether	  the	  act	  restricts	  a	   right	   and	   a	   second	   considering	   whether	   there	   is	   sufficient	   justification	   for	   the	  restriction.	  So	   in	  Wisconsin	  v	  Yoder,157	  a	  case	  noted	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter	  which	  concerned	   whether	   Amish	   children	   could	   be	   withdrawn	   from	   school	   after	   the	  eighth	   grade,	   it	   was	   decided	   that	   the	   government’s	   interest	   in	   ensuring	   that	  children	   had	   an	   extra	   year	   of	   schooling	   was	   not	   compelling	   compared	   to	   the	  Amish’s	   interest	   in	   maintaining	   their	   community’s	   way	   of	   life.	   This	   type	   of	  reasoning	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  a	  proportionality	  analysis.	  	  	  Beyond	   these	   structural	   similarities,	   the	   tests	   have	   similar	   elements.	   The	  compelling	   government	   interest	   includes	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   legitimate	   aim.	   If	   the	  measure	   is	   for	   an	   impermissible	  purpose,	   such	   as	   straightforward	  discrimination	  against	  an	  unpopular	  minority	  religion,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  found	  unconstitutional.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  way	  the	  legitimate	  aim	  test	  functions.	  The	  idea	  of	  narrow	  tailoring,	  or	   least	   restrictive	  means,	   includes	   rationality	  and	  necessity	   tests.158	  It	   requires	  a	  ‘proportionality-­‐like	  judgment	  of	  whether	  marginal	  increments	  in	  the	  avoidance	  of	  risks	   or	   marginal	   reductions	   in	   the	   incidence	   of	   harms	   sufficiently	   justify	  infringements	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   in	   light	   of	   available,	   but	   typically	   less	  efficacious,	  alternatives’.159	  Finally	  there	  are	  some	  elements	  of	  overall	  balancing.	  	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  strict	  scrutiny	  is	  not	  really	  a	  balancing	  test	  because	  once	  it	  had	  been	  decided	  that	  a	  case	  requires	   it,	   it	  will	  not	  pass	   the	  test,	   leading	  to	   the	  aphorism	   that	   strict	   scrutiny	   is	   ‘strict	   in	   theory	  and	   fatal	   in	   fact.’160	  Whatever	   the	  merits	  of	  this	  in	  other	  contexts,161	  it	  was	  never	  true	  in	  the	  free	  exercise	  context.	  An	  empirical	   study	   demonstrated	   the	   ‘survival	   rate’	   of	   cases	   decided	   under	   strict	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  It	  may	  be	  relevant	  though	  where	  the	  RFRA	  applies.	  	  155	  494	  US	  872	  (1990).	  156	  R.	  Fallon,	  ‘Strict	  Judicial	  Scrutiny’	  (2006)	  54	  UCLA	  1267.	  157	  406	  US	  205	  (1972).	  	  158	  Cohen-­‐Eliya	  and	  Porat	  supra	  n.122	  at	  385-­‐6.	  159	  Fallon	  supra	  n.158	  at	  1336.	  160	  G.	  Gunther,	  ‘The	  Supreme	  Court,	  1971	  Term	  –	  Foreword:	  In	  Search	  of	  Evolving	  Doctrine	  on	  a	  Changing	  Court:	  A	  Model	  for	  a	  Newer	  Equal	  Protection’	  (1972)	  86	  Harv	  L	  Rev	  1,	  8.	  161	  Such	  as	  prohibiting	  viewpoint	  speech	  discrimination	  by	  the	  state.	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scrutiny	   to	   be	   59%.162	  This	   rate	   was	   even	   higher	   when	   only	   exemptions	   from	  generally	   applicable	   laws	   were	   in	   issue,	   rather	   than	   laws	   claimed	   to	   be	  discriminatory.163	  An	  earlier	  study	  looking	  at	  Courts	  of	  Appeals	  judgments	  in	  the	  10	  years	  before	  Smith,	  found	  the	  survival	  rate	  to	  be	  90%.164	  More	  broadly,	  Sullivan	  and	  Frase	  point	  to	  cases	  where	  strict	  scrutiny	  has	  not	  been	  fatally	  strict,	  in	  contexts	  as	  diverse	   as	   the	   federal	   regulation	   of	   inter-­‐state	   commerce	   and	   content	   neutral	  restrictions	   of	   speech.	   They	   also	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   use	   of	   ‘intermediate	  scrutiny’	   and	   ‘rational	   basis	   review	   with	   teeth’:	   lower	   standards	   of	   review	   that	  nonetheless	   assess	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   government	   action	   based	   on	   balancing	  considerations.165	  	  	  This	   does	   not	   mean	   though	   that	   these	   methods	   of	   review	   are	   the	   same	   as	  proportionality.	  Fallon	  argues	  strict	  scrutiny	  has	  a	  narrower	  focus,	  which	  does	  not	  lead	   to	   an	   ‘all	   things	   considered’	   reasonableness	   analysis.	   The	   question	   is	   more	  about	  whether	   government	   action	   is	   appropriately	   targeted,	   rather	   than	  whether	  the	   action	   was	   proportionate.	   Cohen-­‐Eliya	   and	   Porat	   also	   point	   to	   a	   more	  theoretical	   difference	   in	   comparing	   the	   German	   use	   of	   proportionality	   to	   the	   US.	  While	  both	  countries	  use	  balancing,	  more	  opprobrium	  is	  attached	  to	  its	  use	  in	  the	  US.	   They	   argue	   this	   is	   because	   of	   a	   theoretical	   difference	   in	   its	   purpose.	   In	   the	  German	  model,	  proportionality	  is	  accepted	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ‘organic	  conception	  of	  the	  state’	  based	  on	  ‘reciprocal	  cooperation	  and	  trust	  amongst	  all	  state	  organs’	  where	  all	  interests	   should	   be	   optimised.166	  In	   the	   US	   by	   contrast,	   proportionality	   is	   more	  often	  seen	  as	  mere	  ‘ad	  hocery’:	  a	  way	  of	  enforcing	  political	  policy	  decisions,	  rather	  than	   a	   method	   of	   law.167	  In	   any	   case,	   it	   is	   certainly	   true	   that	   balancing	   and	  proportionality	  have	  a	  more	   residual	   role	   in	   the	  US	   than	   in,	   for	  example,	  Canada,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Although	  this	  study	  dates	  from	  after	  Smith	  it	  only	  considered	  cases	  decided	  with	  strict	  scrutiny,	  i.e.	  those	  cases	  unaffected	  by	  Smith	  and	  cases	  decided	  under	  RFRA.	  163	  A.	  Winkler,	  ‘Fatal	  in	  Theory	  and	  Strict	  in	  Fact:	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis	  of	  Strict	  Scrutiny	  in	  the	  Federal	  Courts’	  (2006)	  59	  Vand	  L	  Rev	  793.	  164	  J.	  Ryan,	  ‘Smith	  and	  the	  Religious	  Freedom	  Restoration	  Act:	  An	  Iconoclastic	  Assessment’	  (1992)	  78	  Va	  L	  Rev	  1407.	  165	  E.T.	  Sullivan	  and	  R.	  Frase,	  Proportionality	  Principles	  in	  American	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  Ch	  4.	  166	  Cohen-­‐Eliya	  and	  Porat,	  supra	  n.	  97	  at	  390,	  also	  ‘American	  Balancing	  and	  German	  Proportionality:	  The	  Historical	  Origins’	  (2010)	  8	  ICON	  63	  and	  Proportionality	  and	  
Constitutional	  Culture	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  167	  J.	  Bomhoff,	  ‘Lüth's	  50th	  Anniversary:	  Some	  Comparative	  Observations	  on	  the	  German	  Foundations	  of	  Judicial	  Balancing’	  (2008)	  9	  German	  LJ	  121.	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with	  more	  use	  made	  of	  categorisation	  and	  excluded	  reasons	  for	   legislating.168	  The	  results	  of	  these	  differences	  will	  be	  explored	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  
Conclusion	  	  This	   chapter	   has	   provided	   an	   analysis	   of	   proportionality	   and	   suggested	   its	  advantages	   for	   dealing	   with	   situations	   of	   moral	   disagreement	   and	   conflicts	   of	  rights,	   particularly	   regarding	   disputes	   about	   religious	   freedom	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.	  The	  thesis	  aims	  to	  provide	  an	  argument	  of	  how	  these	  cases	  are	  best	  resolved,	   basing	   this	   on	   a	   proportionality	   framework.	   It	   therefore	   has	   dual	   aims:	  arguing	  both	  for	  specific	  conclusions	  but	  also	  for	  a	  general	  framework.	  This	  means	  that	   it	   is	  of	  course	  possible	   to	  agree	  with	  the	   framework	  I	  argue	   for,	  but	  disagree	  about	   results	   in	   concrete	   cases.	  As	   stated	   in	   the	   Introduction,	   the	   thesis	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  provide	  a	  complete	  overview	  of	  the	  law	  in	  the	  three	  jurisdictions,	  but	  rather	  cases	   are	   used	   as	   examples.	   Sometimes	   cases	   are	   used	   as	   good	   examples	   of	   how	  proportionality	   can	   work.	   Sometimes	   different	   tests	   are	   used	   and	   I	   will	   use	  proportionality	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  case	  could	  have	  been	  decided	  or	  reasoned	  differently.	  Sometimes	  proportionality	  or	  proportionality	  type	  tests	  are	  used	  but	  I	  will	   nevertheless	   suggest	   how	   a	   proportionality	   analysis	   could	   also	   be	   used	  differently.	   The	   second	  part	   of	   this	   thesis	  now	  moves	  on	   to	   analyse	  how	   such	   an	  approach	   could	   work	   in	   four	   contexts:	   religious	   claims	   in	   secular	   employment,	  employment	  in	  religious	  organisations,	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  by	  religious	  individuals	  and	  by	  organisations.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  Cohen-­‐Eliya	  and	  Porat	  supra	  n.	  122.	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Chapter	  4:	  Religious	  Claims	  in	  Secular	  Employment	  
	  The	  first	  area	  this	  thesis	  examines	  is	  the	  right	  to	  manifest	  discriminatory	  religious	  beliefs	   within	   employment.	   Rights	   to	   religious	   freedom	   do	   not	   end	   at	   the	   office	  door.	   Employees	   may	   seek	   exemptions	   from	   certain	   parts	   of	   their	   work	   on	   the	  grounds	  that	  they	  conflict	  with	  their	  religious	  beliefs,	  or	  may	  wish	  to	  express	  their	  discriminatory	   views	   in	   or	   outside	   the	   workplace.	   These	   actions	   may	   though	  infringe	   the	   right	   of	   service	   users	   or	   colleagues	   to	   be	   treated	   in	   a	   non-­‐discriminatory	  way,	   as	   well	   as	   affecting	   the	   interests	   of	   employers.	   This	   chapter	  will	   consider	   such	   cases,	   considering	   in	   particular	  whether	   registrars	   or	   those	   in	  similar	  jobs	  should	  be	  exempted	  from	  performing	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  if	  they	  have	  religious	   objections	   to	   doing	   so.	   It	   will	   draw	   on	   the	   approach	   explained	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   arguing	   that	   applying	   a	   fact-­‐specific	   proportionality	   test	   is	   the	  best	  way	   to	   resolve	   these	   types	  of	   cases.	  Even	   so,	   they	  are	  difficult	   to	   adjudicate.	  They	   involve	   complex	  moral	   issues	   and	   starkly	   raise	   the	   problem	   of	   how	   people	  with	  different	  views	  can	  live	  and	  work	  together.	  	  
Disputes	  around	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  	  The	   existence	   of	   same-­‐sex	   marriage/partnership	   (SSM/P),	   although	   opposed	   by	  many	   religions,	   is	   not	   itself	   a	   violation	   of	   religious	   freedom	   and	   indeed	   its	   non-­‐existence	   is	   very	   probably	   a	   violation	   of	   anti-­‐discrimination	   rights.1	  No	   state	   has	  required	   religious	   institutions	   to	   perform	   same-­‐sex	   marriages	   and	   such	   a	  requirement	  would	   presumably	   violate	   constitutional	   or	   other	   religious	   freedom	  guarantees.	  Although	  this	  conflict	  is	  not	  in	  issue,	  the	  creation	  of	  SSM/P	  does	  create	  new	  clashes	  between	  religious	  conscience	  and	  the	  obligation	  not	  to	  discriminate.	  	  Disagreements	  have	  arisen	  over	  claims	  of	  state	  employees	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  performing	  civil	  marriages	  or	  partnerships	  for	  religiously	  based	  exemptions.	  Some	  religious	   registrars2	  have	   argued	   that	   due	   to	   the	   sanctity	   and	   special	   nature	   of	  marriage,	   its	   extension	   to	   same-­‐sex	  partners	  was	   illegitimate	  and	  morally	  wrong.	  They	  therefore	  maintained	  they	  could	  not	  in	  good	  conscience	  facilitate	  such	  unions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Canadian	  courts	  held	  the	  lack	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  to	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Charter	  in	  
Halpern	  v	  Canada	  65	  OR	  (3d)	  161	  and	  Hendricks	  v	  Quebec	  [2002]	  RJQ	  2506	  and	  some	  US	  courts	  have	  held	  that	  it	  was	  against	  state	  constitutions	  e.g.	  Goodridge	  v	  Dept.	  of	  Public	  
Health,	  798	  N.E.2d	  941	  (Mass.,	  2003).	  The	  ECtHR	  held	  such	  decisions	  were	  within	  states’	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	  Schalk	  and	  Kopf	  v	  Austria	  (2011)	  53	  EHRR	  20.	  	  2	  I	  will	  use	  the	  British	  term	  to	  refer	  to	  all	  those	  who	  have	  the	  power	  to	  perform	  or	  register	  non-­‐religious	  marriages	  or	  partnerships.	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While	  religious	  opposition	  should	  not	  by	   itself	  affect	  the	  existence	  of	  SSM/P,	  such	  beliefs	  can	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  protection	  of	  religiously	  motivated	  behaviour.	  Evidently	  though	  such	  exemptions	  interfere	  with	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination.	  	  	  These	   issues	   have	   been	   faced	   by	   the	   courts	   in	   the	   relevant	   jurisdictions	   on	   a	  number	  of	  occasions,	  albeit	   in	  slightly	  differing	  situations.	  All	  apart	   from	  one	  give	  priority	  to	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  discriminated	  against	  above	  the	  right	  to	   freedom	  of	  religion.3	  In	   the	   English	   case	   of	   Ladele	   v	   Islington	   LBC,4	  a	   registrar	   refused	   to	  perform	  civil	  partnerships	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  Christian	  beliefs.	  She	  was	  employed	  before	  the	  Civil	  Partnership	  Act	  2004	  was	  enacted.	  The	  Act	  required	  that	  a	  person	  be	   designated	   as	   a	   civil	   partnership	   registrar	   before	   they	   could	   register	   civil	  partnerships	  but	  Islington	  decided	  to	  designate	  all	  their	  registrars	  in	  order	  to	  share	  the	  new	  work	  equally.5	  Initially,	  Ladele	  managed	  to	  exchange	  her	  shifts	  with	  other	  employees	   when	   she	   was	   due	   to	   perform	   civil	   partnerships,	   but	   this	   became	  unacceptable	   to	   her	   employer,	   partly	   because	   of	   complaints	   made	   by	   her	  colleagues,	   and	   it	   held	   that	   this	  was	   a	   violation	   of	   Islington’s	   non-­‐discrimination	  policy,	   entitled	   ‘Dignity	   for	   All’.	   Her	   line	  manager	   offered	   her	   the	   compromise	   of	  supervising	  simple	  signings	  of	  the	  register,	  rather	  than	  performing	  ceremonies,	  but	  this	  was	  unacceptable	   to	  her.	  With	  no	  resolution	  of	   the	   issue	   forthcoming,	  Ladele	  claimed	  she	  had	  been	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  religion	  and	  eventually	  resigned.	  Her	  case	  was	  unsuccessful	  at	  Employment	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  levels.	  She	  then	  took	  her	  case	  to	  the	  ECtHR	  claiming	  that	   there	   was	   a	   breach	   of	   Article	   14	   taken	   with	   Article	   9	   but	   again	   failed.6	  Her	  request	  for	  a	  referral	  to	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  was	  denied.	  	  	  In	   the	   Canadian	   Marriage	   Commissioners	   Case,7 	  a	   reference	   was	   made	   to	   the	  Saskatchewan	   High	   Court	   to	   decide	  whether	   an	   amendment	   to	   the	  Marriage	   Act	  19958 	  to	   allow	   a	   marriage	   commissioner	   to	   refuse	   to	   solemnise	   a	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  would	   be	   constitutionally	   permissible.	   It	  was	   held	   that	   it	  was	   not.	   This	  followed	   earlier	   litigation	   under	   the	   Saskatchewan	   Human	   Rights	   Code	   where	  marriage	  commissioners	  had	  claimed	  rights	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  beliefs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  There	  are	  legislative	  exemptions	  in	  Prince	  Edward	  Island:	  An	  Act	  to	  Amend	  the	  Marriage	  Act,	  3d	  Sess.,62	  Leg.,	  2005.	  	  4	  [2009]	  ICR	  387	  [EAT],	  [2010]	  1	  WLR	  955	  [CA].	  5	  EAT	  judgment	  ibid.	  at	  390.	  6	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  8.	  7	  2011	  SKCA	  3.	  8	  S.S.	  1995,	  c.	  M-­‐4.1.	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In	  one	  of	  these	  cases,	  Nichols	  v	  M.J.,9	  a	  gay	  couple	  complained	  to	  the	  Saskatchewan	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  when	  a	  marriage	  commissioner	  had	  refused	  to	  perform	  their	  marriage.	  On	  appeal,	  the	  Saskatchewan	  Court	  of	  Queen’s	  Bench	  held	  that	  the	  commissioner	  had	  no	  defence	  to	  the	  discrimination	  claim.	  Unlike	  British	  registrars,	  marriage	  commissioners	  are	  not	  employed	  by	  the	  state,	  but	  rather	  are	  licensed	  by	  the	  provincial	  authorities	  to	  perform	  marriages.	  In	  Saskatchewan	  the	  Marriage	  Unit	  maintains	  a	  list	  of	  marriage	  commissioners	  but	  couples	  then	  arrange	  for	  and	  pay	  a	  fixed	  fee	  to	  the	  commissioner	  directly.	  	  	  There	  are	   two	  American	  cases	  on	  similar	  points,	   concerning	  whether	   town	  clerks	  could	   refuse	   to	   give	   marriage	   licences	   to	   same-­‐sex	   couples.	   The	   first	   involved	  Vermont’s	   civil	   union	   law	   (now	   repealed	   and	   replaced	   with	   same-­‐sex	   marriage)	  where	   town	   clerks	   were	   required	   to	   issue	   a	   civil	   union	   licence	   or	   to	   appoint	   an	  assistant	   to	   do	   so.10	  In	   Brady	   v	   Dean11	  some	   town	   clerks	   argued	   that	   merely	   to	  appoint	   an	   assistant	   infringed	   their	   rights	   under	   the	   Vermont	   Constitution.	   This	  was	   rejected.	   The	   only	   case	   to	   be	   partly	   successful	   in	   the	   jurisdictions	   under	  discussion	  here	  is	  the	  second	  American	  decision,	  Slater	  v	  Douglas	  County,12	  where	  a	  clerk	   refused	   to	   process	   Declarations	   of	   Domestic	   Partnerships.	   Her	   request	   for	  accommodation	  was	  refused.	  The	  case	  concerned	  an	  action	  for	  summary	  judgment	  against	  her	  by	  her	  former	  employer.	  This	  was	  denied	  and	  the	  case	  sent	  for	  trial	  by	  jury.	  Although	  a	  question	   for	   the	   jury,	   the	   judge	  strongly	  suggested	   it	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  to	  accommodate	  her	  without	  causing	  undue	  hardship:	  the	  office	  dealt	  with	  very	  few	  applications	  and	  these	  were	  not	  shared	  out	  equally	  among	  the	  staff.	  The	  case	  subsequently	  settled.13	  	  Interference	  	  Before	   considering	   the	   proportionality	   test,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   first	   issue	   is	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  any	  interference	  with	  the	  registrars’	  rights.	  As	  these	  claims	  arise	   within	   employment,	   on	   one	   understanding,	   since	   employees	   can	   resign	   no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  2009	  SKQB	  299.	  1018	  V.S.A.	  §5161.	  This	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  a	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  law,	  which	  does	  not	  have	  such	  a	  provision.	  11	  173	  Vt.	  542	  (Vt.	  2001).	  12	  743	  F.Supp.	  2d	  1188	  (2010).	  	  13	  ‘County	  Pays	  Off	  On	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  Case’	  The	  Roseburg	  Beacon,	  13th	  April	  2011	  http://www.roseburgbeacon.com/home/2011/4/13/county-­‐pays-­‐off-­‐on-­‐same-­‐sex-­‐marriage-­‐case.html	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	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further	   protection	   of	   their	   religious	   rights	   is	   necessary,	   as	   the	   conflict	   between	  their	  conscience	  and	  their	  obligations	  can	  thereby	  be	  avoided.	  This	  idea,	  sometimes	  known	  as	  the	  specific	  situation	  rule,	  was	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  of	   Human	   Rights,14	  and	   following	   it,	   English	   courts.15	  In	   January	   2013	   in	   Eweida,	  
Chaplin,	   Ladele	   and	   McFarlane	   v	   UK, 16 	  (hereafter	   Eweida	   v	   UK)	   the	   Court	  reconsidered	  this	   idea	  and	   it	  was	  held	   that	   there	  was	  no	  absolute	  bar	   to	  bringing	  claims	   within	   employment,	   but	   rather	   that	   this	   should	   merely	   be	   a	   factor	   to	   be	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  	  	  As	  previously	  mentioned,17	  the	  specific	  situation	  rule	  was	  unnecessarily	  strict.	  That	  a	   person	   can	   resign	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   balancing	   test	   and	   may	   be	   ultimately	  required,	   but	   such	   an	   approach	  prevented	   even	   raising	   the	  question	  of	   rights.	  As	  Gunn	  put	  it,	  it	  meant	  that	  the	  ‘”fundamental	  rights”	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  are	  subject	   to	   a	   simply	   contractual	   waiver’. 18 	  Given	   that	   for	   most	   people	   their	  employment	   is	   an	   economic	   necessity,	   as	   well	   as	   providing	   important	   social	  benefits,	  employment	   is	   too	   important	  an	  area	   for	   religious	  rights	  not	   to	  apply.	  A	  particular	   form	  of	   employment	  may	   also	   be	   particularly	   important	   to	   a	   claimant.	  Furthermore	  these	  claims	  can	  involve	  only	  small	  parts	  of	  an	  employee’s	  duties	  and	  any	   conflict	  between	   their	  obligations	  and	   their	   religious	  beliefs	  may	  have	  arisen	  only	  after	  they	  have	  begun	  employment.	  	  The	   specific	   situation	   approach	   was	   not	   only	   itself	   a	   disproportionate	   rule	   but	  violated	   the	   principle	   of	   providing	   justification.	   As	   Stychin	   puts	   it,	   ‘while	  proponents	  of	  freedom	  of	  religion	  may	  accept	  the	  need	  for	  balancing,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  advocate	  that	  it	  should	  be	  done	  openly	  as	  a	  majoritarian	  limitation	  on	  the	  exercise	   of	   the	   right,	   rather	   than	   constitutively	   in	   the	   definition	   of	   its	   scope.’19	  It	  excluded	   any	   attempt	   to	   find	   less	   intrusive	  measures	  which	   protected	   the	   rights	  and	   interests	   on	   both	   sides.	   It	   meant	   that	   any	   justification,	   no	   matter	   how	  unimportant	  the	  interest	  or	  how	  badly	  tailored	  the	  solution	  is,	  would	  suffice.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  E.g.	  Stedman	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1997)	  5	  EHRLR	  544;	  Ahmad	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1981)	  4	  EHRR	  126.	  	  15	  E.g.	  Copsey	  v	  WBB	  Devon	  Clays	  Ltd	  	  [2005]	  ICR	  1789,	  albeit	  with	  criticism;	  R(Begum)	  v	  
Governors	  of	  Denbigh	  High	  School	  [2007]	  1	  AC	  100.	  16	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  8.	  17	  See	  supra	  at	  p64-­‐5.	  18	  T.J.	  Gunn,	  ‘Adjudicating	  Rights	  of	  Conscience	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights’,	  in	  J.	  Van	  der	  Vyver	  and	  J.	  Witte	  (eds),	  Religious	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Global	  Perspective:	  
Legal	  Perspectives	  (The	  Hague:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1996).	  19	  C.	  F.	  Stychin,	  ‘Faith	  in	  the	  Future:	  Sexuality,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Public	  Sphere’	  (2009)	  29	  
OJLS	  729.	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  Other	   jurisdictions,	   including	   the	   US	   and	   Canada,	   have	   not	   adopted	   such	   a	   strict	  interpretation.	   In	   both	   these	   jurisdictions	   it	   has	   been	   largely	   unproblematic	   to	  suggest	  that	  religious	  freedom	  claims	  can	  be	  made	  relating	  to	  employment.20	  Thus	  in	  Nichols,	  the	  Marriage	  Commissioners	  Case	  and	  Slater,	  it	  was	  not	  in	  issue	  that	  the	  claimant’s21	  rights	   had	   been	   affected.	   In	   Brady	   v	   Dean,	   although	   the	   claim	   failed	  because	  there	  was	  no	   ‘substantial	  burden’	  on	  the	  town	  clerks’	  belief,	   this	  was	  not	  because	   it	   took	   place	   within	   employment,	   but	   because	   there	   already	   was	   an	  accommodation	   as	   it	   was	   possible	   to	   appoint	   an	   assistant	   to	   issue	   civil	   union	  licences.	  	  	  The	   correct	   approach	   then	   is	   to	   say	   that	   there	   was	   an	   interference	   with	   the	  registrars’	  rights	  since	  they	  are	  forced	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  religious	  obligation	  and	  their	   employment.	   The	   exception	   to	   this	   is	   Brady	  where,	   as	   the	   Court	   said,	   the	  obligation	   to	   appoint	   an	   assistant	   was	   too	   indirect	   to	   constitute	   a	   substantial	  burden.	   Notwithstanding	   that	   the	   town	   clerks	   may	   still	   consider	   this	   to	   be	   an	  immoral	   act,	   not	   every	   burden	   on	   religious	   practice	   constitutes	   an	   interference	  with	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  	  Legitimate	  Aim	  	  The	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test	  is	  to	  decide	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  legitimate	  aim	   behind	   the	   refusal	   to	   grant	   an	   exemption.	   The	   clearest	   legitimate	   aim	   is	  preventing	  discrimination.	  Even	   in	   those	  cases	  such	  as	  Ladele	  where	   there	  would	  be	   no	   overall	   effect	   on	   the	   service	   provided,	   since	   services	   could	   be	   provided	   by	  other	  employees	  with	  little	  or	  no	  additional	  cost	  to	  the	  employer	  or	  inconvenience	  to	   service	   users,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   in	   providing	   a	   non-­‐discriminatory	  service.	   Firstly,	   preventing	   discrimination	   itself	   is	   legitimate.	   Gay	   couples	   are	  denied	   formal	   equality:	   they	   do	   not	   receive	   the	   same	   treatment	   from	   all	   public	  officials.22	  If	   it	  were	  not	   for	   the	  person’s	  sexual	  orientation,	   the	  employee’s	  duties	  would	   not	   have	   been	   rearranged.	   Even	   if	   the	   discrimination	   is	   not	   directly	  experienced,	  permitting	  it	  is	  stigmatising	  and	  hurtful	  and	  conveys	  the	  message	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  E.g.	  Thomas	  v	  Review	  Board	  490	  US.707	  (1981);	  Moore	  v	  British	  Columbia	  (Ministry	  of	  
Social	  Services)	  [1992]	  17	  CHRR	  D/426.	  21	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  consistency	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  ‘claimant’	  regardless	  of	  the	  jurisdiction.	  22	  B.	  MacDougall,	  ‘Refusing	  to	  Officiate	  at	  Same-­‐Sex	  Civil	  Marriages’	  (2006)	  69	  Sask	  L	  Rev	  351.	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a	   person	   is	   not	   equal	   to	   others.23	  Secondly,	   although	   the	   employer	   does	   not	  necessarily	  take	  any	  view	  on	  the	  employee’s	  objections,	  and	  certainly	  does	  not	  have	  to	   share	   them,	   the	   underlying	   argument	   of	   the	   employee	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   highly	  offensive	   to	   many.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   merely	   about	   avoiding	   ‘bare	   offence’,24	  which	  as	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  3	  is	  illegitimate.	  The	  employee	  is	  arguing	  that	  SSM/Ps	  or	   homosexual	   sexual	   practices,	   or	   perhaps	   even	   a	   homosexual	   orientation,	   are	  immoral.	  Employers	  have	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  in	  seeking	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  these	  views	  and	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  think	  such	  views	  are	  unacceptable.	  	  	  Another	   potentially	   legitimate,	   although	   more	   problematic,	   aim	   is	   a	   broader	  objective	   to	   create	  an	   inclusive	  and	  welcoming	  space	   for	  all	   as	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  policy.	  Such	  a	  policy	  includes	  prohibitions	  against	  discrimination	  but	  goes	  beyond	  that.	   It	   is	   not	   a	   coincidence	   that	   Islington’s	   anti-­‐discrimination	   policy	  was	   called	  ‘Dignity	  for	  All’.	  This	   is	  what	  could	  be	  called	  the	   ‘cultural	  transformation’	  purpose	  of	   anti-­‐discrimination	   law.25	  This	   should	   not	   be	   interpreted	   too	   broadly	   though,	  since	  it	  could	  be	  justify	  severe	  interferences	  with	  moral	  autonomy.	  	  	  Further	   aims	   may	   also	   be	   more	   prosaic	   but	   still	   legitimate,	   such	   as	   operational	  efficiency	   and	   aiming	   to	   prevent	   disquiet	   within	   the	   workplace.26	  In	   Ladele	   for	  example,	   there	   had	   been	   complaints	   from	   gay	   colleagues	   about	   her	   stance.	  Resolving	  the	  dispute	  had	  therefore	  become	  necessary.	  	  	  Rational	  Connection	  	  The	  second	  step	   is	   that	  of	   requiring	  a	   rational	   connection	  between	   the	   legitimate	  aim	  and	  the	  action	  complained	  of.	  The	  connection	  between	  preventing	  a	  registrar	  from	   discriminating	   and	   the	   legitimate	   aims	   is	   clear:	   it	  would	  mean	   for	   example	  that	   couples	   do	   not	   directly	   experience	   discrimination	   (where	   this	   is	   in	   issue),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  S.	  Gilreath,	  ‘Not	  a	  Moral	  Issue:	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  and	  Religious	  Liberty’	  [2010]	  U	  Ill	  L	  Rev	  205;	  A.	  Koppelman,	  Antidiscrimination	  Law	  and	  Social	  Equality	  (London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  57-­‐76.	  24	  As	  Hambler	  argues:	  A.	  Hambler,	  ‘Recognising	  a	  Right	  to	  ‘Conscientiously	  Object’	  for	  Registrars	  whose	  Religious	  Beliefs	  Are	  Incompatible	  with	  their	  Duty	  to	  Conduct	  Same-­‐Sex	  Civil	  Partnerships’	  (2012)	  7	  Religion	  and	  Human	  Rights	  157.	  25	  Koppelman	  supra	  n.23.	  	  26	  Although	  this	  aim	  may	  not	  be	  accorded	  much	  weight.	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demonstrate	   that	   such	   discrimination	   is	   unacceptable	   and	   prevent	   the	   ‘dignitary	  hurt’27	  from	  awareness	  of	  an	  exemption.	  	  This	  test	  is	  met	  in	  all	  the	  cases.	  	  No	  Less	  Restrictive	  Means	  	  As	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  the	  no	  less	  restrictive	  means	  or	  necessity	  test	  aspect	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test	  as	  described	  by	  Alexy	  asks	  what	  can	  be	  factually	  achieved.	  Can	  the	   ‘amount’	  of	   freedom	  of	  religion	  be	  maintained,	  while	   increasing	  freedom	   from	  discrimination?	   In	  other	  words,	   is	   the	   restriction	  Pareto	  optimal?28	  The	   proposed	   amendment	   to	   the	   Saskatchewan	  Marriage	   Act	   failed	   on	   the	   basis	  that	   it	   had	   not	   ‘minimally	   impaired’	   the	   right.29	  Since	   the	   Saskatchewan	   system	  relied	   on	   couples	   contacting	   marriage	   commissioners	   themselves,	   the	  commissioner	   would	   directly	   tell	   a	   gay	   couple	   that	   he	   would	   not	   perform	   a	  ceremony.	   The	   Court	   therefore	   held	   that	   giving	   a	   right	   to	   refuse	   as	   the	  marriage	  system	   stood	   did	   not	   constitute	   the	   least	   impairment	   of	   the	   right	   to	   non-­‐discrimination,	   since	   an	   alternative	   system	   could	   be	   devised	   where	   a	   same-­‐sex	  couple	  would	   not	   be	   confronted	  with	   direct	   rejection.	   In	   this	   alternative	   system,	  couples	  could	  approach	  the	  Director	  of	   the	  Marriage	  Unit	  who	  would	  give	   them	  a	  list	   of	   marriage	   commissioners	   who	   were	   available	   and	   willing	   to	   perform	   the	  ceremony.	  Thus	  the	  couple	  would	  be	  unaware	  if	  a	  commissioner	  had	  objected.	  The	  proportionality	   and	   thus	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   legislative	   amendment	   therefore	  failed.	  However,	  since	  the	  English	  registry	  and	  American	  marriage	  licence	  systems	  already	   use	   a	   similar	   system,	   in	   those	   jurisdictions	   there	   are	   no	   less	   restrictive	  means	   that	   could	   have	   promoted	   the	   legitimate	   aims	   as	   described	   above	   to	   the	  same	  extent.	  	  Greater	   concentration	   on	   this	   part	   of	   the	   test,	   not	   merely	   by	   courts	   when	   they	  eventually	   come	   to	   review	   these	   decisions	   but	   in	   a	   more	   general	   sense	   by	   all	  participants	   before	   this	   point,	   could	   move	   the	   discussion	   beyond	   the	   exemption	  and	  no	   exemption	   dilemma.	  Although	   this	   binary	   choice	   highlights	   the	   principles	  behind	  these	  cases,	  sometimes	  different	  practical	  solutions	  are	  available	  which	  can	  adequately	  protect	  rights	  on	  both	  sides.	  The	  failure	  to	  consider	  this	  stage	  carefully,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Marriage	  Commissioners	  supra	  n.7	  at	  para	  107.	  28	  R.	  Alexy,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Constitutional	  Rights,	  tr	  J.	  Rivers,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  573.	  29	  As	  explained	  above	  p62-­‐3	  the	  Canadian	  test	  of	  minimal	  impairment	  is	  broader	  than	  the	  test	  of	  no	  less	  restrictive	  means	  used	  in	  Alexy’s	  model.	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particularly	  by	   the	  ECHR,	  which	   tends	   to	   consider	   in	   an	  overall	  way	  whether	   the	  actions	   are	   justified	   rather	   than	   assessing	   each	   aspect	   of	   the	   test	   separately,	   is	  therefore	  problematic.	  	  
Minow	   draws	   attention	   to	   a	   resolution	   of	   a	   dispute	   in	   San	   Francisco.30	  The	   city	  proposed	  a	  policy	   that	   all	   its	   contractors	  must	  provide	  domestic	  partner	  benefits	  equal	   to	   those	   provided	   to	   spouses.	   The	   Catholic	   Church	   opposed	   this	   for	   its	  agencies	   on	   the	  basis	   that	   it	   required	   them	   to	   recognise	  domestic	   partnership	   as	  equivalent	   to	  marriage.	  This	   appeared	   to	  place	   the	  parties	   in	  deadlock.	  However,	  the	  Archbishop	  of	  San	  Francisco	  also	  stated	  that	  the	  church	  approved	  of	  methods	  to	  ensure	   more	   had	   healthcare	   coverage.	   Thus	   an	   alternative	   policy	   was	   devised	  where	  a	  party	  would	  be	  compliant	  if	  they	  ‘allow[ed]	  each	  employee	  to	  designate	  a	  legally	   domiciled	   member	   of	   the	   employee's	   household’. 31 	  This	   fulfilled	   San	  Francisco’s	   aim	   of	   ensuring	   that	   gay	   employees,	   who	   could	   not	   legally	   marry,	  received	  the	  same	  benefits	  as	  married	  employees	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  the	  original	  policy,	  but	   interfered	   less	  with	  the	  Church’s	   freedom	  of	  religion	  since	   it	  made	  the	  
type	  of	  relationship	  irrelevant.32	  
Justification	  	  Before	  considering	  what	  the	  appropriate	  balance	  of	  rights	  should	  be,	  more	  will	  be	  said	   here	   about	   how	   the	   balancing	   stage	   should	   be	   considered.	   As	   has	   been	  discussed	   previously,	  much	   of	   the	   purpose	   of	   a	   proportionality	   analysis	   is	   about	  contesting	   the	   claims	   of	   public	   authorities	   and	   requiring	   them	   to	   demonstrate	  suitable	  justification	  for	  their	  actions.33	  Part	  of	  this	  suitability	  is	  about	  the	  kinds	  of	  reasons	  that	  should	  be	  given.	  The	  justification	  should	  go	  not	  only	  to	  the	  onlooker,	  but	  also	  to	  those	  who	  will	  be	  bound	  by	  it.34	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  reasons	  have	  to	  be	  given	   that	   will	   be	   accepted	   by	   those	   who	   are	   bound	   by	   it.	   This	   may	   well	   be	  impossible.	  However,	  it	  means	  that	  arguments	  that	  a	  person’s	  views	  are	  irrational	  or	   bigoted	   are	   not	   justificatory	   reasons.	   They	   express	   only	   a	   conclusion	   not	  reasoning	   and	   are	   not	   explicable	   unless	   the	   basis	   for	   judgment	   is	   shared.	   Such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  M.	  Minow,	  ‘Should	  Religious	  Groups	  be	  Exempt	  from	  Civil	  Rights	  Laws?’	  (2007)	  48	  BCL	  
Rev	  781.	  	  31	  Ibid.	  at	  830.	  32	  C.f	  Stychin,	  supra	  n.19	  on	  similarities	  between	  queer	  and	  feminist	  theorists	  and	  religious	  arguments.	  33	  M.	  Kumm,‘The	  Idea	  of	  Socratic	  Contestation	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Justification:	  The	  Point	  of	  Rights-­‐Based	  Proportionality	  Review’	  	  (2010)	  4	  Law	  &	  Ethics	  of	  Human	  Rights	  1.	  34	  L.	  Swaine,	  The	  Liberal	  Conscience	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  Ch	  4.	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arguments	   are	   only	   likely	   to	   engender	   resentment	   and	   a	   greater	   sense	   of	  marginalisation.	  	  	  There	  is	  consistently	  no	  failure	  of	  this	  principle	  in	  any	  of	  these	  cases.	  For	  example,	  Elias	   J	   said	   with	   some	   sympathy	   for	   Ladele	   that,	   ‘fundamental	   changes	   in	   social	  attitudes,	   particularly	  with	   respect	   to	   sexual	   orientation,	   are	   happening	   very	   fast	  and	   for	   some	  –	  and	  not	  only	   those	  with	   religious	  objections	   –	   they	  are	  genuinely	  perplexing’.35	  A	   similar	   approach	   was	   taken	   in	   McFarlane	   v	   Relate,36	  discussed	  below,	   where	   a	   relationship	   counsellor	   sought	   to	   be	   exempted	   from	   providing	  sexual	  therapy	  to	  gay	  couples.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  critical	  judgment,	  Laws	  LJ	  was	  keen	  to	   remark	  on	   the	   respectability	  of	   the	   religious	  views	   in	  question.	  He	   stated	   that,	  ‘the	   judges	   have	   never,	   so	   far	   as	   I	   know,	   sought	   to	   equate	   the	   condemnation	   by	  some	   Christians	   of	   homosexuality	   on	   religious	   grounds	   with	   homophobia,	   or	   to	  regard	  that	  position	  as	  “disreputable”.	  Nor	  have	  they	  likened	  Christians	  to	  bigots.’37	  In	  none	  of	   the	  decisions	  discussed	   above	   are	   the	   registrars	   told	   that	   their	   beliefs	  are	  wrong,	  merely	  that	  they	  must	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  their	  beliefs.	  In	  the	  Canadian	  cases,	  the	  courts	  rely	  on	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  duty	  of	  neutrality	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  on	  pointing	  out	  the	  hurtful	  effect	  on	  gay	  couples	  if	  refused	  service.	  In	  Brady	  v	  
Dean	  the	  Court	   firstly	   relies	   again	  on	   the	  duty	  of	  neutrality	   of	   public	   officials	   but	  more	  heavily	  on	  the	  accommodation	  already	  given	  to	  town	  clerks.	  In	  Ladele	  it	  is	  the	  overarching	  importance	  of	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  policy	  to	  Islington	  Council	  that	  is	  significant.	   Although	   of	   course	   these	   arguments	   can	   be	   disagreed	   with,	   they	  provide	  a	  suitable	  type	  of	  reasoning.	  No	  mention	  is	  made	  in	  any	  of	  the	  central	  but	  contested	  moral	   claim	   that	   homosexuality	  must	   be	   accepted	   as	   a	  morally	  neutral	  trait.	  	  	  A	   different	   requirement	   related	   to	   justification	   is	   that	   both	   sides	   should	   be	  permitted	   to	  have	   their	   concerns	   listened	   to	  and	   taken	   seriously	  by	   the	  decision-­‐maker.38	  This	  is	  linked	  to	  a	  norm	  of	  promoting	  dialogue	  and	  deliberation.	  Here	  the	  cases	  demonstrate	  a	  different	  picture.	  In	  Ladele	  the	  initial	  dialogue	  was	  inadequate.	  Her	  managers	  seemed	  to	  have	  decided	  immediately	  that	  refusing	  to	  perform	  a	  civil	  partnership	  was	   ‘an	  act	  of	  homophobia’	  and	  a	  breach	  of	   the	  Council’s	   ‘Dignity	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  EAT	  judgment	  supra	  n.4	  at	  412.	  36	  [2010]	  EWCA	  Civ	  880.	  37	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  18.	  38	  This	  idea	  of	  dialogue	  was	  used	  in	  G.	  Bouchard	  and	  C.	  Taylor,	  Building	  the	  Future:	  A	  Time	  
for	  Reconciliation	  (Gouvernement	  du	  Quebec,	  2008).	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All’	  policy	  and	  thus	  that	  no	  accommodation	  should	  even	  be	  considered.39	  As	  Vickers	  argues,	  ‘making	  requests	  for	  accommodation	  should	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  harassment,	  unless	  this	  has	  been	  done	  in	  an	  offensive	  manner’.40	  At	  an	  earlier	  stage,	  the	  decision	  to	  designate	  her	  a	  civil	  partnership	  registrar	  without	  any	  consultation,	  despite	  her	  having	   raised	   objections	   and	   when	   there	   was	   no	   legal	   obligation	   to	   do	   so,41	  demonstrates	  a	  failure	  of	  dialogue.	  The	  courts	  though,	  while	  pointing	  this	  out,	  make	  nothing	   of	   it.	   There	   had	   been	   the	   suggestion	   that	   she	   could	   supervise	   the	   simple	  signing	  of	   the	   register	   rather	   than	  perform	  civil	  partnership	   ceremonies.	  But	   this	  only	   raises	   further	   questions:	   to	   refuse	   to	   perform	   ceremonies	   is	   just	   as	   much	  discrimination	   as	   a	   refusal	   to	   perform	   civil	   partnerships	   at	   all,	   although	  presumably	  it	  will	  take	  place	  less	  often.	  It	  is	  therefore,	  as	  will	  be	  explained,	  just	  as	  unlawful	   under	   the	   law	   as	   interpreted	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal.	   Furthermore	   this	  accommodation	   did	   not	   match	   her	   objection:	   she	   thought	   that	   all	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  or	  partnership,	  however	  created,	  was	  immoral.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  while	  this	  failure	  of	  dialogue	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  situation	  that	  arose	  in	  
Slater,	  it	  is	  because	  of	  this	  that	  she	  is	  ultimately	  successful	  in	  her	  claim.	  This	  case	  is	  treated	  by	  the	  Court	   like	  any	  other	  claim	  to	  accommodate	  religious	  practices,	  and	  not	  conceptually	  as	  a	  clash	  of	  rights	  case.	  As	  a	  reasonable	  accommodation	  case,	  at	  a	  minimum	   there	   must	   be	   enquiry	   as	   to	   what	   accommodation	   is	   sought	   and	   a	  consideration	  of	  whether	  this	  accommodation	  would	  constitute	  an	  undue	  burden.42	  Since	  this	  did	  not	  occur,	  she	  was	  successful.	  	  These	  principles	  of	  justification	  and	  deliberation	  are	  fulfilled	  primarily	  through	  the	  application	   of	   a	   fact-­‐specific	   contextual	   test.	   This	   kind	   of	   test	   means	   that	  consideration	  of	  the	  harms	  caused	  to	  both	  parties	  are	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	   process	   and	   it	   should	   permit	   both	   sides	   to	   fully	   explain	   the	   reasons	   for	  their	  actions.	  In	  this	  sense,	  in	  the	  domestic	  courts,	  Ladele	  is	  curtailed	  in	  her	  ability	  to	  put	   forward	  her	   case	  by	   the	  unnecessarily	   strict	   interpretation	  of	   interference	  that	   was	   current	   before	   the	   ECtHR’s	   decision	   in	   Eweida	   v	   UK.	   Furthermore,	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	   judgment	  also	  closes	  down	  her	  opportunity	  to	  explain	  and	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  M.	  Malik,	  ‘Religious	  Freedom,	  Free	  Speech	  and	  Equality:	  Conflict	  or	  Cohesion?’	  (2011)	  17	  
Res	  Publica	  21.	  40	  L.	  Vickers,	  ‘Religious	  Discrimination	  in	  the	  Workplace:	  An	  Emerging	  Hierarchy?’	  (2010)	  12	  ELJ	  280,	  297.	  41	  It	  was	  only	  under	  a	  legal	  obligation	  to	  provide	  enough	  civil	  partnership	  registrars	  to	  provide	  an	  efficient	  service:	  Civil	  Partnership	  Act	  2004	  s.29.	  42	  Brown	  v	  General	  Motors	  664	  F.2d	  292	  (8th	  Cir.	  1981).	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taken	   seriously	   the	   harm	   caused	   to	   her	   by	   the	   denial	   of	   an	   exemption,	   since	   it	  accepts	   the	   argument	   that	   any	   accommodation	   of	   her	   beliefs	   is	   itself	   unlawful	  because	  of	  the	  Equality	  Act	  (Sexual	  Orientation)	  Regulations	  2007.	  Under	  this	  law	  it	  is	  unlawful	  for	  a	  person	  ‘concerned	  with	  the	  provision	  to	  the	  public	  or	  a	  section	  of	  the	  public	  of	  goods,	   facilities	  or	   services	   to	  discriminate,	  by	   refusing	   to	  provide	  a	  person	   with	   goods,	   facilities	   or	   services’	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   their	   sexual	  orientation.43	  Not	   only	   organisations	   but	   also	   individual	   employees	   are	   therefore	  caught	  by	   the	  prohibition.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	   like	   the	  EAT	  which	  had	   ‘seen	   the	  force	  of	  this	  argument’	  but	  refused	  to	  decide	  it,	  shows	  obvious	  uneasiness	  with	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	  provision	  might	  upset	   locally	  worked	  out	  compromises,	  but	   it	  still	  accepts	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  Regulations.	  This	  allows	  a	  very	  limited	  scope	  for	  a	  proportionality	  analysis.	  At	  the	  Strasbourg	  level,	  although	  the	  ECtHR	  gives	  a	  much	  broader	  scope	  for	  Art	  9	  rights	  within	  employment	  than	  it	  had	  before,	  making	  clear	  that	  such	  claims	  can	  be	  successful44	  and	  argues	  that	  a	  proportionality	  approach	  is	  necessary,	   it	   holds	   that	  member	   states	  will	   have	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   discretion	   at	   the	  balancing	  stage.45	  Although	  this	  may	  be	  acceptable	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  in	   these	   situations	   in	   the	   member	   states	   and	   the	   ECtHR’s	   role	   as	   a	   supervisory	  international	  court,	  it	  means	  that	  Ladele	  is	  not	  provided	  with	  much	  justification	  for	  the	  interference	  with	  her	  rights.	  	  	  This	  justificatory	  process	  is	  far	  better	  realised	  in	  Nichols	  v	  M.J.	  The	  proportionality	  approach	   used	   there	   permits	   both	   sides	   to	   express	   their	   views,	   with	  M.J.	   clearly	  stating	   what	   effect	   the	   refusal	   of	   service	   had	   on	   him	   and	   the	   marriage	  commissioner	   stating	   the	  value	  of	  his	   religion	   to	  him	  and	  his	  desire	   to	   follow	  his	  religious	   conscience.	   However,	   the	   almost	   blanket	   rule	   that	   government	   officials	  cannot	   let	   their	   religious	   beliefs	   affect	   their	   actions	   does	   not	   focus	   on	   the	   actual	  facts	   of	   the	   case	   and	   therefore	   prevents	   full	   dialogue	   and	   consideration	   taking	  place.	  This	  is	  discussed	  further	  below.	  The	  problem	  occurs	  the	  other	  way	  round	  in	  
Slater	  v	  Douglas	  County.	  Whilst	  acknowledging	  Slater’s	  religious	  objections	  and	  the	  very	  small	  part	  of	  her	   job	  registering	  domestic	  partnerships	  comprised,	   the	  Court	  did	  not	   fully	   take	   into	  account	   the	  expressive	  harm	  suffered	  by	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  when	   such	   an	   exemption	   is	   granted.	   There	   is	   also	   a	   very	   serious	   failure	   in	   the	  minority	   opinion	   of	   Judges	   Vučinič	   and	   De	   Gaetano	   in	   Eweida	   v	   UK	   in	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Reg	  4(1),	  now	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  s.29.	  44	  As	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  violation	  in	  Eweida.	  45	  This	  discretion	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  Court’s	  ready	  acceptance	  in	  Chaplin	  that	  there	  were	  non	  trivial	  health	  and	  safety	  concerns	  in	  preventing	  her	  wearing	  a	  cross	  at	  work	  as	  a	  nurse.	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discussion	   of	  Ladele.	   Rather	   than	   seeing	   this	   as	   a	   difficult	   question	   of	   conflicting	  rights,	  they	  reduce	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  claim	  to	  mere	  pettiness,	  referring	  to	  the	  complaints	   made	   by	   Ladele’s	   gay	   colleagues	   as	   ‘back-­‐stabbing’,	   to	   Islington’s	  policies	  as	  ‘obsessive	  political	  correctness’	  and	  put	  ‘gay	  rights’	  in	  quotation	  marks,	  as	  if	  these	  rights	  have	  no	  ECHR	  protection.	  This	  is	  highly	  unsatisfactory.	  
Balancing	  	  In	  balancing	  these	   issues	   it	  might	  be	  argued	  that	   the	  balance	  should	  always	  come	  down	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  right	  because	  all	  discriminatory	  action	  denies	  respect	  and	  automatically	  assigns	  a	  less	  than	  equal	  worth	  and	  perhaps	  even	  less	  than	  human	  worth	  to	  those	  discriminated	  against.	  Since	  protecting	  dignity	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  human	  rights	  protection,	  it	  will,	  so	  this	  argument	  goes,	  almost	  always	  be	  proportionate	  to	  prohibit	  discrimination	  because	  the	  interest	  against	  it	  is	  so	  great.	  As	   I	   have	   argued	   in	   the	   Introduction	   though,	   the	   situation	   is	  more	   complex	   than	  this.	  	  Some	  discrimination	  certainly	  does	  deny	  the	  personhood	  of	  others	  or	  in	  other	  words	   the	   intrinsic	   respect	   granted	   to	   all	  merely	   by	   being	   human,	   but	   not	   every	  legally	  prohibited	  act	  of	  discrimination	  is	  necessarily	  a	  violation	  of	  human	  dignity.46	  There	   is	   also	   a	   difference	   between	   the	   obligations	   of	   a	   state	   and	   those	   of	  individuals.	  For	  a	  state	  to	  deny	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  marriage	  or	  at	   least	  a	  functional	  equivalent	  to	  it	  is	  one	  thing:	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  refuse	  to	  perform	  it	  quite	  another.	  	  Accommodation	   in	   these	   SSM/P	   cases	   should	   therefore	   not	   be	   ruled	   out	  immediately	  but	  rather	  depend	  on	  a	  fact-­‐specific	  analysis	  of	  the	  rights	  involved	  in	  the	  particular	  case.	  In	  Nichols,	  while	  the	  refusal	  to	  serve	  was	  undoubtedly	  hurtful,	  Nichols	  merely	   stated	   that	   he	   refused	   to	  marry	   them	  because	   it	  went	   against	   his	  beliefs.	  In	  Ladele	  the	  letter	  she	  wrote	  to	  her	  managers	  describing	  her	  position	  was	  described	   by	   the	   EAT	   as	   ‘thoughtful	   and	   temperate’.47	  Not	   all	   discriminatory	   acts	  that	   involve	   criticism	  of	  homosexuality	  or	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	  will	   be	   intrinsically	  unacceptable.	  	  	  Indeed,	   those	   involved	   in	   these	   disputes	   may	   need	   to	   have	   ‘moral	   recognition	  respect’48	  for	   those	   with	   opposing	   views.	   As	   stated	   in	   the	   Introduction,	   having	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  M.	  Mahlmann	  ‘Six	  Antidotes	  to	  Dignity	  Fatigue	  in	  Ethics	  and	  Law’	  in	  C.	  McCrudden	  (ed)	  
Understanding	  Human	  Dignity	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013)	  610.	  47	  EAT	  judgment	  supra	  n.4	  at	  406.	  48	  S.	  Darwall,	  ‘Two	  Kinds	  of	  Respect’	  (1977)	  88	  Ethics	  36.	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moral	   recognition	   respect	   for	   something	   means	   that	   the	   ‘inappropriate	  consideration	  or	  weighing	  of	   that	   fact	   or	   feature	  would	   result	   in	   behavior	   that	   is	  morally	  wrong’.49	  This	  form	  of	  respect	  is	  not	  necessarily,	  and	  indeed	  often	  will	  not	  be,	  about	  respect	  for	  opinions,	  which	  many	  think	  fundamentally	  wrong,	  but	  rather	  respect	   for	   individuals,	   including	   their	   religious	   identity.	   Taking	   Ladele	   as	   an	  example,	  even	  if	  her	  actual	  views	  are	  rejected,	  her	  dilemma,	  that	  of	  being	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  her	  conscience	  and	  her	  obligations,	  is	  understandable.	  The	  argument	  that	  one	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  obey	  one’s	  conscience	  is	  a	  morally	  coherent	  one.50	  Although	   opposed	   to	   civil	   partnerships,	   Ladele	   did	   not	   seek	   to	   prevent	  couples	  from	  entering	  into	  them,	  only	  to	  have	  no	  part	   in	  them.	  By	  exchanging	  her	  shifts	  with	  colleagues	  she	  aimed	  to	  resolve	  her	  dilemma.	  	  The	  balancing	  stage	  involves	  a	  fact-­‐specific	  analysis	  of	  all	  the	  issues	  in	  a	  particular	  case.51	  The	   weight	   each	   interest	   has	   must	   therefore	   be	   assessed.	   This	   is	   not	  straightforward	   though.	   Beatty	   argues	   the	   courts	   should	   simply	   rely	   on	   the	   facts	  and	  listen	  to	  what	  each	  side	  has	  to	  say	  about	  the	  effect	  on	  each	  of	  them.52	  But	  this	  subjective	  approach	  cannot	  be	  the	  whole	  answer.	  While	  in	  Nichols	  the	  claimant	  was	  ‘crushed	   and	   devastated’,	   others	   may	   have	   experienced	   the	   situation	   as	   a	   mere	  annoyance.	   This	   would	   suggest,	   absurdly,	   that	   an	   exemption	   could	   be	   given	   for	  some	  marriages	  but	  not	   for	  others.	  On	   the	  other	   side,	   cases	  can	   involve	  claims	  of	  ‘dire	  consequences	  in	  an	  afterlife,	  perhaps	  for	  all	  eternity’.53	  If	  subjective	  effects	  are	  all	   that	   matter,	   even	   a	   catastrophic	   secular	   outcome	   could	   be	   potentially	  outweighed	   by	   a	   religious	   claim. 54 This	   difficulty,	   although	   real,	   is	   not	  insurmountable	   in	   this	   context.	   Since	   a	   person	   would	   presumably	   choose	   losing	  their	  employment	  over	  eternal	  damnation	  it	  is	  the	  secular	  effect,	  i.e.	  being	  forced	  to	  resign,	   which	   should	   be	   balanced.	   A	   person’s	   subjective	   experiences	   are	   though	  relevant	  to	  show	  the	  depth	  of	  the	  dilemma.	  As	  for	  those	  discriminated	  against,	  it	  is	  sufficient	   to	   consider	   that	   refusal	   of	   service	   could	   be	   highly	   distressing	   and	  corrosive	   of	   dignity,	   given	   that	   an	   exemption	  would	   necessarily	   apply	   to	   all	  who	  may	  seek	  a	  SSM/P.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Ibid.	  at	  41.	  50	  J.	  Childress,	  ‘Appeals	  to	  Conscience’	  (1979)	  89	  Ethics	  315.	  51	  H.	  Loeb	  and	  D.	  Rosenberg,	  ‘Fundamental	  Rights	  in	  Conflict:	  The	  Price	  of	  a	  Maturing	  Democracy’	  (2001)	  77	  ND	  L	  Rev	  27.	  52	  D.	  Beatty,	  The	  Ultimate	  Rule	  of	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  70-­‐2.	  53	  P.	  Cumper	  and	  T.	  Lewis,	  ‘”Public	  Reason”.	  Judicial	  Deference	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Freedom	  of	  Religion	  and	  Belief	  under	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998	  (2011)	  KLJ	  131,131.	  54	  Ibid.	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  A	  factor	  that	  must	  be	  weighed,	  which	  is	  mentioned	  repeatedly	  in	  the	  cases	  but	  not	  dealt	   with	   satisfactorily,	   is	   that	   these	   are	   state	   employees.	   There	   is	   obviously	   a	  public	  interest	  in	  having	  public	  employees	  perform	  all	  the	  obligations	  of	  their	  role.	  However,	  throughout	  these	  cases	  this	  factor	  is	  given	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  weight,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  there	  is	  almost	  an	  absolute	  bar	  on	  accommodations.	  Nichols	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	   ‘public	   official	   acting	   as	   government’.	   The	   Marriage	   Commissioners	   ‘are	   not	  private	   citizens…	   rather	   they	   serve	   as	   agents	   of	   the	   Province’	   and	   are	   told	   to	  ‘uphold	  the	  proud	  tradition	  of	  individual	  public	  officeholders’.55	  In	  Brady	  v	  Dean	  the	  Court	   stated	   that	   it	  was	   a	   ‘highly	   questionable	   proposition	   that	   a	   public	   official…	  can	  retain	  public	  office	  while	  refusing	  to	  perform	  a	  generally	  applicable	  duty	  of	  that	  office	  on	  religious	  grounds’.56	  In	  Ladele	  too	  it	  is	  emphasised	  that	  she	  is	  ‘employed	  in	  a	  public	  job	  and	  was	  working	  for	  a	  public	  authority’.57	  	  	  Evidently	   the	   state	   can	   only	   work	   through,	   and	   enforce	   its	   policies	   by,	   its	  employees	   and	   office-­‐holders	   but	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   duties	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   of	   a	   state	   are	   the	   same	   as	   the	   duties	   of	   an	   employee	   of	   the	   state.	  That	  a	  person	  is	  a	  state	  employee	  is	  relevant,	  but	  not	  conclusive.	  As	  Benson	  puts	  it,	  ‘to	  say	  that	  someone	  has	  a	  public	  role…	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  review	  we	  bring	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  matter,	  but	   it	  cannot	  provide	  a	  complete	  answer	  that	  advantages	  one	  sort	  of	  claimant	  over	  another’.58	  Such	  an	  approach	  would	  treat	  all	  state	  employees,	  regardless	   of	   position	   or	   seniority,	   as	   the	   same.	   This	   also	   does	   not	   permit	  employees	   the	   chance	   to	   be	   rights	   holders	   and	   not	   rights	   violators59	  and	   risks	  reducing	  people	  to	  issues.60	  	  	  Both	   the	   US	   and	   Canada	   have	   given	   state	   employees	   religious	   exemptions	   from	  particular	  work,	   thus	  demonstrating	   that	   the	   interest	   in	  neutrality,	   as	   considered	  by	  that	   legal	  system,	   is	  not	  absolute.	  There	   is	  no	  necessary	  reason	  to	  suggest	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Supra	  n.7	  paras	  97-­‐98.	  56	  Supra	  n.11	  at	  434.	  57	  CA	  judgment	  supra	  n.4	  at	  para	  52.	  58	  I.	  Benson,	  ‘The	  Freedom	  of	  Conscience	  and	  Religion	  in	  Canada:	  Challenges	  and	  Opportunities’	  (2007)	  21	  Emory	  Int'l	  L	  Rev	  111.	  59	  G.	  Trotter,	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  Decline	  Performance	  of	  Same-­‐Sex	  Civil	  Marriages:	  the	  Duty	  to	  Accommodate	  Public	  Servants’	  (2007)	  70	  Sask	  L	  Rev	  365.	  	  60	  Baer	  argues	  that	  this	  often	  occurs	  when	  discussing	  religious	  practices:	  S.	  Baer,	  ‘Privatizing	  Religion.	  Legal	  Groupism,	  No-­‐Go-­‐Areas	  and	  the	  Public-­‐Private	  Ideology	  in	  Human	  Rights	  Politics’	  (2013)	  20	  Constellations	  68.	  See	  also	  L.	  Woodhead,	  ‘Liberal	  Religion	  and	  Illiberal	  Secularism’	  in	  G.	  D’Costa	  et	  al.	  (eds),	  Religion	  in	  a	  Liberal	  State	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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an	  exemption	  has	  any	  endorsement,	  other	  than	  in	  a	  very	  limited	  sense,	  of	  the	  state.	  If	   for	   example	   an	   exemption	  was	   given	   to	   permit	   a	   person	   not	   to	   provide,	   or	   to	  assist	   in,	  abortions,	  this	  would	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  meaning	  that	  an	  employer	  thereby	  thought	  abortions	  were	  wrong,	  or	  even	  necessarily	  that	  they	  had	  sympathy	  for	  that	  view.61	  Similarly	   in	  American	   Postal	  Worker’s	   Union	   v	   Postmaster	   General62	  it	   was	  held	   that	   some	  post	   office	   clerks	   had	   to	   be	   given	   an	   exemption	   from	   processing	  draft	   registration	   forms,	   but	   quite	   clearly	   the	  US	   state	   did	   not	   thereby	   adopt	   the	  view	  that	  pacifism	  was	  an	  imperative	  moral	  requirement.	  The	  US	  has	  also	  rejected	  claims	  that	  religious	  accommodations	  breach	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state,63	  unless	   they	   provide	   an	   absolute	   religious	   veto. 64 	  State	   bodies	   have	   strong	  obligations	   of	   equality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination,	   but	   their	   obligations	   to	   all	   their	  staff,	   including	   those	   with	   conservative	   religious	   opinions,	   should	   not	   be	  forgotten.65 	  While	   as	   discussed	   below,	   there	   are	   some	   employees	   where	   the	  interest	   in	   neutrality	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   is	   so	   strong	   that	   requests	   for	  exemptions	  must	  be	  rejected,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  for	  all	  employees.	  	  Assuming	  therefore	  that	   it	  should	  not	  be	  accepted	  that	  the	  religious	  employees	  in	  these	   cases	   should	   automatically	   lose,	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   interference	   with	   the	  religious	  right	  must	  be	  considered	  since	  the	  greater	  the	  interference	  the	  greater	  the	  justification	  that	   is	  required.66	  A	  number	  of	   factors	  must	  be	  examined.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   Ladele	  will	   lose	   her	   job	   if	   she	   cannot	   be	   accommodated,	  which	   is	   a	   severe	  loss.	  Given	  also	   that	   the	   law	  had	   changed	  after	   she	  was	  employed,	   she	  was	   faced	  with	  a	  conflict	  she	  did	  not	  expect.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  other	  employment	  is	  open	  to	  her,	   perhaps	   even	   with	   the	   same	   employer.	   It	   is	   only	   her	   actions	   within	  employment	   that	   are	   affected	   and	   she,	   seemingly,	   remains	   free	   to	   oppose	   SSM/P	  outside	   it.	   While	   Rivers	   argues	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal’s	   judgment	   in	   Ladele	  ‘requires	   individuals	  to	  (pretend	  to)	  value	  what	  they	  do	  not	  value’,67	  Ladele	   is	  not	  necessarily	  even	  required	  to	  be	  hypocritical	  –	  her	  approval	  of	  SSM	  is	  never	  sought	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  E.g.	  Moore	  v	  British	  Columbia	  (Ministry	  of	  Social	  Services)	  supra	  n.20	  (Employee	  given	  exemption	  from	  approving	  public	  funding	  for	  abortion	  cases).	  62	  781	  F.2d	  772	  (9th	  Cir.	  1986).	  63	  e.g.	  EEOC	  v	  Ithaca	  Indus.	  Inc	  849	  F.2d	  116	  (4th	  Cir.	  1988).	  See	  J.	  Oleske,	  ‘Federalism,	  Free	  Exercise	  and	  Title	  VII:	  Reconsidering	  Reasonable	  Accommodation’	  (2004)	  6	  U	  Pa	  J	  Const	  L	  525.	  64	  Estate	  of	  Thorton	  v	  Caldor	  472	  US	  703	  (1985).	  65	  R.	  Sandberg,	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  Discriminate’	  (2011)	  13	  ELJ	  157.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  R.	  Alexy,	  ‘Balancing,	  Constitutional	  Review	  and	  Representation’	  (2005)	  3	  ICON	  572.	  	  67	  J.	  Rivers,	  ‘Promoting	  Religious	  Equality’	  (2012)	  1	  Ox	  J	  Law	  &	  Religion	  386,	  399.	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and	  is	  largely	  irrelevant.	  She	  is	  not	  required	  to	  value	  it	  or	  to	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  equal	  to	  heterosexual	  marriage.	  	  	  However,	  although	  the	  obligation	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  is	  a	  high	  one,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  discrimination	  was	  negligible	  and	  would	  not	  have	  been	  directly	  experienced	  by	  gay	  couples.	  Ladele	  is	  described	  as	  acting	  in	  a	  temperate	  way	  and	  only	  sought	  not	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  civil	  partnerships.	  Without	  ignoring	  the	  very	  real	  interests	  in	  non-­‐discrimination,	   and	   although	   this	   is	   a	   borderline	   case,	   it	   was	   a	   disproportionate	  interference	  with	  her	  Art	  9	  rights	  for	  her	  not	  to	  be	  permitted	  to	  refuse	  to	  perform	  SSM/Ps.	   While	   it	   was	   a	   legitimate,	   and	   probably	   unavoidable,	   reading	   of	   the	  Regulations	  that	  they	  prohibited	  all	  employees,	  rather	  than	  merely	  the	  organisation	  as	  a	  whole,	  from	  providing	  a	  non-­‐discriminatory	  service,	  this	  leads	  to	  a	  problematic	  result.	  There	  was	  room	  within	  the	  Council’s	  employment	  ‘for	  both	  gay	  people	  and	  conservative	   Christians,	   both	   living	   out	   their	   life	   as	   they	   saw	   fit.’68	  This	   will	   be	  highly	  disagreeable	  to	  some,	  including	  some	  of	  her	  colleagues,	  but,	  as	  Stychin	  puts	  it,	  ‘this	  is	  pluralism	  at	  the	  coalface,	  in	  which	  purity	  is	  foregone,	  solutions	  may	  not	  be	  pleasing	  to	  participants,	  and	  agreements	  are	  contingent	  and	  partial.’69	  	  	  The	   application	   of	   a	   proportionality	   test	   therefore	   demonstrates	   that	   Ladele	   is	   a	  difficult	   case.	   It	   should	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   that	   if	   there	   had	   been	   discussion	   and	  compromise	   at	   the	   beginning,	   this	   case	   might	   never	   have	   arisen	   since	   she	   may	  never	  have	  been	  designated	  a	  civil	  partnership	  registrar.	  There	  may	  still	  have	  been	  offence	   caused	   at	   the	   decision	   to	   have	   ‘given	   in’	   to	   bigotry,	   but	   potentially	   the	  backlash	  would	  have	  been	   less	  and	  a	   ‘reactive	  vicious	  circle’70	  avoided	   if	   Islington	  had	  sought	  volunteers	  rather	  than	  required	  Ladele	  and	  similarly	  placed	  employees	  to	  try	  to	  seek	  an	  exemption	  or	  to	  leave.	  There	  was	  no	  requirement	  to	  bring	  matters	  to	  a	  head.71	  Once	  she	  had	  been	  designated	  though,	  this	  dispute	  became	  much	  more	  intractable.	  	  	  In	  Slater	  v	  Douglas	  County,	  even	   though	   the	   reasoning	  did	  understate	   the	   interest	  against	  discrimination,	  holding	  only	  that	  ‘so	  long	  as	  the	  registration	  is	  processed	  in	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  A.	  Koppelman,	  ‘You	  Can't	  Hurry	  Love:	  Why	  Antidiscrimination	  Protections	  for	  Gay	  People	  Should	  Have	  Religious	  Exemptions’	  (2006)	  72	  Brook	  L	  Rev	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  69	  Stychin	  supra	  n.19	  at	  755.	  70	  Malik	  supra	  n.38.	  71	  P.	  Elias,	  ‘Religious	  Discrimination:	  Conflicts	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  Compromises’	  (2012)	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  EOR.	  	  Elias	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  then	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  the	  President	  of	  the	  EAT	  and	  gave	  the	  judgment	  in	  Ladele.	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a	   timely	   fashion	   the	   registrants	  have	   suffered	  no	   injury’,72	  the	  Court	  nevertheless	  reached	  the	  correct	  decision.	  It	  highlighted	  the	  need	  for	  an	  ‘interactive	  process’	  to	  assess	   the	   employee’s	   objections	   and	   the	   hardship	   giving	   an	   exemption	   would	  cause.	   Processing	   Declarations	   of	   Domestic	   Partnership	  was	   a	   very	   small	   part	   of	  Slater’s	   job:	   in	   the	   two	   years	   after	   the	   law	   came	   into	   force	   there	   were	   37	  applications,	  each	  taking	  about	  10	  minutes	  to	  process,	  and	  five	  other	  clerks	  in	  her	  office.	  Furthermore	  the	  applications	  were	  not	  divided	  evenly	  among	  the	  staff.	  Again	  the	   discrimination	   would	   be	   felt	   indirectly,	   and	   couples	   would	   probably	   be	  unaware	  of	   the	  accommodation	  given.	   In	   these	  circumstances,	  Slater	  was	  entitled	  to	  an	  exemption	  from	  having	  to	  perform	  this	  aspect	  of	  her	  work.	  	  A	   proportionality	   analysis	   though	   produces	   a	   different	   result	   for	   the	   Marriage	  
Commissioners	  Case.	  Even	  if	  the	  claim	  had	  not	  been	  rejected	  at	  the	  least	  restrictive	  means	  stage,	  permitting	  an	  exemption	  would	  not	  be	  proportionate.	  The	  directly	  felt	  discrimination	  prospective	  couples	  would	  have	  faced,	  which	  would	  undoubtedly	  be	  felt	   by	   many	   as	   humiliating	   and	   unfair,	   changes	   the	   balance.	   This	   is	   not	   just	   a	  question	  of	  one	  or	  two	  extra	  phonecalls.73	  	  	  In	   Brady	   v	   Dean,	   the	   claim	   was	   rejected	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   merely	   appointing	   an	  assistant	  did	  not	  ‘substantially	  burden’	  the	  clerks’	  beliefs	  as	  it	  was	  too	  indirect.	  This	  is	  probably	  the	  correct	  decision.	  Even	  if	  not,	  to	  deny	  them	  any	  further	  exemptions	  was	   proportionate	   because	   otherwise	   the	   risk	   of	   couples	   not	   being	   able	   to	   enter	  into	   civil	   unions	   was	   too	   high.	   Such	   an	   exemption	   would	   entirely	   privilege	   the	  rights	   of	   those	  with	   religious	   objections	   to	   gay	  marriage	   above	   gay	   couples.	   This	  was	  not	  the	  reasoning	  given	  by	  the	  Court	  though	  which	  rested	  instead	  on	  concerns	  about	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state.	  However,	  as	  stated	  above,	  the	  conflation	  of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   employees	   is	   unwarranted	   and	   does	   not	   occur	   with	   other	  accommodations.	   The	   clerks	   should	   not	   have	   any	   further	   exemptions	   because	   of	  the	   effect	   on	   the	   rights	   of	   others;	   rather	   than	   because	   they	   are	   bringing	   their	  religious	  views	  into	  the	  workplace.	  
Other	  ‘Conscientious	  Objection’	  Cases	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  there	  are	  some	  jobs	  where,	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  obligations	  of	  the	   post,	   there	   is	   a	   much	   stronger	   interest	   in	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	   neutrality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Supra	  n.12	  at	  1195.	  73	  As	  Trotter	  seems	  to	  suggest	  supra	  n.55	  at	  377.	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than	  for	  registrars.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  proportionality	  test	  should	  not	  be	  applied	  or	  the	  possibility	  of	  dialogue	  and	  compromise	  should	  not	  be	  borne	  in	  mind.	  However,	  in	  these	  cases,	  prohibiting	  discrimination	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  proportionate.	  	  	  The	   first	   set	   of	   these	   cases	   involves	   jobs	   with	   an	   obligation	   of	   impartiality	   and	  equality	   where	   employees	   cannot	   be	   seen	   to	   take	   sides	   on	   social	   issues.	   This	  includes	   judges	   and	   those	   in	   similar	   positions.	   To	   have	   a	   public	   objection	   to	  homosexuality,	   whether	   religiously	   inspired	   or	   not,	   or	   to	   gay	   relationships	   or	  marriage,	  where	  legally	  recognised,	  violates	  these	  duties.	  	  	  In	  McClintock	   v	   Department	   of	   Constitutional	   Affairs74	  a	   magistrate	   wished	   to	   be	  excused	   from	  officiating	   in	   cases	  where	   same-­‐sex	   partners	  might	   adopt	   or	   foster	  children.	  An	  exception	  was	  not	  given,	  and	  he	  resigned	  from	  the	  family	  panel75	  and	  claimed	  he	  had	  been	  indirectly	  discriminated	  against	  contrary	  to	  the	  Employment	  Equality	  (Religion	  or	  Belief)	  Regulations	  2003.76	  The	  Employment	  Appeal	  Tribunal	  (EAT)	  held	  there	  was	  no	  discrimination,	  but	  this	  was	  mainly	  because	  of	  the	  way	  the	  case	   was	   argued.	   McClintock	   wished	   to	   refuse	   to	   place	   children	   with	   same-­‐sex	  couples,	  not	  strictly	  because	  of	  his	  religious	  views,	  but	  because	  he	  believed	  it	  was	  against	  children’s	  best	  interests.	  Therefore,	  the	  Tribunal	  held,	  his	  objections	  did	  not	  constitute	   a	   religious	   or	   philosophical	   belief.	   As	   Pitt	   states,	   this	   means	   that	   ‘a	  stupid,	   but	   sincere	   belief,	   based	   on	   nothing	   at	   all,	   is	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  protection,	   but	   an	  opinion	  based	  on	   logic	   and	   information	   is	   not.’77	  Whatever	   the	  merits	   or	   otherwise	   of	   this	   position,	   even	   if	   McClintock	   had	   passed	   this	   hurdle	  there	  still	  would	  have	  been	  adequate	  justification	  for	  refusing	  to	  accommodate	  him.	  The	   duty	   of	   neutrality	   and	   obligation	   to	   obey	   the	   law	   inherent	   in	   the	   role	   of	   a	  magistrate	   or	   judge	   meant	   that	   any	   exemption	   would	   be	   impermissible	   and	  refusing	   to	   give	   an	   exemption	   is	   proportionate.	   This	   is	   regardless	   of	   how	   easy	   it	  would	  be	  practically	  to	  apply	  an	  exemption,	  or	  indeed	  the	  respectful	  basis	  on	  which	  these	  claims	  might	  be	  made.	  	  	  In	   cases	   where	   a	   judge	   goes	   far	   beyond	   this	   and	   states	   his	   or	   her	   objection	   to	  homosexuality	   in	   vehement	   and	   hate-­‐filled	  ways,	   which	   entirely	   undermines	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  [2008]	  IRLR	  29.	  75	  He	  continued	  to	  hear	  criminal	  cases.	  76	  Now	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010.	  77	  G.	  Pitt,	  ‘Keeping	  the	  Faith:	  Trends	  and	  Tensions	  in	  Religion	  or	  Belief	  Discrimination’	  (2011)	  40	  ILJ	  384,	  389.	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dignity	   of	   those	   it	   is	   aimed	  against,	   there	   clearly	   should	  be	  no	  protection.	   Such	   a	  situation	  occurred	  in	  Mississippi	  Commission	  on	  Judicial	  Performance	  v	  Wilkerson.78	  Since	  it	  is	  an	  American	  case,	  taking	  place	  in	  a	  state	  with	  no	  legal	  protection	  against	  sexual	   orientation	   discrimination,	   the	   reasoning	   is	   of	   necessity	   entirely	   different	  from	   a	   proportionality	   analysis.	   Judge	  Wilkerson	   wrote	   a	   letter	   to	   a	   local	   paper	  identifying	   himself	   as	   a	   Christian	   and	   saying	   that	   ‘homosexuals	   should	   be	   put	   in	  some	   kind	   of	  mental	   institute’.	   He	   also	   gave	   an	   interview	   to	   a	   local	   radio	   station	  repeating	   similar	   thoughts.	   The	   Judicial	   Performance	   Commission	   recommended	  that	  he	  should	  be	  removed	  from	  office	  but	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Mississippi	  held	  he	  could	   not	   be	   sanctioned	   where	   he	   spoke	   on	   ‘religious	   and	   political/public	   issue	  speech	   specially	   protected	   by	   the	   First	   Amendment’	   and	   where	   the	   ‘forced	  concealment	   of	   views	   on	   political/public	   issues	   serves	   to	   further	   no	   compelling	  governmental,	  public	  or	  judicial	  interest’.79	  	  	  Evidently	   this	   case	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   within	   a	   strong	   First	   Amendment	  context	  which	  asks	  whether	  restrictions	  on	  speech	  serve	  a	  compelling	  interest,	  and	  which	   is	   highly	   suspicious	   of	   viewpoint	   discrimination.80 	  Under	   this	   analysis,	  discriminatory	  speech,	  because	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  political	  speech,	  is	  given	  the	  highest	  possible	   protection.	   A	   proportionality	   analysis	   would	   have	   asked	   a	   different	  question:	   were	   the	   restrictions	   on	   a	   person’s	   expressive	   and	   religious	   freedoms	  proportionate?	   Viewpoint	   restrictions	   can	   be	   proportionate	   where	   necessary	   to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  The	  balancing	  process	  allows	  these	  issues	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  true	  conflict	  and	  starts	  without	  a	  preconceived	  weight	  on	  either	  side.	  Freedom	  of	  expression	  is	  important,	  but	  so	  is	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  gay	  people	  and	  the	  state’s	  interest	  in	  having,	  or	  at	  least	  being	  seen	  to	  have,	  an	  impartial	  judiciary.	  In	  refusing	  to	  permit	  this	  speech	  the	  state	  therefore	  has	  two	  legitimate	  aims.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  at	  the	  no	  less	  restrictive	  means	  stage	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test	  that	   the	   interest	   in	  non-­‐discrimination	  could	  be	  met	  by	   Judge	  Wilkerson	  recusing	  himself	  in	  all	  cases	  where	  his	  prejudice	  might	  be	  in	  issue.	  Aside	  from	  any	  practical	  difficulties,	   recusal	   would	   not	   meet	   the	   fundamental	   interest	   in	   having,	   and	  appearing	  to	  have,	  impartial	  judges	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  dismissal.	  Given	  then	  that	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  the	  test	  are	  met,	  the	  various	  interests	  have	  to	  be	  balanced.	  On	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  876	  So.	  2d	  1006	  (Miss.,	  2004).	  79	  Ibid.	  at	  1009.	  80	  D.	  Bernstein,	  You	  Can’t	  Say	  That:	  The	  Growing	  Threat	  to	  Civil	  Liberties	  from	  
Antidiscrimination	  Laws	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Cato	  Institute,	  2003).	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one	  side	  there	  is	  the	  interest	  in	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  and	  particularly	  the	  interest	  in	   allowing	   debate	   on	   political	   issues.	   On	   the	   other	   there	   is	   the	   interest	   of	  minorities	   not	   to	   be	   denigrated	   and	   subjected	   to	   hate	   in	   public	   speech	   and	   the	  important	   public	   interest	   in	   having	   judges	   give,	   and	   be	   seen	   to	   give,	   equal	  treatment	   to	   all.	   Judges	   are	   aligned	   with	   the	   state,	   and	   intrinsically	   part	   of	   the	  mechanism	  of	   the	   state,	   in	   a	  way	   that	   registrars	   are	   not,	   and	   thus	   their	   interests	  have	  commensurably	  less	  weight.	  Therefore	  if	  the	  test	  of	  proportionality	  had	  been	  applied,	   it	   would	   have	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   right	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	  outweighed	   the	   right	   to	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   expression,	   and	   therefore	   the	  Judicial	  Performance	  Commission	  reached	  the	  right	  decision.	  	  A	  second	  type	  of	  public	  job	  where	  restricting	  discriminatory	  speech	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  proportionate	   is	  where	   the	   job	   is	   particularly	   tied	   to	   non-­‐discrimination,	   beyond	  the	  general	  interest	  in	  non-­‐discrimination	  relating	  to	  any	  public	  official.	  In	  Lumpkin	  
v	  Brown81	  a	  member	   of	   the	   San	   Francisco	   Human	   Rights	   Commission	   quoted	   the	  Bible	   in	   saying	   that	   gay	   people	   should	   be	   put	   to	   death	   and	   said	   he	   believed	  everything	  written	   in	   the	  Bible.	  He	  was	  dismissed.	   It	  was	  held	  he	  was	  entitled	   to	  state	  his	  opinions	  as	  a	  private	  citizen	  but	  he	  had	  no	  ‘job	  security	  when	  he	  preaches	  homophobia	   while	   serving	   as	   a	   City	   official	   charged	   with	   the	   responsibility	   of	  “eliminat[ing]	   prejudice	   and	   discrimination.”’82	  This	   is	   the	   correct	   analysis.	  When	  the	  entire	  purpose	  of	  a	   job	  is	  to	  promote	  non-­‐discrimination	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  permit	  the	  employee	  to	  act	  against	  this	  objective.	  Furthermore,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  the	   vehemence	   with	   which	   he	   expressed	   his	   views	   is	   also	   extremely	   relevant,	  because	   it	   interferes	   with	   the	   right	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   more	   severely,	   and	  forbidding	  such	  expression	  is	  a	  lesser	  interference	  with	  freedom	  of	  religion	  than	  if	  all	  types	  of	  discriminatory	  speech	  were	  prohibited.	  	  A	   further	   kind	   of	   employment	  where	   granting	   exemptions	  may	  be	   impermissible	  because	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   role	   involves	   counsellors,	   although	   this	   is	   more	  complex	  than	  the	  previous	  examples	  given.	   It	  raises	  distinct	   issues	  because	  of	   the	  role	   of	   non-­‐directive	   counselling	   and	   non-­‐discrimination	   in	   professional	   ethics.	  There	  are	  three	  relevant	  cases	  on	  this	  matter.	  The	  US	  cases	  of	  Ward	  v	  Polite83	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  109	  F.3d	  1498	  (9th	  Cir.).	  82	  Ibid.	  1500.	  83	  667	  F.3d	  727	  (6th	  Cir.	  2012).	  I	  discuss	  this	  case	  further	  in,	  ‘Religious	  Claims	  vs.	  Non-­‐Discrimination	  Rights:	  Another	  Plea	  for	  Difficulty’	  Rutgers	  J	  of	  L	  &	  Relig	  	  (Forthcoming	  2014).	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Keeton	  v	  Anderson-­‐Wiley84	  concerned	  students	  taking	  counselling	  degrees	  who	  had	  religious	  objections	  to	  ‘affirming’	  either	  same-­‐sex	  relationships	  (in	  Ward’s	  case)	  or	  ‘homosexuality’	   more	   generally	   (in	   Keeton’s	   case).	   Ward	   was	   removed	   from	   the	  course	  in	  her	  final	  year	  when	  she	  sought	  to	  avoid	  counselling	  a	  client	  about	  a	  same-­‐sex	   relationship.	  Her	   university	   lost	   its	   claim	   for	   summary	   judgment	   against	   her,	  and	  the	  case	  subsequently	  settled.	  Keeton	  was	  required	  to	  take	  a	  ‘remediation	  plan’	  after	   she	   ‘continually	   voiced	   her	   condemnation	   of	   the	   homosexual	   “lifestyle”	   and	  her	   support	   of	   "conversion	   therapy"	   for	   GLBTQ	   clients	   based	   on	   her	   religious	  ideals’.	  She	  believed	  that	  ‘sexual	  behavior	  is	  the	  result	  of	  personal	  choice	  for	  which	  individuals	  are	  accountable…	  and	  that	  homosexuality	  is	  a	  “lifestyle,”	  not	  a	  “state	  of	  being”.’85	  Rather	   than	   completing	   the	   remediation	   plan	   she	   instead	   claimed	   the	  university	   had	   breached	   her	   free	   exercise	   and	   free	   speech	   rights	   and	   sought	   an	  injunction	  to	  prevent	  it	  from	  dismissing	  her	  from	  the	  course	  if	  she	  did	  not	  comply.	  This	  was	  not	  granted.	  	  
In	   the	  British	  case	  of	  McFarlane	  v	  Relate	  (Avon)	  Ltd86	  a	  counsellor,	  while	  happy	  to	  provide	  relationship	  counselling,	  refused	  to	  provide	  sexual	  counselling	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  because	  he	   felt	   that	   this	  would	   require	  him	   to	  endorse	  sexual	  acts	  which	  were	  contrary	  to	  his	  religious	  beliefs.	  He	  was	  therefore	  dismissed	  and	  he	  claimed	  this	   amounted	   to	   indirect	   religious	   discrimination.	   His	   claim	  was	   rejected	   by	   the	  Court	   of	   Appeal	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   there	   was	   no	   interference	   with	   his	   religious	  beliefs	   as	   the	   specific	   situation	   rule	   applied.	   He	   sought	   redress	   in	   the	   ECtHR.87	  It	  held	   that	   there	  was	  an	   interference	  with	  his	  manifestation	  of	  his	  beliefs,	   but	   that	  there	  was	   a	  wide	  margin	   of	   appreciation	   in	   deciding	  where	   to	   strike	   the	   balance	  between	  competing	   rights,	   and	   thus	   the	   interference	  was	   justified	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  	  
Both	  US	  courses	  used	  the	  American	  Counselling	  Association’s	  (ACA)	  Code	  of	  Ethics.	  This	  requires	  counsellors	  to	  ‘affirm’	  their	  clients’	  values,	  rather	  than	  to	  force	  their	  own	  values	  onto	  them	  and	  not	  to	  discriminate	  on	  certain	  grounds	  including	  sexual	  orientation.	  It	  permitted,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  required,	  referrals	  where	  a	  counsellor	  did	  not	  have	   relevant	   expertise	  or	   considered	   that	   they	   could	  not	  help	   the	   client.	  The	  British	  Association	  for	  Sexual	  and	  Relationship	  Therapy’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics,	  which	  McFarlane	  was	  required	  to	  adhere	  to,	  had	  similar	  requirements.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  733	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1368,	  (S.D.	  Ga.	  2010),	  664	  F.3d	  865	  (11th	  Cir.	  2011).	  	  85	  Ibid.	  at	  868.	  86	  [2010]	  IRLR	  872.	  87	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  8.	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It	   is	   probably	   unsurprising,	   given	   the	   vehemence	   and	   strength	   of	   her	   views,	   that	  Keeton	  lost	  her	  case.	  However,	  there	  were	  major	  problems	  in	  the	  court’s	  reasoning.	  Since	   the	  university’s	  policy	  of	  not	   allowing	   students’	   personal	   religious	   views	   to	  affect	   their	   counselling	   was	   neutral	   and	   generally	   applicable	   and	   therefore	   not	  open	   to	   challenge	   following	  Employment	  Division	  v	  Smith,88	  she	  had	  no	   claim	   that	  the	   university	   breached	   or	   even	   affected	   her	   free	   exercise	   rights.	   The	   case	   was	  therefore	  primarily	  decided	  as	  a	  free	  speech	  rather	  than	  free	  exercise	  case.	  Under	  free	  speech	  law	  the	  question	  was	  whether	  the	  policy	  was	  reasonable	  and	  viewpoint	  neutral.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  it	  was.	  The	  university	  had	  a	  legitimate	  pedagogical	  aim	  as	  ‘the	  entire	  mission	  of	  its	  counseling	  program	  is	  to	  produce	  ethical	  and	  effective	  counselors	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  professional	   requirements	  of	   the	  ACA.’89	  These	  were	  the	  ‘types	  of	  academic	  decisions	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  significant	  deference,	  not	  exacting	  constitutional	  scrutiny.’90	  	  
Keeton	   certainly	   had	   a	   strong	   speech	   element	   to	   her	   case	   and	   therefore	  consideration	   of	   free	   speech	   concerns	  was	   relevant.	   The	   Court	   was	   also	   right	   to	  give	   discretion	   to	   the	   university	   in	   considering	   the	   needs	   of	   their	   counselling	  programme.	  However,	   the	  assessment	  of	  her	  claims	   is	  problematic.	  To	   ignore	   the	  free	  exercise	  element	  of	  her	   claim	   is	  unsatisfactory,	   since	   she	  not	  only	  wanted	   to	  speak,	  but	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  for	  her	  to	  engage	  in	  affirming,	  as	  she	  saw	  it,	   immoral	   conduct.	   Even	   the	   analysis	   of	   her	   free	   speech	   claims	   is	   problematic	  because	   it	   uses	   a	  weak	   standard	  of	   ‘reasonableness’.	   It	   therefore	   fails	   to	   give	  her	  adequate	   justification	   for	   the	   interference	   with	   her	   rights	   and	   so	   fails	   in	   the	  obligation	  of	  dialogue.	  	  
In	  the	  domestic	  courts,	  McFarlane	  suffers	  from	  similar	  problems	  because	  his	  claim	  is	  entirely	  rejected	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  he	  can	  avoid	  the	  conflict	  by	  resigning	  from	  his	  employment:	  an	  approach	  which	  fails	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  dilemma	  he	   faced.	  Laws	  LJ	  also	  stated	  that	   ‘there	   is	  no	  more	  room	  here	  than	  there	  was	  [in	  
Ladele]	  for	  any	  balancing	  exercise	  in	  the	  name	  of	  proportionality.’	  This	  unhelpfully	  seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   proportionality	   is	   a	   pretence,	   or	   at	   least	   that	   it	   is	   not	  something	  to	  be	  encouraged.	  
Despite	  this	  failure	  to	  assess	  many	  of	  the	  relevant	  factors,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  either	  of	  these	  cases	  should	  have	  been	  successful	  under	  a	  proportionality	  test.	  This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  494	  US	  872	  (1990).	  89	  Supra	  n.80	  at	  876.	  90	  Ibid.	  at	  879.	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is	  particularly	  evident	  in	  Keeton.	  Her	  attempt	  to	  infuse	  her	  professional	  obligations	  with	   her	   strong	   views	   meant	   the	   interests	   of	   her	   prospective	   clients,	   who	   were	  entitled	   to	  expect	   that	   counsellors	  would	   comply	  with	   the	  ethical	  obligations	   laid	  down	   by	   their	   professional	   body,	   were	   jeopardised.	   Also	   the	   university	   was,	   at	  present	  at	  least,	  only	  seeking	  to	  require	  her	  to	  perform	  additional	  tasks	  and	  engage	  in	  some	  reflection,	  rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  dismiss	  her	  from	  the	  course	  entirely.	  	  
McFarlane’s	   objections	   though	   were	   narrower	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   be	  immediately	   rejected	   on	   this	   basis.	   Nevertheless,	   his	   claim	   should	   still	   fail.	   The	  interests	   of	   his	   employer	   and	   clients	   are	   strong	   because	   discrimination	   violated	  core	   principles	   of	   his	   role	   and	   could	   affect	   his	   perhaps	   vulnerable	   clients.	   The	  applicable	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  stated	   that	  counsellors	  must	  respect	   ‘the	  autonomy	  and	  ultimate	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  of	  clients	  and	  of	  others	  with	  whom	  clients	  may	  be	   involved.	   It	   is	   not	   appropriate	   for	   the	   therapist	   to	   impose	   a	   particular	   set	   of	  standards,	  values	  or	  ideals	  upon	  clients’.	  Non-­‐discrimination	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  inclusive	  environment	  for	  gay	  people	  were	  also	  essential	  parts	  of	  Relate’s	  ethos.	  	  
The	   particular	   facts	   also	   weaken	   McFarlane’s	   case.	   Relate	   offered	   two	   different	  kinds	   of	   counselling:	   relationship	   counselling	   and	   psycho-­‐sexual	   therapy.	  McFarlane	   appeared	   to	   object	   to	   providing	   any	   kind	   of	   sexual	   therapy	   to	   gay	  couples.	   Although	   it	   may	   have	   been	   possible	   to	   ensure	   he	   would	   not	   have	   to	  provide	   psycho-­‐sexual	   therapy	   to	   same-­‐sex	   couples,	   it	   would	   not	   have	   been	  possible	  to	  know	  in	  advance	  whether	  sexual	  issues	  would	  arise	  during	  relationship	  counselling.	   Permitting	   discrimination	   in	   that	   situation	   would	   be	   likely	   to	   cause	  significant	  disruption	  and	  harm	  to	  his	  clients.	  As	  for	  the	  psycho-­‐sexual	  therapy,	  this	  problem	  only	  arose	  after	  McFarlane	  had	  decided	  to	  train	  for	  a	  diploma	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  counselling.	  This	  situation	  was	  therefore	  partly	  of	  his	  own	  making.	  Given	  these	  factors,	   the	   limited	   interference	   with	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion,	   and	   the	  greater	   interference	   with	   the	   right	   to	   non-­‐discrimination,	   denying	   him	   an	  exemption	  was	  proportionate.	  
In	  Ward	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  her	  case	  and	  remanded	  it	  to	  the	  District	  Court	  for	  further	  consideration	  of	  the	  factual	   issues.	  As	  already	  noted,	  the	  case	   later	   settled.91	  As	   in	   Keeton,	   her	   claim	   was	   considered	   on	   two	   bases:	   free	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  L.	  Jones,	  ‘Christian	  Counselor	  Bias	  Case	  Settled	  Out	  of	  Court’,	  World	  on	  Campus,	  13	  Dec	  2012	  http://www.worldoncampus.com/2012/12/christian_counselor_discrimination_case_settled_out_of_court	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	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speech	  and	  free	  exercise.	  Again	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  use	  a	  proportionality	  type	  test	  but	  rather	   considered,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   free	   speech	   claim,	   whether	   the	   policy	   was	  reasonable	   and	   viewpoint	   neutral	   and,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   free	   exercise	   issue,	  whether	  the	  policy	  was	  neutral	  and	  of	  general	  applicability.	  	  
The	  viewpoint	  neutral	  policy	   the	  university	  sought	   to	  put	   forward	  was	   that	   there	  was	  a	  policy	  of	  not	  permitting	  students	  to	  refer	  clients.	  This	  argument	  was	  difficult	  to	  make	  though,	  because	  the	  ACA	  did	  permit	  referrals	  where	  this	  was	  in	  the	  client’s	  best	  interests.92	  The	  Court’s	  approach	  meant	  that	  the	  case	  was	  entirely	  focused	  on	  the	   nature	   of	   the	   policy	   rather	   than	   either	   of	   the	   interests	   at	   stake,	   leading	   to	  unsatisfactory	  reasoning.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  necessarily	  suspect	  in	   not	   having	   an	   absolute	   policy.	   There	   is,	   for	   example,	   a	   difference	   between	  referring	  a	  client	  who	  is	  seeking	  bereavement	  counselling	  from	  a	  student	  who	  has	  recently	   suffered	   a	   bereavement93	  and	   referrals	   for	   discriminatory	   reasons,	   in	  terms	  of	   its	   effect	   on	   clients’	   rights	   and	   interests.	  Although	   certainly	   the	  Court	   is	  right	   in	   that,	   ‘at	   some	   point,	   an	   exception-­‐ridden	   policy	   takes	   on	   the	   appearance	  and	  reality	  of	  a	  system	  of	  individualized	  exemptions,	  the	  antithesis	  of	  a	  neutral	  and	  generally	   applicable	   policy	   and	   just	   the	   kind	   of	   state	   action	   that	   must	   run	   the	  gauntlet	  of	  strict	  scrutiny’,94	  there	  is	  no	  necessary	  reason	  why	  there	  should	  only	  be	  assessment	   of	   the	   justifiability	   of	   the	   policy	   in	   these	   situations	   or	   why	   these	  situations	  are	  necessarily	  the	  most	  problematic.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  why	   it	   was	   so	   readily	   assumed	   that	   the	   policy	   failed	   strict	   scrutiny,95	  given	   the	  strength	   of	   the	   interest	   in	   non-­‐discrimination.	   Certainly	   there	   seemed	   to	   be	   a	  higher	  standard	  than	  usual	  in	  free	  exercise	  cases	  in	  considering	  this.	  
A	  proportionality	  enquiry	  would	  have	  dealt	  with	  this	  case	  far	  better.	  It	  would	  have	  meant	  that	   the	  discussion	  would	  not	  have	  focused	  entirely	  on	  the	  rule’s	  generally	  applicable	  nature.	  If	  the	  rule	  was	  discriminatory,	  if	  for	  example	  it	  permitted	  those	  of	   non-­‐Christian	   beliefs,	   or	   those	   whose	   objections	   were	   not	   based	   on	   religious	  beliefs	   to	   refer	   clients	   because	   they	   were	   gay,	   then	   this	   would	   have	   been	   an	  additional	  problem,	  but	  even	  without	  this	  it	  would	  not	  have	  meant	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  unproblematic.	  The	  Court	  argued	  that	  ‘allowing	  a	  referral	  would	  be	  in	  the	  best	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  There	  was	  therefore	  a	  factual	  disagreement,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  case	  was	  remanded	  to	  the	  District	  Court.	  93	  An	  example	  given	  in	  the	  case.	  94	  Supra	  n.79	  95	  The	  Court	  stated,	  ‘the	  university	  does	  not	  argue	  that	  its	  actions	  can	  withstand	  strict	  scrutiny,	  and	  we	  agree.	  Whatever	  interest	  the	  university	  served	  by	  expelling	  Ward,	  it	  falls	  short	  of	  compelling.’	  Supra	  n.79	  at	  740.	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interest	  of	  Ward	  (who	  could	  counsel	  someone	  she	  is	  better	  able	  to	  assist)	  and	  the	  client	  (who	  would	  receive	  treatment	  from	  a	  counsellor	  better	  suited	  to	  discuss	  his	  relationship	  issues).’96	  This	  may	  be	  persuasive	  if	  only	  the	  short	  term	  is	  considered.	  However,	   it	  does	  not	  adequately	  weigh	  the	   interests.	   It	   ignores	  the	  wider	   interest	  the	   university	   and	   the	   ACA	   have	   in	   promoting	   certain	   ways	   their	   accredited	  counsellors	   should	   act.	   The	   Code	   of	   Ethics	   is	   not,	   and	   neither	   it	   should	   it	   be,	  viewpoint	  neutral.	  As	  argued	  above,	  discrimination	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  type	  of	  counselling	   required.	   Therefore	   the	   University	   should	   have	   been	   permitted	   to	  prevent	  Ward	  from	  discriminating.	  
However,	   this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  Ward’s	   treatment	  was	  entirely	   fair.	  The	   formal	  review	  to	  decide	  whether	  she	  should	  be	  dismissed	  from	  the	  course,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  way	  it	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  Court,	  was	  questionable.	  It	  appeared	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  her	  religious	  beliefs	   than	  on	  her	  behaviour	  and	  professional	  obligations,	  with	  one	  professor	   stating	   in	   his	   evidence	   that	   he	   took	   her	   ‘on	   a	   little	   bit	   of	   a	   theological	  bout’97	  and	  another	  telling	  Ward	  during	  the	  review	  that	  she	  was	   ‘selectively	  using	  her	  religious	  beliefs	  in	  order	  to	  rationalize	  her	  discrimination	  against	  one	  group	  of	  people’.98	  Of	  course,	  discussion	  of	  different	  moral	  and	  religious	  beliefs	  is	  good	  and,	  indeed,	   probably	   essential	   if	   a	   pluralistic	   society	   is	   to	   function,	   but	   it	   was	   not	  appropriate	   for	   this	   context.	   This	   is	   firstly	   because	   her	   professors	   were	   in	   a	  position	  of	  power.	  Secondly,	   it	  gives	  the	  appearance	  of	  bias,	   leading	  to	  some	  basis	  for	  an	  allegation	  of	  religious	  discrimination,	  even	   if	   there	  were	  sound	  reasons	   for	  the	   university’s	   decision.	   Thirdly,	   and	   more	   substantively,	   if	   possible,	   decision	  makers	   should	   avoid	   judging	   people’s	   deepest	   moral	   convictions,	   (unless	   these	  have	   to	   be	   rejected	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   they	   deny	   the	   basic	   dignity	   of	   all	   human	  beings),	   and	  decide	  disputes	  on	   low	   level	   rather	   than	  high	   level	   reasoning.	  99	  This	  would	   avoid	   challenging	   her	   deepest	   moral	   beliefs,	   respect	   her	   as	   a	   moral	   and	  reasoning	  agent,	  help	  realise	  mutual	  respect	  and	  reduce	  the	  cost	  of	  disagreements	  for	   participants.100	  Deciding	   greater	   controversies	   may	   do	   nothing	   other	   than	  create	   a	   sense	   of	  marginalisation	   in	   the	   losing	   side	   and	  make	   it	  more	   difficult	   to	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.	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compromise	   in	   the	   future.101	  Here	   this	   principle	   means	   the	   review	   should	   have	  been	  decided	  on	  what	  is	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  relevant	  code	  of	  ethics,	  rather	  than	   the	   ‘Truth’	   about	   the	   morality	   of	   same-­‐sex	   relationships	   according	   to	  Christianity,	  a	  subject	  of	  deep	  complexity	  even	  for	  the	  most	  eminent	  theologians.	  	  
In	   conclusion	   to	   this	   section	   then,	   the	   Court	   was	   correct	   in	   saying	   that	   denying	  Ward	  a	  referral	  because	  ‘her	  conflict	  arose	  from	  religious	  convictions	  is	  not	  a	  good	  answer;	  that	  her	  conflict	  arose	  from	  religious	  convictions	  for	  which	  the	  department	  at	   times	   showed	   little	   tolerance	   is	   a	   worse	   answer’. 102 	  She	   may	   have	   an	  understandable	  sense	  of	  anger	  and	  discrimination.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  proportionality	  analysis	  demonstrates	  there	  are	  sufficient	  reasons	  why	  she,	  Keeton	  and	  McFarlane	  should	  not	  have	  been	  permitted	  to	  discriminate.	  
Discriminatory	  Religious	  Expression	  and	  the	  Workplace	  	  Some	   religious	   employees	   may	   not	   experience	   conscientious	   dilemmas	   between	  their	   employment	   obligations	   and	   their	   faith,	   but	  may	   find	   themselves	   in	   conflict	  with	  employment	  rules	  when	  they	  express	  discriminatory	  views	   in	  or	  outside	  the	  workplace.	   As	   I	   have	   previously	   argued,	   speech	   that	   does	   not	   accept	   the	  personhood	   or	   basic	   dignity	   of	   others	   can	   be	   prohibited,	   and	   this	   is	   particularly	  true	   in	   employment,	   where	   employers	   have	   obligations	   to	   protect	   their	   other	  employees	  from	  harm.	  	  In	   Apelogun-­‐Gabriels	   v	   London	   Borough	   of	   Lambeth,103	  the	   claimant	   distributed	   a	  document	  to	  his	  colleagues	  with	  extracts	  from	  the	  Bible.	  The	  first	  headings	  on	  this	  document	  were	   ‘sexual	   activity	   between	  members	   of	   the	   same	   sex	   is	   universally	  condemned’	  and	  ‘male	  homosexuality	  is	  forbidden	  by	  law	  and	  punished	  by	  law’.	  He	  was	  dismissed.	  The	   interests	  of	  his	   colleagues	  not	   to	  be	   faced	  with	   such	  material	  together	   with	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   employer	   in	  maintaining	   a	   non-­‐discriminatory	  workplace	  clearly	  outweighed	  the	  limited	  interference	  with	  the	  claimant’s	  right.	  	  	  Similarly	   in	   Peterson	   v	   Hewlett-­‐Packard	   Co,104	  Peterson	   objected	   to	   a	   series	   of	  posters	   put	   up	   around	   the	   office	   as	   part	   of	   a	   workplace	   diversity	   campaign.	   In	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  n.79	  at	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response	   he	   put	   up	   Biblical	   passages	   in	   his	   work	   cubicle,	   including	   an	   extract	  saying	  ‘If	  a	  man	  also	  lie	  with	  mankind,	  as	  he	  lieth	  with	  a	  woman,	  both	  of	  them	  have	  committed	  an	  abomination;	   they	  shall	  surely	  be	  put	   to	  death;	   their	  blood	  shall	  be	  put	  upon	  them’.	  Peterson	  said	  the	  posters	  were	  intended	  to	  be	  hurtful,	  so	  that	  ‘gays	  and	  lesbians	  would	  repent’.	  He	  refused	  to	  remove	  them	  whilst	  the	  diversity	  posters	  remained.	   After	   unfruitful	   discussions	   Peterson	  was	   dismissed.	  The	  Ninth	   Circuit	  held	  that	  he	  had	  not	  been	  discriminated	  against	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  his	  religious	  belief	  and	   that	   accommodating	   him	   would	   have	   caused	   his	   employer	   undue	   hardship	  because	  it	  would	  have	  affected	  the	  company’s	  right	  to	  promote	  diversity.	  	  	  Koppelman	  wonders	  whether,	   although	  Hewlett-­‐Packard	  was	  within	   its	   rights	   to	  dismiss	   him,	   this	   was	   the	   best	   resolution	   given	   that	   Peterson	   had	   worked	   there	  without	  incident	  for	  21	  years.105	  I	  disagree.	  Peterson’s	  comments	  were	  hurtful	  and	  intended	   to	   be	   so.	   Quite	   correctly	   there	   had	   been	   a	   process	   of	   dialogue,	   with	  Hewlett-­‐Packard	  holding	  no	  fewer	  than	  four	  meetings	  with	  him,	  but	  Peterson	  was	  unwilling	  to	  change.	  Eventually	  matters	  had	  to	  be	  concluded	  and	  dismissal	  was	  the	  only	   solution.	   As	   a	   proportionality	   test	   would	   demonstrate,	   not	   all	   the	   burden	  should	  be	  on	  his	  gay	  colleagues	  or	  his	  employer.	  	  	  A	   more	   complex	   UK	   case	   is	   R(Raabe)	   v	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   the	   Home	  
Department.106	  Raabe,	  a	  GP,	  was	  appointed	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Advisory	  Council	  on	  the	  Misuse	  of	  Drugs	  (ACMD).	  Six	  years	  before	  his	  appointment	  he	  had	  co-­‐authored	  a	   short	   paper	   entitled	   ‘“Gay	   Marriage”	   and	   Homosexuality:	   Some	   Medical	  Comments’,	  which	  argued	  against	  the	  introduction	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Canada.	  It	  argued	  that	  gay	  men	  were	  extremely	  sexually	  promiscuous	  and	  engaged	  in	  risky	  sexual	  practices,	  that	  they	  tended	  to	  have	  short	  relationships	  and	  that	  this	  posed	  a	  risk	  for	  children	  brought	  up	  by	  gay	  people	  and,	  most	  controversially,	  that	  there	  was	  a	   link	  between	  homosexuality	   and	  paedophilia.	   It	   stated	   that	   ‘there	   is	   an	   overlap	  between	  the	  “gay	  movement”	  and	  the	  movement	   to	  make	  paedophilia	  acceptable’	  and	  that	  ‘the	  prevalence	  of	  paedophilia	  among	  homosexuals	  is	  about	  10	  –	  25	  times	  higher	  than	  heterosexuals’.	  It	  also	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  some	  gay	  people	  to	  change	  their	  sexual	  orientation	  by	  ‘reparative	  therapy’.	  The	  Home	  Office	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  paper	  after	  Raabe	  had	  been	  appointed	  and	  it	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  media	  attention.	  He	  was	  then	  dismissed.	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  This	  is	  not	  an	  employment	  case,	  but	  rather	  concerned	  appointment	  to	  a	  post	  where	  the	  government	  normally	  has	  considerable	  discretion	  in	  appointing	  and	  dismissing	  members.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Court	   did	   not	   use	   a	   proportionality	   test,	   instead	  reviewing	   the	   case	   on	   the	   less	   intensive	   bases	   of	   whether	   the	   decision	   was	  irrational	  or	  irrelevant	  considerations	  had	  been	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  	  However,	  proportionality	  could	  have	  been	  considered	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  was	  an	  interference	  with	  his	  Convention	  rights.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  dismissing	  him	  was	  not	  an	  interference	  with	  his	  freedom	  of	  religion	  as,	  while	  he	  was	  motivated	  by	  his	  religious	   views,	   he	   was	   not	   manifesting	   them.	   This	   was	   because	   the	   paper	  purported	   to	   be	   a	   neutral	   scientific	   paper	   rather	   than	   a	   religious	   tract,	   not	  mentioning	  any	  religious	  precepts	  at	  all.	  It	  was	  not	  Raabe’s	  opposition	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  per	  se	  which	  was	  the	  issue.	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  for	  there	  to	  be	  an	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  of	  religious	  freedom,	  there	  has	  to	  be	  a	  close	  link	  between	  the	  religious	  belief	  and	  the	  action	  taken	  and	  it	  is	  more	  than	  arguable	  that	  this	   did	   not	   exist	   here.	   However,	   it	   was	   an	   interference	   with	   his	   freedom	   of	  expression.	  	  Nevertheless,	  even	  if	  proportionality	  had	  been	  applied	  on	  this	  basis,	  a	  combination	   of	   factors	  would	   have	  made	   his	   dismissal	   proportionate.	   Applying	   a	  proportionality	  test	  would	  not	  have	  affected	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  decision.	  	  	  The	  paper	  was	  extremely	  offensive,	  particularly	  in	  its	  linking	  of	  homosexuality	  with	  paedophilia.	   Although	   presented	   as	   a	   scientific	   document,	   the	   paper	   was	   not	   a	  summary	  of	  peer-­‐reviewed	  studies	  but	  a	  polemic	  against	  gay	  people.	  Although	  the	  paper	   was	   not	   recent,	   Raabe	   refused	   to	   distance	   himself	   from	   the	   views	   it	  contained.	  As	  a	  result,	  other	  members	  of	  the	  ACMD	  had	  threatened	  to	  resign	  if	  he	  were	  not	  dismissed.	  There	  had	  recently	  been	  a	  number	  of	  high-­‐profile	  resignations	  and	   the	   Home	   Office	   was	   anxious	   that	   more	   should	   not	   follow.	   It	   was	   also	  considered	   important	   for	   the	   ACMD	   to	   have	   the	   support	   of	   gay	   people	   because	  research	  had	  identified	  that	  there	  were	  particular	  patterns	  of	  drug	  misuse	  among	  some	   gay	   people.	   The	   government	   therefore	   had	   legitimate	   aims	   in	   ensuring	   the	  smooth	  running	  of	  the	  organisation	  and	  in	  ensuring	  that	  its	  pronouncements	  were	  seen	   as	   authoritative.	   There	   were	   no	   other	   less	   restrictive	   means	   short	   of	  dismissing	   Raabe	  which	   could	   have	   been	   taken	  which	  would	   have	   fulfilled	   these	  aims,	   and	   given	   the	   unusual	   circumstances	   and	   the	   very	   offensive	   nature	   of	   the	  paper,	  the	  dismissal	  was	  proportionate.	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  The	  question	  arises	  as	   to	  whether	  employers	  should	  be	  able	   to	  restrict	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  expression,	  which	  while	   it	  may	  be	  discriminatory,	  could	  not	   in	  any	  sense	  be	   described	   as	   hate	   speech.	   In	   Smith	   v	   Trafford	   Housing	   Trust107 	  a	   Housing	  Manager,	   who	   had	   listed	   his	   employment	   on	   his	   Facebook	   page,	   put	   a	   link	   on	  Facebook	  to	  a	  news	  article	  entitled	  ‘Gay	  church	  ‘marriages’	  set	  to	  get	  the	  go-­‐ahead’,	  with	  the	  comment	  ‘an	  equality	  too	  far’.	  After	  a	  colleague	  posted	  ‘does	  this	  mean	  you	  don’t	  approve?’	  he	  replied:	  
‘No	   not	   really,	   I	   don’t	   understand	   why	   people	   who	   have	   no	   faith	   and	   don’t	  believe	  in	  Christ	  would	  want	  to	  get	  hitched	  in	  church	  the	  bible	  is	  quite	  specific	  that	  marriage	  is	  for	  men	  and	  women	  if	  the	  state	  wants	  to	  offer	  civil	  marriage	  to	  same	  sex	  then	  that	  is	  up	  to	  the	  state;	  but	  the	  state	  shouldn’t	  impose	  it’s	  [sic]	  rules	  on	  places	  of	  faith	  and	  conscience.’	  	  Because	  of	   these	  comments	  he	  was	  demoted	   to	  a	  non-­‐managerial	  position	  with	  a	  40%	  reduction	   in	  pay.	   It	  was	   considered	   that	   the	   comments	   ‘had	   the	  potential	   to	  cause	  offence	  and	  ‘could	  be	  seriously	  prejudicial	  to	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  Trust’	  and	  that	   he	   had	   committed	   a	   serious	   breach	   of	   its	   Equal	   Opportunities	   Policy.	   He	  claimed	  that	  the	  trust	  had	  committed	  a	  breach	  of	  contract	  in	  demoting	  him.	  
In	  deciding	  the	  case,	  the	  High	  Court	  did	  not	  use	  a	  proportionality	  analysis,	  since	  it	  focused	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  employment	  contract	  and	  did	  not	  directly	  consider	  his	  rights	   to	   freedom	  of	  expression	  or	  religion.	  However,	   the	  Court	   took	  a	   ‘principled	  and	   sensible	   approach’,108	  identified	   the	   factors	   that	   would	   be	   relevant	   to	   this	  discussion	   and	   reached	   the	   correct	   conclusion.	   It	   held	   that	   in	   demoting	   him	  Trafford	  Housing	  Trust	  had	  breached	  his	  contract	  of	  employment.109	  The	  judge	  said	  that	   he	   had	   come	   ‘without	   difficulty’	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   ‘his	   moderate	  expression	   of	   his	   particular	   views	   about	   gay	  marriage	   in	   church,	   on	   his	   personal	  Facebook	   wall	   at	   a	   weekend	   out	   of	   working	   hours,	   could	   not	   sensibly	   lead	   any	  reasonable	   reader	   to	   think	   the	  worst	   of	   the	   Trust	   for	   having	   employed	   him	   as	   a	  manager’	   and	   thus	  he	  did	  not	  bring	   the	  Trust	   into	  disrepute.	   It	  was	  held	   that	  his	  expression	   of	   his	   views	   could	   not	   ‘objectively	   be	   described	   as	   judgmental,	  disrespectful	  or	  liable	  to	  cause	  discomfort,	  embarrassment	  or	  upset.’	  The	  subject	  of	  gay	  marriage	  is	  an	  important	  matter	  of	  public	  interest	  and	  debate	  which	  should	  not	  be	   entirely	   restricted	   purely	   on	   the	   ground	   it	  might	   cause	   offence,	   as	   this	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  [2012]	  EWHC	  3221	  (Ch).	  108	  D.	  McGoldrick,	  ‘The	  Limits	  of	  Freedom	  of	  Expression	  on	  Facebook	  and	  Social	  Networking	  Sites:	  A	  UK	  Perspective’	  (2013)	  13	  HRLR	  125.	  	  109	  He	  made	  no	  claim	  that	  he	  had	  been	  unfairly	  dismissed.	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highly	  restrict	   the	  right	   to	   freedom	  of	  expression.	   It	  should	  be	  accepted	  that	  such	  discussion,	  particularly	  in	  an	  out	  of	  work	  context,	  is	  permissible.	  	  
Proportionality	  and	  Belief	  
	  It	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   so	   far	   that	   a	   proportionality	   analysis	   is	   capable	   of	  providing	   nuanced	   and	   fact-­‐specific	   decisions	   in	   a	   way	   which	   categorical	   tests	  which	  always	  prioritise	  one	  right	  over	  another	  in	  particular	  circumstances	  do	  not.	  As	   we	   have	   also	   seen,	   it	   may	   be	   proportionate	   to	   restrict	   speech	   and	   deny	  exemptions	  for	  specific	  types	  of	  employees.	  In	  all	  employment,	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  and	   the	   public	   interest	   will	   always	   have	   to	   be	   considered.	   Is	   it	   proportionate	  though	   not	   only	   to	   prevent	   employees	   from	   obtaining	   exemptions	   from	   part	   of	  their	   duties	   and	   restricting	   their	   speech,	   but	   also	   requiring	   them	   to	   advance	   the	  conception	  of	  equality	  promoted	  by	  their	  employer?	  	  As	  argued	  earlier,110	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  necessarily	  a	  violation	  to	  be	  required	  to	  hold	  particular	  beliefs	  for	  a	  particular	  job,	  for	  example	  it	   is	  obviously	  not	  a	  violation	  of	  freedom	   of	   belief	   for	   a	   priest	   to	   be	   required	   to	   hold	   official	   Roman	   Catholic	  beliefs.111	  This	   is	   also	   the	   same	   for	   some	   secular	   jobs,	   for	   example	   an	   animal	  welfare	   charity	   could	   require	   its	   employees	   to	   have	   a	   commitment	   to	   animal	  welfare.112	  The	  question	  for	  current	  purposes	  is	  whether	  an	  employer	  can	  require	  some	   of	   its	   employees	   to	   hold	   a	   particular	   conception	   of	   equality,	   or	   act	   to	  encourage	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  this	  idea.	  Normally	  of	  course	  it	  will	  not	  seek	  to	  do	  so,	  being	  more	  concerned	  with	  actions	  rather	  than	  belief.	  	  Where	  a	  state	  will	  mainly	  seek	  to	  do	  this	  is	  where	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  employment	  is	  at	   least	   partly	   to	   care	   for	   and	   to	   inculcate	   beliefs	   in	   children.	   The	   aims	   here	   are	  twofold:	  firstly	  to	  advance	  children’s	  well-­‐being,	  perhaps	  by	  promoting	  messages	  of	  inclusion	   and	   secondly	   to	   exert	   a	   ‘moderate	   hegemony’113	  over	   children’s	   beliefs.	  The	  two	  are	  of	  course	  linked.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  rights	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  See	  supra	  at	  p35-­‐6.	  111	  See	  Karlsson	  v	  Sweden	  (1988)	  57	  Decisions	  and	  Reports	  172,	  Cm	  where	  a	  vicar	  who	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  work	  with	  female	  priests	  for	  religious	  reasons	  had	  no	  rights	  under	  the	  ECHR,	  discussed	  in	  P.	  Edge	  ‘Religious	  Rights	  and	  Choice	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights’	  [2000]	  3	  Web	  JCLI	  http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue3/edge3.html.	  112	  See	  A.	  Motilla,	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  Discriminate:	  Exceptions	  to	  the	  General	  Prohibition’,	  in	  M.Hill	  (ed.),	  Religion	  and	  Discrimination	  Law	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (Trier:	  Institute	  for	  European	  Constitutional	  Law,	  2012).	  113	  S.	  Macedo,	  ‘Transformative	  Constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  Religion:	  Defending	  the	  Moderate	  Hegemony	  of	  Liberalism’	  (1998)	  26	  Pol	  Theory	  56.	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cases	   since	   the	   only	   pertinent	   criterion	   is	   the	   obligation	   to	   provide	   the	   best	  environment	  for	  children.	  Although	  deciding	  what	  the	  ‘best’	  environment	  is	  is	  open	  to	   debate,	   the	   state	   is	   entitled	   to	   make	   a	   decision	   on	   this	   and	   act	   accordingly.	  However,	   as	   in	   all	   contexts,	   rights	   set	   the	   parameters	   of	   permissible	   state	  behaviour;	   if	   a	   person’s	   rights	   have	   been	   affected	   then	   the	   interference	  must	   be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  interest	  advanced.	  	  Such	  a	  policy	  was	  in	  issue	  for	  foster	  parents	  in	  R(Johns)	  v	  Derby	  City	  Council.114	  The	  Johns	  wished	  to	  be	  approved	  as	  foster	  parents	  but	  were	  Pentecostal	  Christians	  who	  believed	   that	   homosexuality	  was	  wrong.	   They	   felt	   they	   could	   not	   ‘lie’	   to	   a	   foster	  child	   and	   tell	   her	   the	   opposite.	   While	   the	   council	   thought	   they	   were	   ‘kind	   and	  hospitable	   people’	   who	   would	   take	   their	   caring	   responsibilities	   seriously,	   and	  indeed	  the	  Johns	  had	  previously	  been	  foster	  parents,	  their	  views	  posed	  a	  problem	  for	  their	  application.	  Without	  a	  final	  decision	  having	  been	  made,	  the	  couple	  sought	  a	  declaration	  that	   	   ‘adhering	  to	  a	  traditional	  code	  of	  sexual	  ethics’	  did	  not	  make	  a	  person	  an	  unsuitable	   foster	  parent.	  The	   council	   sought	   an	  alternative	  declaration	  that	   a	   fostering	   service	   provider	   ‘may	   be’115	  acting	   lawfully	   if	   it	   decides	   not	   to	  approve	   a	   prospective	   foster	   carer	   who	   ‘evinces	   antipathy,	   objection	   to,	   or	  disapproval	   of,	   homosexuality	   and	   same-­‐sex	   relationships	   and	   an	   inability	   to	  respect,	   value	   and	   demonstrate	   positive	   attitudes	   towards	   homosexuality	   and	  same-­‐sex	  relationships.’	  
Ensuring	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   child	   is	   the	   most	   important	   aspect	   of	   foster	  parenting.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   rights	  are	  not	   relevant:	   a	   status-­‐based	  bar	  on	  adopting	  or	  fostering	  could	  certainly	  be	  a	  violation.116	  But	  where	  there	  are	  relevant	  reasons	   to	   believe	   that	   a	   person’s	   beliefs	   are	   potentially	   harmful	   to	   a	   child,	   then	  restricting	   them	   from	   fostering	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   proportionate.	   As	   the	   Court	   put	   it,	  ‘this	   is	   not	   a	   prying	   intervention	   into	   mere	   belief’	   but	   an	   investigation	   of	   their	  probable	  treatment	  of	  a	  child.117	  
In	  the	  event,	  the	  Court	  declined	  to	  give	  a	  declaration	  but	  suggested	  that	  opinions	  on	  homosexuality	   may	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	   This	   is	   unobjectionable,	   although	  perhaps	  rather	  meaningless.	   If	   a	   couple	   is	   to	  be	  given	   the	  responsibility	  of	   caring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  [2011]	  HRLR	  20.	  115	  Originally	  this	  was	  ‘would	  be’.	  This	  was	  changed	  during	  the	  hearing.	  116	  A	  bar	  on	  unmarried	  couples	  adopting	  was	  held	  to	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  Art	  8	  and	  Art	  14	  in	  Re	  
P	  [2009]	  1	  AC	  173.	  117	  Supra	  n.	  110	  at	  para	  97.	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for	  a	  child	  who	  is	  under	  the	  state’s	  care	  then	  they	  have	  to	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  suitable	  parents	   based	   on	   the	   available	   evidence	   as	   to	  what	   promotes	   child	  welfare.	   The	  state	   could	   point	   to	   evidence	   that	   children	   raised	   by	   parents	   who	   were	  disapproving	  of	  homosexuality	  had	  greater	  problems	  in	  adulthood	  if	  they	  were	  gay.	  Any	  interference	  with	  the	  Johns’	  rights	  is	   justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  child.	  	  
This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   council	  was	  necessarily	   right,	   however,	   to	   prevent	   the	  Johns	  from	  becoming	  foster	  parents	  nor	  that	  there	  might	  have	  been	  no	  way	  round	  this	   problem,	   by	   for	   example	   using	   them	   as	   short-­‐term	   relief	   foster	   parents.	  Whether	   a	   person	   is	   suitable	   to	   be	   a	   foster	   parent	   relies	   on	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  information	  and	  expert	  opinion	  and	  is	  therefore	  impossible	  to	  state	  in	  the	  abstract.	  Nevertheless	  it	  is	  clearly	  proportionate	  to	  assess	  a	  person’s	  view	  of	  homosexuality	  and	  to	  take	  this	  into	  account	  on	  a	  fact-­‐specific	  basis.	  
It	  should	  be	  highlighted	  though	  that	  this	  is	  an	  unusual	  case.	  Normally	  it	  will	  not	  be	  proportionate	   to	  even	  consider	  an	  employee’s	  view	  of	  homosexuality,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  requiring	  certain	  behaviour,	  because	  this	  is	  an	  intrusive	  interference	  into	  a	   person’s	   religious	   freedom,	   which	   is	   generally	   not	   justified	   by	   the	   employer’s	  interest	   in	  a	  non-­‐discriminatory	  workforce.	   In	  Buananno	  v	  AT&T	  Broadband118	  for	  example,	   an	   employee	   was	   dismissed	   because	   he	   refused	   to	   sign	   an	   equality	  statement	   which	   required	   him	   to	   ‘value	   the	   differences	   between	   employees’.	   He	  refused	   to	   sign	   it	   since	  he	  believed	   this	   required	  him	   to	  value	   the	   ‘sinful’	   state	  of	  homosexuality	   and	   to	   value	   other	   religions	   as	   equal	   to	   Christianity.	   However,	   he	  stated	   he	   would	   never	   discriminate	   against	   colleagues	   and	   valued	   individuals	   in	  themselves.	  There	  was	  nothing	  particular	  about	  his	  job	  which	  required	  him	  to	  have	  particular	   beliefs	   about	   homosexuality	   or	   non-­‐Christian	   beliefs.	   Rightly,	   he	   was	  successful	  in	  his	  religious	  discrimination	  claim:	  such	  a	  policy	  was	  disproportionate	  and	  bore	  little	  relation	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  his	  employer.	  
Conclusion	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  argued	  that	  an	  approach	  based	  on	  a	  proportionality	  test	  and	  the	  principles	   described	   above	   is	   the	   best	   way	   of	   deciding	   these	   employment	   cases.	  There	  are	   few	  straightforward	  or	  absolute	  answers	   in	   this	  context.	  Employees	  do	  have	   (limited)	   rights	   to	  manifest	   their	   beliefs	  within	   employment	   and	   thus	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  313	  F.Supp.2d	  1069	  (D.	  Colo.,	  2004).	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claims	   should	   be	   taken	   seriously.	   This	   should	   include	   a	   right	   to	   put	   their	   case	  forward	  and	  to	  have	  their	  interests	  directly	  assessed	  by	  a	  decision-­‐maker.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  may	  be	  permissible	  even	  for	  state	  employees	  to	  discriminate,	  and	  I	  have	  argued	   that	   registrars	   should	   be	   exempted	   by	   their	   employers	   from	   performing	  same-­‐sex	   marriages	   if	   this	   is	   practical	   and	   if	   the	   discrimination	   would	   not	   be	  directly	  experienced.	  In	  other	  cases	  though,	  such	  as	  foster	  parenting,	  the	  employer	  has	  a	  sufficient	  interest	  not	  only	  in	  preventing	  discrimination,	  but	  possibly	  also	  in	  trying	   to	   ensure	   particular	   attitudes	   are	   expressed	   relating	   to	   sexuality.	   The	  vehemence	   of	   the	   speech	   or	   practice	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   it	   undermines	   the	  dignity	  of	  others	  will	  also	  be	  relevant.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  a	  person	  has	  a	   ‘right	   to	  discriminate’	   therefore	  depends	  on	  many	  factors	   and	   a	   fact-­‐specific	   inquiry.	   Such	   an	   approach	   will	   not	   fully	   satisfy	   either	  side.	  This	  is	  inevitable	  though	  where	  no-­‐one	  has	  the	  absolute	  right	  to	  live	  out	  their	  lives	  or	  to	  have	  society	  ordered	  entirely	  as	  they	  wish	  and	  where	  similar	  questions	  of	   identity	   and	   liberty	   exist	   on	   both	   sides.119	  The	   next	   chapter	   considers	   this	  question	   from	   perhaps	   an	   opposite	   perspective:	   if	   secular	   institutions	   can	   be	  required	   to	   accommodate	   those	   who	   disagree	   with	   the	   organisation’s	   non-­‐discriminatory	   ethos,	  when	   (if	   at	   all)	   can	   a	   religious	   organisation	   be	   required	   to	  employ	  gay	  people,	  if	  it	  believes	  that	  this	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  organisation’s	  purpose?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  C.	  Feldblum,	  ‘Moral	  Conflict	  and	  Liberty:	  Gay	  Rights	  and	  Religion’	  (2006)	  72	  Brook	  L	  Rev	  61.	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Chapter	  5:	  Discrimination	  and	  Religious	  Employment	  
	  
Introduction	  	  This	  chapter	  addresses	  whether	  religious	  organisations,	  including	  religious	  bodies	  such	  as	  churches,	  as	  well	  as	  religious	  educational	  establishments	  and	  social	  service	  providers,	  can	  be	  required	  not	  to	  discriminate	  against	  gay	  people	   in	  employment.	  Of	  course,	  it	  should	  always	  be	  remembered	  that	  many	  will	  not	  wish	  to:	  sometimes	  because	   they	   have	   no	   theological	   objections	   to	   homosexuality,	   or	  more	   narrowly	  because	  they	  do	  not	  consider	  it	  necessary	  for	  the	  particular	  position	  in	  question.	  1	  Very	  often	  these	  may	  be	  contested	  issues	  within	  religious	  organisations.	  	  	  	  In	   an	   important	   article,	   Bagni	   proposed	   an	   approach	   which	   resembled	   ‘three	  concentric	   circles	   revolving	   around	   an	   epicentre’.2	  He	   argued	   that,	   ‘the	   spiritual	  epicenter	  of	  a	  church	  must	  be	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  civil	  regulation…	  only	  the	  most	  compelling	   government	   interest	   must	   justify	   regulation	   of	   some	   practices…Once	  the	  church	  acts	  outside	  this	  epicenter	  and	  moves	  closer	  to	  the	  purely	  secular	  world,	  it	  subjects	  itself	  to	  secular	  regulation	  proportionate	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  secularity	  of	  its	  activities	  and	  relationships’.3	  His	  four	  categories,	  decreasing	  in	  religiosity,	  are:	  
1. Spiritual	  epicentre	  2. Church-­‐sponsored	  community	  activities	  3. Church’s	   purely	   secular	   business	   activities	   and	   relationships	   between	  clerical	  or	  janitorial	  employees	  who	  perform	  only	  nonspiritual	  functions	  4. Totally	  secular	  activities	  
There	   are	   inevitable	   definitional	   problems	   in	   deciding,	   for	   example,	   what	   the	  ‘spiritual	  epicentre’	  includes,	  especially	  if	  a	  religion	  asserts	  that	  all	  its	  activities	  are	  spiritual	   in	   nature.	   However,	   this	   approach	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   as	   having	   four	  entirely	   distinct	   categories;	   rather	   there	   is	   a	   sliding	   scale	   between	   spiritual	   and	  secular	  activity,	  with	  totally	  secular	  activities	  by	  religious	  organisations	  treated	  the	  same	  as	  those	  carried	  out	  by	  secular	  organisations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  a	  range	  of	  views	  different	  religious	  institutions	  have	  taken	  see	  P.	  Dickey	  Young,	  ‘Two	  by	  Two:	  Religion,	  Sexuality	  and	  Diversity	  in	  Canada’	  in	  L.	  Beaman	  and	  P.	  Beyer	  (eds),	  
Religion	  and	  Diversity	  in	  Canada	  (Leiden:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  2008).	  2	  B.	  Bagni,	  ‘Discrimination	  in	  the	  Name	  of	  the	  Lord:	  A	  Critical	  Evaluation	  of	  Discrimination	  by	  Religious	  Organizations’	  (1979)	  79	  Colum	  L	  Rev	  1514,	  1539.	  3	  Ibid.	  at	  1539-­‐40.	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  This	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   proportionality	   enquiry:	   the	   greater	   the	  interference	   with	   the	   right	   to	   religious	   freedom,	   the	   greater	   the	   justification	  required. 4 	  The	   interference	   with	   religious	   autonomy	   is	   much	   less	   and	   the	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  greater	  where	  the	  employment	  in	  question	   is	   as	   a	   cleaner	   rather	   than	   as	   a	  minister	   for	   example.	   However,	   Bagni’s	  approach	   only	   focuses	   on	   religious	   freedom	   and	   not	   on	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	  right.	   Additional	   questions	   need	   to	   be	   asked:	   is	   there	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   for	  permitting	   the	   discrimination	   and,	   even	   if	   a	   religious	   organisation	   is	   pervasively	  religious,	   is	   this	   a	   sufficient	   reason	   to	   allow	   it	   to	   discriminate,	   when	   balanced	  against	  the	  interference	  with	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  right?	  	  	  Evidently,	   in	   assessing	   how	   much	   weight	   the	   claims	   of	   religious	   organisations	  should	  be	  given,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  why	  collective	  religious	  freedom	  should	  be	   protected	   at	   all.	   The	   first	   reason	   is	   that	   individual	   rights	   of	   conscience	   may	  directly	   be	   in	   issue.	   A	   leader	   of	   a	   religious	   organisation	   may	   argue	   that	   it	   goes	  against	  his5	  conscience,	  and	  against	  his	  understanding	  of	   its	   religious	  precepts,	   to	  employ	   someone	  who	   is	   gay.	   Lupu	   though	   argues	   that	   conscientious	   objection	   is	  only	  relevant	  to	   individuals	  and	  not	   institutions	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  only	  people	  can	  feel	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  being	  forced	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  they	  disagree	  with.6	  This	  is	  of	  course	  true,	  although	  it	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  in	  those	  organisations	  may	  experience	   such	   effects.	   However,	   freedom	   of	   conscience	   is	   protected	   not	   only	  because	   of	   the	   psychological	   effects	   of	   its	   violation	   but	   because	   it	   is	   seen	   as	  valuable	   in	   its	   own	   right	   as	   part	   of	   human	   flourishing	   in	   a	   liberal	   society.7	  Only	  recognising	  individual	  rights	  to	  religious	  conscience	  would	  exclude	  much	  of	  what	  is	  significant	   about	   religious	   freedom.	   Maintaining	   collective	   religious	   freedom	  provides	  the	  structure	  and	  support	  for	  individual	  religious	  belief	  to	  thrive	  and	  the	  continuation	   of	   doctrine	   and	   thought	   over	   time.	   Groups	   provide	   the	   context	   for	  ‘personal	   expression,	   development	   and	   fulfillment.’8	  Permitting	   the	   formation	   of	  exclusive	  groups	  allows	  them	  to	  provide	  ‘a	  source	  of	  ideas,	  for	  those	  who	  can	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  is	  part	  of	  Alexy’s	  First	  Law	  of	  Balancing,	  discussed	  above	  at	  p78-­‐9.	  5	  I	  use	  his	  deliberately	  here:	  in	  this	  context	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  people	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  discrimination	  against	  women.	  6	  I.	  Lupu,	  ‘Free	  Exercise	  Exemption	  and	  Religious	  Institutions	  –	  The	  Case	  of	  Employment	  Discrimination’	  (1987)	  67	  BUL	  Rev	  391.	  7	  M.	  Nussbaum,	  Liberty	  of	  Conscience	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2008).	  8	  F.M	  Gedicks,	  ‘Toward	  a	  Constitutional	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Religious	  Group	  Rights’	  (1989)	  99	  
Wisconsin	  LR	  100,	  116.	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learn	   and	   stimulate	   learning	   when	   they	   feel	   they	   are	   among	   peers…	   They	   can	  provide	  comfort	  in	  both	  an	  emotional	  and	  material	  sense.’9	  Religious	  organisations	  also	  act	  as	  mediating	   institutions:	   that	   is	  as	  organisations	   that	   stand	  between	   the	  individual	  and	  the	  state,	  protecting	  individuals	  from	  the	  state’s	  interference.10	  	  	  An	   important	   part	   of	   collective	   religious	   freedom,	   and	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	  association	   generally,	   is	   the	   right	   to	   disassociate,	   or	   to	   exclude	   those	  who	   are	   in	  disagreement	   with	   the	   group.	   This	   can	   be	   as	   important	   as	   being	   allowed	   to	  associate	   at	   all	   in	   terms	   of	   defining	   or	  maintaining	   an	   organisation’s	  message	   or	  purpose.11	  Without	   it,	   a	   group	   loses	   the	   ‘authority	   to	   define	   and	   to	   control	   the	  terms	  of	  its	  own	  existence…	  The	  group’s	  vision	  of	  itself,	  its	  ability	  freely	  to	  tell	  and	  retell	   its	   narrative	   story	   is	   destroyed.’12	  Therefore	   religious	  organisations	   require	  some	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  over	  their	  membership	  and	  message,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  ‘power	  of	  a	  community	  for	  self-­‐government	  under	  its	  own	  law’.13	  In	  some	  ways,	  permitting	   religious	   organisations	   to	   discriminate	   by	   requiring	   members	   and	  employees	  to	  adhere	  to	  religious	  precepts	  is	  comparable	  to	  permitting	  any	  political	  or	  moral	   organisation	   to	   only	   have	   employees	   that	   agree	  with	   the	   organisation’s	  message.14	  	  	  Many	  religions	  have	  strict	  rules	  about	  sexual	  morality.	  Therefore	  many	  may	  seek	  to	  exclude	   gay	   people	   from	   certain	   positions	  within	   their	   organisation.	   It	   would	   be	  difficult	   for	   a	   church	   to	   maintain	   its	   teaching	   that	   all	   sexual	   activity	   outside	  heterosexual	  marriage	  is	  wrong,	  if	  those	  responsible	  for	  spreading	  this	  message	  do	  not	  agree.	  There	  may	  also	  be	  a	  role	  model	  element.	  As	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   justice	  Alito	  J	  put	  it,	  ‘When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  expression	  and	  inculcation	  of	  religious	  doctrine,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  messenger	  matters’.15	  Even	  if	  the	  position	  does	  not	  involve	   disseminating	   the	   faith,	   the	  mere	   inclusion	   of	   those	  who	   disagree	  with	   a	  religious	  precept	  undermines	   the	  message.	  Employees	  also	  represent	  and	  are	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  C.	  Boyle,	  ‘A	  Human	  Right	  to	  Group	  Self-­‐Identification?	  Reflections	  on	  Nixon	  v.	  Vancouver	  
Rape	  Relief’	  (2011)	  23	  Can	  J	  Women	  &	  L	  488,	  509.	  10	  B.	  Hafen,	  ‘Institutional	  Autonomy	  in	  Public,	  Private,	  and	  Church-­‐Related	  Schools’	  (1988)	  3	  
Notre	  Dame	  J	  L	  Ethics	  &	  Pub	  Pol’y	  405.	  11	  W.P.	  Marshall,	  ‘Discrimination	  and	  the	  Right	  of	  Association’	  (1986)	  81	  Nw	  U	  L	  Rev	  68.	  12	  Gedicks	  supra	  n.8.	  13	  J.	  Rivers,	  The	  Law	  of	  Organized	  Religions:	  Between	  Establishment	  and	  Secularism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  333.	  14	  C.H.	  Esbeck,	  ‘Charitable	  Choice	  and	  the	  Critics’	  57	  NYU	  Ann	  Surv	  Am	  L	  17,	  22.	  15	  Hosanna	  Tabor	  Evangelical	  Lutheran	  Church	  and	  School	  v	  EEOC	  565	  US	  ____	  (2012),	  132	  S.Ct.	  694,	  713.	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‘public	  face’	  of	  the	  institution.16	  	  
Balanced	   against	   this,	   though,	   is	   the	   right	   not	   to	   be	   discriminated	   against,	   and	  possibly	  also	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  The	  denial	  of	  employment	  because	  a	  person	  is	  gay	  obviously	  has	  important	  practical	  economic	  and	  social	  disbenefits	  for	  that	   person,	   especially	   when	   patterns	   of	   discrimination	   exist. 17 	  This	   may	   be	  particularly	  so	  for	  jobs	  not	  immediately	  thought	  of	  as	  religious	  in	  nature.	  For	  more	  centrally	   religious	   employment,	   such	   as	   clergy,	   there	   may	   also	   be	   an	   additional	  argument:	   that	   of	   the	   individual’s	   right	   to	   freedom	   of	   religion.	   This	   is	   further	  discussed	   below.	   In	   all	   cases,	   allowing	   discrimination	   increases	   exclusion	   within	  the	  organisation,	  causing	  hurt	  to	  those	  affected	  and	  making	  the	  needs	  and	  wishes	  of	  gay	  people	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  heard.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  public	  interest	  in	  non-­‐discrimination	  as	  a,	  ‘fundamental	  moral	  value	  that	  is	  widely	  shared	   in	   our	   society.’18	  Permitting	   religious	   organisations	   to	   discriminate	   has	  repercussions	   outside	   the	   religious	   context	   since	   it	   demonstrates	   generally	   that	  such	  discrimination	  may	  be	  tolerable.	  	  	  A	  major	  problem	  is	  considering	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  different	  kinds	  of	  discrimination.	  Organisations	  are	  generally	  permitted	  wider	  rights	  to	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  religion	   than	   they	   are	   on	   other	   characteristics	   such	   as	   gender.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	  problem	   in	   how	   to	   characterise	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination.	   If	   same-­‐sex	  sexual	   activity	   is	   not	   permitted	   by	   the	   religion,	   but	   an	   employee	   still	   considers	  herself	   a	   member	   of	   that	   religion	   and	   believes	   its	   other	   precepts,	   should	  discrimination	  against	  her	  be	  considered	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  religion,	  because	   she	   is	   not	   compliant	   with	   religious	   rules,	   (which	   may	   be	   permitted)	   or	  discrimination	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   (which	   may	   not	   be)?	  Furthermore,	  what	  if	  an	  employee	  is	  discriminated	  against	  because	  of	  her	  status	  as	  a	  gay	  person,	  rather	  than	  for	  any	  particular	  behaviour?	  	  	  These	   are	  difficult	   questions.	  Religion	   is	   evidently	   a	  matter	  not	   only	  of	   belief	   but	  also	   of	   practice.	   A	   religion	   may	   find	   it	   difficult	   to	   define	   a	   person	   as	   a	   member	  unless	  they	  follow	  religious	  rules.	  It	  also	  goes	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  religious	  autonomy	  for	  a	  religion	  to	  be	  able	  to	  define	  its	  own	  criteria	  for	  membership.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  P.	  Taylor,	  ‘The	  Costs	  of	  Denying	  Religious	  Organizations	  the	  Right	  to	  Staff	  on	  a	  Religious	  Basis	  When	  They	  Join	  Federal	  Social	  Service	  Efforts’	  (2002)	  12	  Geo	  Mason	  U	  CR	  LJ	  159.	  17	  P.	  Brest,	  ‘The	  Supreme	  Court	  1975	  Term	  Foreword:	  In	  Defense	  of	  the	  Antidiscrimination	  Principle’	  (1976)	  90	  Harv	  LR	  1.	  18	  Ibid.	  at	  5.	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merely	   because	   someone	   is	   gay	   and	   belongs	   to	   a	   discriminatory	   religious	  organisation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  religion	  itself	  does	  not	  define	  that	  person	   as	   a	   member,	   albeit	   a	   failing	   one,	   or	   mean	   that	   they	   cannot	   perform	  religious	  aspects	  of	  the	  job.	  Of	  course	  a	  person	  is	  likely	  to	  self-­‐define	  as	  a	  member	  of	   that	   religion	   and	   denying	   this	  may	   be	   extremely	   hurtful.	   These	   issues	   will	   be	  considered	  throughout	  the	  discussion	  that	  follows.	  A	  hard	  and	  fast	  rule	  will	  be	  not	  be	   given,	   but	   rather	   the	   chapter	   will	   consider	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  is	  proportionate	  in	  particular	  circumstances.	  	  This	   chapter	  will	   address	  when	  discrimination	  should	  be	  permitted	   in	   relation	   to	  religious	  ministers,	   teachers	   at	   religious	   schools,	   employees	   of	   faith	   based	   social	  service	   organisations	   and	   employees	   with	   no	   religious	   function.	   It	   will	   then	  consider	  specific	  types	  of	  organisations	  which	  may	  claim	  more	  extensive	  rights	  to	  discriminate.	  It	  will	  consider	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘islands	  of	  exclusivity’:	  that	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  proportionate	   for	   some	   organisations	   to	   be	   allowed	   to	   ensure	   that	   all	   their	   staff	  believe	  and	  follow	  its	  religious	  precepts.	  Of	  course,	  in	  many	  situations	  no	  conflicts	  between	  perceived	  religious	  need	  and	  the	  law	  will	  arise	  at	  all,	  or	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  informally.19	  In	  other	  cases	  the	  issue	  will	  be	  fiercely	  contested.	  These	  issues	  will	  be	  considered	  through	  the	  framework	  of	  proportionality,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  need	  for	  mutual	   respect	   and	   accommodation	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   dialogue	   and	  justification,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
Religious	  Ministers	  	  The	   archetypal	   case	   where	   discrimination	   is	   permitted	   is	   that	   of	   religious	  ministers.	  Even	  this	  does	  not	  command	  universal	  support.	  Rutherford	  has	  argued	  that	   such	   discrimination	   should	   not	   be	   permitted.	   Her	   first,	   jurisdiction-­‐specific,	  argument	   is	   that	   equality	   is	   the	   ‘primary	   constitutional	   value’	   in	   the	   US	  constitution.20	  This	  is	  unpersuasive.	  All	  kinds	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality	  are	  seen	   as	   perfectly	   acceptable	   and	   perhaps	   even	  mandated	   by	   the	   constitution.21	  If	  there	   is	   a	   primary	   constitutional	   value,	   rather	   than	   a	   collection	   of	   sometimes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  e.g.	  B.	  Popplewell,	  ‘Church	  Reconciles	  with	  Gay	  Altar	  Server’,	  The	  Toronto	  Star	  6	  June	  2010	  http://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/article/819850-­‐-­‐church-­‐reconciles-­‐with-­‐gay-­‐altar-­‐server[Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  20	  J.	  Rutherford,	  ‘Equality	  as	  the	  Primary	  Constitutional	  Value:	  The	  Case	  for	  Applying	  Employment	  Discrimination	  Laws	  to	  Religion’	  (1996)	  81	  Cornell	  L	  Rev	  1049.	  See	  also	  H.	  Skjeie,	  ‘Religious	  Exemptions	  to	  Equality’	  (2007)	  10	  Critical	  Review	  of	  International	  Social	  
and	  Political	  Philosophy	  471.	  21	  See	  e.g.	  C.	  Sheppard,	  ‘Equality	  Rights	  and	  Institutional	  Change:	  Insights	  from	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  (1998)	  15	  Ariz	  J	  Int’l	  &	  Comp	  L	  143.	  	  
	   137	  
competing	   values,	   this	   could	   easily	   be	   liberty.	   Presumptively,	   this	  would	   seem	   to	  permit	  such	  discrimination.	  	  More	  generally,	  Rutherford	  argues	  that	  prohibiting	  discrimination	  would	  enhance	  the	   ‘free	   exercise’	   of	   religious	   groups,	   as	  discrimination	   leads	   to	   the	   ‘exclusion	  of	  viewpoints	  of	  disfavored	  groups	   from	  religious	  dialogue’.22	  While	   free	  exercise,	  or	  the	   manifestation	   of	   religious	   belief,	   is	   undeniably	   extremely	   important,	   it	   is	  unclear	  why	  this	  necessarily	  means	  that	  religious	  institutions	  have	  to	  change	  their	  practices	  to	  comply	  with	  some	  of	  their	  members’	  religious	  beliefs.	  Religious	  people	  always	   have	   the	   possibility	   of	   joining	   a	   different	   religious	   organisation	   more	   in	  accordance	  with	   their	   views,	   or,	   if	   enough	  disagree	   and	   there	   is	   the	  will	   do	   it,	   to	  divide,	  as	  has	  happened	  to	  many	  religious	  institutions.	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  not	  without	  cost,	   perhaps	   severe,	   to	   the	   believer,	   for	   whom	   their	   religion	   may	   be	   the	  overwhelming	   link	   to	   their	   community.	  However,	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  why	   the	  opposite	  would	  not	  also	  be	   true:	   that	   forcing	   religious	  organisations	   to	   change	  would	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  members	  who	  agreed	  with	  the	  original	  policy.	  In	  fact,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  greater	  violation:	  believers	  who	  did	  not	  agree	  with	   the	  change	  would	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  accept	  a	  religious	   institution	  that	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  their	  beliefs.	  Finally	  Rutherford	  argues	   that	  creating	  an	   incentive	   to	  change	  one’s	   faith,	  by	   only	   providing	   the	   right	   to	   change	   religion,	   violates	   the	   free	   exercise	   clause.23	  Given	   that	   the	   state	   constantly	   and	   inevitably	   influences	   religious	   belief,	   this	   is	  difficult	  to	  accept.24	  	  	  This	   does	   not	   mean	   there	   are	   no	   arguments	   for	   prohibiting	   discrimination	   in	  selecting	   clergy.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   general	   disadvantages	   of	   discrimination	  discussed	  above,	   it	  would	  be	   important	   in	  breaking	  down	  entrenched	  patterns	  of	  discrimination	   in	  often	  non-­‐democratic	  and	  change-­‐resistant	  organisations,	  which	  have	  greater	  resources	  than	  an	  individual	  believer.25	  Equality	  is	  an	  important	  value	  in	   all	   three	   legal	   systems	   in	   issue.	   However,	   requiring	   non-­‐discrimination	   has	  received	  little	  support,	  with	  all	  three	  jurisdictions	  permitting	  some	  discrimination	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Rutherford	  supra	  n.20	  at	  1086.	  23	  Ibid.	  at	  1087.	  24	  R.	  Finke	  and	  L.	  Iannacone,	  ‘Supply-­‐Side	  Explanations	  for	  Religious	  Change’	  [1993]	  527	  
Annals	  Am	  Acad	  Pol	  &	  Soc	  Sci	  27;	  W.P	  Marshall	  and	  D.C.	  Blomgren,	  ‘Regulating	  Religious	  Organizations	  Under	  the	  Establishment	  Clause’	  (1986)	  47	  Ohio	  State	  LJ	  293,	  310:	  ‘Although	  [religion]	  can	  and	  should	  be	  free	  from	  government	  coercion,	  it	  cannot	  be	  insulated	  from	  government	  action	  that	  might	  affect	  religious	  values.’	  	  25	  F.M.	  Gedicks,	  ‘Narrative	  Pluralism	  and	  Doctrinal	  Incoherence	  in	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor’	  (2013)	  64	  Mercer	  L	  Rev	  405.	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in	  this	  area.	  Challenges	  to	  discriminatory	  policies	  in	  this	  context	  have	  been	  rare.	  An	  American	  woman	  did	  challenge	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church’s	  prohibition	  on	  female	  priests	  but	  this	  was,	  unsurprisingly,	  firmly	  rejected.26	  This	  was	  the	  correct	  decision.	  Not	   to	   permit	   this	   would	   be	   a	   great	   interference	   with	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	  would	   severely	   constrain	   religious	   organisations	   from	   formulating	   their	   own	  doctrines.	  What	   is	   less	   clear	   is	  whether	  discrimination	  should	  be	  permitted	   in	  all	  circumstances.	  	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   proportionality	   test,	   there	  would	   appear	   to	   be	   two	   legitimate	  aims	   in	   permitting	   discrimination,	   corresponding	   to	   the	   benefits	   of	   collective	  religious	   freedom	   discussed	   above.	   The	   first,	   based	   on	   conscience,	   is	   about	  relieving	  the	  burden	  on	  organisations	  (and	  thereby	  their	  members)	  when	  they	  are	  required	   to	   act	   in	   ways	   with	   which	   they	   do	   not	   agree.	   The	   second	   is	   based	   on	  autonomy,	   and	   is	   potentially	   broader.	   This	   recognises	   that	   the	   ability	   to	   choose	  religious	   leaders	   in	  accordance	  with	  religious	  beliefs,	  and	  without	   interference,	   is	  at	   the	   core	   of	   collective	   religious	   rights.	   As	   Laycock	   puts	   it,	   ‘when	   the	   state	  interferes	  with	  the	  autonomy	  of	  a	  church,	  and	  particularly	  when	  it	  interferes	  with	  the	  allocation	  of	  authority	  and	  influence	  within	  a	  church,	  it	  interferes	  with	  the	  very	  process	  of	  forming	  the	  religion	  as	  it	  will	  exist	  in	  the	  future.’27	  	  	  The	  ‘conscientious	  objection’	  argument	  only	  applies	  where	  the	  religion	  is	  forced	  to	  act	   against	   its	   beliefs.	   The	   aim	   of	   protecting	   religious	   autonomy	   though	   applies	  whatever	  the	  reason	  for	  dismissal	  or	  refusal	  to	  employ.28	  That	  is,	  it	  applies	  whether	  or	   not	   a	   person	   is	   dismissed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   religious	   rule,	   although	   the	  interference	   with	   religious	   autonomy	   is	   evidently	   much	   greater	   where	   the	  discrimination	   is	   religiously	  mandated.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   only	   a	   policy	   of	  complete	   non-­‐interference,	   which	   permits	   religious	   organisations	   to	   be	   as	  capricious	   as	   they	  wish	   in	   employment	   decisions	   relating	   to	   clergy,	  will	   fulfil	   the	  autonomy	  aim	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  Thus	  the	  rational	  connection	  test	  and	  the	  no	  less	  restrictive	   means	   parts	   of	   the	   proportionality	   test	   are	   met	   even	   where	   the	  discrimination	  is	  not	  religiously	  mandated.	  The	  important	  question	  therefore	  is	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Rockwell	  v	  Roman	  Catholic	  Archdiocese	  of	  Boston	  2002	  WL	  31432673	  (D.N.H.	  2002).	  27	  D.	  Laycock,	  ‘Toward	  a	  General	  Theory	  of	  the	  Religion	  Clauses:	  The	  Case	  of	  Church	  Labor	  Relations	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Church	  Autonomy’	  (1981)	  81	  Colum	  L	  Rev	  1373,	  1391.	  	  28	  Therefore	  it	  is	  not	  right	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  permit	  the	  discrimination	  where	  it	  is	  not	  religiously	  required	  as	  Corbin	  seems	  to	  suggest,	  in	  ‘Above	  the	  Law?	  The	  Constitutionality	  of	  the	  Ministerial	  Exemption	  from	  Antidiscrimination	  Law’	  (2007)	  75	  
Fordham	  L	  Rev	  2031.	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of	  balancing	  the	   interests.	  The	  US	  and	  Britain	  have	  reached	  different	  positions	  on	  whether	   this	   is	   permissible.	   There	   appear	   to	   be	   no	   cases	   directly	   on	   point	   in	  Canada.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  British	  approach	  better	  assesses	  the	  conflicting	  rights	  because	   it	   provides	   an	   opportunity	   for	   more	   fact-­‐specific	   analysis,	   rather	   than	  applying	  a	  blanket	  exception.	  	  	  In	   the	   US,	   Title	   VII	   of	   the	   Civil	   Rights	   Act	   1964,	   which	   grants	   rights	   not	   to	   be	  discriminated	   against	   in	   employment,	   excludes	   religious	   organisations	   from	   its	  ambit	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   religious	  activities	   for	   religious	  discrimination,29	  but	   for	  no	   other	   form	   of	   discrimination.	   The	   question	   was	   therefore	   whether	  discrimination	  on	  other	  grounds	  could	  be	  constitutionally	  prohibited.	  This	  was	  first	  considered	   by	   the	   Fifth	   Circuit	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   in	  McClure	   v	   Salvation	   Army.30	  McClure	   was	   an	   officer	   in	   the	   Salvation	   Army.	   After	   she	   complained	   that	   she	  received	   lower	   pay	   than	   her	  male	   equivalents,	   she	  was	   dismissed.	   The	   Salvation	  Army	  put	  forward	  no	  theological	  argument	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  pay.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	   Title	   VII	   could	   not	   constitutionally	   be	   applied	   to	   ministers.	   It	   held	   that	   the	  ‘relationship	   between	   a	   church	   and	   its	   ministers	   was	   its	   lifeblood’31	  and	   ‘the	  minister	  is	  the	  chief	  instrument	  by	  which	  the	  church	  seeks	  to	  fulfill	   its	  purpose’.32	  Thus	   the	   Court	   should	   not	   intervene,	   ‘otherwise	   there	   would	   be	   intrusion	   in	  matters	   of	   internal	   organisation	   which	   are	   matters	   of	   singular	   ecclesiastical	  concern’.33	  This	   has	   become	   known	   as	   the	   ministerial	   exception,	   although	   it	   is	  widely	   accepted	   that,	   since	   the	   term	   ‘minister’	   is	   used	   by	   few	   religions,	   it	   is	  inappositely	  named.	  	  
EEOC	  v	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor34	  is	  a	  restatement	  and	  reaffirmation	  of	  this	  principle	  by	  the	  Supreme	   Court.	   Perich	   was	   a	   ‘called’	   teacher	   at	   a	   Lutheran	   private	   school.	   Her	  official	   title	   was	   ‘Minister	   of	   Religion,	   Commissioned’:	   a	   position	   seen	   by	   the	  Lutheran	  church	  as	  distinct	  from	  either	  an	  ordained	  pastor	  or	  an	  ordinary	  member	  of	   the	   church.35	  However,	   the	  main	  part	   of	   her	   job	  was	   teaching	   secular	   subjects.	  While	  there	  may	  be	  doubt	  therefore	  as	  to	  whether	  she	  should	  qualify	  as	  a	  ‘minister’	  at	  all,	  that	  is	  not	  the	  important	  question	  for	  present	  purposes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  42	  U.S.C.	  §2000e.	  30	  460	  F.2d	  553	  (5th	  Cir.,	  1972).	  31	  Ibid.	  at	  558.	  32	  Ibid.	  at	  559.	  33	  Ibid.	  at	  560.	  34	  Supra	  n.15.	  35	  D.	  Laycock,	  ‘Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  and	  the	  Ministerial	  Exception’	  (2012)	  35	  Harvard	  Journal	  of	  
Law	  &	  Public	  Policy	  840.	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Perich	   became	   ill	   with	   narcolepsy.	   Following	   disability	   leave	   the	   school,	   having	  concerns	  about	  her	  health,	  would	  not	  permit	  her	  to	  return	  to	  work	  and	  asked	  her	  to	  resign.	   She	   refused	   and	   advised	   she	   would	   sue	   for	   disability	   discrimination.	   She	  was	  dismissed,	  as	  the	  school	  considered	  their	  relationship	  to	  be	  ‘damaged	  beyond	  repair’	  and	  because	  she	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  ‘Biblical	  chain	  of	  command’.	  This	  was	  a	  religious	  policy	  which	  held	  that	  all	  disputes	  should	  be	  decided	  within	  the	  auspices	  of	   the	  church	  and	  not	  by	  secular	  courts.	  Perich	   filed	  a	  claim	  of	  discrimination,	  on	  the	   basis	   that	   she	   had	   suffered	   ‘retaliation’	   after	   asserting	   a	   claim	   of	   disability	  discrimination,	  contrary	  to	  the	  Americans	  with	  Disabilities	  Act.36	  	  
Evidently,	  the	  discrimination,	  if	  proved,	  was	  not	  religiously	  required.	  	  However,	  the	  Supreme	   Court’s	   view	  was	   that	   the	   reason	   for	   her	   dismissal	   was	   irrelevant.	   The	  purpose	  of	   the	  ministerial	   exception	  was	   ‘not	   to	   safeguard	   a	   church’s	  decision	   to	  fire	  a	  minister	  only	  when	   it	   is	  made	   for	  a	   religious	   reason.	  The	  exception	   instead	  ensures	  that	  the	  authority	  to	  select	  and	  control	  who	  will	  minister	  to	  the	  faithful…is	  the	  church’s	  alone.’37	  The	  American	  approach	  then	  is	  almost	  a	  jurisdictional	  one:	  if	  a	  person	  is	  a	  minister,	  then	  the	  church	  will	  have	  a	  defence	  to	  a	  discrimination	  claim	  in	   the	   secular	   courts.	   This	   is	   particularly	   important	   when	   it	   is	   considered	   that	  ‘minister’	  is	  interpreted	  broadly.	  The	  Fifth	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  has	  held	  that	  a	  Music	  Director	  at	  a	  church	  was	  a	   ‘minister’,	  although	  he	  had	  no	  religious	   training	  and	   his	   only	   role	   was	   to	   play	   the	   piano	   during	   services.	   The	   Court	   argued	   that	  because	  he	  ‘performed	  an	  important	  function	  during	  the	  service…	  he	  played	  a	  role	  in	   furthering	   the	   mission	   of	   the	   church	   and	   conveying	   its	   message	   to	   its	  congregants’.38	  The	   expansion	   of	   ‘minister’	   to	   cover	   teachers	   at	   religious	   schools	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  below.	  
The	  British	  approach	  is	  different.	  Percy	  v	  Church	  of	  Scotland39	  held	  that	  a	  religious	  minister	   could	   sue	   for	   sex	   discrimination	   since	   she	   had	   a	   contract	   personally	   to	  execute	  work.40	  Percy	  was	  dismissed	  after	  it	  was	  alleged	  she	  had	  had	  an	  affair	  with	  a	  married	  elder,	  but	  she	  complained	  that	  a	  man	  would	  not	  have	  been	  dismissed	  for	  similar	  reasons.	  Under	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010,	  if	  the	  employment	  is	  ‘for	  the	  purpose	  of	   an	   organised	   religion’	   the	   employer	   may	   impose	   a	   requirement	   to	   be	   of	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  12101.	  37	  Supra	  n.15	  at	  698.	  38	  Cannata	  v	  Catholic	  Diocese	  of	  Austin	  Case	  No.	  11-­‐51151	  (5th	  Cir.,	  Oct	  24,	  2012)	  18.	  39	  [2006]	  2	  AC	  28.	  40	  Although	  see	  Moore	  v	  President	  of	  the	  Methodist	  Conference	  [2013]	  2	  AC	  163.	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particular	  sex,	  or	  a	  requirement	  related	  to	  sexual	  orientation41	  if	  the	  discrimination	  is	  either	  ‘necessary	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  religion’	  or	  if	  ‘because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  employment	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  carried	  out’	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  discriminate	  ‘to	  avoid	  conflicting	  with	  the	  strongly	  held	  religious	  convictions	  of	  a	  significant	   number	   of	   the	   religion's	   followers’.42	  Thus,	   while	   it	   is	   permissible	   to	  discriminate	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  the	  alleged	  discrimination	  in	  Percy	  did	  not	  fall	  within	  either	  of	  these	  exceptions.	  
As	  they	  relate	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination,	   the	  exceptions	  were	  originally	  contained	   in	   the	   Employment	   Equality	   (Sexual	   Orientation)	   Regulations	   2003.	  These	  were	  challenged	  in	  R(Amicus)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  Industry43	  on	  the	   basis	   that	   they	   did	   not	   comply	   with	   the	   EU	   Directive	   they	  were	   intended	   to	  incorporate.44	  The	   wording	   in	   the	   Regulations	   does	   not	   appear	   in	   the	   Directive,	  which	  only	  allows	  a	  derogation	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  treatment	  where	  it	  is	  a	  genuine	   and	   determining	   occupational	   requirement	   to	   be	   of	   a	   particular	   sexual	  orientation.	  However,	   it	  was	  accepted	  that	   it	  did	  comply	  with	  the	  Directive	  as	  the	  criteria	   were	   ‘tightly	   drawn	   and	   are	   to	   be	   construed	   strictly’.45	  The	   question	   of	  whether	  there	  should	  be	  a	  narrower	  approach	  will	  be	  considered	  further	  below.	  	  
Only	  one	  case	  has	  arisen	  under	  this	  provision	  in	  relation	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  it	   went	   no	   further	   than	   an	   Employment	   Tribunal.	   In	  Reaney	   v	  Hereford	  Diocesan	  
Board	  of	  Finance,46	  Reaney	  was	  gay	  and	  had	  applied	  for	  the	  post	  of	  Diocesan	  Youth	  Officer.	   The	   official	   church	   position	   was	   that	   while	   gay	   people	   could	   become	  clergy47	  they	   would	   have	   to	   remain	   celibate.	   Despite	   Reaney’s	   assurance	   that	   he	  would	  remain	  celibate,	  the	  Bishop	  refused	  to	  offer	  him	  the	  post.	  He	  sued	  for	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  and	  won	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  he	  met	  the	  church’s	  condition	  relating	  to	  homosexuality	  and	  there	  were	  no	  reasonable	  grounds	  for	  the	  Bishop	  to	  disbelieve	  him.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  There	  are	  also	  exemptions	  concerning	  marital	  status.	  42	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  Sch	  9	  Para	  2.	  43	  [2004]	  EWHC	  860	  (Admin).	  44	  Council	  Directive	  2000/78/EC.	  45	  Supra	  n.43	  at	  para	  103.	  46	  ET	  Case	  No.	  1602844/2006.	  47	  Reaney	  was	  not	  ordained	  and	  the	  post	  could	  be	  performed	  by	  clergy	  or	  laity.	  However,	  candidates	  had	  to	  state	  that	  they	  complied	  with	  the	  Church’s	  teachings	  on	  sexuality	  as	  they	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘ministers	  of	  the	  gospel’.	  The	  Tribunal	  held	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  small	  number	  of	  non-­‐clergy	  posts	  which	  were	  ‘for	  the	  purposes	  of	  an	  organised	  religion’.	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Balancing	  the	  Interests	  	  Evidently,	   requiring	   the	   discrimination	   to	   be	   religiously	   mandated	   is	   a	   greater	  interference	  with	   religious	   freedom	   than	   if	   discrimination	   is	   always	   permissible.	  Whether	  the	  organisation	  has	  complied	  with	  its	  own	  rules	  will	  have	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	   each	   case.	   There	   are	   normally	   strong	   presumptions	   against	   interfering	   in	  religious	  disputes	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  competence	  of	  the	  court	  in	  assessing	  such	  matters,	   the	   possibility	   of	   cases	   becoming	   extremely	   complex	   and	   contested,	   and	  the	  lack	  of	  state	  interest	  in	  deciding	  them.48	  	  	  Balanced	   against	   the	   right	   to	   religious	   autonomy	   though	   is	   the	   right	   not	   to	   be	  discriminated	  against.	  It	   is	  obvious	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  discrimination	  can	  be	  severe.	  To	  some	  extent	  of	  course	  this	  will	  happen	  if	  discrimination	  is	  permitted	  at	  all,	  but	  any	   element	   of	   surprise	   and	   unfairness	   in	   these	   situations	   presumably	   increases	  feelings	  of	  hurt	   and	  exclusion	  quite	   sharply.	   Furthermore	  as	  Hamilton	  argues,	   ‘to	  grant	   immunity	  to	  the	  religious	  organizations	  where	   its	  actions	  were	  not	  dictated	  by	   religious	   belief,	   but	   rather	   expediency	   or	   a	   desire	   for	   secrecy,	   is	   to	   invite	  misbehavior’. 49 	  It	   does	   not	   take	   seriously	   enough	   the	   individual’s	   right	   to	  justification	  since	  the	  religious	  organisation	  is	  under	  no	  obligation	  to	  explain	  why	  the	   employee	  has	   been	  dismissed.	   Even	   if	   it	   is	   not	   used	   cynically,	   the	   very	   act	   of	  requiring	   religions	   to	   state	   their	  position	  may	   lead	   to	   a	   change	   in	  policy	   in	   some	  cases,	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  dialogue	  this	  necessitates.50	  	  	  The	  ministerial	  exception,	  as	  interpreted	  in	  Hosanna	  Tabor,	  is	  extremely	  broad.	  In	  argument,	  counsel	   for	  the	  school	  argued	  that	  the	  court	  should	  be	  prohibited	  from	  hearing	   all	   cases	  where	   a	  minister	  was	  dismissed,	   even	   if	   for	   example	   they	  were	  dismissed	   for	   reporting	   child	   abuse	   allegations.51	  Certainly	   a	   claim	   cannot	   be	  brought	   for	   race	  discrimination,	   even	   if	   this	   is	   against	   the	   tenets	  of	   the	   church.	  52	  Gedicks	  has	  rightly	  called	  it	  a	  ‘constitutional	  right	  on	  steroids’.53	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  See	  Khaira	  v	  Shergill	  [2012]	  EWCA	  Civ	  983;	  R	  v	  Chief	  Rabbi	  of	  the	  United	  Hebrew	  
Congregations	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  Commonwealth	  Ex	  p.	  Wachmann	  [1992]	  1	  WLR	  1036.	  49	  M.	  Hamilton,	  God	  vs.	  The	  Gavel:	  Religion	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  196.	  50	  K.	  Greenawalt,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Constitution	  Vol.	  No	  1	  (Princeton,	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  382.	  	  51	  F.M.	  Gedicks	  supra	  n.	  25.	  See	  also	  Weishuhn	  v	  Catholic	  Diocese	  of	  Lansing	  756	  N.W.2d	  483	  (2008).	  52	  Young	  v	  Northern	  Illinois	  Conference	  of	  United	  Methodist	  Church	  21	  F.3d	  184	  (1994).	  53	  Gedicks	  supra	  n.	  25	  at	  429.	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Laycock	  argues	  that	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  analysis	  of	  whether	  discrimination	  is	  religiously	  required	  would	  be	  practically	   unworkable.54	  However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	  Under	  the	  British	  approach,	  only	  a	   limited	   inquiry	   is	   called	   for.	  Determining	  whether	  or	  not	  discrimination	   is	  religiously	  approved	  will	  normally	  be	   fairly	  straightforward.	  In	   many	   cases	   the	   organisation’s	   views	   will	   be	   set	   out	   in	   a	   formal	   document.	  Significantly,	   this	   enquiry	   is	   not	   a	   centrality	   enquiry:	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  discriminatory	  rule	  in	  the	  religion’s	  theology	  is	  irrelevant.	  What	  matters	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  rule	  exists.	  It	  may	  be	  harder	  to	  establish	  the	  content	  of	  a	  religious	  policy	  in	  non-­‐hierarchal	  institutions,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  central	  authority.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  insuperable	  problem.	  A	  ‘rule’	  could	  for	  example	  be	  as	  vague	  as	  that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  each	   congregation	   to	   decide	   its	   own	   policy.	   Furthermore,	   under	   the	   British	  approach,	   identifying	   ‘true’	  religious	  doctrine	   is	  unnecessary,	  since	  the	  exemption	  also	   applies	   where	   discrimination	   is	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   offending	   the	   religious	  feelings	   of	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   the	   religion’s	   followers.	   Such	   an	   exemption	   is	  proportionate.	   There	   is	   often	   division	   and	   doubt	   within	   religious	   institutions	   on	  these	  issues.	  Different	  sections	  of	  a	  religious	  membership	  may	  have	  different	  views	  on	  what	  is	  religiously	  required	  and	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  theological	  reasons	  for	  their	  views.	   Secular	   courts	   are	   not	   well	   placed	   to	   decide	   religious	   matters,	   both	   as	   a	  matter	  of	  expertise	  and	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  authority.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  that	  any	  approach	  does	  not	  require	  a	  court	  to	  decide	  religious	  disputes,	  but	  leaves	  this	  as	  a	  matter	  to	  be	  resolved	  internally.	  	  	  US	   courts	   fear	   that	   if	   there	   is	   greater	   scrutiny	   of	   religious	   decisions,	   courts	   will	  inevitably	   be	   drawn	   into	   deciding	   religious	   questions	   in	   cases	   of	   disputed	   facts	  where	  the	  church	  claims	  dismissal	   is	   for	  religious	  reasons,	  such	  as	  disagreements	  over	  services55	  or	  the	  content	  of	  sermons.56	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  In	  Percy	  for	  example,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  quite	  possible	  for	  the	  church	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  male	   ministers	   were	   dismissed	   because	   they	   had	   affairs,	   without	   deciding	   any	  religious	  matters.	  In	  many	  cases	  no	  non-­‐discriminatory	  reason	  is	  put	  forward	  at	  all.	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   there	   is	   no	   entanglement	   in	   religious	   matters.	   Where	   a	  minister	  argues	  she	  was	  dismissed	  for	  a	  discriminatory	  reason	  but	  the	  organisation	  argues	  it	  was	  because	  she	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  religious	  standards,	  there	  will	  have	  to	  be	  some	  enquiry	  into	  religious	  matters,	  but	  this	  will	  be	  limited:	  the	  enquiry	  will	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Supra	  n.35.	  55	  Tomic	  v	  Catholic	  Diocese	  of	  Peoria	  442	  F.3d	  1036	  (7th	  Cir.,	  2006).	  56	  Young	  v	  N.	  Illinois	  Conference	  of	  United	  Methodist	  Church	  supra	  n.	  53.	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be	  to	  assess	  whether	  the	  religious	  reason	  is	  a	  pretext.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  considering	  religious	  questions,	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  truncated	  assessment	  than	  would	  take	  place	  in	  an	  ordinary	  discrimination	  case,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  no	  assessment	  can	  ever	  take	  place.	  	  	  The	   ECtHR	   too	   does	   not	   categorically	   exclude	   such	   claims,	   instead	   balancing	   the	  rights	  of	  the	  employee	  and	  employer,	  and	  this	  has	  not	  led	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  religious	  organisations	   being	   overly	   restricted,	   although	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   are	  few	   cases	  which	   consider	   the	   position	   of	   clergy,	   as	   opposed	   to	   other	   employees.	  While	  under	  ECHR	  law	  it	  appears	  there	  must	  be	  some	  oversight	  of	  the	  employment	  situation	   of	   organised	   religions,	   religious	   autonomy	   is	   still	   an	   important	  consideration.	   It	   is	   therefore	   very	   unlikely	   to	   be	   a	   violation	   where	   clergy	   are	  dismissed	  because	  of	  disagreements	  over	  religious	  doctrine.57	  	  In	   Fernandez	  Martinez	   v	   Spain58	  the	   applicant	   was	   ordained	   as	   a	   priest	   but	   later	  applied	   to	   the	   Vatican	   for	   dispensation	   from	   the	   obligation	   of	   celibacy	   and	   then	  married.	   His	   contract	   as	   a	   teacher	   of	   Catholic	   religion	   at	   a	   state	   school	   was	   not	  renewed	   after	   a	   newspaper	   article	   was	   published	   which	   stated	   that	   he	   was	   a	  member	   of	   the	   Movement	   for	   Optional	   Celibacy.	   He	   claimed	   that	   this	   was	   a	  violation	  of	  Arts	  8	   and	  14.	  Drawing	  on	  previous	   cases,59	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  held	  that	  the	  state	  had	  positive	  obligations	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  private	  life	  was	  protected	  from	  interference	  between	  private	  parties	  and	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  the	   two	   parties	   needed	   to	   be	   balanced.	   It	   therefore	   did	   not	   adopt	   the	   hands	   off	  approach	  taken	  by	  US	  courts.	  However,	   the	  Court	  protected	  the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  rights	   sufficiently	   by	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   religious	   autonomy	  and	   the	   state’s	   duty	   of	   religious	   neutrality.	   The	  majority	   of	   the	   Court	   ultimately	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  violation	  of	  his	  rights.	  	  	  It	   should	   be	   remembered	   that	   this	   discussion	   is	   only	   relevant	   where	   the	  interference	  is	  for	  a	  legitimate	  aim:	  non-­‐discrimination.	  If	  the	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  to	  religious	  autonomy	  is	  not	   for	  a	   legitimate	  aim	  it	  cannot	  be	  proportionate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  See	  also	  Williamson	  v	  UK	  App	  No.	  27008/95	  (17	  May	  1995)	  and	  Sindicatul	  Pastorul	  cel	  
Bun	  v	  Romania	  [2014]	  IRLR	  49.	  58	  App	  No	  56030/07	  (15	  May	  2012);	  [2014]	  ECHR	  615.	  59	  Obst	  v	  Germany	  (senior	  public	  relations	  employee	  of	  the	  Mormon	  Church	  dismissed	  for	  adultery)	  Schüth	  v	  Germany	  (2011)	  52	  EHRR	  32	  (church	  organist	  dismissed	  for	  adultery).	  There	  was	  a	  violation	  in	  the	  second	  but	  not	  the	  first	  case,	  demonstrating	  the	  fact-­‐specific	  nature	  of	  the	  Court’s	  enquiry.	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Hasan	  v	  Bulgaria60	  provides	  an	  example.	  A	  dispute	  had	  arisen	  over	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Chief	  Mufti	  of	  Bulgarian	  Muslims.	  The	  government	  replaced	  one	  candidate,	  who	  appeared	  to	  have	  the	  support	  of	  Bulgarian	  Muslims,	  with	  the	  previous	   incumbent	  who	   had	   collaborated	  with	   the	   Communist	   government.	   This	  was	   impermissible,	  because	   the	   government’s	   purported	   aim	   of	   ensuring	   civil	   peace	   did	   not	   seem	  plausible.	   The	   action	   appeared	   to	   be	   taken	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   favouring	   the	  government’s	  preferred	  candidate.	  	  
While	   the	   US	   approach	   does	   not	   protect	   non-­‐discrimination	   rights	   sufficiently,	   it	  should	   be	   noted	   that	   it	   is	   far	   more	   intrusive	   of	   religious	   autonomy	   to	   require	  reinstatement	  rather	  than	  the	  payment	  of	  damages.	  Reinstatement	  truly	  does	  force	  a	  minister	  on	  an	  unwilling	  church.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  proportionate.	  In	  practice	  it	  is	  rarely	  sought	  and	  even	  more	  rarely	  given.61	  
As	   always,	   merely	   because	   the	   approach	   suggested	   here	   permits	   some	   legal	  intervention,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  legal	  solutions	  should	  necessarily	  be	  pursued.	  With	   good	   advice	   and	   discussion,	   the	   litigation	   in	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	   could	   probably	  have	  been	  avoided.	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  had	  paid	  Perich’s	  salary	  while	  she	  was	  on	  sick	  leave	  for	  much	  longer	  than	  was	  legally	  required.	  They	  also	  had	  a	  fairly	  strong	  case	  that	   permitting	   her	   to	   come	   back	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   school	   year	   when	   a	  replacement	   teacher	   had	   been	   hired	   would	   have	   placed	   them	   under	   undue	  hardship	  as	  they	  tried	  to	  maintain	  continuity	  in	  teaching.62	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   it	   would	   not	   have	   posed	   a	   great	   risk	   to	   religious	   freedom	   to	   have	  required	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  to	  pay	  damages	  to	  Perich.	  This	  would	  still	  leave	  religious	  organisations	  free	  to	  create	  their	  own	  rules	  on,	  for	  example,	  sexual	  morality,	  even	  if,	  and	  in	  fact	  particularly	  importantly	  if,	  these	  are	  ‘practices	  that	  the	  larger	  society	  condemns’.63	  Religious	  organisations	  are	  free	  to	  apply	  any	  policy	  they	  wish	  relating	  to	   employment	   of	  ministers	   and	   sexual	   orientation.	   At	  worst	   therefore,	   they	  will	  only	  be	  forced	  to	  adhere	  to	  their	  own	  rules.	  This	  rule	  thus	  deters	  hypocrisy.64	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  55.	  61	  See	  A.	  Korn	  and	  M.	  Sethi,	  Employment	  Tribunal	  Remedies	  4th	  ed	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  Ch	  3;	  B.	  Wolkinson	  and	  V.	  Nicol,	  ‘The	  Illusion	  of	  Make-­‐Whole	  Relief:	  The	  Exclusion	  of	  the	  Reinstatement	  Remedy	  in	  Hostility-­‐Based	  Discrimination	  Cases’	  (1992)	  8	  Lab	  Law	  157.	  62	  Laycock	  supra	  n.35.	  63	  S.	  Carter,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Disbelief:	  How	  American	  Law	  and	  Politics	  Trivialize	  Religious	  
Devotion	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1993)	  34.	  64	  G.S.	  Buchanan,	  ‘The	  Power	  of	  Government	  to	  Regulate	  Class	  Discrimination	  by	  Religious	  Entities:	  A	  Study	  in	  Conflicting	  Values’	  (1994)	  43	  Emory	  LJ	  1189.	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  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   allowing	   discrimination	   for	   clergy,	  wherever	   this	   was	   mandated	   by	   religious	   rules,	   is	   too	   broad.	   Although	   I	   have	  considered	  whether	  the	  British	  approach	  itself	  is	  proportionate,	  it	  does	  not	  require	  a	   proportionality	   assessment	   in	   each	   case.	   The	   lack	   of	   a	   proportionality	  requirement	   for	   discrimination	   for	   positions	   which	   are	   ‘for	   the	   purposes	   of	   an	  organised	  religion’	  was	  challenged	   in	  R(Amicus)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Trade	  and	  
Industry65	  but	  was	  upheld	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  itself	  a	  proportionate	  rule.	  Given	  the	   importance	   to	   collective	   religious	   freedom	   of	   being	   able	   to	   select	   religious	  ministers	   in	   accordance	   with	   religious	   precepts,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   the	  selection	  of	  a	  minister	   in	  compliance	  with	  such	  precepts,	  at	   least	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  sexual	  orientation,	  could	  not	  be	  proportionate.	  Therefore	  although	  the	  British	  law	  is	  expressed	  as	  a	  rule,	   it	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  working	  out	  of	  the	  requirements	  of	  proportionality	  in	  a	  particular	  situation,	  as	  was	  in	  fact	  held.	  
Biblical	  Chain	  of	  Command	  	  Clergy	   should,	   then,	   be	   able	   to	   bring	   claims	   where	   the	   discrimination	   is	   not	  religiously	   based.	   However,	   the	   decision	   to	   dismiss	  may	   be	   based	   on	   a	   different	  religious	   rule	   particularly	   in	   Fundamentalist66	  Protestant	   churches:	   the	   failure	   of	  the	  minister	  to	  subject	  herself	  to	  the	  religious	  institution	  and,	  by	  involving	  secular	  authorities	   in	   religious	   matters,	   breaking	   the	   Biblical	   ‘chain	   of	   command’.67	  In	  
Hosanna	  Tabor	  itself	   this	  rule	  was	   irrelevant	   to	   the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision:	   the	  school	   would	   have	   had	   the	   right	   to	   dismiss	   Perich	   for	   any	   reason,	   but	   if	   the	  ministerial	  exception	  is	  narrowed,	  this	  rule	  could	  become	  crucial.	  The	  rule	  may	  be	  just	  as	  important	  to	  the	  religion,	  being	  Biblically	  based,	  and	  resonating	  with	  other	  religious	  concepts,68	  as	  a	  rule	  forbidding	  women	  ministers,	  for	  example.	  Preventing	  religious	   organisations	   from	   applying	   this	   rule	   may	   therefore	   be	   a	   great	  interference	  with	  its	  autonomy	  and	  conscience.	  
The	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   and	  no	   less	   restrictive	  means	   of	   achieving	  this	   aim	   does,	   however,	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   the	   rule’s	   importance	   is	   not	  outweighed	   by	   other	   considerations.	   Evidently,	   such	   a	   policy	   greatly	   affects	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  [2004]	  EWHC	  860	  (Admin).	  66	  See	  for	  meaning	  C.	  Pasquinelli,	  ‘Fundamentalisms’	  (1998)	  5	  Constellations	  10.	  67	  As	  in	  Dayton	  Christian	  Schools	  v	  Ohio	  Civil	  Rights	  Commission	  766	  F.2d	  932	  (6th	  Cir.,	  1985);	  477	  US	  619	  (1986).	  68	  K.	  Boone,	  The	  Bible	  Tells	  Them	  So:	  The	  Discourse	  of	  Protestant	  Fundamentalism	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  1989).	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right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination,	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  situations	  where	  there	  is	  no	  recourse	  against	  discrimination.	  Most	  importantly	  though,	  it	  infringes	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	   hearing.69	  It	   means	   that	   a	   person	   may	   be	   treated	   extremely	   badly,	   both	   by	  secular	  standards	  and	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  religion	  itself,	  but	  be	  prevented	  from	   having	   any	   opportunity	   to	   challenge	   this.	   It	   can	   be	   used	   entirely	   cynically.	  Clergy,	   like	   any	   employees,	   can	  be	   extremely	   vulnerable	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   employer.	  For	  these	  reasons	  when	  the	  interests	  are	  balanced,	  the	  right	  to	  religious	  autonomy,	  although	  potentially	  deeply	  affected,	  is	  outweighed	  by	  these	  concerns.	  	  
Religious	  Ministers:	  Conclusion	  	  	  Overall	   therefore	   a	  blanket	   rule	   that	   always	   allows	  ministers	   to	  be	  discriminated	  against	   is	   disproportionate.	   It	   ‘protects	   unjustified	   discrimination	   and	  administrative	   blunders	   by	   a	   congregation’.70	  Instead	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   assessment	  should	  be	  undertaken	  in	  deciding	  whether	  discrimination	  is	  religiously	  required.71	  Because	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  religious	  autonomy,	  the	  British	  approach,	  whereby	  a	  religious	   organisation	   may	   discriminate	   if	   it	   demonstrates	   either	   that	   the	  discrimination	   is	   doctrinally	   mandated	   or	   it	   is	   needed	   to	   avoid	   offending	   a	  significant	  number	  of	  followers,	   is	  proportionate.	  It	  draws	  an	  appropriate	  balance	  between	  the	  interests.	  
Other	  Religious	  Employment	  	  	  The	   rest	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   devoted	   to	   the	   more	   difficult	   subject	   of	   religious	  employment	   aside	   from	   clergy.	   There	   may	   be	   great	   differences	   between	   the	  religious	   roles	   such	   employees	   perform,	   even	   if	   the	   role,	   such	   as	   a	   teacher	   at	   a	  religious	  school,	  is	  formally	  the	  same.	  For	  this	  reason,	  proportionality’s	  fact-­‐specific	  nature	  is	  very	  useful	  and	  relevant	  in	  this	  context.	  
Teachers	  	  Teachers	   have	   a	   dual	   aspect	   to	   their	   employment.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   they	   are	  responsible	   for	   passing	   on	   religious	   teachings,	   what	   Buchanan	   calls	   its	   ‘mind-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  C.f.	  I.	  Leigh,	  ‘Balancing	  Religious	  Autonomy	  and	  Other	  Human	  Rights	  under	  the	  European	  Convention’	  (2012)	  1	  Ox	  J	  Law	  &	  Religion	  109.	  70	  Gedicks	  supra	  n.25.	  71	  See	  for	  a	  similar	  argument	  J.	  Vartanian,	  ‘Confessions	  of	  the	  Church:	  Discriminatory	  Practices	  by	  Religious	  Employers	  and	  Justifications	  for	  a	  More	  Narrow	  Ministerial	  Exception’	  (2009)	  U	  Tol	  L	  Rev	  40.	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training	   function’.72	  One	   of	   the	   main	   purposes	   of	   religious	   institutions,	   including	  religious	   schools,	   is	   to	   ‘train,	   persuade,	   or	   otherwise	   influence’	   those	   who	   hear	  their	   messages.73	  This	   function	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   teaching	   religious	   subjects.	  Schools	   may	   try	   to	   present	   religious	   messages	   in	   secular	   subjects	   and	   in	   other	  activities.	  Teachers	  may	  also	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  role	  models,	  demonstrating	  how	  to	  live	   a	   religiously	   acceptable	   life.	   If	   a	   religion	  wishes	   to	   pass	   on	   the	  message	   that	  homosexuality	  is	  unacceptable,	  this	  message	  will	  be	  undermined	  if	  those	  giving	  the	  message	  are	  gay.	  A	  school	  may	  also	  wish	  to	  preserve	  its	  strictly	  religious	  character	  and	   define	   itself	   in	   opposition	   to	   secular	   society.	   This	   raises	   issues	   of	   religious	  autonomy	  similar	  to	  those	  discussed	  above.	  The	  rights	  of	  parents	  to	  educate	  their	  children	  in	  line	  with	  their	  beliefs	  are	  also	  relevant.	  They	  may	  argue	  that	  the	  school	  should	  provide	  an	  environment	  where	  it	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  moral	  messages	  they	   wish	   to	   pass	   on	   to	   their	   children.74	  Finally,	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   that,	   as	   in	  
Hosanna	   Tabor,	   teaching	   is	   seen	   as	   part	   of	   wider	   ministry,	   and	   a	   teacher	   is	  therefore	  an	  important	  part	  of	  a	  religious	  community.	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   much	   of	   the	   work	   of	   a	   teacher	   at	   a	   religious	   school	   will	   be	  indistinguishable	   from	   that	   of	   teachers	   at	   non-­‐religious	   schools	   or	   from	   those	  teachers	   who	   are	   not	   expected	   to	   disseminate	   religious	   messages.	   The	   religious	  interest	  may	  therefore	  be	  minor.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  interest	  in	  non-­‐discrimination	  can	  be	   great.	   Religious	   schools	   can	   make	   up	   a	   sizeable	   proportion	   of	   the	   overall	  employment	   market	   for	   teachers.	   Teachers	   may	   be	   attracted	   to	   work	   in	   private	  schools	   for	   reasons	   entirely	   unconnected	   to	   their	   religious	   ethos,	   such	   as	   better	  resources	   and	   smaller	   classes,	   which	   may	   be	   a	   problem	   where	   the	   majority	   of	  private	  schools	  are	  religious.75	  If,	  rather	  than	  refuse	  such	  employment,	  gay	  teachers	  decide	  to	  closet	  themselves	  then	  this:	  ‘stunts	  and	  often	  destroys	  the	  mental	  health	  of	  the	  suppressor.	  It	  impedes	  the	  development	  of	  self-­‐esteem	  as	  well	  as	  a	  person's	  ability	  to	  build	  meaningful	  relationships.’76	  A	  discriminatory	  policy	  may	  also	  lead	  to	  intrusive	  and	  personal	  questioning.77	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Supra	  n.58	  at	  1225.	  73	  Ibid.	  at	  1240.	  74	  R.	  Ahdar	  and	  I.	  Leigh,	  Religious	  Freedom	  in	  the	  Liberal	  State,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013)	  248-­‐50.	  75	  S.	  Brandenburg,	  ‘Alternatives	  to	  Employment	  Discrimination	  at	  Private	  Religious	  Schools’	  
1999	  Ann	  Surv	  Am	  L	  335.	  She	  points	  out	  that	  90%	  of	  private	  schools	  in	  the	  US	  are	  religiously	  affiliated.	  	  76	  H.	  Paterson,	  ‘The	  Justifiability	  of	  Biblically	  Based	  Discrimination:	  Can	  Private	  Christian	  Schools	  Legally	  Refuse	  to	  Employ	  Gay	  Teachers?’	  (2001)	  59	  U	  Toronto	  Fac	  L	  Rev	  59,	  84.	  See	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  Such	  a	  policy	   can	  also	  have	  negative	   effects	  on	  gay	   students,	   leading	   to	   a	   greater	  sense	   of	   isolation.	   This	   is	   particularly	   important	   given	   that	   gay	   teenagers	   are	   at	  greater	  risk	  of	  depression	  and	  suicide.78	  Furthermore,	  as	  with	  all	  discrimination	  it	  has	  a	  societal	  effect,	  sending	  out	  a	  general	  message	  that	  gay	  people	  are	  less	  worthy	  of	  respect,	  even	  to	  those	  not	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  policy.	  In	  Canada	  and	  the	  UK,	  this	  discrimination	  may	  occur	  in	  state	  schools	  directly	  funded	  by	  the	  state.	  Even	  in	  private	   schools,	   in	   all	   three	   jurisdictions	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   school	   will	   be	   tax	  exempt,	  which	  functions	  as	  a	  state	  subsidy.	  	  	  English,	  US	  and	  Canadian	  Approaches	  	  The	  English	  approach	   is	   fairly	   complex.	  Whether	   it	   is	  permissible	   to	  discriminate	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   religion	   depends	   on	   the	   type	   of	   school.	   If	   it	   is	   a	   foundation	   or	  voluntary	  controlled	  school	  with	  a	  religious	  character,	  the	  school	  may	  reserve	  up	  to	  a	   fifth	   of	   its	   teaching	   posts	   as	   requiring	   a	   particular	   religious	   view.79	  Voluntary	  aided	  and	  private	  schools	  listed	  as	  schools	  with	  a	  religious	  ethos	  may	  discriminate	  for	   all	   their	   teaching	   staff, 80 	  as	   may	   free	   schools	   and	   academies	   if	   they	   are	  registered	   as	   having	   a	   religious	   character.81	  The	   legislation	   only	   gives	   rights	   to	  discriminate	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  religion.	  However	  s.60(5)(b)	  of	  the	  School	  Standards	  and	   Framework	  Act	   1998	   states	   that	   ‘regard	  may	  be	   had,	   in	   connection	  with	   the	  termination	  of	  the	  employment	  or	  engagement	  of	  any	  teacher	  at	  the	  school,	  to	  any	  conduct	  on	  his	  part	  which	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  precepts,	  or	  with	  the	  upholding	  of	   the	   tenets,	   of	   the	   religion	   or	   religious	   denomination	   so	   specified’.	   This	   would	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  teacher	  could	  be	  dismissed	  for,	  for	  example,	  being	  in	  a	  same-­‐sex	   relationship	   if	   this	  was	   forbidden	  by	   the	   religion,	   although	  not	   for	  her	   sexual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  also	  C.	  Yarel,	  ‘Where	  are	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  for	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Teachers?’	  (1997)	  24	  Human	  
Rights	  22.	  77	  Brandenburg	  supra	  n.78.	  78	  Paterson	  supra	  n.79.	  79	  School	  Standards	  and	  Framework	  Act	  1998	  s.58.	  In	  a	  voluntary	  aided	  school	  the	  land	  and	  buildings	  are	  controlled	  by	  the	  church	  and	  the	  governing	  body	  employs	  the	  staff	  and	  controls	  admission	  but	  the	  school	  is	  funded	  by	  the	  local	  authority.	  See	  L.	  Vickers,	  ‘Religious	  Discrimination	  and	  Schools:	  The	  Employment	  of	  Teachers	  and	  the	  Public	  Sector	  Duty	  in	  Law’	  in	  M.	  Hunter-­‐Henin,	  (ed.),	  Law,	  Religious	  Freedoms	  and	  Education	  in	  Europe	  (Farnham:	  Ashgate,	  2012).	  80	  School	  Standards	  and	  Framework	  Act	  1998	  s.60.	  In	  a	  voluntary	  controlled	  school	  again	  the	  land	  and	  buildings	  are	  controlled	  by	  the	  church,	  but	  the	  local	  authority	  funds,	  employs	  the	  staff	  and	  controls	  admission.	  Vickers	  ibid.	  81	  School	  Standards	  and	  Framework	  Act	  1998	  S.124A.	  Free	  schools	  are	  state	  funded	  but	  can	  be	  set	  up	  by	  any	  interested	  parties	  e.g.	  teachers,	  parents,	  businesses.	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orientation	   per	   se,	   even	   if	   she	   otherwise	   were	   a	   member	   of	   the	   religion	   and	  compliant	   with	   its	   religious	   rules.82	  There	   is	   no	   explicit	   exemption	   for	   sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  at	  religious	  schools	  though,	  although	  there	   is	  a	  general	  exception	  where	  a	  requirement	  relating	  to	  sexuality	  is	  a	  ‘genuine	  and	  determining	  occupational	  requirement’	  and	  it	  is	  ‘proportionate	  to	  apply	  that	  requirement	  in	  the	  present	   case’.83	  This,	   however,	   was	   considered	   in	   Amicus84	  to	   be	   a	   very	   narrow	  exemption,	  and	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  it	  would	  not	  cover	  such	  a	  case.	  	  	  If	  requirements	  regarding	  religious	  behaviour	  include	  discriminatory	  rules	  relating	  to	  sexual	  behaviour,	   these	  are	   then	  potentially	  extremely	  wide	  exceptions	  and	  go	  beyond	  what	  many	  schools	  require	   to	   fulfil	   their	  religious	  purposes.	  Over	  30%	  of	  state	  schools	   in	  England	  have	  a	  religious	  character.	  85	  The	  particular	  religious	  role	  of	   teachers	  may	  vary	  widely	  between	  schools,	  and	  even	  within	  schools.	  There	  are	  many	   schools	   where	   the	   religious	   ethos	   is	   merely	   nominal.	   The	   exceptions	  therefore	   potentially	   leave	   gay,	   and	   certainly	   leave	   non-­‐religious,	   teachers	  vulnerable	  to	  discrimination	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  arbitrary	  decisions.	  	  American	   law	   is	   more	   complex.	   As	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination	   is	   not	  prohibited	   at	   federal	   level	   but	   only	   at	   state	   level,	   legislative	   exemptions	   for	  religious	   organisations	   vary	   by	   state,	   but	   some	   simply	   exclude	   religious	   schools	  from	   their	   ambit.	   Importantly,	   there	   are	   also	   constitutional	   restrictions	   on	  when	  discrimination	  can	  be	  prohibited.	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  declined	  to	  give	  a	  test	  for	  when	  a	  person	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  minister,	  but	  considered	  that	  a	  person’s	  title	  and	  the	  functions	   they	  performed,	   including	  whether	   they	  had	   responsibility	   for	   teaching	  the	  faith,	  were	  relevant.	  Some	  subsequent	  case	  law	  has	  considered	  some	  teachers	  at	  religious	  schools	  to	  be	  ‘ministers’	  if	  they	  have	  a	  religious	  role,	  even	  if	  the	  religion	  does	  not	  have	  a	  concept	  of	  ‘called	  teacher’	  as	  in	  the	  Lutheran	  Church.	  The	  particular	  importance	   of	   this	   is	   that	   if	   a	   teacher	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   minister	   then,	   as	  discussed	   above,	   she	   can	   be	   dismissed	   for	   any	   reason	   at	   all,	  without	   any	   kind	   of	  balancing	  or	  other	  limits.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Although	  see	  O’	  Neill	  v	  Governors	  of	  St	  Thomas	  More	  RCVA	  Upper	  School	  [1996]	  IRLR	  372.	  83	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  Sch	  9.	  84	  Supra	  n	  43.	  85	  See	  Department	  for	  Education,	  FOI	  Release:	  Maintained	  Faith	  Schools:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/maintained-­‐faith-­‐schools	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  This	  includes	  many	  of	  the	  schools	  set	  up	  under	  the	  academies	  and	  free	  schools	  programmes:	  http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/leadership/typesofschools/b0066996/faith-­‐schools/faith	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	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Kant	   v	   Lexington	   Theological	   Seminary86	  demonstrates	   how	   broad	   this	   exception	  can	   be.	   It	   involved	   a	   tenured	   associate	   professor	   who	   was	   dismissed	   following	  severe	  budgetary	  constraints.	  The	  seminary	  was	  affiliated	  to	  the	  Disciples	  of	  Christ,	  but	  Kant	  was	  Jewish.	  The	  seminary	  itself	  obviously	  had	  a	  religious	  purpose	  and	  like	  all	   the	   academic	   staff	   there,	   Kant	   helped	   to	   fulfil	   this	   religious	   purpose.	   His	   role	  though	  was	  academic	   rather	   than	  spiritual,	   albeit	  within	  a	   religious	  environment.	  Nevertheless,	   he	  was	  held	   to	   be	   a	  minister	   and	   therefore	   could	  not	   challenge	  his	  dismissal.	   Where	   the	   person	   concerned	   is	   of	   a	   different	   faith	   to	   the	   religious	  institution,	   such	   an	   approach	   stretches	   the	   meaning	   of	   ‘minister’	   beyond	   all	  recognition.	  This	   is	  particularly	   serious	  given	   the	  devastating	  effect	  a	  designation	  as	  ‘minister’	  has	  on	  a	  discrimination	  claim.	  	  	  Such	  a	  broad	  interpretation	  is	  though	  unusual.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  Dias	  v	  Archdiocese	  of	  
Cincinnati87	  a	   non-­‐Catholic	   teacher	   was	   dismissed	   after	   she	   became	   pregnant	   by	  artificial	  insemination,	  but	  it	  was	  held	  that	  she	  was	  not	  a	  ‘minister’	  because	  she	  was	  not	  involved	  in	  teaching	  Catholic	  doctrine,	  despite	  the	  school’s	  attempt	  to	  portray	  her	  as	  a	  role	  model.	  It	  was	  also	  held	  the	  school	  could	  not	  enforce	  a	  ‘morals’	  clause	  in	  her	  contract	  because	  she	  was	  not	  aware	   this	  prohibited	  artificial	   insemination.	  The	  refusal	  to	  give	  clear	  guidance	  in	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  minister	  has	  spawned	  these	  problems	  of	  inconsistency,	  but	  the	  major	  problem	  is	  the	  width	  of	  the	  ministerial	  exception	  and	  that	  it	  contains	  no	  requirement	  of	  proportionality	  or	  even	  balancing.	  	  It	  does	   seem	  clear	   that	  a	   teacher	  of	   religious	  subjects	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  considered	  a	  ‘minister’.	  In	  Weishuhn	  v	  Catholic	  Diocese	  of	  Lansing88	  a	  teacher	  of	  mathematics	  and	  religion,	   who	   was	   also	   responsible	   for	   planning	   masses	   at	   the	   school	   and	   for	  preparing	   her	   students	   for	   confirmation,	   was	   not	   protected	   under	   the	  Whistleblowers’	  Protection	  Act	  for	  raising	  child	  abuse	  claims	  and	  could	  not	  bring	  a	  sex	   discrimination	   claim,	   because	   her	   role	   was	   ‘primarily	   religious’.	   Similarly	   in	  
Temple	  Emanuel	  of	  Newton	  v	  Massachusetts	  Commission	  Against	  Discrimination,89	  a	  teacher	   of	   religion	   could	   not	   bring	   a	   claim	   for	   age	   discrimination.	   Requiring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  2012	  WL	  3046472	  (Ky.	  App.,	  July	  12,	  2012).	  These	  cases	  are	  referred	  to	  in	  L.	  Griffin,	  ‘Divining	  the	  Scope	  of	  the	  Ministerial	  Exception’	  (2013)	  39	  Human	  Rights	  19.	  87	  114	  Fair	  Empl.Prac.Cas	  (BNA)	  1316	  (S.D.	  Ohio,	  2012).	  88	  Supra	  n.	  52.	  89	  975	  N.E.2d	  433	  (Mass.,	  2012).	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teachers	   like	   Weishuhn,	   who	   have	   clearly	   religious	   roles,	   to	   adhere	   to	   religious	  rules	   even	   if	   these	   are	   discriminatory	   may	   well	   be	   justified	   in	   a	   particular	   case	  because	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   collective	   religious	   freedom.	   Permitting	   such	  discrimination	  ensures	  a	  consistent	  message	   is	  given	   in	  teaching	  the	  tenets	  of	   the	  religion,	  provides	   role	  models,	   and	  allows	  a	   religious	   community	   to	  be	  organised	  around	   particular	   values.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   discrimination	   should	   be	  accepted	   where	   it	   is	   not	   for	   a	   religious	   reason.	   It	   leaves	   teachers	   vulnerable	   to	  dismissal	  when	   this	   is	   not	   needed	   to	   protect	   an	   institution’s	   religious	  mission	   or	  teachings.	  	  	  The	   ministerial	   exception	   provides	   the	   most	   extensive	   protection	   for	   religious	  rights,	   but	   case	   law	   decided	   before	   Hosanna	   Tabor	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   free	  exercise	   clause	   may	   require	   other,	   narrower,	   exemptions.	   In	   Dayton	   Christian	  
Schools	  v	  Ohio	  Civil	  Rights	  Commission90	  for	  example	  a	  school	  decided	  not	  to	  renew	  a	   (married)	   teacher’s	   contract	   because	   she	   was	   pregnant	   and	   the	   school’s	  religiously	  based	  policy	  was	  that	  mothers	  of	  young	  children	  should	  not	  work.	  When	  she	  sought	  to	  challenge	  this,	  she	  was	  dismissed	  for	  not	  following	  the	  Biblical	  chain	  of	  command.	  The	  Ohio	  Civil	  Rights	  Act91	  did	  not	  have	  any	  exemptions	  for	  religious	  organisations.	   Although	   the	   result	   was	   reversed	   on	   procedural	   grounds	   by	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	   the	  Sixth	  Circuit	  held	   that	   the	  school	  had	  a	  constitutional	  right	   to	  discriminate,	  as	  applying	  the	  law	  to	  it	  would	  have	  violated	  its	  free	  exercise	  rights.	  	  	  The	   school	   sought	   to	   infuse	   religion	   into	   all	   aspects	   of	   teaching.	   Teachers	   were	  ‘required	  to	  be	  born	  again	  Christians	  and	  to	  carry	  with	  them	  into	  their	  classes	  the	  religious	  fervor	  and	  conviction	  felt	  necessary…	  The	  belief	  system	  espoused	  by	  DCS	  touches	   every	   aspect	   of	   their	   life.’92	  The	   school	   clearly	   wished	   to	   be	   pervasively	  religious	  and	  to	  inculcate	  particular	  religious	  values,	  many	  of	  which	  conflicted	  with	  those	  of	  wider	  society,	  in	  its	  students.	  Given	  this,	  requiring	  all	  teachers	  to	  abide	  by	  religious	   rules	   may	   be	   appropriate.	   However,	   there	   were	   problems	   with	   the	  school’s	   argument.	   The	   teacher	   was	   not	   aware	   of	   the	   rule	   at	   issue	   in	   the	   case.	  Although	   she	   was	   aware	   in	   general	   terms	   of	   the	   religiously	   ordained	   differing	  gender	  roles	  for	  men	  and	  women,	  she	  was	  unaware	  that	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  school	  would	  require	  her	  to	  give	  up	  her	  job	  when	  she	  had	  children.	  By	  dismissing	  her	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Supra	  n.70.	  91	  Ohio	  Revised	  Code	  4112.02(A).	  92	  Supra	  n.70	  at	  936.	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behaviour	   that	   she	  had	  not	   realised	  was	   religiously	   unacceptable,	   the	   school	   had	  failed	  to	  respect	  her	  right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination.	  As	  discussed	  below,	  knowledge	  is	  an	  important	  factor.	  	  Other	   cases	   have	   also	   concluded	   that	   religious	   schools	   may	   have	   the	   right	   to	  discriminate	  when	  teachers	  have	  failed	  to	  comply	  with	  religious	  conduct	  rules.93	  In	  
Little	  v	  Wuerl94	  a	  non-­‐Catholic	  teacher	  at	  a	  Catholic	  school	  divorced	  and	  remarried.	  The	  Court	  held	  the	  school	  could	  dismiss	  her	  for	  not	  following	  the	  canonical	  process	  required	  to	  have	  her	  first	  marriage	  annulled	  and	  this	  did	  not	  breach	  the	  prohibition	  on	  religious	  discrimination.	  It	  considered	  that	  applying	  non-­‐discrimination	  laws	  to	  the	  school	  would	  ‘arguably’	  infringe	  its	  free	  exercise	  rights	  and	  that	  ‘attempting	  to	  forbid	  religious	  discrimination	  against	  non-­‐minister	  employees	  where	  the	  position	  involved	  has	  any	  religious	  significance	   is	  uniformly	  recognized	  as	  constitutionally	  suspect,	  if	  not	  forbidden’.95	  It	  is	  very	  questionable	  though	  whether	  merely	  because	  a	  job	  has	  some	  religious	  significance,	  it	  should	  then	  be	  automatically	  permissible	  to	  discriminate,	  especially	  where	  the	  school	  did	  not	  think	  it	  necessary	  for	  a	  teacher	  to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  the	  religion	  at	  all.	  The	  decision	  is	  also	  odd	  in	  that	  the	  Court	  held	  it	  could	   not	   make	   a	   determination	   as	   to	   whether	   Little	   rejected	   the	   teachings	   or	  doctrines	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church.	   However,	   quite	   obviously,	   simply	   by	   not	   being	  Catholic,	  Little	  had	  rejected	  some	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  teachings.	  This	  was	  not	  the	   issue.	   The	   question	   should	   have	   been	   whether	   in	   these	   circumstances	   the	  school’s	  interest	  in	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  marital	  status	  was	  sufficient	  to	  outweigh	   the	   interest	   in	   non-­‐discrimination.	   The	   judgment	   thus	   overstated	   the	  effect	  on	  religious	  autonomy.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  in	  EEOC	  v	  Freemont	  Christian	  School,96	  for	  example,	  it	  was	  held,	  using	  a	  balancing	   analysis,	   that	   it	   was	   not	   permissible	   to	   only	   pay	   health	   insurance	   to	  ‘heads	  of	   households’,	   thereby	  excluding	  married	  women.	  The	   school	  was	   run	  by	  the	   Assembly	   of	   God	   Church.	   Teachers	   did	   not	   have	   to	   be	   members	   but	   had	   to	  belong	  to	  an	  evangelical	  church	  and	  subscribe	  to	  certain	  doctrinal	  beliefs,	  including	  the	   belief	   that	   there	   are	   different	   gender	   roles.	   There	  was	   no	   relevant	   legislative	  exemption	   and	   the	   Court	   argued	   that	   applying	   the	   law	   would	   not	   infringe	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  J.	  Belcove-­‐Shalin,	  ‘Ministerial	  Exception	  and	  Title	  VII	  Claims:	  Case	  Law	  Grid	  Analysis’	  (2002)	  2	  Nev	  LJ	  86.	  94	  929	  F.2d	  944	  (3rd	  Cir.,	  1991).	  95	  Ibid.	  at	  948.	  96	  781	  F.2d	  1362	  (9th	  Cir.,	  1986).	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school’s	   free	  exercise	   rights.	   It	  noted	   that	  wages	  and	  other	  benefits	  were	  already	  paid	  equally	  to	  men	  and	  women	  and	  held	  that	  giving	  this	  benefit	  equally	  would	  not	  substantially	  affect	  the	  Church’s	  religious	  practices.	  	  	  To	  summarise,	  under	  Hosanna-­‐Tabor	   it	  appears	  that	   if	  a	   teacher	  teaches	  religious	  subjects	  then	  she	  will	  be	  designated	  a	  minister	  and	  cannot	  make	  a	  discrimination	  claim,	  no	  matter	  how	  remotely	  this	  discrimination	  is	  connected	  to	  a	  religious	  aim.	  In	  some	  other	  cases	  a	  teacher	  may	  also	  be	  designated	  a	  minister,	  but	   it	   is	  unclear	  when.	   In	  still	   further	  cases	  a	   teacher	  may	  not	  be	  a	  minister,	  but	  may	  still	  have	   to	  comply	   with	   religious	   rules,	   an	   exception	   which	   arises	   out	   of	   the	   free	   exercise	  clause.	  Consideration	  of	  this	  issue	  is	  complex	  and	  involves	  questions	  of	  whether	  a	  teacher’s	   primary	   duties	   are	   secular	   or	   religious	   and	   whether	   enforcing	   non-­‐discrimination	   principles	   would	   lead	   to	   a	   substantial	   or	   de	   minimis	   burden	   on	  religious	  belief.	  Essentially	   this	   is	  a	  balancing	  enquiry,	  but	   the	   factors	   to	  be	   taken	  into	  account	  are	  unclear	  and,	  as	  the	  balancing	  is	  not	  carried	  out	  openly,	   the	  cases	  often	  seem	  to	  understate	   the	   interest	   in	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  occasionally	  give	  rise	   to	   somewhat	   Delphic	   pronouncements.97	  Alongside	   this	   there	   is	   a	   legislative	  general	   exemption	   for	   discrimination	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   religion.98	  Battaglia	   rightly	  criticises	   this	   case	   law	   for	   ‘mask[ing]	   judicial	   judgments	   regarding	   burdens	   and	  interests’	   and	   failing	   to	   ‘articulate	   those	   implicit	   judgments	   leading	   to	   the	  conclusory	  characterization’.99	  A	  proportionality	  test	  would	  make	  the	  reasoning	  for	  these	  decisions	  much	  more	  open.	  	  In	   contrast,	  Canada’s	   approach	   is	  more	   clearly	  a	  balancing	  one.	  Although	   there	   is	  some	   variation	   in	   the	   law	   between	   jurisdictions,	   the	   usual	   approach	   is	   to	   use	   a	  BFOR	   (bona	   fide	   occupational	   requirement)	   model.	   This	   permits	   discrimination	  where	  it	  is	  a	  bona	  fide	  occupational	  requirement	  that	  the	  person	  is,	  for	  example,	  of	  a	  particular	  religion,	  and	  this	  requirement	  is	  a	  proportionate	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  legitimate	  aim.	  In	  common	  with	  the	  other	  jurisdictions	  then,	  religious	  schools	  may	  sometimes	  discriminate	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  religious	  precepts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  D.	  Okamato,	  ‘Religious	  Discrimination	  and	  the	  Title	  VII	  Exemption	  for	  Religious	  Organizations:	  A	  Basic	  Values	  Analysis	  for	  the	  Proper	  Allocation	  of	  Conflicting	  Rights’	  (1987)	  60	  S	  Cal	  L	  Rev	  1375.	  98	  Schools	  are	  exempted	  under	  federal	  legislation	  if	  they	  are	  ‘in	  whole	  or	  in	  substantial	  part,	  owned,	  supported,	  controlled,	  or	  managed	  by	  a	  particular	  religion	  or	  by	  a	  particular	  religious	  corporation,	  association	  or	  society,’	  or	  if	  the	  ‘curriculum	  of	  such	  school…	  is	  directed	  toward	  the	  propagation	  of	  a	  particular	  religion’	  §	  2000e-­‐1.	  99	  J.	  Battaglia,	  ‘Religion,	  Sexual	  Orientation	  and	  Self-­‐	  Realization:	  First	  Amendment	  Principles	  and	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Laws’	  (1999)	  76	  U	  Det	  Mercy	  L	  Rev	  190,	  378.	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  In	  Caldwell	  v	  St	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  High	  School100	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	   it	  was	  not	  impermissible	   marital	   status	   discrimination	   where	   a	   Catholic	   teacher	   at	   a	   state	  denominational	   school	   was	   dismissed	   because	   she	   married	   a	   divorced	  man	   in	   a	  civil	  ceremony.	  The	  school	  did	  employ	  some	  non-­‐Catholic	  teachers	  where	  suitably	  qualified	  Catholic	  teachers	  could	  not	  be	  found,	  but	  these	  teachers	  were	  expected	  to	  support	  the	  school’s	  religious	  approach	  and	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  practices	  of	  their	  own	  religion.	   In	  deciding	   that	   compliance	  with	   religious	   rules	   constituted	   a	  BFOR,	   the	  Court	  stated	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  school	  was	  to	  impart	  a	  Catholic	  way	  of	  life	  to	  its	  students.	  The	  religious	  aspect	  of	  the	  school	  ‘lies	  at	  its	  very	  heart	  and	  colours	  all	  its	   activities	   and	   programs’.101	  Teachers	  were	   expected	   to	   act	   as	   role	  models	   and	  had	   to	   be	   able	   to	   credibly	   espouse	   Catholic	   doctrine.	   The	   Court	   therefore	  considered	   that	   there	   existed	   ‘the	   rare	   circumstances’ 102 	  in	   which	   religious	  conformance	   was	   a	   bona	   fide	   qualification.	   This	   case	   is	   very	   similar	   to	   Little	   v	  
Wuerl,	  with	  the	  important	  difference	  that	  the	  teacher	  was	  Catholic,	  and	  would	  not	  have	   been	   dismissed	   if	   she	   had	   belonged	   to	   a	   Protestant	   church	   that	   accepted	  remarriage.103	  	  
	  The	  school’s	   interest	   in	  maintaining	   the	  religious	  behaviour	  of	   its	  Catholic	  staff	   is	  obviously	   higher	   than	   its	   non-­‐Catholic	   staff,	   and	   this	   is	   recognised.	   Even	   so,	   the	  Court	  may	   have	   been	   overly	   deferential	   to	   the	   school	   in	   assessing	   its	   interest,	   in	  that	   it	   is	   questionable	  whether	   it	  would	   really	   have	   affected	   the	   school’s	   interest	  greatly	   if	   it	   had	   had	   to	   accept	   an	   imperfect	   role	  model	   in	   Caldwell,	   given	   that	   it	  accepted	  other	  ‘imperfect’	  role	  models.	  	  	  Proportionality	  	  The	  Canadian	  and	  English	  approaches	  accept	  that	  the	  autonomy	  that	  is	  appropriate	  in	   selecting	   and	   dismissing	   clergy	   is	   not	   appropriate	   for	   teachers	   because	   of	   the	  less	  fundamentally	  religious	  nature	  of	  their	  employment	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  role,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  [1984]	  2	  RCS	  603.	  101	  Ibid.	  at	  624.	  102	  Ibid.	  at	  625.	  103	  Later	  cases	  have	  also	  permitted	  schools	  to	  dismiss	  teachers	  for	  breaches	  of	  religious	  doctrines.	  	  See	  e.g.	  Garrod	  v	  Rhema	  Christian	  School	  [1992]	  15	  CHRR	  D/477	  (teacher	  could	  be	  dismissed	  for	  beginning	  a	  new	  relationship	  while	  separated,	  but	  not	  divorced,	  from	  her	  husband);	  Kearley	  v	  Pentecostal	  Assemblies	  Board	  of	  Education	  [1993]	  19	  CHRR	  D/473	  (could	  be	  dismissed	  for	  remarriage	  while	  former	  spouse	  still	  living).	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status	   in	   the	   religion	   and	   the	   religious	   nature	   of	   their	   workplace	   varies	   widely.	  However,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   these	   cases	   is	   an	   unavoidable	   dilemma.	   Either	   some	  schools	   will	   be	   forced	   to	   employ	   those	   who	   do	   not	   agree	   or	   comply	   with	   the	  school’s	  religious	  message,	  or	  gay	  teachers	  will	  be	  left	  vulnerable	  to	  discriminatory	  dismissals.	   In	  settling	  this	  dispute,	   it	   is	  not	  sufficient	   to	  classify	  certain	  schools	  as	  able	  to	  discriminate	  or	  to	  exempt	  all	  religious	  schools	  from	  discrimination	  law.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary,	  for	  example,	  for	  all	  voluntary	  aided	  schools	  or	  for	  all	  private	  schools	  with	  a	  religious	  ethos	  to	  be	  able	  to	  discriminate	  for	  all	  their	  teaching	  posts	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  level	  of	  religious	  ethos	  that	  they	  require.	  The	  ‘religious	  intensity’104	  of	   schools	   varies	   greatly.105	  The	   British	   approach	   allows	   schools	   to	   discriminate	  where	  they	  could	  not	  demonstrate	  the	  need	  for	   teachers	  to	   follow	  religious	  rules.	  This	   denies	   the	   importance	   of	   fact-­‐specific	   judgments	   and	   does	   not	   provide	  justification	  to	  those	  to	  whom	  the	  discrimination	  affects.	   It	   therefore	  unjustifiably	  privileges	  one	  right	  above	  another.	  	  	  An	  alternative	  to	  a	  categorical	  test	  is	  to	  use	  a	  BFOR	  approach	  as	  used	  in	  Canada.106	  This	   essentially	   incorporates	   the	   proportionality	   enquiry.	   It	   focuses	   on	   the	  particular	  need	  for	  discrimination	  in	  the	  particular	  circumstances	  and	  balances	  the	  interests	  at	  stake.	  In	  this	  enquiry,	  the	  first	  question	  is	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  in	  permitting	  such	  discrimination.	  This	  will	  generally	  be	  easy	  to	  find,	  unless	  the	  stated	  reason	  for	  dismissal	  is	  a	  clearly	  a	  pretext.	  The	  religious	  organisation	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  legitimate	  interests	  in	  protecting	  its	  religious	  conscience	  and	  in	  protecting	  the	  religious	  autonomy	  of	  the	  school.	  	  	  The	   next	   test,	   a	   rational	   connection	   between	   the	   discrimination	   and	   protecting	  religious	   conscience	   or	   autonomy,	  will	   also	   normally	   be	   easy	   to	   pass.	   This	   is	   not	  explicitly	   mentioned	   in	   the	   BFOR	   test,	   but	   as	   any	   discrimination	   must	   be	  proportionate,	   it	   is	   an	   essential	   question.	   Similarly,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	  whether	  the	  approach	  taken	  is	  the	  least	  restrictive	  means	  of	  achieving	  the	  aim.	  It	  is	  conceivable	   that	   there	  could	  be	  some	  resolution	   if,	   instead	  of	  being	  dismissed,	  an	  employee	  is	  moved	  from	  teaching	  religious	  subjects	  to	  only	  secular	  ones.	  Normally	  though	   the	   decision	   will	   depend	   on	   whether	   the	   policy	   is	   ‘proportionate’	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Laycock	  supra	  n.27	  at	  1403.	  105	  See	  C.	  Evans	  and	  B.	  Gaze,	  ‘Discrimination	  by	  Religious	  Schools:	  Views	  from	  the	  Coal	  Face’	  (2010)	  34	  MULR	  392.	  106	  And	  for	  some	  religious	  employment	  in	  Britain.	  See	  social	  service	  section	  below.	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strict	   sense.	   Although	   this	   is	   a	   fact-­‐specific	   enquiry,	   some	   factors	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  generally	  relevant	  in	  deciding	  these	  and	  similar	  cases.	  	  	  The	  first	  and	  most	  important	  factor	  is	  the	  pervasive	  religiousness	  of	  the	  school	  or	  other	  workplace.	  Relevant	   to	   this	   is	  how	  strong	   its	   links	  are	   to	  a	   church	  or	  other	  religious	  body.	  Control	  over	  admission	  may	  be	  relevant	   if	   the	  school	  only	  accepts	  children	  of	  one	  faith.	  This	  might	  not	  though	  be	  conclusive.	  An	  evangelical	  Christian	  school	  may	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   religiously	   obligated	   to	   encourage	   as	  many	   people	   as	  possible	  to	  hear	  its	  religious	  message	  and	  a	  Catholic	  school	  in	  a	  deprived	  inner-­‐city	  area	   may	   see	   providing	   education	   to	   those	   particularly	   in	   need	   as	   part	   of	   its	  religious	   mission,	   regardless	   of	   their	   religion.	   The	   schools	   may	   though	   require	  strict	  codes	  of	  behaviour	  and	  belief	  for	  their	  employees.	  	  	  Araujo	  argues	   that	   ‘to	  have	  some	  external,	   secular	   institution…dictate	  what	   is	   the	  ”essence”	  of	  a	  private	  school	  and	  what	  constitutes	  its	  ”central	  mission”	  places	  [the	  institution]	   in	   a	   peculiar	   position	   for	   which	   its	   expertise	   can	   claim	   no	  competence’.107	  However,	  if	  a	  school’s	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  in	  conflict	  with	  another	   right	   such	   as	   non-­‐discrimination,	   a	   secular	   authority	   must	   decide	   the	  appropriate	   balance	   between	   them.	   This	   weighing	   of	   competing	   rights	   is	   an	  important	   legal	   and	   not	   religious	   question:	   although	   religious	   institutions	   may	  have	  opinions	  as	  to	  where	  the	  balance	  should	  be	  struck,	  that	  does	  not	  automatically	  make	  it	  a	  religious	  question.	  A	  holistic	  enquiry	  into	  whether	  the	  school’s	  religiosity	  is	  merely	  nominal	  or	  all-­‐encompassing	  is	  a	  suitable	  objective	  factor	  for	  ascertaining	  the	  boundaries	  of	  these	  rights.	  	  The	  second	   factor	   is	   the	  religiousness	  of	   the	  post.	  Even	   if	  a	  school	  has	  a	  religious	  mission,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  it	  should	  be	  permitted	  to	  discriminate	  with	   regard	   to	   all	   its	   teachers.	   It	   is	   clearly	   easier	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   it	   is	   a	  requirement	   that	   a	   teacher	   of	   religion	   belongs	   to	   a	   religion	   and	   complies	   with	  religious	  rules,	  as	  compared	  to	  a	  teacher	  of	  only	  secular	  subjects.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  school	   may	   wish	   the	   religious	   ethos	   to	   be	   infused	   throughout	   teaching	   and	  extracurricular	   activities.	   The	   degree	   of	   religiousness	   should	   not	   be	   assessed	  formulaically.	  The	  proportion	  of	   time	  a	  person	  spends	   ‘doing	  religion’	   is	   relevant,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  R.	  Araujo,	  ‘”The	  Harvest	  is	  Plentiful,	  but	  the	  Laborers	  are	  Few”:	  Hiring	  Practices	  and	  Religiously	  Affiliated	  Universities’	  (1996)	  30	  U	  Rich	  L	  Rev	  713,	  751.	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but	  only	  as	  part	  of	  the	  enquiry.108	  Facts	  such	  as	  that	  a	  person	  only	  spends	  10.6%	  of	  their	  time	  teaching	  and	  supervising	  religious	  activities	  should	  not	  be	  decisive.109	  	  A	   third	   important	   factor	   is	   whether	   the	   religious	   rule	   has	   been	   brought	   to	   the	  attention	   of	   the	   teacher.	   This	   allows	   teachers	   to	   take	   up	   employment	   in	   full	  knowledge	   of	  what	   is	   expected	   from	   them	   and	   provides	   some	  protection	   against	  arbitrary	   enforcement	   of	   rules.	   It	   also	   has	   a	   more	   intangible	   benefit	   in	   that	   it	  demonstrates	   respect	   to	   prospective	   employees	   because	   it	   shows	   that	   the	  organisation	  recognises	   it	  can	  only	  enforce	   its	  beliefs	  on	   those	  who	  are	  willing	   to	  accept	  its	  authority.	  	  	  A	  related	  factor	  is	  whether	  the	  rule	  has	  been	  applied	  consistently.	  This	  is	  relevant	  because	   it	   demonstrates	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   rule	   to	   the	   religion.	   If	   an	  organisation	  has	  not	  previously	  considered	  the	  rule	  vital,	  presumptively	  it	  makes	  it	  difficult	   for	   it	   to	   claim	   that	   a	   further	   dispensation	  would	   be	   a	   great	   interference	  with	   its	   religious	   interest.	   It	   is	   likely	   therefore	   to	  be	  outweighed	  by	   the	  opposing	  interest,	   unless	   good	   reason	   can	   be	   shown.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   different	  standards	  of	  behaviour	  could	  not	  be	  required	  for	  different	  types	  of	  employee.	  Care	  should	  be	  taken	  though	  not	  to	  place	  religious	  organisations	  in	  a	  double	  bind	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  consistency.	  Since	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  rule	  on	  a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis,	   it	   could	   be	   suggested	   that	   having	   one	   exception	   will	   not	  undermine	  the	  school’s	  interests.	  However,	  if	  a	  rule	  is	  not	  applied	  to	  all	  this	  may	  be	  used	   to	   undermine	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   rule	   is	   necessary	   at	   all.110	  Therefore	   the	  requirement	  of	   consistency	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  absolute.	  A	  school	  may	  well	  be	  able	  to	  show	  its	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  some	  religiously	  compliant	  staff.111	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  more	  general	  requirement	  of	  consistency.	  If	  gay	  sexual	  activities	  or	  relationships	   are	   the	   only	   behaviour	   prohibited,	   this	   looks	   less	   like	   an	   effort	   to	  maintain	   religious	   exclusivity	   and	   more	   like	   mere	   homophobia.112	  If	   employees	  have	  been	  dismissed	  for	  breaking	  other	  religious	  codes,	  or	  are	  at	  least	  required	  to	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  This	  type	  of	  approach	  was	  rejected	  in	  Hosanna	  Tabor.	  109	  See	  discussion	  of	  Clapper	  v	  Chesapeake	  Conference	  of	  Seventh	  Day	  Adventists	  No.	  97-­‐2648,	  1998	  WL	  904528	  (4th	  Cir.,	  Dec.	  29,	  1998)	  in	  L.	  Fisher,	  ‘A	  Miscarriage	  of	  Justice:	  Pregnancy	  Discrimination	  in	  Sectarian	  Schools’	  	  (2010)	  16	  Wash	  &	  Lee	  JCR	  Soc	  Just	  529.	  110	  A.	  Esau,	  ‘Islands	  of	  Exclusivity	  Revisited:	  Religious	  Organizations,	  Employment	  Discrimination	  and	  Heintz	  v	  Christian	  Horizons’	  (2009)	  15	  Canadian	  Lab	  &	  Emp	  LJ	  389.	  111	  Pime	  v	  Loyola	  University	  of	  Chicago	  585	  F.	  Supp.	  435	  (N.D.	  Ill.,	  1984).	  112	  C.f.	  Brown	  v	  Dade	  Christian	  Schools	  556	  F.2d	  310	  (5th	  Cir.,	  1977).	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uphold	  them,	  it	  makes	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  dismissal	  is	  justified.	  Some	  cases	  have	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  factors.	  Cases	  involving	  pre-­‐marital	  pregnancy	  have	   for	   example	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   applying	   a	   rule	   forbidding	   pre-­‐marital	   sex	   equally	   to	   men	   and	   women,	   otherwise	   this	   is	   simply	   unlawful	   sex	  discrimination.113	  	  	  It	   should	   be	   remembered	   that	   the	   BFOR	   approach	   requires	   some	   loss	   to	   both	  rights.	   Even	   if	   an	   exception	  were	   granted	   there	  would	   still	   be	   some	   interference	  with	  religious	  practices.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  chilling	  effect	  where	  organisations	  amend	  their	  practices	   to	   avoid	   the	   risk	  of	   litigation,	   even	   if	   this	  would	  ultimately	  not	  be	  required	  if	  assessed	  by	  the	  courts.	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  prohibition	  of	   discrimination	   at	   religious	   schools	   may	   make	   gay	   employees	   vulnerable.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  proportionality	  approach	   is	   the	  best	  way	   to	   take	   full	  account	  of	  the	  conflicting	  rights.	  	  
Social	  Service	  Organisations	  	  Religious	   institutions	   are	   greatly	   involved	   in	   a	   wide	   provision	   of	   social	   services	  from	  healthcare	  provision,	  to	  services	  for	  homeless	  people,	  to	  care	  of	  people	  with	  disabilities.	   They	   may	   receive	   quite	   extensive	   government	   funding,	   and	   in	   some	  sectors	   a	   significant	   proportion	   may	   be	   run	   by	   religious	   organisations.114	  The	  services	  they	  provide	  may	  be	  quite	  indistinguishable	  from	  secular	  services.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  work	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  a	  religion’s	  mission	  and	  indeed	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  religious	  practice	  in	  itself.115	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  organisation	  may	  only	  provide	  a	  benefit	  for	  co-­‐religionists.	  Alternatively	  it	  may	  be	  part	  of	  outreach	  work	  or	   perhaps	   include	   an	   element	   of	   proselytisation	   to	   service	   users.	   Like	   teachers,	  although	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  they	  may	  be	  required	  to	  act	  as	  role	  models.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  this	  atmosphere,	  the	  organisation	  may	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  vital	  that	  the	  work	  is	   carried	   out	   by	   co-­‐religionists,	   which	   they	   might	   argue	   includes	   adherence	   to	  religious	  precepts	  in	  non-­‐work	  life.	  Again,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  BFOR	  approach	  which	  takes	  proportionality	  into	  account	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  cases.	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  E.g.	  Dolter	  v	  Walhert	  High	  School	  483	  F.	  Supp.	  266,	  271	  (N.D.	  Iowa,	  1980);	  Vigars	  v	  Valley	  
Christian	  Ctr	  805	  F.	  Supp	  802	  (N.D.	  Cal.,	  1992).	  114	  See	  S.	  Monsma,	  When	  Sacred	  and	  Secular	  Mix:	  Religious	  Nonprofit	  Organizations	  and	  
Public	  Money	  (London:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  1996)	  7-­‐10.	  115	  Ibid.	  at	  50-­‐51.	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In	   British	   law	   there	   are	   no	   explicit	   exemptions	   for	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	   for	   religious	   social	   service	   organisations.	   However,	   organisations	  with	   a	   religious	   ethos	   may	   discriminate	   based	   on	   religion	   if	   this	   is	   a	   genuine	  occupational	  requirement116	  and	  there	  is	  a	  general	  exception	  for	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	   if	   this	   is	   a	   genuine	   and	   determining	   occupational	   requirement.117	  The	   religious	   ethos	   exception	   has	   been	   defined	   fairly	   narrowly.	   In	   Hender	   v	  
Prospects118	  it	  was	   held	   that	   there	  must	   be	   something	   specifically	   religious	   about	  the	   particular	   job	   for	   the	   exemption	   to	   apply.	   The	   fact	   that	   some	   religious	   tasks	  have	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  organisation’s	  Christian	  ethos	  is	  not	  determinative.	   There	   are	   no	   cases	   as	   to	   whether	   such	   an	   organisation	   may	  discriminate	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   sexual	   orientation,	   but	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   such	   an	  argument	  would	  not	  receive	  much	  support.	  	  	  The	   law	   in	   the	   US	   differs	   from	   state	   to	   state.	   Not	   all	   states	   prohibit	   sexual	  orientation	   discrimination	   in	   employment	   and	   most	   of	   those	   that	   do	   exclude	  religious	   organisations	   entirely	   from	   such	   laws.	   This	   leaves	   gay	   employees	  extremely	  vulnerable	  to	  discrimination.	  Thus	  in	  Thorson	  v	  Billy	  Graham	  Evangelistic	  
Association119	  a	   mail	   room	   supervisor	   could	   be	   dismissed	   because	   she	   was	   gay,	  because	   sending	   out	   religious	   materials	   was	   part	   of	   the	   organisation’s	   religious	  function.	   Some	   states	   prevent	   religious	   or	   other	   discrimination	   as	   a	   condition	   of	  receiving	   state	   funding,	   but	   religious	   discrimination	   is	   permitted	   even	  where	   the	  use	  of	  federal	  funds	  is	  involved.120	  Thus	  in	  Lown	  v	  Salvation	  Army121	  it	  was	  held	  that	  in	   government	   funded	   programmes	   open	   to	   the	   public,	   it	   was	   constitutionally	  permissible	   for	   the	   Salvation	   Army	   to	   discriminate	   in	   hiring	   and	   dismissing	   its	  workers	  on	  religious	  grounds.	  	  
Some	   claimants	   have	   attempted	   to	   bring	   claims	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   religious	  discrimination	   if	   there	   is	   no	   legal	   protection	   against	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination.	   Such	   arguments	   have	   not	   fared	   well.	   This	   is	   partly	   because	   the	  cases	  do	  not	   fit	  easily	   into	  such	  a	  claim,	  but	  also	  because	   the	  employer’s	  claim	  to	  maintain	   religious	   conformity	   is	   valued	   extremely	   highly.	   Thus	   in	   Pedreira	   v	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  Equality	  Act	  2010	  Schedule	  9	  Para	  4.	  117	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  Schedule	  9	  Para	  1.	  118	  ET	  Case	  No.	  2902090/2006.	  119	  687	  N.W.	  2d	  652	  (2004).	  120	  M.	  McClellan,	  	  ‘Faith	  and	  Federalism:	  Do	  Charitable	  Choice	  Provisions	  Preempt	  State	  Nondiscrimination	  Employment	  Laws?	  (2004)	  61	  Wash	  &	  Lee	  L	  Rev	  1437.	  121	  393	  F	  Supp	  2d	  223	  (S.D.	  N.Y.,	  2005).	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Kentucky	  Baptist	  Homes	  for	  Children122	  a	  lesbian	  therapist	  could	  be	  dismissed	  from	  her	   job	   in	  a	  children’s	  home	  because	  her	   ‘lifestyle’	  was	  not	   in	  accordance	  with	   its	  ‘Christian	  core	  values’.	  The	  Court	  held	  the	  organisation	  was	  permitted	  to	  ensure	  its	  staff’s	  conduct	  was	  consistent	  with	  its	  Christian	  mission.	  There	  was	  a	  similar	  result,	  although	  slightly	  different	  reasoning,	  in	  Hall	  v	  Baptist	  Memorial	  Health	  Care	  Corp.123	  There	   a	   gay	   student	   services	   specialist	   at	   a	   Southern	   Baptist	   college	   ‘permeated	  with	   religious	   overtones’124	  which	   trained	   medical	   staff	   as	   part	   of	   its	   Christian	  outreach	   mission	   was	   dismissed.	   Her	   job	   involved	   organising	   student	   societies’	  activities	  and	  ensuring	   that	   they	  complied	  with	  Baptist	   teachings.	   	  She	  also	  had	  a	  role	  in	  counselling	  students.	  	  
Hall	  is	  not	  a	  straightforward	  case	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  because	  she	  was	  dismissed	  only	  after	  she	  became	  a	  lay	  minister	  at	  a	  church	  that	  encouraged	  gay	  membership	  and	  taught	  that	  there	  was	  no	  inconsistency	  between	  Christianity	  and	  homosexuality.	  Southern	  Baptists	  though	  saw	  a	   ‘homosexual	   lifestyle’,	  but	  not	  the	  orientation	   itself,	   as	   ‘an	   abomination	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   God’.125	  She	   was	   offered	   a	  transfer	  of	  position,	  but	  refused	  and	  was	  dismissed	  because	  there	  was	  a	  ‘conflict	  of	  interest’.	   The	   Court	   held	   that	   since	   she	   publicly	   opposed	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	  Southern	   Baptist	   teaching	   she	   could	   be	   dismissed.	   The	   Court	   argued	   this	   meant	  there	  was	  no	  religious	  discrimination	  because	  any	  person	  who	  publicly	  opposed	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  college’s	  teaching	  would	  be	  dismissed,	  whether	  this	  was	  for	  religious	  reasons	  or	  not.	  	  	  
A	  better	  approach	  may	  have	  been	  to	  accept	  that	  there	  was	  religious	  discrimination	  as	  she	  was	  dismissed	  because	  she	  held	  different	  opinions	  about	  a	  religious	  matter	  and	  because	  of	  her	  involvement	  in	  a	  different	  church,	  but	  then	  to	  say	  that	  this	  was	  justified	   because	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   her	   job	   and	   the	   importance	   to	   the	   college	   of	  maintaining	   a	   clear	   religious	   identity	   and	   message.	   Evidently	   there	   is	   a	   greater	  religious	   interest	   where	   an	   employee	   actively	   and	   publicly	   opposes	   a	   religious	  precept,	   rather	   than	   simply	   failing	   to	   abide	   by	   it.	  However,	   the	   court	  might	   have	  overstated	   how	   public	   Hall’s	   opinions	   were.	   Courts	   should	   be	   careful	   not	   to	   see	  public	  openness	  about	  being	  gay	  as	  ‘activism’,	  in	  a	  way	  which	  would	  seem	  bizarre	  if	  a	  person	  was	  heterosexual.	  However,	   the	  decision	   can	  be	  approved	   if	   the	  College	  would	  have	  dismissed	  an	  employee	  in	  a	  similar	  role	  for	  a	  non-­‐private	  disagreement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  579	  F.3d	  722,	  725	  (6th	  Cir.,	  2009).	  123	  215	  F.	  3d	  618	  (6th	  Cir.,	  2000).	  124	  Ibid.	  at	  625.	  125	  Ibid.	  at	  622.	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with	   another	  major	   tenet	   of	   the	   religion.	   The	   college’s	   claim	  was	   fairly	   narrowly	  defined:	   it	  related	  only	  to	  certain	  employees	  and	  was	  not	  claimed	  merely	  because	  she	  was	  gay	  or	  because	  of	  her	  membership	   in	  a	  different	  church.	  Nevertheless,	   in	  both	   this	   case	   and	   Pedreira	   there	   was	   an	   undervaluing	   of	   the	   interest	   in	   non-­‐discrimination	  because	  it	  is	  not	  a	  legally	  recognised	  interest.	  In	  Pedreira	  there	  was	  also	   an	   overvaluing	   of	   the	   religious	   interest	   in	   that	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   simply	  because	   the	   organisation	   has	   some	   interest	   in	   maintaining	   its	   religious	   identity,	  this	  meant	   that	   it	  was	  vitally	   important	   for	   it	   to	  ensure	   that	   all	   its	   staff	   complied	  with	  all	  its	  religious	  precepts.	  	  
As	   in	   the	  US,	   the	   approach	   in	   Canada	   differs	   according	   to	   the	   province	   but	  most	  have	  a	  BFOR	  approach.126	  Heintz	  v	  Christian	  Horizons127	  involved	  a	  care	  worker	  at	  an	   evangelical	   Christian	   home	   for	   children	   with	   severe	   learning	   difficulties	   in	  Ontario.	   When	   she	   began,	   she	   signed	   a	   Lifestyle	   and	   Morality	   statement	   that	  forbade,	   among	   other	   things,	   ‘homosexual	   relationships’.	   After	   several	   years	  working	  there	  she	  came	  out	  as	  a	  lesbian	  and	  began	  a	  relationship.	  Once	  it	  became	  apparent	   that	   she	   would	   be	   dismissed,	   she	   resigned.	   She	   remained	   a	   committed	  Christian.	  She	  was	  successful	  in	  her	  claim	  for	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination.	  	  
Slightly	  unusually,	  Ontario’s	  law	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  BFOR	  but	  requires	  the	  organisation	  to	   be	   ‘primarily	   engaged	   in	   serving	   the	   interests	   of	   persons	   identified	   by	   their	  creed’	   and	   the	   discrimination	   must	   be	   ‘a	   reasonable	   and	   bona	   fide	   qualification	  because	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   employment.128	  At	   first	   instance,	   the	  Ontario	  Human	  Rights	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  since	  Christian	  Horizons	  provided	  services	  regardless	  of	  the	   service	   users’	   religion,	   it	   could	   not	   benefit	   from	   the	   exemption,	   regardless	   of	  the	  fact	  the	  work	  was	  intended	  as	  an	  outward	  manifestation	  of	  Christian	  belief.	  	  
The	  Ontario	  Divisional	   Court	   held	   that	   such	   a	   narrow	   focus	   could	   not	   have	   been	  meant	   by	   the	   legislature,	   as	   otherwise	   this	   would	   ignore	   ‘the	   long	   history	   of	  assistance	  to	  the	  disadvantaged	  offered	  by	  religious	  groups	  in	  Canada,	  which	  have	  not	  imposed	  a	  requirement	  of	  religious	  membership	  or	  adherence	  on	  recipients’.129	  It	   also	   held	   it	   would	   infringe	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   under	   the	   Charter.	  Whether	  this	  is	  right	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  statutory	  interpretation	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  debate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  G.	  Demeyere,	  ‘Discrimination	  in	  Employment	  by	  Religious	  Organizations:	  Exemptions,	  Defences,	  and	  the	  Lockean	  Concept	  of	  Toleration’	  (2010)	  15	  Canadian	  Lab	  &	  Emp	  LJ	  435.	  127	  [2008]	  63	  CHRR	  12	  (Ontario	  Human	  Rights	  Commission);	  Ontario	  Human	  Rights	  
Commission	  v	  Christian	  Horizons	  2010	  ONSC	  2105	  (Divisional	  Court).	  128	  S.	  24(1)(a)	  Ontario	  Human	  Rights	  Code.	  129	  Supra	  n.	  130	  at	  para	  67.	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On	   a	   Charter	   or	   proportionality	   analysis	   this	   though	   seems	   correct:	  whether	   the	  service	  is	  provided	  to	  co-­‐religionists	  or	  the	  public	  should	  be	  a	  relevant	  factor,	  but	  is	  not	   necessarily	   decisive.	   Otherwise	   a	   religious	   organisation	   that	   provides	   some	  services	   to	   the	   public	   could	   not	   choose	   even	   the	   head	   of	   the	   organisation	   on	  religious	  grounds,	  even	  if	  the	  organisation	  was	  entirely	  privately	  funded.130	  	  
However,	   the	   court	   held	   that	   the	   discrimination	   was	   not	   a	   BFOR.	   It	   argued	   that	  Christian	   Horizons	   had	   not	   considered	   whether	   the	   particular	   employment	  required	   such	   discrimination.	   It	   held	   that	   the	   requirement	   ‘must	   not	   just	   flow	  automatically	  from	  the	  religious	  ethos	  of	  Christian	  Horizons…	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  anyone…	  ever	  considered	  whether	   the	  prohibition	  on	  same	  sex	  relationships	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  effective	  performance	  of	  the	  job	  of	  support	  worker	  in	  a	  home	  where	   there	   is	   no	   proselytizing	   and	   where	   residents	   are	   not	   required	   to	   be	  Evangelical	  Christians.’131	  	  
This	  point	  is	  important.	  It	  is	  the	  converse	  of	  what	  is	  required	  by	  secular	  employers	  for	   their	   religious	  staff:	   given	   the	   importance	  of	   the	   right	  not	   to	  be	  discriminated	  against,	  it	  must	  be	  asked	  whether	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  accommodate	  the	  other.	  It	  could	  though	  be	  doubted	  whether	   the	   failure	   to	   consider	   this	   issue	  was	   as	  drastic	   as	   it	  seemed	   to	   the	   Court.	   There	   had	   been	   some	   consideration	   since	   the	   Lifestyle	   and	  Morality	   policy	   arose	   out	   of	   consultation	   with	   the	   organisation’s	   employees.	   As	  Esau	  argues,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  in	  principle	  why	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  policy	  originated	  from	   employees	   rather	   than	   the	   leadership	   should	   necessarily	   matter. 132	  Nevertheless,	  without	  an	  examination	  of	  whether	  there	  should	  have	  been	  different	  policies	   for	   certain	   positions,	   the	   important	   requirement	   of	   fact-­‐specific	  consideration	  has	  not	  been	   fulfilled.	   Inevitably	   though,	  a	   focus	  on	  particular	  roles	  within	  an	  organisation	  places	  pressure	  on	  Christian	  Horizons	  and	  similar	  bodies	  to	  secularise	   themselves.	   It	   makes	   it	   very	   difficult	   to	   create	   a	   large	   outward	   facing	  body	  which	  is	  pervasively	  religious.	  However,	  this	  may	  have	  to	  be	  the	  price	  that	  is	  paid	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  sufficient	  protection	  for	  non-­‐discrimination	  rights.	  	  
Permitting	   Christian	   Horizons	   to	   discriminate	   against	   Heintz	   would	   have	   had	  severe	   practical	   effects	   for	   gay	   people	   seeking	   employment	   in	   this	   field.	   It	  ‘operate[d]	  over	  180	  residential	  homes	  across	  Ontario,	  ha[d]	  over	  2500	  employees	  and	   provide[d]	   care	   and	   support	   to	   approximately	   1400	   individuals	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Esau	  supra	  n.113.	  131	  Supra	  n.130	  at	  para	  90.	  132	  Esau	  supra	  n.113.	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developmental	  disabilities’	   and	  was	   the	   largest	  provider	  of	   residential	   services	   in	  the	   province. 133 	  In	   providing	   this	   care	   and	   support,	   it	   was	   funded	   almost	  exclusively	   by	   the	   Ontario	   Ministry	   of	   Community	   and	   Social	   Services.134	  It	   was	  therefore	   conceivably	   ‘quasi-­‐governmental	   in	   nature’. 135 	  The	   interest	   in	   non-­‐discrimination	  is	  thus	  very	  great.	  	  
Christian	  Horizons’	  religious	  interests	  are	  also	  fairly	  weak.	  It	  originally	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  desire	  of	  Evangelical	  parents	  to	  provide	   family-­‐type,	  Christian	  settings	   for	  the	  provision	  of	   care	   to	  disabled	   adults	   and	   children.	  However,	   by	   the	   time	   this	   case	  arose,	  it	  had	  expanded	  to	  provide	  care	  regardless	  of	  religious	  background,	  and	  the	  religious	   element	   of	   care	   was	   diluted,	   although	   evidently	   still	   present.	   In	   these	  circumstances,	   the	   interest	   in	  having	  all	   employees	  abide	  by	   strict	   religious	   rules	  was	   fairly	   small.	   Given	   this,	   the	   result	   was	   correct.	   Certainly,	   this	   case	  demonstrates	  the	  ‘ambiguous	  embrace’136	  of	  government	  funding.	  	  
Even	   if	   it	   had	  been	  proportionate	   for	   Christian	  Horizons	   to	   dismiss	  Heintz,	   there	  was	  also	  a	  major	  failing	  in	  the	  requirement	  of	  mutual	  respect	   in	  the	  way	  this	  was	  carried	  out.	  After	  her	  relationship	  became	  known,	  she	  continued	  to	  work	  there	  for	  five	  months.	  This	  was	  a	  ‘disaster’.137	  Her	  performance	  reviews,	  previously	  positive,	  became	  very	  critical.	  A	  colleague	  made	  allegations	  of	  abuse	  against	  her,	  which	  were	  investigated	   without	   consideration	   of	   whether	   they	   were	   motivated	   by	  homophobia.	  This	  was	  unacceptable.	  Even	  if	  an	  organisation	  has	  a	  right	  to	  dismiss	  an	  employee,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  unlimited	  discretion	  in	  the	  way	  this	  is	  carried	  out.138	  	  
Secular	  Function	  Employees	  	  In	   situations	  where	   staff	   do	   not	   have	   any	   religious	   functions	   at	   all,	   the	   religious	  interest	   is	   very	   small	   and	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   right	   correspondingly	   great.	   In	  Bagni’s	  schema,	  discussed	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  chapter,	   the	  work	  comes	  under	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Although,	  as	  Esau	  points	  out,	  this	  only	  constituted	  2%	  of	  people	  with	  developmental	  disabilities	  who	  were	  supported	  through	  government	  funding.	  	  134	  Supra	  n.130	  at	  para	  2.	  135	  B.	  MacDougall	  and	  D.	  Short,	  ‘Religion-­‐based	  Claims	  for	  Impinging	  on	  Queer	  Citizenship’	  (2010)	  Dalhousie	  LJ	  133,	  141.	  136	  C.	  Glenn,	  The	  Ambiguous	  Embrace:	  Government	  and	  Faith	  Based	  Schools	  and	  Social	  
Agencies	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  137	  Esau	  supra	  n.113	  at	  394.	  138	  C.f.	  Logan	  v	  Salvation	  Army	  10	  Misc	  3d	  756	  (N.Y.,	  2005)	  ‘Those	  limited	  exemptions	  for	  religious	  organizations	  are	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  letting	  them	  harass	  their	  employees	  and	  treat	  the	  employees	  in	  an	  odiously	  discriminatory	  manner	  during	  their	  employment,	  and	  to	  use	  derogatory	  expressions	  toward	  the	  employees’.	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his	  third	  category	  as	  it	  is	  ‘far	  removed	  from	  the	  spiritual	  epicenter	  of	  the	  church’.139	  Whilst	  Canada	  and	  Britain	  do	  not	  permit	  discrimination	  in	  this	  context,	  in	  the	  US	  it	  is	   constitutional	   to	   exclude	   all	   employees	   of	   religious	   organisations	   from	  discrimination	   laws	   and	   some,	   unusual,	   cases	   require	   such	   discrimination	   to	   be	  permitted.	   In	   Corporation	   of	   Presiding	   Bishop	   v	   Amos,140	  a	   building	   engineer	   was	  dismissed	  from	  his	  employment	  at	  a	  Mormon	  owned	  non-­‐profit	  gym	  that	  was	  open	  to	   the	   public	   because	   he	   failed	   to	   keep	   his	   Temple	   Recommend,	   a	   document	  showing	   that	   he	   complied	   with	   the	   tenets	   of	   the	   Mormon	   faith.	   As	   has	   been	  explained,	   Title	   VII	   simply	   excluded	   religious	   organisations	   from	   its	   remit	   for	  religious	   discrimination.	   Amos	   sued	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   law	   infringed	   the	  Establishment	   Clause	   as	   it	   provided	   an	   unconstitutional	   benefit	   to	   religion.	   The	  Supreme	   Court	   held	   that	   it	   did	   not	   and	   permitting	   such	   discrimination	   was	  constitutional.	  	  	  This	   leaves	   open	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   state	   or	   federal	   governments	   may	  legislate	  to	  prevent	  such	  discrimination.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  constitutional	  rights	  of	  religious	   organisations	   to	   discriminate	   have	   been	   held	   to	   extend	   far	   beyond	   the	  core	   of	   religious	   employment.	   It	   has	   been	  held	   constitutionally	   required	   to	   allow	  discrimination	   for	   religiously	  based	  reasons	  when	  a	   lesbian	  sports	   journalist	  was	  dismissed	   from	   a	   church	   newspaper	   in	   Madsen	   v	   Erwin.141	  The	   Court	   held	   that	  ‘requiring	  the	  defendants	   to	  pay	  damages	  to	  maintain	   their	  religious	  belief	  would	  constitute	   a	   substantial	   burden	   on	   the	   defendants’	   rights’	   and	   any	   assessment	  would	   involve	   the	   court	   in	   a	   review	  of	   ‘an	   essentially	   ecclesiastical	  procedure’.142	  However,	  in	  a	  similar	  case	  there	  was	  held	  to	  be	  no	  First	  Amendment	  defence	  where	  a	   married	   female	   editorial	   secretary	   for	   a	   religious	   magazine	   did	   not	   receive	  allowances	  paid	  to	  married	  male	  employees.143	  	  Some	  have	  defended	  the	  decision	  in	  Amos.	  Gedicks	  argued	  that:	  	   ‘Forcing	   the	  Mormon	  church	   to	   retain	  an	  unfaithful	  employee	  and	   to	  pay	  his	  salary	  with	  tithing	  funds	  would	  have	  undermined	  the	  sacrifice	  narrative	  that	  is	  so	  prominent	  both	   in	  Mormon	  history	  and	   in	  contemporary	  Mormon	   life…	   it	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  dilute	  and	  perhaps	  even	  to	  abandon	  the	  powerful	  concept	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Supra	  n.2.	  140	  483	  US	  327	  (1987).	  141	  481	  N.E.	  2d	  1160	  (1985).	  142	  Ibid.	  at	  1166.	  143	  676	  F.2d	  1272	  (9th	  Cir.,	  1982).	  See	  also	  Whitney	  v	  Greater	  New	  York	  Corp.	  of	  Seventh-­‐Day	  
Adventists	  401	  F.	  Supp	  1363	  (N.Y.	  1975).	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that	   tithing	   is	   the	   sacred	   means	   by	   which	   Mormons	   build	   the	   Kingdom	   of	  God.’144	  	  However,	  merely	  because	  there	  is	  some	  impact	  on	  a	  religious	  belief	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  religious	  institution	  should	  necessarily	  be	  permitted	  to	  discriminate.	  Where	  there	   is	   no	   religious	   aspect	   to	   the	   employment	   at	   all,	   being	   forbidden	   to	  discriminate	   interferes	   very	   lightly	   with	   a	   religion’s	   interest	   in	   propagating	   and	  maintaining	  its	  faith,	  even	  if	  there	  are	  religious	  motivations	  for	  the	  discrimination.	  The	  interest	  in	  religious	  autonomy	  and	  deference	  to	  religious	  organisations	  seen	  in	  
Madsen	   also	  does	  not	   sit	  well	  with	  other	   cases.	  Only	   in	  a	  very	   loose	  way	  was	   the	  employer	  required	  to	  ‘pay	  damages	  to	  maintain	  their	  religious	  beliefs’.	  They	  could	  certainly	   ‘maintain	   their	   religious	   beliefs’	   but	   they	   could	   not	   require	   that	   this	  employee	   abide	   by	   them.	   Secondly,	   the	   fears	   of	   entanglement	   with	   religious	  matters	  are	  overstated.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  have	  to	  decide	  a	  religious	  issue.	  	  	  Permitting	  such	  discrimination	  could	  amount	  to	  severe	  pressure	  on	  employees	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  religion	  out	  of	  economic	  necessity.145	  Furthermore,	  as	  has	  often	  been	  stated,	   the	   interest	   is	   not	   simply	   an	   individual	   one.	   Society	   generally	   also	   has	   a	  strong	   interest	   in	   non-­‐discrimination,	   to	   avoid	   patterns	   of	   inequality	   and	   ensure	  that	  opportunities	  are	  available	  for	  all.	  Thus	  such	  an	  exemption	  is	  disproportionate.	  	  
Islands	  of	  Exclusivity?	  	  The	   analysis	   has	   so	   far	   assumed	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	  importance	   of	   various	   positions	   and	   that	   it	   is	   always	   far	   more	   important	   to	   a	  religion	   to	   have,	   for	   example,	   the	   leader	   of	   an	   organisation	   abide	   by	   religious	  precepts	  than	  a	  secretary.	  It	  is	  possible	  though	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  this	  assumption	  cannot	  be	  made.	  Some	  organisations	  are	  so	  pervasively	  religious	  that	  the	  only	  way	  of	   protecting	   their	   religious	   rights	   is	   for	   them	   to	   be	   able	   to	   create	   an	   ‘island	   of	  exclusivity’.146	  To	  require	  them	  to	  prove	  the	  religiousness	  of	  each	  job	  may	  radically	  alter	   and	   misunderstand	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   religious	   organisation.	   This	   is	   not	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Gedicks	  supra	  n.8	  at	  114.	  Although	  see	  supra	  n.	  25	  for	  his	  later,	  very	  different,	  views	  on	  this	  topic.	  145	  N.	  Rosenblum,	  ‘Amos:	  Religious	  Autonomy	  and	  the	  Moral	  Uses	  of	  Pluralism’	  in	  N.	  Rosenblum	  (ed.),	  Obligations	  of	  Citizenship	  and	  Demands	  of	  Faith:	  Religious	  Accommodation	  
in	  Pluralist	  Democracies	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  146	  A.	  Esau,	  ‘Islands	  of	  Exclusivity:	  Religious	  Organizations	  and	  Employment	  Discrimination’	  (1993)	  33	  UBC	  Law	  Rev	  719.	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argument	  that	  a	  proportionality	  or	  BFOR	  approach	  is	  wrong	  in	  these	  cases	  but	  that	  an	  ‘occupational	  requirement’	  should	  not	  always	  be	  interpreted	  narrowly.	  	  One	   such	   case	   is	   Schroen	   v	   Steinbach	   Bible	   College.147	  The	   College	   was	   a	   small	  Mennonite	  college	  offering	  degrees	  in	  Mennonite	  scholarship	  and	  pastoral	  training	  to	   about	   75	   students.	   It	   described	   itself	   as	   ‘an	   evangelical	   Anabaptist	   college	  equipping	   servant	   leaders	   for	   Church	  ministries’.	   Schroen	   was	   given	   the	   post	   of	  accounting	  clerk	  on	  the	  understanding	  she	  was	  a	  Mennonite.	   In	  fact	  she	  had	  been	  brought	  up	  Mennonite,	  but	  subsequently	  converted	  to	  Mormonism.	  When	  this	  was	  discovered	  she	  was	  dismissed.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  is	  quite	  radical	  and	  indeed	   Mennonites	   view	   Mormonism	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   ‘false	   cult’.148	  The	   Manitoba	  Human	   Rights	   Commission	   eventually149	  held	   that	   hiring	   a	   co-­‐religionist	   was	   a	  BFOR.	  	  	  Esau	  argues	  that,	  ‘to	  force	  an	  exclusivist	  communitarian	  religious	  organization,	  like	  that	   of	   Steinbach	   Bible	   College,	   to	   accept	   people	   of	   incompatible	   faiths	   into	   the	  community	   is	   a	   direct	   assault	   on	   the	   religion	  of	   the	   employer	   at	   its	   very	   core’.150	  There	  were	  religious	  aspects	   to	  her	   job.	  All	   staff	  were	  expected	   to	  be	  available	   to	  students	   and	   each	   other	   for	   religious	   discussions	   and	   prayer.	   However,	   the	  important	  point	  is	  not	  just	  that	  she	  had	  to	  perform	  religious	  duties,	  but	  that	  every	  element	  of	  her	  work	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  infused	  with	  Mennonite	  beliefs.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  unusual	  case,	  and	  it	  reached	  the	  right	  decision.	  Employment	  here	  is	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  membership	   of	   a	   religion.	   The	   organisation	  was	   small	   and	   privately	   funded	  and	  had	  the	  purpose	  of	  training	  future	  religious	  ministers	  in	  an	  exclusivist	  religion.	  The	   state	   interest	   in	   preventing	   discrimination	  was	   therefore	   very	   small	   and	   the	  interest	  in	  religious	  freedom	  great.	  
So	   far	  of	   course	   this	  discussion	  merely	  demonstrates	   that	   it	  may	  be	  a	  BFOR	   for	  a	  person	   to	   be	   of	   a	   particular	   religion.	   But	  what	   if	   she	  was	   gay	   and	   a	  Mennonite?	  Steinbach	   College	   listed	   ‘homosexual	   relationships’	   among	  many	   other	   things,	   as	  prohibited	   for	   its	   staff.	   However,	   a	   gay	   Mennonite	   could	   still	   perform	   religious	  tasks,	  lead	  prayer	  meetings	  and	  so	  on	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  a	  Mormon	  could	  not.	  This	  though	   takes	   an	   instrumental	   rather	   than	   organic	   view	   of	   employment	   which	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  [1999]	  35	  CHRR	  D/1	  (Man.	  Bd.	  Adj.).	  148	  Esau	  supra	  n.	  149	  at	  720.	  149	  It	  took	  more	  than	  5	  years	  for	  the	  investigation	  to	  be	  concluded.	  150	  Esau	  supra	  n.	  149	  at	  733.	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inappropriate	   for	   such	   an	   organisation.151	  The	   College	   did	   not	   want	   to	   create	   an	  organisation	   where	   its	   employees	   only	   paid	   lip	   service	   to	   religious	   rules,	   but	   a	  community	   of,	   and	   adhering	   to,	   a	   particular,	   and	   strict,	   faith.	   Perhaps	   the	   best	  question	  to	  ask	   is	  whether,	   to	  the	  College,	   its	   ‘exclusivist	  communitarian	  religious	  organization’	   with	   its	   ‘close,	   tight,	   focused	   and	   interactive	   culture’,152	  would	   be	  jeopardized	   by	   the	   forced	   inclusion	   of	   someone	   who	   they	   did	   not	   consider	   a	  compliant	  member	  of	  their	  religion.153	  	  	  Esau	   criticises	   the	   BFOR	   test	   because	   of	   its	   intrusiveness	   and	   contextual	   nature,	  which	   he	   argues	   does	   not	   adequately	   protect	   religious	   institutions.	   That	   a	  proportionality	   test	   is	   intrusive	   cannot	   be	   denied.	   It	   requires	   organisations	   to	  defend	   their	   policies	   and	   is	   likely	   to	   require	   detailed	   evidence.	   However,	   not	   to	  assess	  the	  situation	  in	  some	  detail	  does	  not	  treat	  the	  right	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  as	  itself	  an	  important	  right.	  The	  employee	  of	  a	  religious	  organisation	  has	  a	  right,	  just	  as	   religionists	   have	   in	   secular	   employment,	   to	   an	   individualised	   assessment	   of	  whether	  her	  right	  has	  been	  violated.	  Neither	  right	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  merely	  an	  exception	  to	  each	  other	  but	  as	  rights	  that	  are	  a	  priori	  equal.	  Therefore	  providing	  a	  wider	  exception	  than	  a	  BFOR	  is	  unnecessary.	  
Conclusion	  	  There	   are	   several	   approaches	   in	   evidence	   in	   this	   area	   of	   law.	   Both	   Canada	   and	  Britain	  have	   incorporated	   the	  requirement	  of	  proportionality	   into	  assessments	  of	  discrimination	  in	  religious	  organisations	  and	  Canada	  has	  also	  done	  so	  in	  relation	  to	  religious	  schools.	   In	  other	  cases	   though,	   categorical	   tests	  are	  used	  which	  give	   too	  much	   discretion	   to	   religious	   authorities.	   This	   is	   particularly	   evident	   in	   the	  American	   doctrine	   of	   the	   ministerial	   exception.	   This	   is	   understandable	   within	   a	  system	  that	  has	  as	  a	  constitutional	  priority	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state,	  but	  it	  means	   that	   the	  value	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	   is	  understated,	  or	   even	  discounted.	  There	   is	  a	  valid	   fear	  of	  becoming	  embroiled	   in	   religious	  disputes,	  but	  a	  narrower	  approach	  would	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  this.	  	  	  Rivers	  argues	  that	  the	  British	  law	  is	  characterised	  by	  ‘narrowly	  drafted	  exceptions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  Ibid.	  at	  720.	  152	  Schroen	  supra	  n.150	  at	  para	  61.	  153	  Gedicks	  supra	  n.8.	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narrowly	  interpreted	  by	  an	  unsympathetic	  judiciary’.154	  However,	  a	  proportionality	  approach,	   on	   which	   the	   British	   approach	   is	   generally	   based,	   does	   give	   religious	  organisations	  the	  autonomy	  needed	  to	  live	  out	  their	  religious	  mission.	  Compared	  to	  a	   categorical	   approach,	   ‘this	   nuanced	   approach	   may	   ultimately	   prove	   better	  equipped	   to	   navigate	   the	   complexities	   of	   a	   world	   in	   which	   both	   religious	   and	  equality	   rights	   are	   taken	   seriously	   and	  given	   their	  due.’155	  However,	   although	   the	  BFOR	   approach	   is	   a	   good	   way	   to	   address	   the	   proportionality	   enquiry	   in	   this	  context,	   care	   must	   be	   taken	   that	   not	   too	   much	   is	   demanded	   from	   religious	  organisations.	  Intangible	  concerns,	  such	  as	  maintaining	  a	  religious	  ethos,	  may	  be	  as	  relevant	  and	  as	  worthy	  of	  protection	  as	  tangible	  ones	  such	  as	  the	  specific	  religious	  role	  performed	  by	  an	  employee.	  	  
Throughout	   this	   chapter	   it	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   proportionality	   can	  sufficiently	  recognise	  and	  protect	  collective	  religious	  freedom,	  as	   it	  can	  individual	  religious	  freedom,	  whilst	  also	  protecting	  non-­‐discrimination	  rights.	  Proportionality	  identifies	   relevant	   differences	   between	   situations,	   allowing	   differences	   between	  roles	  even	  with	  the	  same	  job	  titles	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  rather	  than	  imposing	  a	  one	   size	   fits	   all	   approach.	   It	   is	   also	   more	   coherent	   and	   intuitively	   easier	   to	  understand	  and	   to	   apply	   than	  many	  of	   the	  other	   tests	   and	   categorisation	  used	   in	  this	  area	  of	  law.	  So	  far	  therefore	  it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  proportionality	  is	  a	  useful	   concept	   in	  considering	  employment	  claims.	  The	  next	  chapter	  develops	   this	  approach	  outside	  the	  employment	  context.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  J.	  Rivers,	  ‘Law,	  Religion	  and	  Gender	  Equality’	  (2007)	  9	  Ecc	  LJ	  24,	  52.	  155	  C.	  Evans	  and	  A.	  Hood,	  ‘Religious	  Autonomy	  and	  Labour	  Law:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  the	  Jurisprudence	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  (2012)	  1	  Ox	  J	  
Law	  &	  Religion	  81,	  107.	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Chapter	  6:	  Religious	  Organisations	  and	  Services	  	  The	   previous	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   it	   may	   be	   proportionate	   to	   allow	  religious	  organisations	  to	  maintain	  their	  distinctive	  nature	  and	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  doctrines	   of	   their	   religion	   when	   hiring	   their	   staff,	   even	   if	   it	   results	   in	  discrimination.	  Religious	  organisations	  may	  also	  wish	  to	  place	  restrictions	  on	  who	  they	  provide	  services	  to	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  Some	  organisations	  may	  provide	  some	  services	  only	  to	  members	  of	  their	  religion.	  This	  may	  be	  because	  the	  service	  is	  either	  seen	  as	  a	  benefit	  of	  membership	  or	  because	   it	   involves	  a	  religious	  practice	  and	   is	   thus	   only	   for	   those	   who	   abide	   by	   its	   religious	   tenets.	   Given	   potentially	  discriminatory	   rules	   of	   membership,	   this	   may	   constitute	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination.	  Religious	  organisations	  may	  also	  provide	  extensive	  services	  to	  the	  general	   public,	   some	   of	  which	  may	   receive	   state	   funding,	   but	  may	   claim	   that	   for	  reasons	  of	  conscience	  they	  cannot	  serve,	  for	  example,	  gay	  people	  in	  some	  contexts.	  Religious	   organisations	  may	   also	   claim	   some	   control	   over	   the	   use	   to	  which	   their	  property	   is	   put.	   As	   can	   be	   seen,	   the	   number	   and	   range	   of	   circumstances	   where	  conflicts	  can	  arise	  is	  large	  and	  diverse.	  It	  will	  be	  argued	  that,	  as	  in	  the	  employment	  context,	  proportionality	  is	  a	  valuable	  method	  of	  resolving	  these	  varied	  conflicts.	  
Religious	  Activities	  	  The	   religious	   interest	   is	   at	   its	   strongest	  where	   there	   is	   a	   claim	   for	   inclusion	   into	  core	  religious	  activities	  such	  as	  religious	  worship.	  This	  will	  normally	  be	  a	  claim	  to	  be	   included	   in	   an	   organisation’s	   membership.	   As	   was	   described	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter,	  associations	  are	  valuable,	  in	  part	  because	  they	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  comfort	  and	   meaning	   for	   members.	   To	   tell	   a	   religious	   group	   who	   they	   must	   accept	   as	  members	  violates	  the	  core	  of	  its	  religious	  freedom.	  As	  White	  puts	  it,	  ‘individuals	  are	  hardly	  free	  to	  associate	  in	  pursuit	  of	  some	  shared	  set	  of	  beliefs	  about	  the	  good	  life	  and/or	   good	   society	   unless	   they	   are	   also	   free	   to	   exclude	   from	   this	   specific	  association	  those	  who	  do	  not	  share	  their	  distinctive	  beliefs’.1	  They	  must	  be	  allowed	  to	  protect	   themselves	   against	   those	  who	  would	   ‘corrupt	   or	  undermine	  pursuit	   of	  these	   purposes.’ 2 	  There	   is	   also	   limited	   state	   interest	   in	   preventing	   such	  discrimination.	   Whereas	   with	   employment	   in	   religious	   organisations,	   where	   a	  person	   may	   take	   employment	   for	   non-­‐religious	   reasons,	   such	   as	   economic	  pressure,	   there	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   freer	   choice	   in	   joining	   and	   leaving	   such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  S.	  White,	  ‘Freedom	  of	  Association	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Exclude	  (1997)	  4	  J	  Pol	  Phil	  373,	  377.	  2	  Ibid.	  at	  380.	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organisations	  as	  a	  member,	  and	  therefore	  this	  protects	  rights	  to	  a	  greater	  extent.	  	  	  
This	   analysis	   does	   not	   presuppose	   a	   monolithic	   view	   of	   religious	   belief.	   It	   is	  extremely	   unlikely	   that	   within	   all	   but	   the	   most	   tightly	   controlled	   organisations	  there	  will	   be	   no	   dissent	   on	   doctrinal	   or	   organisational	  matters.	   The	   relationship	  between	   religious	   doctrine	   and	   members’	   beliefs	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   complex	   one.	  However,	   it	   should	   still	   be	   within	   the	   religious	   organisation’s	   power	   to	   decide	  ultimately	  who	   can	   be	   a	  member	   and	   on	  what	   terms,	   even	   though	   this	  may	  well	  cause	  harm.	  
In	  fact,	  none	  of	  the	  jurisdictions	  under	  discussion	  here	  would	  consider	  claims	  over	  membership	  or	  taking	  part	   in	  religious	  worship.3	  Evidently,	  all	  discrimination	   law	  is	   limited	   in	   scope:	   thus	   for	   example	   it	   is	   not	   prohibited	   to	   discriminate	   on	   any	  basis	   in	   forming	   personal	   relationships.	   In	   the	   three	   jurisdictions,	   there	   are	  variations	   as	   to	   whether	   and	   when	   membership	   organisations	   are	   permitted	   to	  discriminate,	   but	   all	   accept	   that	   permitting	   discrimination	   on	   any	   ground	   is	  sometimes	  appropriate.	  Thus,	  under	   federal	  US	   law	  only	   ‘public	  accommodations’	  are	   covered.	   Most	   states	   have	   exclusions	   for	   private	   clubs	   and	   there	   would	  undoubtedly	   be	   constitutional	   problems	   if	   there	   were	   an	   attempt	   to	   apply	   anti-­‐discrimination	   laws	   to,	   for	   example,	   attendance	   at	   a	   religious	   service.4	  Under	  British	   law	   there	   is	   an	   explicit	   exception	   for	   religious	   organisations	   where	   the	  discrimination	   relates	   to	   ‘membership	   of	   the	   organisation’,	   and	   it	   does	   not	   cover	  religious	   worship	   at	   all.5	  One	   rare	   challenge	   to	   this	   was	   Parry	   v	   Vine	   Christian	  
Centre,6	  where	  a	  transgender	  woman	  unsuccessfully	  claimed	  she	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	   attend	   the	   women’s	   prayer	   meeting.	   In	   Canada,	   discrimination	   laws	   vary	   by	  province,	   but	   all	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   Canadian	   Human	   Rights	   Act	   which	   forbids	  discrimination	   in	   an	   ‘accommodation,	   service	   or	   facility	   customarily	   available	   to	  the	   public’.7	  It	   is	   unlikely	   that	   access	   to	   religious	   worship	   would	   be	   included.	   A	  religious	  organisation	  may	  open	  its	  doors	  to	  all	  who	  are	   interested	  in	  hearing	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Although	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  held	  in	  Southgate	  v	  United	  
African	  Movement	  1997	  WL	  1051933	  (N.Y.C.	  Com.	  Hum.	  Rts.,	  June	  30	  1997)	  that	  a	  black	  separatist	  movement	  unlawfully	  discriminated	  when	  it	  refused	  to	  permit	  a	  white	  journalist	  to	  attend	  a	  publically	  advertised	  speech.	  However,	  even	  if	  the	  decision	  was	  correct	  at	  the	  time,	  it	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  survive	  Boy	  Scouts	  v	  Dale	  530	  US	  640	  (2000).	  	  4	  K.	  Francart,	  ‘No	  Dogs	  Allowed:	  Freedom	  of	  Association	  v	  Forced	  Inclusion.	  Anti-­‐Discrimination	  Statutes	  and	  the	  Applicability	  to	  Private	  Organizations’	  (2000)	  17	  TM	  Cooley	  
L	  Rev	  273.	  5	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  Sch	  23	  Para	  2.	  6	  Bridgend	  County	  Court,	  BG	  101748,	  15	  February	  2002,	  referred	  to	  in	  R.	  Ahdar	  and	  I.	  Leigh	  
Religious	  Freedom	  in	  the	  Liberal	  State,	  2nd	  ed,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  7	  Canadian	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  R.S.C.,	  1985,	  c.H-­‐6	  	  s.14.	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religious	  message	   and	  becoming	  members,	   but	   that	   does	   not	   necessarily	   thereby	  make	   it	   ‘public’.	   In	   any	   case	   there	   is	   also	   an	  exception	   if	   there	   is	   a	  bona	   fide	   and	  reasonable	  justification	  for	  the	  discrimination.	  	  	  Situations	  that	  do	  not	  fall	   into	  the	  archetype	  of	  religious	  worship	  at	  specific	  times	  at	  a	  place	  specifically	  dedicated	  to	  this	  purpose	  may	  though	  cause	  greater	  difficulty.	  Two	  cases	  have	  been	  brought	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  Nation	  of	   Islam’s	  policy	  of	  having	  sex-­‐segregated	   religious	   services.	   This	   policy	   extended	   to	   lectures	   given	   by	   its	  leader,	  Louis	  Farrakhan,	  and	  which	  were	  open	   to	  members	  and	  non-­‐members.	   In	  the	   first,	   Donaldson	   v	   Farrakhan8,	   a	   woman	   sued	   after	   she	   was	   prevented	   from	  attending	  a	  meeting.	  In	  the	  second,	  City	  of	  Cleveland	  v	  Nation	  of	  Islam9	  the	  Nation	  of	  Islam	   challenged	   a	   refusal	   to	   allow	   it	   hire	   a	   convention	   centre	   because	   of	   its	  discriminatory	   policies.	   In	   both	   cases,	   it	   was	   held	   that	   the	   municipally	   owned	  theatres	   hired	   by	   the	   organisation	  were	   not	   places	   of	   ‘public	   accommodation’	   in	  this	   context	   and	   that	   even	   if	   they	  were,	   enforcing	   the	   law	   in	   this	   situation	  would	  have	  violated	  the	  First	  Amendment.	  	  
Rosenblum	  disagrees	  with	   this	   reasoning.10	  She	  argues	   that	  permitting	  women	   to	  attend	   would	   have	   had	   only	   a	   minimal	   impact	   on	   the	   organisation’s	   message,	  particularly	  given	  that	  the	  purpose	  was	  to	  reach	  a	  broad	  audience.	  She	  is	  correct	  in	  saying	   this	   left	   alternatives	   open	   to	   Farrakhan,	   in	   that	   he	   could	   have	   decided	   to	  only	   invite	   selected	  men	  or	   to	  hold	   the	   event	   in	   an	   alternative	   venue.11	  However,	  these	   alternatives	  would	   have	   greatly	   affected	   the	   ability	   to	   spread	   the	   religious	  message	   to	   non-­‐members.	   Rosenblum’s	   more	   general	   argument	   is	   also	  problematic.	   In	   pointing	   out	   that	   ‘the	   government	   would	   be	   just	   as	   concerned	  about	   discriminatory	   admission	   to	   a	   basketball	   game	   or	   bake	   sale’	   and	   thus	   the	  restriction	   is	   content	  neutral,	   she	  does	  not	   thereby	  make	  her	   case	   that	   ‘universal	  application	  of	   the	  public	  accommodations	   law	   is	  preferable	   to	  a	   scheme	   in	  which	  municipal	   or	   state	   authorities,	   or	   courts,	   assess	   the	   constitutional	   rights	   of	   each	  applicant	   in	   an	   ad	   hoc	   manner.’12	  Of	   course	   the	   authorities	   would	   be	   concerned	  about	   such	   discriminatory	   admission,	   but	   that	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   the	   situations	  are	   analogous.	   The	   opposing	   interest	   to	   non-­‐discrimination	   when	   the	   issue	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  436	  Mass.	  94	  (2002).	  9	  922	  F.Supp.	  56	  (1995).	  10	  L.	  Rosenblum,	  ‘Equal	  Access	  or	  Free	  Speech:	  The	  Constitutionality	  of	  Public	  Accommodations	  Law’	  (1997)	  72	  NYU	  L	  Rev	  1243.	  11	  Although	  many	  other	  venues	  would,	  on	  her	  argument,	  still	  be	  public	  accommodations.	  	  12	  Supra	  n.	  11	  at	  1280.	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admission	   to	   a	   basketball	   game	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  minimal	   at	   best,	   but	  much	   greater	  where	   the	   issue	   is	   access	   to	   a	   core	   religious	   activity.	   It	   is	   precisely	   because	   the	  opposing	  interest	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  is	  likely	  to	  vary	  that	  a	  fact-­‐specific	  analysis	  is	  necessary.	  It	  is	  principled	  to	  hold	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  it	  might	  be	  proportionate	  to	  permit	  such	  discrimination	  depending	  on	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  conflicting	  right.	  
In	  the	  present	  circumstances	  permitting	  such	  discrimination	  was	  proportionate.	  In	  
Donaldson	   the	   state,	   by	   allowing	   such	   discrimination,	   had	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   of	  protecting	  the	  Nation	  of	  Islam’s	  right	  of	  freedom	  of	  religion	  by	  allowing	  it	  to	  choose	  who	  attended	  its	  religious	  events.	  In	  City	  of	  Cleveland,	  the	  state	  had	  a	  legitimate	  aim	  in	  protecting	   the	   rights	  of	  others	   in	  preventing	  discrimination	   taking	  place	  on	   its	  property.	  In	  both	  cases	  such	  legitimate	  aims	  had	  a	  rational	  connection	  to	  the	  action	  taken.	   There	   was	   also	   no	   less	   restrictive	   means	   that	   could	   have	   been	   taken	   to	  protect	   either	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   in	  Donaldson	  or	   the	   right	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   in	   City	   of	   Cleveland	   to	   the	   same	   extent.	   The	   question	   thus	   came	  down	  to	  the	  final	  balancing	  stage.	  	  	  Of	   importance	  here	   is	  that	  the	  Nation	  of	   Islam	  believes	   in	  different	  religious	  roles	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  The	  message	   to	  be	  given	  therefore	  differed	  according	   to	   the	  audience.	  While	   it	   was	   not	   an	   act	   of	   worship	   in	   its	   strictest	   sense,	   although	   the	  lecture	  was	   to	   take	  place	   at	   a	   time	   traditionally	   used	   for	  men’s	  worship,	   it	   had	   a	  religious	   purpose.	   Merely	   because	   it	   sought	   to	   reach	   a	   wider	   audience	   than	   its	  current	  membership	  does	  not	  necessarily	  negate	   its	  rights	   to	  control	  access	  to	   its	  religious	   events.	   A	   proportionality	   test	   is	   therefore	   protective	   of	   core	   religious	  rights.	  Even	  though	  there	  may	  undoubtedly	  be	  understandable	  anger	  and	  distress	  caused	  by	  a	  discriminatory	  policy,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  will	  be	  permissible	  to	  ‘disturb	  the	  intimacy’13	  of	  a	  religious	  organisation	  and	  require	  it	  to	  change	  its	  rules	  on	  membership	  and	  access	  to	  religious	  activities.	  	  	  One	  context	  though	  where	  the	  ability	  to	  exclude	  certain	  groups	  from	  membership	  of	  a	   religious	  organisation	   is	   far	   less	   clear	   is	   that	  of	  university	   religious	  societies.	  Many	   universities	   have	   policies	   prohibiting	   religious,	   sex	   and	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	   for	   membership	   and	   leadership	   positions	   in	   university-­‐affiliated	  societies.	   This	   may	   cause	   problems	   for	   some	   religious	   groups.	   In	   the	   UK,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  I.	  Lupu,	  ‘Free	  Exercise	  Exemption	  and	  Religious	  Institutions:	  The	  Case	  of	  Employment	  Discrimination’	  (1987)	  67	  BU	  L	  Rev	  391.	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controversy	   has	   arisen	   in	   many	   universities.14	  For	   example,	   Exeter	   University	  Evangelical	  Christian	  Union	  threatened	  legal	  action	  when	  it	  was	  suspended	  from	  its	  Students’	   Guild	   because	   it	   required	   its	   committee	   members	   to	   sign	   a	   Doctrinal	  Basis	   of	   belief 15 	  and	   thereby	   clearly	   discriminated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   religion.	  Ultimately,	   this	   dispute	   was	   resolved	   and	   it	   re-­‐joined	   the	   Guild. 16 	  At	   other	  universities,	   Christian	   Unions	   have	   chosen	   not	   to	   formally	   affiliate	   with	   Student	  Unions	  so	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  comply	  with	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  other	  policies.17	  	  	  In	   the	   US,	   this	   issue	   reached	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Christian	   Legal	   Society	   v	  
Martinez.18	  In	   order	   to	   receive	   ‘Registered	   Student	   Organization’	   (RSO)	   status	   at	  Hastings	   College	   of	   the	   Law,	   organisations	   had	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   university’s	  Nondiscrimination	  Policy.	  This	  forbade	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  inter	  alia,	  religion	  and	   sexual	   orientation	  and	  was	  apparently	   interpreted	  as	   an	   ‘all	   comers’	  policy:	  RSOs	  had	  to	  permit	   ‘any	  student	  to	  participate,	  become	  a	  member,	  or	  seek	  leadership	   positions,	   regardless	   of	   her	   status	   or	   beliefs’.19	  However,	   the	   Christian	  Legal	   Society	   (CLS)	   required	   members	   and	   officers	   to	   abide	   by	   a	   ‘Statement	   of	  Faith’,	   which	   as	   well	   as	   requiring	   specific	   Christian	   views,	   required	   them	   not	   to	  engage	  in	  any	  sexual	  activity	  outside	  heterosexual	  marriage,	  although	  it	  permitted	  anyone	  to	  attend	  its	  meetings.	  As	  a	  result	  it	  was	  denied	  RSO	  status.	  	  	  The	   Supreme	  Court,	   albeit	  with	   a	   strong	  dissent,	   held	   that	   the	  university’s	   policy	  was	   permissible.	   The	   Court	   characterised	   the	   issue	   as	   being	   one	   of	   access	   to	   a	  ‘limited	   public	   forum’	   and	   so	   the	   test	   under	   American	   free	   speech	   jurisprudence	  was	  whether	  the	  restriction	  was	   ‘reasonable	  and	  viewpoint	  neutral’.	  The	  majority	  characterised	   the	   university	   as	   ‘dangling	   the	   carrot	   of	   subsidy,	   not	   wielding	   the	  stick	  of	  prohibition’,	   thus	  not	   requiring	  strict	   scrutiny.20	  It	  held	   that	   the	  proffered	  justification	   of	   ensuring	   the	   ‘leadership,	   educational	   and	   social	   opportunities’21	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  D.	  Lister	  and	  R.	  Gledhill,	  ‘Students	  Sue	  over	  Christian	  Rights	  at	  Colleges’	  The	  Times	  16	  Nov	  2006,	  1.	  15	  One	  which	  would	  not	  be	  acceptable	  to	  many	  Christians.	  16	  Christian	  Concern,	  ‘Exeter	  Evangelical	  Christian	  Union’	  12	  Dec	  2007	  http://www.christianconcern.com/our-­‐concerns/universities/exeter-­‐evangelical-­‐christian-­‐union.	  	  17	  Ekklesia,	  ‘United	  We	  Stand:	  A	  Report	  on	  Current	  Conflicts	  between	  Christian	  Unions	  and	  Students’	  Unions’	  	  (London:	  Ekklesia,	  2006).	  18	  130	  S.Ct.	  2971	  (2010).	  Alpha	  Delta	  Chi-­‐Delta	  Chapter	  v	  Reed	  648	  F.3d	  790	  (9th	  Cir.,	  2011)	  raises	  a	  similar	  point.	  19	  Ibid.	  at	  2982.	  20	  Ibid.	  at	  2986.	  21	  Ibid.	  at	  2989.	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afforded	  by	  RSOs	  were	  available	  to	  all	  students	  meant	  the	  policy	  was	  a	  reasonable	  one.	   Merely	   because	   the	   policy	   affected	   some	   groups	   more	   than	   others	   did	   not	  mean	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  not	  viewpoint	  neutral.	  	  	  This	   is	   a	   deferential	   form	   of	   review	   and	   there	   are	  many	   problems	   in	   the	   Court’s	  reasoning.	   Firstly	   the	   dissent	   persuasively	   argued	   that	   the	   evidence	   did	   not	  demonstrate	   that	   there	   was	   an	   ‘all-­‐comers’	   policy,	   but	   rather	   that	   other	  organisations	   were	   permitted	   to	   control	   their	   membership	   by	   reference	   to	   the	  organisation’s	  purposes,	  including	  one	  which	  was	  permitted	  to	  only	  admit	  students	  of	  Hispanic	  origin	  as	  voting	  members.	  These	  exceptions	  may	  of	  course	  be	  justifiable	  under	  a	  proportionality	  test,	  but	  they	  demonstrate	  severe	  difficulties	  in	  finding	  that	  the	   policy	   was	   viewpoint	   neutral.	   Secondly,	   in	   assessing	   reasonableness	   the	  majority	   was	   deferential	   in	   assuming	   that	   the	   aim	   of	   increasing	   leadership	   and	  social	  opportunities	  could	  actually	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  policy.	  CLS	  was	  only	  one	  of	  many	   societies	   at	   Hastings	   and	   was	   created	   for	   a	   particular	   purpose.	   Having	   a	  pluralistic	   range	  of	   societies,	   aimed	  at	   different	   groups	  of	   students	   and	   requiring	  different	  interests	  and	  beliefs	  could	  have	  increased	  rather	  than	  reduced	  leadership	  and	  social	  opportunities.	  The	  fit	  between	  the	  goal	  and	  the	  policy	  is	  therefore	  not	  a	  close	   one, 22 	  which	   would	   have	   been	   an	   important	   consideration	   under	   a	  proportionality	  test.	  	  	  Nice	  argues	  though	  that:	  ‘Martinez	  enhances	  liberty,	  making	  space	  for	  an	  individual	  to	   embrace	   any	   religious	   ideology	   regardless	   of	   his	   or	   her	   sexual	   orientation’.23	  This	   is	   true,	   but	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   CLS	   wished	   to	   espouse	   a	   particular	  conservative,	   evangelical,	   Protestant	   form	   of	   Christianity,	   rather	   than	   be	   open	   to	  anyone	   who	   identified	   as	   Christian.	   Nice’s	   statement	   is	   therefore	   problematic:	  particular	   views	   on	   sexuality	   were	   relevant	   to	   this	   group’s	   ideology	   and	   so	   its	  religious	   message	   could	   not	   be	   accepted	   ‘regardless’	   of	   sexual	   orientation.	   An	  enforced	  change	  would	  have	  altered	  the	  religious	  ideology.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	   university	   also	   prohibited	   religious	   discrimination	   and	   therefore	   the	   society	  could	  not	  have	  prevented	  an	  atheist	  running	  for	  a	  leadership	  position	  or	  becoming	  a	  member.	  Although	   this	  may	   ‘enhance	   liberty,	  making	   space	   for	   an	   individual	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  A.	  Brownstein	  and	  V.	  Amar,	  ‘Reviewing	  Associational	  Freedom	  Claims	  in	  a	  Limited	  Public	  Forum:	  An	  Extension	  of	  the	  Distinction	  Between	  Debate-­‐Dampening	  and	  Debate-­‐Distorting	  State	  Action’	  (2011)	  38	  Hastings	  Const	  LQ	  505.	  23	  J.	  Nice,	  ‘How	  Equality	  Constitutes	  Liberty:	  The	  Alignment	  of	  CLS	  v.	  Martinez’	  	  (2011)	  38	  
Hastings	  Const	  LQ	  631,	  672.	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embrace	  any	  religious	  ideology	  regardless	  of	  his	  or	  her’	  religious	  beliefs,	  this	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	   lessening	  the	  coherence	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  organisation.	  There	  was	  nothing	   to	   prevent	   those	   who	   do	   not	   agree	   with	   such	   an	   interpretation	   of	  Christianity,	  as	  of	  course	  many	  do	  not,	  forming	  their	  own	  society.24	  	  Secondly,	  the	  court	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  right	  of	  freedom	  of	  association	  separately	  from	  the	  right	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  in	  a	  limited	  public	  forum.	  This	  seems	  a	  serious	  problem.	  As	  Bhagwat	  puts	  it,	  ‘the	  primary	  burden	  imposed	  by	  Hastings	  was	  not	  on	  CLS’	  ability	  to	  communicate;	  rather,	   it	  was	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  select	  its	  members	  -­‐	   in	  other	   words	   on	   CLS	   members’	   choice	   to	   associate	   with	   whomever	   they	   want.’25	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  policy	  was	  viewpoint	  neutral	  is	  not	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  	  The	  various	   interests	   in	   this	   case	  would	  have	  been	   far	  better	   considered	  under	  a	  proportionality	  analysis.	  The	  university	  put	  forward	  as	  justification	  the	  ensuring	  of	  access	  to	  leadership	  and	  social	  activities.	  Although	  a	  legitimate	  aim,	  for	  the	  reasons	  explained	  above,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  least	  restrictive	  means	  of	  achieving	  this	  aim	  since	  having	   a	   range	   of	   societies	   centred	   on	   different	   viewpoints	   could	   protect	   this	  interest	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  A	  more	  persuasive	  way	  of	  formulating	  the	  university’s	  aim	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  has	  an	  interest	  in	  preventing	  discrimination	  on	  certain	  grounds	  on	  its	  campus	  and	  distancing	  itself	  from	  CLS’	  discriminatory	  message	  because	  such	  discrimination	  affects	  its	  students’	  sense	  of	  self	  worth	  and	  inclusion.	  
Being	   an	   RSO	   though	   had	   many	   practical	   consequences.	   It	   permitted	   an	  organisation	  to	  book	  rooms,	  use	  newsletters	  and	  bulletin	  boards	  and	  participate	  in	  a	  yearly	  students’	  fair.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  being	  allowed	  access	  to	  these	  official	  methods	  of	  communication	  was	  not	  necessary	  because	  CLS	  could	  use	  ‘electronic	  media	  and	  social	  networking	  sites’.26	  This	  is	  of	  course	  true,	  but	  ignores	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  the	  society	  could	  easily	  recruit	  new	  members	  at	  the	  university	  or	   hold	   events	   without	   such	   access.	   The	   distinction	   between	   subsidy	   and	  prohibition,	  which	  was	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  majority	  judgment,	  is	  slight	  when	  this	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  There	  may	  be	  a	  naming	  problem	  though:	  ‘Evangelical	  Christian	  Union’	  may	  be	  better	  than	  ‘Christian	  Union’	  to	  highlight	  that	  it	  only	  advanced	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  Christianity.	  See	  Ekklesia	  report	  supra	  n.18.	  25	  A.	  Bhagwat,	  ‘Associations	  and	  Forums:	  Situating	  CLS	  v.	  Martinez’	  (2011)	  38	  Hastings	  Const	  
LQ	  543,	  553.	  Luther	  also	  points	  out	  that	  students	  joined	  the	  society	  because	  they	  were	  ‘actively	  looking	  to	  mingle	  with	  those	  who	  share	  a	  common	  ideology’,	  rather	  than	  to	  engage	  in	  ‘the	  robust	  spread	  of	  ideas’:	  R.	  Luther,	  ‘Marketplace	  of	  Ideas	  2.0:	  Excluding	  Viewpoints	  to	  Include	  Individuals	  (2011)	  38	  Hastings	  Const.	  LQ	  673,	  681.	  26	  Supra	  n.19	  at	  2991.	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taken	  into	  account.	  Although	  the	  majority	  stated	  that	  the	  university	  had	  asserted	  it	  would	  permit	  CLS	   to	  book	   rooms	  and	  hold	   activities,	   the	  minority	  pointed	   to	   the	  difficulties	   CLS	   had	   in	   fact	   faced	   in	   attempting	   to	   do	   so.	   An	   informal	   policy	   was	  therefore	  not	  satisfactory.	  
However,	  the	  university	  did	  still	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  demonstrating	  its	  disapproval	  of	  CLS’	  policy.	  A	  fact-­‐specific	  proportionality	  analysis	  could	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  being	  an	  RSO	  brought	  with	  it	  a	  bundle	  of	  benefits.	  An	  alternative	  to	  preventing	  CLS	  from	  being	  an	  RSO	  at	  all	  would	  be	  to	  refuse	  to	  give	  CLS	  the	  status	  of	  being	  an	  RSO,	   but	   still	   to	   grant	   it	   some	   of	   the	   benefits.	   This	   is	   a	   similar	   analysis	   to	   the	  Georgetown	   University	   case	   described	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   where	   a	   gay	   rights	  organisation	   wanted	   to	   receive	   official	   recognition	   in	   a	   Catholic	   university.	  Allowing	  Hastings	  to,	  for	  example,	  deny	  CLS	  the	  right	  to	  use	  the	  university’s	  name	  or	  logo	  and	  of	  course	  to	  describe	  itself	  as	  an	  RSO	  permits	  it	  to	  distance	  itself	  from	  the	  discriminatory	  message.	  	  
There	   is	   therefore	   a	   need	   to	   balance	   the	   interests.	   The	   university’s	   policy	   deeply	  affected	   the	   rights	  of	   the	  organisation.	  Conversely,	  permitting	   the	  organisation	   to	  operate	  would	  have	  a	   limited	  effect	  on	  non-­‐CLS	  member	  students:	  membership	  is	  entirely	  voluntary,	  and	  students	  could	  attend	  events	  without	  being	  a	  member.	  Even	  the	   symbolic	   aspect	   of	   CLS’s	   policy	   is	   small	   if	   a	   distinction	   between	   status	   and	  support	  is	  made.	  It	  is	  not	  noticeably	  greater	  than	  the	  symbolic	  exclusion	  caused	  by	  general	  knowledge	  of	  some	  religions’	  views	  on	  sexuality.	  Although	  CLS’s	  policy	  may	  have	  very	  real	  effects	  on	  students’	  well-­‐being,	  this	  may	  simply	  have	  to	  be	  tolerated.	  In	   any	   case,	   even	   if	   this	   conclusion	   is	   disagreed	   with,	   a	   proportionality	   analysis	  does	  far	  better	  justice	  to	  these	  issues	  than	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court.	  
Services	  Provided	  to	  Co-­‐Religionists	  	  Beyond	  religious	  worship	  and	  teaching,	  religious	  organisations	  may	  provide	  more	  practical	  services	  only	  to	  co-­‐religionists.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  US	  case	  of	  Wazeerud-­‐
Din	  v	  Goodwill	  Missions27	  a	  Christian	  society	  ran	  a	   ‘discipleship	  program’	  designed	  to	   combat	   drug	   and	   alcohol	   addictions,	   which	   it	   considered	   ‘outward	  manifestations	   of	   inward	   sin’.	   It	   refused	   to	   admit	   anyone	   who	   was	   not	   ‘open	   to	  considering	   the	   claims	   of	   Christ’.	   The	   program	   mainly	   consisted	   of	   intensive	  religious	   instruction.	   Although	   this	   case	   only	   concerns	   religious	   discrimination	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  737	  A.2d	  683	  (N.J.	  App.	  Div.,	  1999).	  See	  also	  Intermountain	  Fair	  Housing	  Council	  v	  Boise	  
Rescue	  Mission	  657	  F.3d	  988	  (9th	  Cir.,	  2011).	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could	  have	  included	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination,	  since	  the	  organisation	  could	  have	  included	  not	  engaging	  in	  homosexual	  sexual	  conduct	  as	  one	  of	  the	   ‘claims	  of	  Christ’.	   The	   Court	   easily	   held	   that	   such	   discrimination	   was	   justifiable	   because	   it	  would	  otherwise	  require	  a	  change	  in	  the	  whole	  nature	  of	  the	  programme.	  This	  was	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	  case.	  	  More	  complex	  cases	  arise	   in	  educational	  contexts.	  Many	  religious	   institutions	  run	  schools	   and,	   particularly	   in	   the	   US,	   colleges	   and	   universities.	   Some	   of	   these	  organisations	   require	   that	   students	   follow	   at	   least	   some	   religious	   rules,	   and	  may	  also	  insist	  that	  they	  are	  members	  of	  a	  particular	  religion.	  In	  some	  fairly	  rare	  cases	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada,	  university	  students	  may	  be	  prohibited	  from	  having	  same-­‐sex	  relationships	  or	  any	  sexual	  activity	  outside	  heterosexual	  marriage.28	  The	  university	  may	  argue	  that	  the	  point	  of	  the	  institution	  is	  not	  merely	  or	  even	  primarily	  to	  teach	  secular	  subjects	  but	  rather	  to	  inculcate	  religious	  virtues.	  For	  example,	  the	  Student	  Handbook	  at	  Bob	   Jones	  University,	   a	  private	  Fundamentalist	  Christian	  university,	  gives	   nine	   ‘Institutional	   Goals’	   of	   the	   university	   of	   all	   of	  which	   refer	   to	   Christian	  beliefs,	   such	   as	   ‘To	   inspire	   regenerated	   students	   to	   know,	   love	   and	   serve	   Jesus	  Christ’	  or	  ‘To	  direct	  students	  toward	  a	  biblical	  life	  view	  that	  integrates	  God’s	  Truth	  into	   practical	   Christian	   living’.29	  Bingham	   outlines	   such	   a	   university’s	   claim	   to	  discriminate	  as	  follows:	  	  
‘(1)	  Private	  universities	  engage	  in	  “expressive	  association”	  because	  they	  serve	  to	   educate	   students	   in	   various	   disciplines,	   (2)	   if	   a	   private	   university	   asserts	  that	   homosexual	   conduct	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   its	   values,	   then	   forcing	   it	   to	  include	  a	  homosexual	  student	  would	  run	  counter	   to	   the	  views	   the	  university	  seeks	   to	   assert,	   and	   (3)	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   homosexual	   student	   may	   send	   a	  message	  that	  the	  university	  accepts	  homosexual	  conduct	  as	  a	  legitimate	  form	  of	  behavior	  when	  it,	  in	  fact,	  does	  not.’30	  In	  principle	  this	  argument	  could	  be	  accepted.	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  TWU	  v	  BCCT	  [2001]	  1	  SCR	  772.	  In	  the	  US,	  see	  e.g.	  Brigham	  Young	  University’s	  behaviour	  code	  available	  at:	  http://besmart.com/#	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  In	  England,	  designated	  institutions	  with	  a	  religious	  ethos	  may	  discriminate	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  religion	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  religion’s	  ethos	  (Schedule	  9	  Para	  5)	  but	  only	  Catholic	  Sixth	  Form	  Colleges	  have	  been	  designated.	  It	  is	  also	  permissible	  to	  discriminate	  for	  vocational	  courses	  if	  such	  discrimination	  is	  an	  occupational	  requirement	  for	  the	  intended	  employment,	  e.g.	  a	  Catholic	  seminary	  may	  only	  accept	  men.	  However,	  the	  issue	  only	  has	  limited	  practical	  importance	  in	  the	  UK	  because	  there	  are	  no	  private	  religious	  universities,	  although	  it	  might	  be	  an	  issue	  in	  religious	  schools.	  	  29	  BJU	  Student	  Handbook	  3-­‐4	  available	  at	  http://www.bju.edu/student-­‐life/	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb].	  30	  T.	  Bingham,	  ‘Discrimination	  in	  Education:	  Public	  Versus	  Private	  Universities’	  (2007)	  36	  J	  
L	  &	  Educ	  273.	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it	  may	  be	  proportionate,	  especially	  where	  an	  organisation	  is	  attempting	  to	  create	  a	  community	  of	  believers,	  to	  permit	  religious	  organisations	  to	  discriminate	  in	  hiring	  their	   staff.	   Similar	   considerations,	   such	   as	   the	   religiosity	   of	   the	   institution	   and	  whether	  the	  rule	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  student’s	  attention,	  should	  apply	  where	  the	   rules	   are	   applied	   to	   students.	   However,	   given	   that	   there	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   less	  coercion	  on	  students	  than	  teachers	  to	  join	  these	  organisations	  and	  thus	  be	  subject	  to	  these	  rules	  (because	  students	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  choices	  about	  where	  to	  attend	  university	  compared	  to	  employment	  opportunities),	  less	  should	  be	  demanded	  to	  justify	  the	  discrimination.	  If	  this	  assumption	  is	  not	  justified,	  because	  for	  example	   there	  are	  particular	  benefits	   in	  education	  at	  a	  religious	  university,	  or	  because	  a	  large	  number	  of	  universities	  have	  religious	  entry	  requirements	  and	  thus	  access	  to	  university	  education	  for	  all	  students	  is	  compromised,	  then	  this	  should	  be	  a	  crucial	  factor.	  
Sometimes	   it	   is	   accepted	   that	   the	   university	   may	   discriminate,	   but	   as	   a	  consequence	   of	   the	   discrimination	   it	   is	   subjected	   to	   disadvantage,	   which	   the	  university	  may	  then	  seek	  to	  challenge.	  This	  issue	  arose	  in	  British	  Columbia	  College	  
of	  Teachers	  v	  Trinity	  Western	  University.31	  TWU	   is	   a	   private	   university,	   associated	  with	  the	  Evangelical	  Free	  Church	  of	  Canada.	  All	  students	  and	  staff	  had	  to	  accept	  the	  TWU	   Community	   Standards	   which	   forbade	   ‘practices	   that	   are	   Biblically	  condemned’,	  including	  ‘sexual	  sins	  including…	  homosexual	  behaviour’.	  It	  offered	  a	  five-­‐year	  degree	  in	  education,	  but	  when	  the	  course	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1985	  the	  last	  year	  had	  to	  be	  spent	  at	  another	  university,	  as	  appears	  to	  be	  standard	  practice	   for	  new	  courses.	   In	   1995	   TWU	   applied	   to	   have	   control	   over	   the	   fifth	   year,	   but	   this	   was	  denied	  by	  the	  British	  Columbia	  College	  of	  Teachers	  (BCCT)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	   it	  would	   not	   be	   in	   the	   public	   interest	   to	   allow	   teacher	   education	   to	   be	   wholly	  controlled	  by	  a	  university	  which	  had	  discriminatory	  policies.	  A	  similar	  problem	  has	  arisen	  more	  recently,	  as	   the	  Federation	  of	  Law	  Societies	  of	  Canada	  has	  permitted	  TWU	  to	  set	  up	  a	  School	  of	  Law,32	  above	  criticism	  that	  such	  discrimination	  violates	  core	  professional	  ethics.33	  	  	  In	  the	  earlier	  dispute	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  in	  favour	  of	  TWU,	  holding	  that	  BCCT	  could	   not	   refuse	   to	   accredit	   the	   course.	   The	  majority,	   not	   applying	   the	   standard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  [2001]	  1	  SCR	  772.	  32	  Federation	  of	  Law	  Societies	  of	  Canada,	  ‘Trinity	  Western	  University’s	  Proposed	  Common	  Law	  Program’:	  http://www.flsc.ca/en/twu-­‐common-­‐law-­‐program/.	  	  33	  E.	  Craig,	  ‘The	  Case	  for	  the	  Federation	  of	  Law	  Societies	  Rejecting	  Trinity	  Western	  University’s	  Proposed	  Law	  Degree	  Program’	  (2013)	  25	  CJWL	  148.	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Canadian	  proportionality	  test	  strictly,	  but	  weighing	  the	  factors	  generally,	  held	  that	  BCCT	  did	  not	  weigh	  the	  relevant	  rights	  in	  its	  assessment	  and	  neglected	  to	  consider	  the	   importance	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   the	   place	   of	   private	   institutions	   in	  Canadian	  society	  and	  its	  constitution.34	  It	  held	  that	  when	  a	  university	  had	  a	  right	  to	  discriminate	  in	  its	  selection	  policies	  it	  would	  then	  be	  strange	  if	  exercising	  that	  right	  submitted	   it	   to	   detriment.35	  There	   was	   no	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   graduates	   of	  TWU	   would	   discriminate	   or	   have	   a	   detrimental	   effect	   in	   public	   schools.	  Furthermore	  personal	   rules	  of	   conduct	  could	  generally	  be	  adopted	  provided	   they	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  rights	  of	  others.	  	  	  L’Heureux-­‐Dubé	  J.	  dissented.	  For	  her,	  this	  was	  not	  a	  human	  rights	  matter	  but	  a	  case	  about	   providing	   the	   best	   possible	   educational	   environment	   for	   public	   school	  students.	   TWU’s	   graduates	   could	   still	   become	   teachers	   and	   the	   detriment	   of	   one	  year	   at	   a	   different	   university	   was	   not	   very	   severe.	   Given	   the	   strong	   need	   for	  teachers	   to	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   gay	   students,	   it	   was	   reasonable	   to	  require	   students	   at	   a	   university	   which	   condemned	   homosexual	   behaviour	   to	  experience	  life	  at	  another	  university.	  	  	  Although	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  reached	  the	  correct	  decision	  and	  dealt	  with	  the	  main	  arguments,	  applying	  a	  proportionality	  analysis	  more	  strictly	  would	  have	  sharpened	  the	  reasoning.	  The	  legitimate	  aim	  here	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  discrimination-­‐free	  public	  education	   system.	  But	   as	   the	  majority	   saw	   it,	   requiring	  TWU	  students	   to	   spend	  a	  year	  at	  another	  university	  would	  not	  have	  done	  much	  to	  change	  ingrained	  beliefs,	  even	   if	   there	   had	   been	   evidence	   that	   they	   did	   or	   would	   discriminate	   in	   their	  employment.	   The	   connection	   between	   the	   two,	   although	   sufficient	   to	   pass	   the	  rational	   connection	   test,	  was	   fairly	   tenuous.	   The	   policy	  was	   both	   under-­‐inclusive	  and	  over-­‐inclusive.	  It	  was	  over-­‐inclusive	  because	  it	  assumed	  that	  all	  TWU	  students	  would,	   unless	   required	   to	   attend	   another	   university,	   discriminate.	   It	   was	   under-­‐inclusive	   because	   it	   still	   permitted	   students	   with	   objections	   to	   same-­‐sex	   sexual	  behaviour	   to	  become	   teachers.	  The	  badly	   tailored	  nature	  of	   the	   restriction	   raises	  doubts	  about	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  proportionate.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Religious	  institutions	  are	  partially	  exempted	  from	  British	  Columbia’s	  human	  rights	  legislation	  and	  as	  a	  private	  institution,	  the	  Charter	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  it.	  35	  This	  does	  not	  strictly	  follow	  -­‐	  it	  may	  be	  tolerable	  for	  a	  discriminatory	  organisation	  to	  exist,	  but	  only	  if	  it	  receives	  no	  state	  support	  of	  any	  kind	  e.g.	  Bob	  Jones	  University	  v	  United	  
States,	  461	  US	  574	  (1983)	  (religious	  university	  which	  earlier	  banned	  black	  students,	  and	  then	  forbade	  inter-­‐racial	  dating	  could	  be	  denied	  tax	  exemption).	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If	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  protect	  against	  discriminatory	  behaviour,	  then	  the	  likelihood	  of	  this	  arising	   must	   be	   considered,	   as	   this	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   proportionality	   test.	   As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,36	  Alexy’s	  Second	  or	  Epistemic	  Law	  of	  Balancing	  states	  that:	  ‘the	  more	  intensive	  an	  interference	  in	  a	  constitutional	  right	  is,	  the	  greater	  must	  be	  the	  certainty	  of	  its	  underlying	  premisses.’37	  That	  the	  students	  would	  discriminate	  is	  assumed	   only	   because	   of	   their	   attendance	   at	   a	   particular	   university.	   Although	  students	  were	   required	   to	   sign	   the	  Community	  Standards,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   they	  may	  not	  necessarily	  have	  agreed	  with	  them	  but	  have	  merely	  agreed	  to	  uphold	  (or	  even	  pretended	  to	  uphold)	  the	  rules	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  their	  degree.	  Secondly,	  even	  if	   the	   trainee	   teachers	   were	   opposed	   to	   homosexuality,	   that	   does	   not	  mean	   that	  they	  would	  necessarily	  have	  sought	  to	  spread	  discrimination	  against	  their	  students	  or	  their	  colleagues.	  Indeed	  the	  Standards	  themselves	  stated	  that	  respect	  should	  be	  shown	   to	   everyone.	   Possibly,	   as	   Gonthier	   J	   put	   it	   in	  Chamberlain	   v	   Surrey	   School	  
District	  No.	  36,	  ‘adults	  in	  Canadian	  society	  who	  think	  that	  homosexual	  behaviour	  is	  immoral	  can	  still	  be	  staunchly	  committed	  to	  non-­‐discrimination’.38	  Furthermore,	  if	  a	   teacher	   did	   discriminate	   or	   vehemently	   expressed	   discriminatory	   ideas	   when	  qualified	   then	   appropriate	   action	   could	   be	   taken	   because	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   others,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  they	  were	  a	  former	  TWU	  student	  or	  not.39	  	  	  Alternatively,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   what	   was	   needed	   was	   not	   only	   non-­‐discrimination	  but	  also	  the	  positive	  affirmation	  of	  gay	  students.	  This	  though	  would	  require	   a	   far	   more	   expansive	   and	   intrusive	   policy	   that	   enquired	   into	   each	  prospective	   teacher’s	  view	  of	  homosexuality	  and	   that	  would	   in	   turn	   raise	   serious	  problems	  of	  proportionality.	  Of	  course,	  requiring	  BCCT	  to	  accept	  TWU’s	  course	   in	  this	  situation	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  in	  all	  cases	  a	  university	  should	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  detriment	   because	   of	   its	   discriminatory	   policies:	   this	   requires	   a	   fact-­‐specific	  assessment.	  	  Even	   if	  an	   institution	  does	  not	  have	  such	  prohibitive	  rules	  on	  membership	   it	  may	  refuse	  to	  offer	  services,	  understood	  broadly,	  where	  this	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  endorsing	  same-­‐sex	   relationships	  or	   falsely	  demonstrating	   that	   such	   relationships	  are	  equal	  in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   religion.	   This	   was	   the	   argument	   in	   a	   case	   that	   received	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Supra	  at	  p79.	  37	  R.	  Alexy,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Constitutional	  Rights	  tr	  J.	  Rivers	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  419.	  38	  [2002]	  4	  SCR	  710	  at	  para	  127.	  39	  E.g.	  Kempling	  v	  British	  Columbia	  College	  of	  Teachers	  [2005]	  255	  DLR	  (4th)	  169.	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enormous	  amount	  of	  media	  coverage	  and	  attracted	  extremely	  heated	  debate.	  The	  issue	  in	  Hall	  v	  Powers,40	  a	  Canadian	  case,	  was	  whether	  a	  student	  at	  a	  Catholic	  high	  school	  could	  take	  his	  boyfriend	  to	  his	  prom.	  The	  school	  refused	  to	  permit	  him	  on	  the	   basis	   that	   it	   would	   contravene	   its	   religious	   teachings	   and	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  endorsement	   of	   same	   sex	   relationships.	   Hall	   won	   an	   interlocutory	   injunction,	  granted	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  prom,	  to	  permit	  the	  couple	  to	  attend	  together.	  The	  case	  was	  discontinued	  (contrary	  to	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  school)	  before	  a	  full	  trial.	  	  The	   main	   basis	   of	   the	   decision	   on	   the	   interlocutory	   injunction	   is	   unfortunately	  flawed	   because	   it	   rests	   on	   the	   Court’s	   own	   interpretation	   of	   Catholic	   doctrine.	  Evidently,	  there	  is	  a	  great	  diversity	  of	  views	  within	  the	  Catholic	  tradition	  as	  to	  the	  morality	   or	   otherwise	   of	   same-­‐sex	   relationships,	   and,	   even	   if	   same-­‐sex	  relationships	   are	   seen	   as	   sinful,	   then	   as	   to	   the	   appropriate	   pastoral	   reaction.	   To	  highlight	   this	   in	  a	   judgment	   is	  not	   therefore	  wrong.	  However,	   the	  Court	  used	   this	  uncertainty	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  was	  no	  religious	  reason	  why	  Hall	  could	  not	  attend	  the	  prom	  with	  his	  boyfriend.	  This	  oversteps	  the	  court’s	  role.	  It	  is	  not	  legitimate	  for	  a	   secular	   court	   to	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   no	   religious	   reason	   for	   a	   policy	   when	   the	  religious	  authority	  could	  point	  to	  a	  large	  body	  of	  thought	  within	  the	  church	  which	  supported	   its	   point	   of	   view.	   As	   Donlevy	   puts	   it,	   ‘the	   court	   chose	   to	   interpret	   the	  Catholic	  Church's	  official	  position	  regarding	  the	  ethics	  of	  human	  behaviour	  through	  an	   analysis	   appropriate	   to	   a	   secular	   institution,	   with	   the	   deciding	   factor	   in	   the	  decision	  being	  the	  opinions	  and	  practices	  of	  members	  of	  that	  institution.’41	  	  	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  since	  the	  school	  was	  publicly	  funded	  and	  the	  School	  Board	  had	  ‘establish[ed]	  and	  implement[ed]	  policies	  of	  general	  application’,	   it	  was	  subject	  to	  the	  Charter	  and,	   in	  particular	  to	  the	  equal	  protection	  right	  of	  students	  under	  s.15.	  However,	   it	   considered	   that,	   since	   it	   was	   a	   Catholic	   separate	   school,	   the	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  was	  potentially	  justified	  because	  of	  its	  right	  to	  manage	  the	  school	  in	  accordance	  with	  Catholic	  beliefs.	  Under	  a	  proportionality	  enquiry,	  the	  school	   thus	   has	   the	   legitimate	   aims	   of	   protecting	   its	   religious	   conscience	   and	   its	  autonomy	   in	   the	   running	   of	   its	   schools.	   By	   forbidding	   Hall	   to	   attend	   with	   his	  boyfriend	   there	   was	   also	   a	   rational	   connection	   to	   this	   aim.	   As	   a	   less	   restrictive	  means	  of	  restricting	  Hall’s	  rights,	  the	  school	  had	  suggested	  a	  compromise	  whereby	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  [2002]	  213	  DLR	  (4th)	  308.	  	  41	  J.K.	  Donlevy,	  ‘Re-­‐Visiting	  Denominational	  Cause	  and	  Denominational	  Breach	  in	  Canada’s	  Constitutionally	  Protected	  Catholic	  Schools’	  (2005)	  Education	  &	  Law	  Journal	  94.	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a	   female	   friend	  of	  Hall’s	   could	   take	  his	  boyfriend	  as	  her	   ‘date’,	  meaning	   that	  both	  could	  attend.	  However,	  this	  was	  unacceptable	  to	  Hall	  and	  evidently	  did	  not	  protect	  his	  right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  	  Considering	  the	  balancing	  of	  the	  interests,	  even	  on	  the	  most	  favourable	  reading	  to	  the	   Church,	   the	   religious	   interest	   was	   limited.	   The	   reason	   the	   school	   gave	   for	  forbidding	   Hall’s	   boyfriend	   to	   attend	   was	   that	   ‘interaction	   at	   a	   prom	   between	  romantic	  partners	  is	  a	  form	  of	  sexual	  activity	  and	  that,	  if	  permission	  were	  granted	  to	  Mr	  Hall	  to	  attend	  the	  prom	  with	  his	  boyfriend	  as	  a	  same-­‐sex	  couple,	  this	  would	  be	  seen	  both	  as	  an	  endorsement	  and	  condonation	  of	  conduct	  which	  is	  contrary	  to	  Catholic	   church	   teachings.’42	  Even	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   religious	   doctrine	   put	  forward	  by	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  though,	  this	  endorsement	  would	  have	  been	  rather	  remote.	   There	   is	   an	   inconsistency	   in	   the	   Church’s	   reasoning:	   it	   was	   not	  automatically	   assumed	   that	   opposite-­‐sex	   dancing	   would	   lead	   to	   any	   sexual	  behaviour	  not	  permitted	  by	  the	  church	  or	  seen	  as	  sexual	  behaviour	  in	  itself,	  but	  the	  same	  activity	  by	  a	  same-­‐sex	  couple	  is	  seen	  as	  intrinsically	  sexual.43	  This	  criticism	  is	  valid,	  but	  requiring	  religious	  teachings	  to	  be	  internally	  consistent	  is	  not	  the	  court’s	  responsibility.	  Religious	   teachings	  are	   ‘not	   always	   susceptible	   to	   lucid	  exposition,	  or	   still	   less,	   rational	   justification’.44	  Of	   more	   importance	   is	   that:	   ‘the	   prom	   in	  question	   is	   not	   part	   of	   a	   religious	   service	   (such	   as	   a	   mass),	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	  religious	   education	   component	   of	   the	   Board's	   activity,	   is	   not	   held	   on	   school	  property,	  and	  is	  not	  educational	  in	  nature.’45	  	  
Significantly	   though,	   this	   discussion	   about	   the	   particular	   nature	   of	   the	   activity	  misses	  the	  stronger	  aspect	  of	  the	  school’s	  claim,	  aspects	  that	  careful	  application	  of	  the	   proportionality	   test	   could	   have	   foregrounded.	   Hall	   was	   still	   a	   student	   at	   the	  school	   and	   therefore	   subject	   to	   its	   control	   as	   to	   what	   constituted	   appropriate	  behaviour	  based	  on	  its	  religious	  beliefs.	  As	  Schneiderman	  puts	  it,	  ‘this	  was	  a	  claim	  not	  merely	  about	  “same	  sex	  dancing”	  but	  also	  about	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  church	  to	  regulate	  the	  conduct	  of	  its	  members	  enrolled	  in	  its	  schools.’46	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Supra	  n.41	  at	  para	  4.	  43	  J.A.	  Russ,	  ‘Shall	  We	  Dance?	  Gay	  Equality	  and	  Religious	  Exemptions	  at	  Private	  Californian	  High	  School	  Proms’	  (1988)	  42	  NYL	  Sch	  L	  Rev	  71.	  44	  R(Williamson	  and	  Others)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Education	  and	  Employment	  [2005]	  2	  AC	  246,	  259.	  45	  Supra	  n.41	  at	  para	  26.	  46	  D.	  Schneiderman,	  ‘Associational	  Rights,	  Religion	  and	  the	  Charter’	  in	  R.	  Moon	  (ed),	  Law	  
and	  Religious	  Pluralism	  in	  Canada	  (Vancouver:	  UBC	  Press,	  2008)	  75.	  
	   184	  
There	  are	  two	  entirely	  different	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  dispute.	  On	  one	  hand	   it	   is	  merely	  about	  one	  social	  occasion	  with	  no	  religious	  significance,	  which	   is	  not	  closely	  related	  to	   the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  message.	  On	  the	  other,	  Hall’s	  demand	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  whole	  position	  on	  same-­‐sex	  relationships	  and	  a	  challenge	  to	   its	  perceived	  inability	  to	  respond,	  at	  minimum,	   compassionately	   towards	   gay	  people,	   in	   particular	   in	   schools.	  Hall	   can	  be	   seen	   as	   a	   role	   model	   to	   other	   gay	   students,	   leading	   them	   to	   challenge	   their	  schools’	   homophobic	   and	   heterosexist	   policies.	   Combine	   this	   with	   a	   new,	   more	  vocal,	   attitude	   amongst	   gay	   students47	  and	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   that	   the	   Church	  vehemently	  opposed	  Hall’s	  claim.	   If	   this	   is	  true,	   then	  the	  case	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  no	  longer	  a	  claim	  at	  the	  peripheries	  of	  Catholic	  teaching,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  its	  centre.	  	  	  This	  second	  way	  of	  seeing	  it	  though	  is	  unpersuasive.	  The	  ‘slippery	  slope’	  argument	  is	   unconvincing	   because	   one	   decision	   does	   not	   lead	   inexorably	   to	   any	   future	  decisions.	   Even	   if	   Hall’s	   success	   were	   to	   make	   other	   students	   more	   likely	   to	  challenge	  teachings	  on	  sexuality	   in	  denominational	  schools,	   these	  claims	  could	  be	  dealt	  with	  on	  their	  own	  merits.	  Furthermore,	  whether	  and	  in	  what	  way	  the	  case	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  public	  opinion	  is	  difficult	  to	  predict	  and	  in	  any	  event	  should	  not	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  Court’s	  decision.	  Therefore	  Hall’s	  challenge	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  core	  of	  Catholic	  rights.	  	  	  This	   thesis	   has	   argued	   throughout	   for	   an	   approach	   which	   leaves	   aside	   ultimate	  moral	   questions,	   providing	   space	   for	   individuals	   and	   organisations	   to	   ‘define	  [their]	   own	   concept	   of	   existence,	   of	   meaning,	   of	   the	   universe.’48	  The	   judgment	  draws	  attention	   to	   this	   idea,	   stating	   that:	   ‘Mr.	  Hall	  has	  a	  duty	   to	  accord	   to	  others	  who	  do	  not	  share	  his	  orientation	  the	  respect	  that	  they,	  with	  their	  religious	  values	  and	  beliefs,	  are	  due.	  Conversely…	  the	  principal	  and	  the	  Board	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  accord	  to	  Mr.	  Hall	  the	  respect	  that	  he	  is	  due’.	  The	  judgment	  therefore	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  antagonism	  between	  the	  parties	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  is	  something	  of	  value	  in	  both	   sides’	  perspectives	   that	   is	  worthy	  of	  protection.	   It	   also	  places	   the	  dispute	   in	  context	  as	  part	  of	  an	  on-­‐going	  relationship.	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  A.	  Grace	  and	  K.	  Wells,	  ‘The	  Marc	  Hall	  Prom	  Predicament:	  Queer	  Individual	  Rights	  v.	  Institutional	  Church	  Rights	  in	  Canadian	  Public	  Education’	  (2005)	  28	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  
Education	  237,	  239:	  ‘Many	  making	  up	  today’s	  queer	  student	  body	  are	  vocal,	  visible,	  and	  proud.	  They	  are	  making	  their	  schools	  key	  sites	  in	  their	  struggles	  for	  social	  justice	  and	  cultural	  recognition	  and	  respect.’	  48	  Kennedy	  J,	  Planned	  Parenthood	  v	  Casey	  505	  US	  833	  (1992).	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  The	  difficulty	  is	  of	  course	  in	  deciding	  ultimately	  where	  the	  burden	  of	  tolerance	  lies.	  The	   interests	   on	   both	   sides	   are	   limited:	   whether	   or	   not	   Hall	   could	   bring	   his	  boyfriend	  to	  the	  prom	  would	  not	  necessarily	  affect	  the	  Catholic	  Church’s	  teachings	  on	   sexuality	   or	   even	   the	   school’s	   ability	   to	   control	   or	   disseminate	   its	   religious	  message.	   Similarly,	   although	   undoubtedly	   extremely	   hurtful,	   the	   discrimination	  was	  only	  symbolic,	  and	  only	  related	  to	  one	  evening.	  The	  most	  persuasive	  factor	  is	  the	   school’s	   interest	   in	   religious	   autonomy.	   The	   timing	   of	   the	   issue	   is	   also	  important.	  This	  was	  a	   liminal	  moment	   for	  Hall.	  He	  was	  about	   to	   leave	   the	  school.	  From	   then	   on	   the	   amount	   of	   direct	   control	   the	   Catholic	   Church	  would	   have	   over	  him	  would	  be	  of	  his	  own	  choosing.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  although	  the	  Court’s	  decision	  is	   more	   than	   understandable,	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   it	   reached	   the	   right	  decision.	   However,	   a	   proportionality	   analysis,	  which	   pays	   careful	   attention	   to	   all	  the	   interests	   in	   the	   case,	   demonstrates	   how	   finely	   balanced	   the	   interests	   in	   this	  case	  are.	  
Non-­‐members	  and	  Services	  	  This	  discussion	  will	  now	  move	  from	  claims	  that	  involve	  the	  control	  of	  members	  to	  claims	   made	   primarily	   by	   outsiders	   who	   wish	   to	   use	   some	   service	   run	   by	   the	  religious	   organisation,	   normally	   for	   secular	   rather	   than	   religious	   reasons.	   These	  cases	   involve	   different	   issues:	   the	   interests	   in	   religious	   autonomy	   will	   be	   less	  important	  as	   these	  cases	  are	  not	  about	   religious	  organisations’	   control	  over	   their	  own	   members,	   but	   the	   interest	   in	   protecting	   religious	   conscience	   remains	  important.	  The	  interests	  of	  those	  challenging	  the	  religious	  organisation’s	  policy	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  higher	  because	  they	  do	  not	  claim	  inclusion	  into	  an	  organisation	  but	  merely	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  service	  on	  equal	  terms.	  	  Hiring	  of	  Religion-­‐Owned	  Premises	  	  The	  first	  issue	  is	  whether	  religious	  organisations	  can	  deny	  the	  use	  of	  their	  premises	  to	  organisations	  with	  which	  they	  disagree.	   It	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  say	   that	  a	  religious	  organisation	  can	  avoid	  any	  conflict	  by	  not	  renting	  out	  the	  property.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  used	   to	   spread	   general	   awareness	   of	   the	   religion	   or	   be	   an	   important	   source	   of	  income	   which	   is	   relied	   on	   to	   fulfil	   the	   religious	   mission.	   As	   has	   been	   said	  previously,	  merely	  because	  a	   conflict	   is	   avoidable	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   there	   is	  no	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interference	  with	  the	  right.	  Indeed	  one	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  proportionality	  is	  that	  interference	  can	  be	  defined	  broadly	  because	  justification	  can	  be	  fully	  considered.	  	  There	  are	  of	  course	  different	  kinds	  of	  property.	  A	  church	  has	  a	  greater	  claim	  over	  the	  use	  of	  sacred	  places	  such	  as	  a	  chapel,	  than	  it	  does	  to	  premises	  used	  mainly	  as	  a	  source	  of	  income,	  not	  used	  for	  religious	  purposes	  and	  rented	  out	  to	  all-­‐comers.	  As	  always,	   the	   greater	   the	   interference	   with	   the	   religious	   right,	   the	   greater	   the	  justification	  required,	  and	  vice	  versa.49	  At	  the	  secular	  end	  of	  this	  continuum	  is	  the	  American	   case	   of	  Bernstein	   and	  Paster	   v	  Ocean	  Grove	  Camp	  Meeting	  Association50	  (hereafter	  OGCMA).	  Ocean	  Grove	   is	   a	   resort,	   owned	  by	   a	  Methodist	   organisation,	  which	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  camp	  meeting	  revival	  movement.51	  On	  the	  resort	  was	   the	  Boardwalk	  Pavilion,	  which	  was	  used	   for	  religious	  services	  and	  concerts	  but	  which	  could	  also	  be	  hired	  out	   for	  weddings.	  When	  not	   in	  use	   it	  was	  freely	  open	  to	  the	  public.	  A	  lesbian	  couple,	  Bernstein	  and	  Paster,	  tried	  to	  book	  the	  Pavilion	  for	  their	  wedding	  but	  were	  refused	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  Methodist	  Church	  did	  not	  approve	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  It	  was	  found	  that	  the	  Pavilion	  was	  a	  place	  of	  public	   accommodation	   at	   the	   time,	   that	   OGCMA	   had	   discriminated	   against	   the	  couple	  and	  there	  was	  no	  free	  exercise	  defence	  under	  the	  approach	  in	  Employment	  
Division	  v	  Smith52	  since	  there	  was	  no	  targeting	  of	  religious	  practice.	  	  In	  assessing	   the	  opposing	   interests	  under	   the	  proportionality	   test,	  much	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  Pavilion	  is	  characterised	  as	  a	  public	  or	  private	  space.	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  use	  this	  distinction	  to	  set	  up	  a	  false	  dichotomy	  between	  public	  and	  private	  or	  to	  suggest	   that	   whether	   the	   discrimination	   is	   permissible	   or	   impermissible	   is	  coterminous	   with	   this	   distinction.	   However,	   ascertaining	   the	   character	   of	   the	  Pavilion	   is	   relevant	   in	   deciding	   the	   level	   of	   interference	   with	   the	   religious	  organisation’s	  right.	  	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Bold	   characterises	   the	   Pavilion	   as	   private,	   arguing	   that,	   ‘if	   the	  public	   sees	   religious	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	  Methodist	   pavilion	   owners	   allowing	  same-­‐sex	   civil	   commitment	   ceremonies	   on	   their	   premises,	   casual	   observers	  may	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  This	  is	  Alexy’s	  First	  Law	  of	  Balancing.	  See	  supra	  at	  p78-­‐9.	  50	  OAL	  Dkt.	  No.	  CRT	  6145-­‐09	  (N.J.	  Office	  of	  Administrative	  Law,	  2008)	  See	  M.	  Pearson,	  ‘Religious	  Claims	  vs.	  Non-­‐Discrimination	  Rights:	  Another	  Plea	  for	  Difficulty’	  Rutgers	  J	  of	  L	  &	  
Relig	  (forthcoming	  2014).	  51	  T.W.	  Messenger,	  Holy	  Leisure:	  Recreation	  and	  Religion	  in	  God’s	  Square	  Mile	  (Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  52	  94	  US	  872	  (1990).	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erroneously	   think	   the	   Methodist	   church	   has	   changed	   its	   historic	   stance	   against	  same-­‐sex	   marriage.’53	  He	   also	   suggests	   that	   a	   ceremony	   would	   have	   received	   a	  great	  deal	  of	  media	  interest.	  	  	  This	   analysis	   makes	   the	   mere	   ownership	   of	   a	   place	   crucial.	   It	   follows	   that	   a	  religious	   organisation	   may	   prevent	   a	   use	   which	   it	   does	   not	   agree	   with	   on	   any	  premises	   it	   owns,	   no	  matter	   how	  attenuated	   its	   link.	   This	   reduces	   the	  protection	  given	   by	   the	   anti-­‐discrimination	   norm.	   As	   it	   relates	   to	   this	   case	   it	   also	   fails	   to	  appreciate	   that	   the	   Pavilion	  was	   at	   least	   a	   partly	   public	   place.	   Although	   used	   for	  religious	  worship,	   it	  was	  not	   a	   church	  and	  was	  open	   to	   everyone.	  Non-­‐Methodist	  and	   non-­‐religious	   weddings	   had	   taken	   place	   there	   with	   no	   indication	   that	   the	  Church	  thereby	  endorsed	  them.	  Importantly	  also,	  OCGMA	  received	  a	  tax	  exemption	  for	  the	  Pavilion	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  open	  to	  the	  public.	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  Bold,	  Lupu	  and	  Tuttle	  depict	  the	  Pavilion	  as	  public.	  They	  argue	  that,	  ‘Bernstein	  and	  Paster	  asked	  to	  use	  a	  facility	  that	  was	  not	  specifically	  identified	  with	  Methodist	  worship,	  that	  ordinary	  observers	  would	  see	  as	  public	  space,	  and	  that	  had	  been	  available	   for	  rental	  by	  anyone	  willing	  to	  pay	  the	   fee.’54	  This	  analysis	   is	  more	  appropriate	   than	  Bold’s.	  Although	  OGCMA	  is	  a	  religiously	  based	  organisation,	   this	  does	   not	   thereby	   make	   the	   property	   it	   owns	   necessarily	   religious.	   Given	   the	  particular	   circumstances	   and	   use	   to	   which	   the	   Pavilion	   was	   put,	   the	   religious	  interest	   is	   fairly	   small.	   The	   risk	   of	   confusion	   between	   the	   Methodist	   Church’s	  precepts	   and	   the	   actions	   it	   permits	   on	   some	   of	   its	   property	   therefore	   appears	  remote.	   Perhaps	   the	   fears	   about	   people	   erroneously	   thinking	   that	   the	  Methodist	  Church	  endorsed	  same-­‐sex	  weddings	  could	  be	  met	  by	  having	  a	  sign	  saying	  that	  any	  activity	  taking	  place	  there	  did	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Methodist	  Church.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  none	  of	  this	  means	  that	  OGCMA	  necessarily	  had	  to	  allow	  anyone	  to	  use	  the	  Pavilion.	  Their	  obligation	  was	  only	  not	  to	  discriminate,	  not	  to	  actively	  provide	  places	  for	  same-­‐sex	  weddings.	  OGCMA	  could	  use	  it	  only	  as	  a	  religious	  space	  if	  it	  so	  wished	  and	  indeed	  did	  so	  after	  the	  case	  was	  brought,	  with	  it	  then	  being	  classified	  for	   tax	   purposes	   as	   a	   religious	   space	   rather	   than	   a	   public	   one.	   Thus	   the	   laws	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  F.	  Bold,	  ‘Vows	  to	  Collide:	  The	  Burgeoning	  Conflict	  between	  Religious	  Institutions	  and	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  Antidiscrimination	  Laws’	  (2009)	  158	  U	  Pa	  L	  Rev	  179,	  202.	  54	  I.	  Lupu	  and	  R.	  Tuttle,	  ‘Same-­‐Sex	  Equality	  and	  Religious	  Freedom’	  (2010)	  5	  Nw	  J	  L	  &	  Soc	  
Pol'y	  274,	  285.	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non-­‐discrimination	   in	  public	  accommodations	  did	  not	  apply	   to	   it.	  Another	   lesbian	  couple	  later	  tried	  to	  make	  a	  complaint	  to	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Tribunal,	  but	  this	  was	  rejected	  on	  the	  basis	  there	  was	  no	  cause	  of	  action.55	  The	  choice	  OGMGA	  was	  put	  to	  was	   therefore	   not	   a	   disproportionate	   one.	   However,	   a	   proportionality	   approach	  does	   recognise	   that	   there	  was	   some	   religious	   interest	   in	   the	   control	   of	   property,	  which	   the	  approach	  under	  Smith	  does	  not,	   as	   it	   is	  only	  concerned	  with	  situations	  where	  religious	  practices	  are	  deliberately	  targeted.	  	  In	   other	   cases	   the	   religious	   organisation	   has	   a	   stronger	   claim	   to	   control	   over	   its	  premises.	  Dignity	  Twin	  Cities	  v	  Newman	  Center	  &	  Chapel56	  is	  a	  case	  at	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  Dignity	  is	  a	  national	  organisation	  of	  LGBT	  Catholics	  who	  press	  for	  change	  within	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  on	  matters	  relating	  to	  sexuality	  as	  well	  as	  acting	  as	  a	  support	  group.	  A	  chapter	  of	  this	  organisation	  had	  rented	  a	  chapel	  and	  meeting	  rooms	  owned	  by	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Archdiocese	  of	  St	  Paul	  and	  Minneapolis	  for	  a	  number	   of	   years.	   However,	   the	   Archdiocese	   then	   reconsidered	   its	   policy	   and	  decided	   it	   would	   permit	   it	   to	   hire	   the	   premises	   only	   if	   it	   signed	   a	   document	  affirming	  the	  Church’s	  teachings	  on	  homosexuality,	  which	  it	  refused	  to	  do.	  Dignity	  then	   made	   a	   complaint	   to	   the	   Minneapolis	   Commission	   on	   Civil	   Rights	   which	  initially	  rejected	  the	  claim	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  jurisdiction.	  The	  Commission	  Appeals	  Board	  held	   though	   that	   there	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  Dignity’s	   civil	   rights,	   except	   in	   so	   far	  as	  this	  related	  to	  the	  chapel.	  However,	  the	  Minnesota	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  overturned	  this	  decision	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   entire	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   parties	  was	   a	  religious	   one.	   It	   held	   that	   deciding	   the	   case	   would	   involve	   excessive	   state	  entanglement	  in	  church	  affairs	  and	  would	  infringe	  the	  Church’s	  free	  exercise	  rights.	  	  This	  was	   the	  correct	  decision.	  As	   the	  Court	  pointed	  out,	   ‘Dignity’s	   sole	   reason	   for	  using	  the	  facility	  was	  for	  worship	  and	  involvement	  in	  the	  Catholic	  tradition…	  They	  utilized	   the	   facility	   because	   of	   its	   religious	   identity.’57	  In	   the	   context	   of	   this	   case	  there	   was	   little	   difference	   between	   using	   the	   Chapel	   and	   using	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  Center.	   Suggesting	   a	   less	   restrictive	   means	   of	   preserving	   the	   Newman	   Center’s	  rights	  by	  differentiating	  between	  different	  parts	  of	   the	  Center,	  as	   the	  Commission	  Appeals	   Board	   sought	   to	   do,	   although	   potentially	   appropriate,	   was	   here	   not	   an	  adequate	  response	  to	  the	  Center’s	  concerns.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Ibid.	  56	  472	  N.W.2d	  355	  (Minn.	  Ct.	  App.,	  1991).	  57	  Ibid.	  at	  357.	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  Although	  the	  case	  certainly	  involved	  discrimination,	  this	  was	  primarily	  an	  internal	  religious	   dispute	   and	   it	   would	   have	   been	   inappropriate	   for	   this	   to	   have	   been	  resolved	   by	   an	   external	   body.	   Dignity’s	   aim	   is	   to	   challenge	   the	   Catholic	   Church’s	  doctrines	  on	  homosexuality.	  Of	  course,	  within	  every	  religious	  organisation	  there	  is	  dissent,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  religious	  leadership	  must	  provide	  facilities	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  take	  place.	  The	  fact	  that	  non-­‐religious	  groups,	  such	  as	  Weight	  Watchers	  and	   the	  Alliance	   for	  Sustainable	  Agriculture,	  used	   the	  premises	   (although	  Dignity	  was	  the	  only	  one	  to	  use	  the	  Chapel)	  did	  not	  negate	  this.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Dignity,	  these	  relationships	  involved	  purely	  secular	  business	  relationships.	  The	  Center’s	  religious	  interest	   was	   therefore	   greater	   than	   Dignity’s.	   Dignity	   could	   continue	   its	   work	   in	  another	  venue.	  	  	  The	  Canadian	  case	  of	  Smith	  v	  Knights	  of	  Columbus58	  falls	  between	  the	  two	  cases	  just	  outlined.	  A	  lesbian	  couple	  booked	  a	  hall	  run	  by	  the	  Knights	  of	  Columbus,	  a	  Catholic	  fraternal	   organisation,	   and	   owned	   by	   the	   Archdiocese	   of	   Vancouver,	   for	   their	  wedding	  reception.	  The	  hall	  was	  on	  the	  same	  piece	  of	  land	  as	  a	  chapel	  and	  a	  parish	  school	   and	  was	   primarily	   used	   for	   parish	   activities,	   but	   could	   be	   hired	   for	   other	  events.	  It	  was	  advertised	  via	  a	  sign	  outside	  which	  had	  no	  indication	  of	  its	  religious	  character.	   Unfortunately	   the	   events	   that	   then	   unfolded	   were	   characterised	   by	  confusion	  and	  misunderstanding	  on	  both	  sides.	  The	  couple	  did	  not	  realise	  the	  hall	  was	   owned	   by	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   or	   who	   the	   Knights	   of	   Columbus	   were.	   The	  manager	   of	   the	   hall	   did	   not	   realise	   the	  wedding	  was	   to	   be	   between	   two	  women.	  When	  this	  was	  discovered,	  and	  apparently	  on	  the	  misunderstanding	  that	  a	  wedding	  rather	  than	  a	  wedding	  reception	  was	  to	  take	  place	  there,	  the	  Knights	  of	  Columbus	  cancelled	  the	  booking.	  	  	  The	   couple	   complained	   to	   the	   British	   Columbia	   Human	   Rights	   Tribunal.	   The	  question	   was	   whether	   the	   Knights’	   religious	   beliefs	   constituted	   a	   ‘bona	   fide	   and	  reasonable	   justification’	   for	   the	   discrimination.	   The	  Tribunal	   held	   that	   it	  was	   not	  enough	  that	  the	  Archdiocese	  owned	  the	  hall,	  especially	  since	  there	  was	  no	  warning	  given	  of	  any	  restriction	  on	   its	  use.	   It	   therefore	  correctly	  rejected	  an	  absolute	  rule	  which	   would	   nullify	   any	   non-­‐discrimination	   obligation	   of	   the	   Archdiocese,	  including	   a	   limited	   obligation	   to	   consider	   whether	   such	   discrimination	   was	  necessary	   for	   its	  religious	  purposes.	  Oddly	  though,	   the	  Tribunal	  also	  stated	  that	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  2005	  BCHRT	  544.	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‘person	  cannot	  be	  compelled	  to	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  conflicts	  with	  [his/her]	  belief.’	  This	  is	  clearly	  too	  wide.	  More	  relevantly,	  it	  held	  that	  the	  Knights	  did	  have	  the	  right	  to	   restrict	   the	   use	   in	   the	   circumstances,	   but	   it	   ‘could	   have	   taken	   additional	   steps	  that	  would	  have	  recognized	  the	  inherent	  dignity	  of	  the	  complainants	  and	  their	  right	  to	  be	  free	  from	  discrimination’.59	  
Quite	   clearly,	   the	   situation	   that	   arose	   was	   not	   the	   least	   restrictive	   means	   of	  interfering	   with	   the	   couple’s	   rights	   while	   preserving	   the	   Knights’	   rights.	   The	  Knights	  could	  have	  provided	  more	   information	   to	   the	  couple	  as	   to	   the	  ownership	  and	  management	  of	  the	  hall	  before	  the	  booking	  was	  taken,	  without	  this	  infringing	  their	  rights	  at	  all.	  In	  fact	  this	  would	  have	  greatly	  reduced	  the	  likelihood	  of	  conflict.	  The	   couple	   said	   that	   had	   they	   known	   this	   they	   would	   not	   have	   tried	   to	   make	   a	  booking	   because	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church’s	   position	   on	   gay	   marriage.	   To	   take	   a	  booking	  and	  then	  cancel	  it	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  cause	  more	  distress	  than	  if	  the	  booking	  had	  not	   been	   taken	   at	   all.	   Even	   in	   cancelling	   the	   booking	   the	  Knights	   could	   have	  done	  more	   to	   protect	   the	   couple’s	   interests	  while	   still	   acting	   in	   accordance	  with	  their	  beliefs.	  As	  the	  Tribunal	  suggested,	  it	  ‘could	  have	  taken	  steps	  such	  as	  meeting	  with	   the	   complainants	   to	   explain	   the	   situation,	   formally	   apologizing,	   immediately	  offering	   to	   reimburse	   the	   complainants	   for	   any	   expenses	   they	   had	   incurred	   and,	  perhaps	   offering	   assistance	   in	   finding	   another	   solution.’60	  The	   confusion	   as	   to	  whether	   there	  was	   to	  be	  a	  wedding	  reception	  or	  a	  wedding	   itself	  also	  meant	   that	  the	  situation	  was	  not	  given	  the	  consideration	  it	  deserved,	  even	  though	  the	  Knights	  later	  said	  they	  did	  not	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two	  and	  had	  religious	  objections	  to	  holding	   a	   wedding	   reception.	   	   Given	   all	   these	   factors,	   the	   couple’s	   claim	   should	  have	  been	  	  successful,	  as	  indeed	  it	  was.	  
These	   cases	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   organisation’s	   right	   to	   control	   the	   use	   of	   their	  premises	   is	   not	   absolute,	   even	   if	   there	   are	   religious	   objections	   to	   the	   activity.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  all	  these	  cases	  the	  religious	  organisation’s	  claim	  is	  taken	  seriously	  and	  assessed.	  It	  is	  not	  rejected	  a	  priori	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  can	  solve	  this	  dilemma	  by	  not	  offering	  the	  property	  for	  hire	  at	  all,	  although	  of	  course	  that	  is	  relevant,	  and	  may	  in	   the	   end	   be	   the	   best	   solution.	   Furthermore,	   the	   opposing	   interest	   is	   also	  recognised	   as	   important.	   These	   cases	   therefore	   take	   the	   conflict	   seriously	   and	  demonstrate	  a	  conciliatory	  form	  of	  reasoning.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  123.	  60	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  124.	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There	   has	   so	   far	   been	  no	   legal	   challenge	   to	   a	   refusal	   to	   hire	   out	   religious-­‐owned	  property	  under	  British	   law.	  Under	   the	  Equality	  Act	  2010,	  a	   religious	  organisation	  may	   discriminate	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   regarding	   the	   ‘use	   or	  disposal	  of	  premises	  owned	  or	  controlled’	  by	  a	  religious	  organisation,	  where	  this	  is	  necessary	   either	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   organisation,	   or	   ‘to	   avoid	  conflict	  with	  the	  strongly	  held	  convictions	  of	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  the	  members	  of	   the	   religion	   or	   belief’.61	  The	   EHRC’s	   (Equality	   and	  Human	   Rights	   Commission)	  guidance	  states,	  however,	  that	  a	  religious	  organisation	  may	  discriminate	  ‘provided	  it	  does	  not	  normally	  hire	  out	  its	  premises	  for	  payment’.62	  Under	  this	  interpretation,	  this	   could	   mean	   that	   if	   a	   religious	   organisation	   hired	   out	   its	   church	   for	   some	  purposes,	   such	   as	   concerts	   of	   religious	   music,	   this	   would	   be	   enough	   to	   mean	   it	  could	   not	   subsequently	   discriminate,	   even	   if	   all	   the	   previous	   events	   had	   been	  consistent	  with	  its	  religious	  mission.	  	  
It	   is	   unclear	   on	  what	   the	   EHRC’s	   interpretation	   is	   based.	   The	   Act	   states	   that	   the	  exemption	   does	   not	   apply	   where	   the	   organisation’s	   ‘sole	   or	   main	   purpose	   is	  commercial’.63	  A	   restriction	   on	  discrimination	   in	   commercial	   activities	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  justifiable,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  but	  the	  Act	  does	  not	  say	  that	  a	  non-­‐commercial	   organisation	   cannot	  hire	  out	   its	  premises	   for	  payment	   and	   the	  income	   used	   to	   support	   the	   organisation’s	   non-­‐commercial	   aims.	   The	   EHRC’s	  stance	  would	  be	  very	  restrictive.	  However,	  the	  contrary	  reading	  is	  also	  not	  without	  its	  problems,	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  propose	  an	  absolute	  right	  to	  discriminate.	  There	  is	   nothing	   to	   prevent	   gay	   organisations	   alone	   from	   being	   singled	   out	   where	   the	  organisation	   otherwise	   hires	   its	   premises	   out	   to	   all-­‐comers,	   since	   there	   is	   no	  proportionality	  test.	  This	  is	  therefore	  problematic.	  
Services	  Provided	  to	  the	  General	  Public	  	  Religious	  organisations’	   interactions	  with	  wider	  society	  go	  well	  beyond	  hiring	  out	  premises.	   As	   was	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   religious	   organisations	   also	  provide	   a	   number	   of	   welfare	   services,	   which	   may	   receive	   state	   funding,	   and	   in	  some	   cases	   would	   otherwise	   be	   provided	   by	   the	   state,	   such	   as	   health	   care,	  addiction	   counselling	   or	   care	   of	   children	   or	   vulnerable	   adults.	   In	   some	   cases	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Schedule	  23	  Para	  2.	  62	  Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  Your	  Rights	  to	  Equality	  from	  Voluntary	  and	  
Community	  Sector	  Organisations	  (Including	  Charities	  and	  Religion	  or	  Belief	  Organisations)	  (Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  2011)	  21.	  63	  Schedule	  23	  Para	  2(2).	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religious	   organisations	  may	   argue	   that	   due	   to	   reasons	   of	   conscience	   they	   cannot	  provide	  a	  particular	  service	  to	  gay	  people.	  	  
Many	   practical	   and	   symbolic	   issues	   arise	   out	   of	   these	   restrictions.	   The	   first	  practical	  issue	  is	  whether	  a	  service	  can	  still	  be	  easily	  accessed	  even	  if	  refused	  by	  a	  religious	  organisation.	   In	  most	  cases,	  but	  certainly	  not	  all,64	  the	  religious	  provider	  is	   likely	   to	   only	   be	   one	   provider	   among	   many	   and	   a	   person	   can	   choose	   to	   use	  another	   service.	   Indeed,	  permitting	   religious	  providers	  may	   increase	   choice	   since	  some	  people	  may	  prefer	   to	  use	   specifically	   religious	   services.	   It	  may	   therefore	   fit	  into	  policies	  of	  welfare	  pluralism,	  which	  aim	  to	  encourage	  competition	  and	  choice	  in	   the	  provision	  of	   services.65	  Furthermore,	   if	   large	   and	  well-­‐established	   charities	  refuse	  to	  provide	  services	  unless	  they	  have	  an	  exemption	  there	  may	  be	  an	  impact	  on	  services	  if	  this	  is	  denied.	  	  
Although	   these	  practical	   issues	   are	   important,	   symbolic	  harms	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  motivate	  disagreement.	   These	   symbolic	   harms	   can	  be	   characterised	   either	   as	   the	  loss	   to	   dignity	   caused	   by	   state-­‐sponsored	   discrimination66	  or,	   alternatively,	   as	  ‘concerning	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  discourse	  of	  equality	  and	  gay	  rights	  trumps	  the	  sincerely	  held	  faith-­‐based	  views	  of	  a	  minority.’67	  In	  Britain,	  these	  issues	  have	  arisen	  most	  controversially	  over	  whether	  Catholic	  adoption	  agencies	  can	  refuse	   to	  place	  children	   with	   gay	   couples.	   In	   many	   ways	   the	   controversy	   is	   not	   surprising.	   Any	  issue	   about	   the	   best	   environment	   for	   raising	   children,	   including	   either	   fear	   of	  children	  remaining	  in	  care	  when	  suitable	  parents	  are	  available	  or	  which	  challenges	  ‘the	   heterosexual	   family	   as	   the	   "gold	   standard"	   of	   parenting’68	  is	   bound	   to	   be	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  E.g.	  B.R.	  Clark,	  ‘When	  Free	  Exercise	  Exemptions	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  Liberty	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  Salamon,	  ‘The	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  Governance	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  Tools	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  Wintemute,	  ‘Religion	  vs.	  Sexual	  Orientation:	  A	  Clash	  of	  Human	  Rights?’	  [2002]	  Journal	  
of	  Law	  &	  Equality	  125.	  	  67	  C.F.	  Stychin,	  ‘Faith	  in	  Rights:	  The	  Struggle	  Over	  Same-­‐Sex	  Adoption	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  (2008)	  17	  Const	  F	  7,	  8.	  	  68	  Ibid.	  at	  8.	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controversial.	   Although	   practical	   issues	   of	   ensuring	   adequate	   access	   to	   adoption	  services	   were	   relevant,	   as	   Stychin	   argues,	   ‘the	   issue	   assumed	   a	   symbolic	  importance	  far	  beyond	  its	  practical	  relevance.	  It	  was	  widely	  agreed	  that	  there	  were	  many	  avenues	  open	  to	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  wishing	  to	  pursue	  adoption	  aside	  from	  the	  Catholic	   agencies	   and,	   intuitively,	   it	   seemed	  unlikely	   that	  many	   same-­‐sex	   couples	  would	  be	  adamant	  on	  pursuing	  adoption	  only	  through	  a	  Catholic	  agency.’69	  	  
In	   this	   heated	   debate,	   the	   adoption	   agencies	   could	   be	   characterised	   as	   bigots,	  ignoring	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   children	   in	   care	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   dogma.70	  Those	  arguing	   against	   an	   exemption	   could	   also	   be	   characterised	   as	   ignoring	   the	   best	  interests	  of	  children	  in	  forcing	  ‘unsuitable’	  parents	  onto	  vulnerable	  children	  and	  as	  forcing	   a	   minority	   to	   ‘either	   violate	   their	   clear	   Church	   doctrine,	   or	   ignore	   their	  religious	   vocation’.71	  In	   England	   this	   dispute	   has	   led	   to	   an	   extremely	   long,	   but	  unsuccessful,	  legal	  battle	  by	  one	  adoption	  agency,	  Catholic	  Care	  (Diocese	  of	  Leeds)	  (hereafter	  Catholic	  Care),	  to	  gain	  an	  exemption.	  This	  issue	  has	  also	  led	  to	  extensive	  debates	   in	   a	   number	   of	   states	   in	   America,	   most	   notably	   in	   Illinois	   and	  Massachusetts,	   but	   not	   to	   many	   legal	   challenges.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   Canada	   private	  adoption	   agencies	  may	   discriminate	   on	   religious	   grounds	   and	   this	   has	   not	   so	   far	  been	  noticeably	  controversial.	  	  
In	  Britain,	  voluntary	  adoption	  agencies	  do	  not	  care	  for	  children	  in	  care	  themselves	  but	  instead	  recruit	  and	  assess	  potential	  adoptive	  parents	  and	  provide	  support	  and	  training.	  The	  local	  authority	  is	  responsible	  for	  matching	  children	  with	  prospective	  parents	   approved	   by	   these	   agencies.	   Alternatively,	   potential	   adopters	   can	   apply	  directly	   to	   the	   local	   authority.	   As	   a	   concession,	   religious	   voluntary	   adoption	  agencies	   were	   granted	   an	   exemption	   from	   the	   prohibition	   of	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	   until	   December	   2008,	   under	   a	   temporary	   exemption	   from	   the	  Equality	   Act	   (Sexual	   Orientation)	   Regulations	   2007.	   The	   Regulations	   enacted	   a	  general	  rule	  that	  a	  person	  providing	  a	  service	  to	  the	  public	  or	  a	  section	  of	  the	  public	  must	  not	  discriminate72	  and	  which	  otherwise	  came	  into	  force	  on	  30	  April	  2007.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   continue	   to	   provide	   services,	   which	   it	   refused	   to	   do	   without	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ibid.	  	  70	  E.g.	  National	  Secular	  Society,	  ‘Catholic	  Adoption	  Agency	  Loses	  Fight	  Over	  Gay	  Adoption’	  3	  Nov	  2012	  http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2012/11/catholic-­‐adoption-­‐agency-­‐loses-­‐fight-­‐over-­‐gay-­‐adoption	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  71	  C.T.	  Rutledge,	  ‘Caught	  in	  the	  Crossfire:	  How	  Catholic	  Charities	  of	  Boston	  was	  Victim	  to	  the	  Clash	  Between	  Gay	  Rights	  and	  Religious	  Freedom’	  (2008)	  15	  Duke	  J	  Gender	  L	  &	  Pol'y	  297,	  299.	  72	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  s.29.	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exemption,	  Catholic	  Care	  attempted	   to	  bring	   itself	  under	  a	  permanent	  exemption,	  now	  s.193	  of	  the	  Equality	  Act	  2010	  which	  provides	  that:73	  	  
(1)	  A	  person	  does	  not	  contravene	  this	  Act	  only	  by	  restricting	  the	  provision	  of	  benefits	  to	  persons	  who	  share	  a	  protected	  characteristic	  if—	  (a)	  the	  person	  acts	  in	  pursuance	  of	  a	  charitable	  instrument,	  and	  	  (b)	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  benefits	  is	  within	  subsection	  (2).	  	  (2)	  The	  provision	  of	  benefits	  is	  within	  this	  subsection	  if	  it	  is—	  (a)	  a	  proportionate	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  legitimate	  aim,	  or	  (b)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preventing	  or	  compensating	  for	  a	  disadvantage	  linked	  to	  the	  protected	  characteristic.	  
	  This	   is	   essentially	   a	   legislatively-­‐mandated	  proportionality	   enquiry.	   Catholic	  Care	  wanted	   to	   change	   its	   Memorandum	   of	   Association	   to	   say	   that	   it	   only	   provided	  adoption	   services	   to	   married	   heterosexual	   couples.	   To	   do	   this	   it	   needed	   the	  permission	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  this	  could	  only	  be	  given	   if	  Catholic	  Care’s	  work	  fell	  under	  the	  exemption	   in	  s.193.	  This	   litigation	  has	  been	  extremely	   lengthy.	  The	  Charity	  Commission	  originally	  refused	  permission	  to	  make	  the	  required	  change	  in	  November	  2008.	  Catholic	  Care	  appealed	  to	  the	  Charity	  Tribunal	   in	   June	  2009,74	  which	  upheld	   this	  decision.	  This	  was	   further	  appealed	   to	  the	  High	   Court,75	  which	   held	   the	   change	   could	   potentially	   be	   lawful	   and	   sent	   the	  decision	   back	   for	   reconsideration	   by	   the	   Charity	   Commission.	   The	   Charity	  Commission	  again	  refused	  permission.76	  Catholic	  Care	  appealed	  this	  decision	  to	  the	  First-­‐Tier	   Tribunal	   (Charity)77	  and	   subsequently	   to	   the	   Upper	   Tribunal	   (Tax	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  The	  law	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  dispute	  until	  1	  October	  2010	  was	  as	  follows:	  
Reg	  18(1)	  Nothing	  in	  these	  Regulations	  shall	  make	  it	  unlawful	  for	  a	  person	  to	  provide	  benefits	  
only	  to	  persons	  of	  a	  particular	  sexual	  orientation	  if	  –	  (a)	  he	  acts	  in	  pursuance	  of	  a	  charitable	  
instrument,	  and	  (b)	  the	  restriction	  of	  benefits	  to	  persons	  of	  that	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  imposed	  
by	  reason	  of	  or	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  charitable	  instrument	  
(2)	  Nothing	  in	  these	  Regulations	  shall	  make	  it	  unlawful	  for	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  
England	  and	  Wales…	  to	  exercise	  a	  function	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  charity	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  appears	  
to	  the	  commission	  or	  to	  the	  holder	  to	  be	  expedient	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  charity,	  having	  
regard	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  charitable	  instrument.	  Similar	  issues	  arose	  under	  both	  provisions	  though.	  74	  Father	  Hudson’s	  Society	  and	  anor	  v	  Charity	  Commission	  [2009]	  PTSR	  1125.	  75	  Catholic	  Care	  (Diocese	  of	  Leeds)	  v	  Charity	  Commission	  for	  England	  and	  Wales	  [2010]	  EWHC	  520.	  76	  Decision	  of	  the	  Charity	  Commission	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  21	  July	  2010.	  77	  [2011]	  Eq	  LR	  597.	  The	  First-­‐Tier	  Tribunal	  (Charity)	  and	  Upper	  Tribunal	  (Tax	  and	  Chancery	  Chamber)	  have	  taken	  over	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Charity	  Tribunal	  and,	  in	  this	  respect,	  the	  High	  Court,	  following	  the	  coming	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Tribunals	  Courts	  and	  Enforcement	  Act	  2007.	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Chancery	  Chamber).78	  Both	  of	  these	  appeals	  were	  unsuccessful.	  	  
In	   Scotland,	   interpreting	   the	   same	   legislation,	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Scottish	   Charity	  Regulator	   (OSCR)	   initially	   gave	   permission	   for	   a	   Catholic	   adoption	   agency,	   St	  Margaret’s	  Children	  and	  Family	  Care	  Society,	  to	  change	  its	  Constitution	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  provide	  services	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  to	  give	  preference	  to	  married	  Catholic	  couples.	  This	  situation	  continued	  for	  a	  number	  of	   years,	   but	   the	   OSCR	   reconsidered	   its	   decision	   in	   January	   2013,	   following	   a	  complaint	  from	  the	  National	  Secular	  Society.	  However,	  the	  Scottish	  Charity	  Appeals	  Panel	  overturned	   this	  decision	   in	   January	  2014.79	  Importantly	   though,	   the	  charity	  did	   not	   have	   a	   blanket	   policy	   prohibiting	   gay	   people	   from	   becoming	   adoptive	  parents.	  Rather,	   it	  only	  gave	  preference	   to	   those	  who	  wished	   to	  adopt	  within	   the	  framework	  of	  Catholic	  teaching	  on	  the	  family,	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  adopted	  child	  were	   always	   considered	   to	   be	   paramount.	   Thus	   the	   Panel	   considered	   that	   the	  discrimination	   was	   indirect	   rather	   than	   direct.	   Nevertheless,	   there	   are	  inconsistencies	  between	  the	  Scottish	  and	  English	  decisions.	  
The	   issue	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   English	   dispute	   was	   whether	   Catholic	   Care	   could	  demonstrate	   that	   providing	   adoption	   services	   only	   to	   married	   heterosexual	  couples	  was	  a	  proportionate	  means	  of	  achieving	  a	  legitimate	  aim.	  The	  justification	  put	  forward	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  religious	  rights	  of	  the	  agency.	  Although	  there	  could	  be	   an	   argument	   that	   the	   work	   of	   a	   Catholic	   adoption	   agency	   was	   a	   direct	  outworking	  of	  its	  religious	  mission	  and	  therefore	  interference	  in	  the	  way	  it	  was	  run	  was	  a	  violation	  of	   its	  religious	  rights,80	  this	  argument	  was,	  at	   the	  time,	  doomed	  to	  failure	  on	  account	  of	  the	  very	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  Art	  9	  that	  had	  been	  given	  by	  the	   British	   courts.81	  As	   the	   courts	   had	   held	   that	   there	   is	   no	   interference	  where	   a	  person	   is	   required	   to	   choose	   between	   their	   employment	   and	   following	   their	  religious	   conscience,	   it	  would	   have	   been	   strange	   to	   hold	   there	   is	   an	   interference	  where	   a	   religious	   charity	   cannot	   run	   its	   services	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   wishes.	  Following	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  decision	  in	  Ladele	  v	  Islington	  LBC,82	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  service	  took	  place	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  also	  made	  finding	  an	  interference	  difficult.	  Although	   the	   test	   for	   interference	   is	   now	   broader	   after	   the	   ECtHR’s	   decision	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  [2012]	  UKUT	  395	  (TCC).	  79	  App	  2/13	  (31	  Jan	  2013).	  80	  Such	  an	  argument	  was	  though	  accepted	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Charity	  Appeals	  Panel,	  ibid.	  81	  See	  Ch	  4.	  82	  [2010]	  1	  WLR	  955.	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Eweida	  v	  UK,83	  to	  be	  successful,	  the	  claim	  must	  go	  beyond	  a	  mere	  licence	  to	  provide	  these	  services.	  In	  order	  to	  continue	  its	  service,	  Catholic	  Care	  would	  have	  to	  contract	  with	   the	  state.	  Essentially	   then,	  Catholic	  Care	  would	  have	  had	   to	  argue	   that	   there	  was	  an	  obligation	   to	  require	   the	  state	   to	   fund	  a	  particular	  activity	  by	  a	  particular	  organisation	  because	  of	  its	  religious	  nature.	  This	  would	  place	  such	  a	  burden	  on	  the	  state	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  accepted.	  	  
An	  American	  case	  is	  instructive	  on	  the	  point.	  The	  Illinois	  Circuit	  Court	  concluded	  in	  the	   factually	   very	   similar	   case	   of	   Catholic	   Charities	   of	   the	  Diocese	   of	   Springfield	   v	  
State	  of	  Illinois84	  that	  there	  is	  no	  legally	  cognisable	  interest	  in	  requiring	  the	  state	  to	  contract	   with	   a	   particular	   contractor.	  Catholic	   Charities	   had	   contracted	   annually	  with	  the	  state	  for	  forty	  years	  to	  provide	  foster	  care	  and	  adoption	  services.	  In	  2011	  the	  state	  refused	  to	  renew	  its	  contract	  because	  it	  would	  not	  provide	  these	  services	  to	   unmarried	   cohabiting	   couples.	   The	   Court	   held	   that	   since	   there	  was	   no	   legally	  recognised	   protected	   property	   interest	   in	   the	   renewal	   of	   its	   contracts,	   Catholic	  Charities	  had	  no	  claim	  when	  it	  was	  not	  renewed.	  
The	   justification	   Catholic	   Care	   instead	   advanced	   was	   based	   on	   the	   interests	   of	  children	   in	   care.	   The	   charity	   specialised	   in	   finding	   placements	   for	   ‘hard	   to	   place	  children’,	   which	   included	   older	   children,	   sibling	   groups	   and	   children	   with	  disabilities.	  It	  placed	  about	  ten	  children	  per	  year.	  The	  funding	  it	  received	  from	  the	  local	  authority	   for	  each	  child	   it	  placed	  was	  not	  sufficient	  payment	   for	   the	  work	   it	  did,	   leading	   to	   a	   shortfall	   of	   about	   £13,000	   per	   placement.	   It	   therefore	   relied	   on	  charitable	   donations	   to	   make	   up	   the	   difference.	   These	   largely	   came	   through	   the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  The	  Church	  stated	  that	  if	  the	  charity	  did	  not	  have	  an	   exemption	   it	   would	   no	   longer	   be	   operating	   in	   accordance	   with	   Catholic	  principles	   and	   it	   could	   therefore	   no	   longer	   support	   it.	   Since	   this	   income	   stream	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  available,	  the	  charity	  would	  have	  to	  close	  and	  its	  capacity	  and	  expertise	  would	  be	  lost.	  	  
The	   High	   Court	   held	   that	   this	   could	   in	   theory	   constitute	   justification	   but	  subsequently	   both	   the	   First-­‐Tier	   Tribunal	   (Charity)	   and	   the	  Upper	   Tribunal	   (Tax	  and	  Chancery	  Chamber)	  held	   that	   this	   justification	  was	  not	   in	  practice	  made	  out.	  The	   charity	   failed	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   it	   would	   affect	   to	   any	   great	   extent	   the	  interests	  of	  children	  in	  care,	  since	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  that	  more	  children	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  (2013)	  57	  EHHR	  8.	  84	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  Aug	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be	  adopted	   if	   it	   remained	  open.	  There	   therefore	  did	  not	  exist	   the	   ‘convincing	  and	  weighty	  reasons’	  required	  for	  discrimination	  based	  on	  sexual	  orientation	  by	  ECHR	  law.85	  	  
It	  may	  seem	  surprising	  that	  the	  closure	  of	  an	  adoption	  agency	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  number	   of	   children	   adopted.	   As	   explained	   in	   the	   judgments,	   this	   was	   mainly	  because	   of	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   adoption	   system	   and	   its	   funding.	   Voluntary	  adoption	   agencies	   are	   paid	   an	   ‘inter-­‐agency	   fee’	   by	   the	   local	   authority	   for	   each	  placement	   they	   make.	   However,	   because	   this	   is	   more	   expensive	   than	   placing	  children	   through	   the	   local	   authority	   itself,	   local	   authorities	   are	   reluctant	   to	   use	  such	  agencies.86	  Although	  if	  Catholic	  Care	  closed	  this	  would	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  routes	   by	   which	   an	   adopter	   could	   be	   approved,	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	  potential	  adopters	  registered	  with	  voluntary	  adoption	  agencies	  did	  not	  necessarily	  mean	   that	  more	   children	  would	   be	   adopted.	   Furthermore,	   as	   the	  Upper	  Tribunal	  pointed	   out,	   the	   local	   authorities	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   have	   experienced	   greater	  problems	   in	   finding	   adopters	   since	   Catholic	   Care	   stopped	   providing	   adoption	  services	   in	   2008,	   as	   they	   had	   simply	  made	  more	   use	   of	   other	   agencies.	   Although	  voluntary	   adoption	   agencies	   have	   higher	   success	   rates	   than	   local	   authorities,	  Catholic	   Care’s	   success	   rate	   was	   comparable	   to	   other	   voluntary	   agencies.	   There	  was	  therefore	  no	  particular	  benefit	  of	  Catholic	  Care	  continuing	  to	  provide	  services.	  
Refusing	  to	  permit	  it	  to	  discriminate	  was	  therefore	  the	  appropriate	  conclusion.	  An	  attention	   to	   the	   facts	   actually	   demonstrates	   that	   much	   of	   the	   reasonable	   fears	  caused	  by	  the	  ‘forced’	  closure	  of	  an	  adoption	  agency	  were	  misplaced,	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  current	  English	  experience.	  Whether	  an	  exemption	  was	  granted	  or	  not	  would	  seem	   to	   have	   little	   effect	   on	   the	   needs	   of	   children	   in	   care.	   This	   further	  demonstrates	   the	   lack	   of	   practical	   importance	   of	   the	   issue	   and	   could	   potentially	  lower	  some	  of	  the	  tension	  caused	  by	  refusing	  an	  exemption.	  	  
However,	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  the	  judgments	  and	  decisions.	  They	  are	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal’s	  judgment	  in	  Ladele,	  which	  had	  been	  interpreted	  to	   mean	   that	   there	   is	   an	   absolute	   rule	   that	   it	   is	   impermissible	   to	   rely	   on	  discriminatory	   religious	   ideas	   in	   the	   public	   sphere.	   In	   the	   Charity	   Commission’s	  decision	   there	   is	  perhaps	  also	  an	   implied	   lack	  of	   respect	   in	   the	  assertion	   that	   the	  views	   of	   Catholic	   donors	   who	   do	   not	   wish	   to	   donate	   to	   a	   charity	   that	   does	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  EB	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  47	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  86	  J.	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  Adoption	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  Schools	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follow	   the	   Catholic	   church’s	   teachings	   on	   the	   family	   cannot	   be	   relevant	   because	  these	  views	  are	  discriminatory.	  The	  Upper	  Tribunal,	  which	  held	  that	  the	  attitude	  of	  donors	   had	   a	   ‘legitimate	   place	   in	   a	   pluralist,	   tolerant	   and	   broadminded	   society’,	  though	   corrected	   this	   problem.87	  These	   judgments	   are	   also	   very	   clear	   on	   the	  importance	   of	   non-­‐discrimination,	   repeatedly	   holding	   that	   very	   weighty	   reasons	  must	  be	  given	  for	  discrimination.	  	  
Although	  this	  was	  the	  correct	   legal	  decision,	  the	  discussion	  so	  far	   leaves	  open	  the	  question	   of	   whether	   the	   government	   was	   necessarily	   right	   not	   to	   grant	   an	  exemption	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy.	  Practical	  concerns	  could	  have	  been	  met	  by	  notice	  requirements	   to	   prospective	   adopters	   that	   only	   heterosexual	   married	   couples	  would	  be	  accepted	  and	  an	  obligation	  to	  refer	  to	  other	  agencies	  if	  approached.88	  	  
Of	  course	  symbolic	  issues	  would	  still	  remain.	  There	  is	  the	  danger	  that	  the	  state	  will	  be	  seen	  as	  approving	  the	  view	  that	  gay	  couples	  are	  not	  suitable	  adopters.	  However,	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  in	  principle	  why	  this	  view	  should	  be	  ascribed	  to	  the	  state	  merely	  because	  an	  exemption	  is	  given.	  Rather	  it	  would	  only	  demonstrate	  that	  ‘these	  positions	  were	  merely	  tolerated,	  in	  the	  proper	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   that	   they	   were	   exceptions	   made	   to	   positions	   of	   which	   the	  government	   disapproved,	   but	   given	   on	   the	   principled	   ground	   that	   there	   was	   no	  imperative	  raison	  d’état	  why	  those	  conscientious	  objections	  should	  be	  overridden	  at	  the	  present	  stage.’89	  Nevertheless,	  this	  still	  involves	  an	  acceptance	  that	  these	  are	  views	  that	  can	  be	  tolerated	  and	  that	  ending	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  people	  is	  not	  an	   ‘imperative	  raison	  d’état’.	  An	  exemption	  can	  therefore	  undermine	  dignity	  since	  ‘people	  are	  harmed	  in	  respect	  of	  their	  civil	  status	  if	  they	  are	  refused	  a	  service	  that	  is	  available	  to	  all	  other	  citizens.’90	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  strong	  argument	  that	  if	  charities	  are	  to	  be	  given	  public	  money	  then	  the	  state	  can	  decide	  the	  terms	  on	  which	  the	  services	  are	  provided.	  The	  government	  may	   have	   a	   number	   of	   purposes	   alongside	   the	   practical	   provision	   of	   a	   service,	  which	   may	   include	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	   inclusivity.	   This	   may	   have	   a	   heavy	  impact	  on	  some	  charities,	  but	   the	  argument	  might	  be	  that,	   ‘if	   they	  cannot	   in	  good	  conscience	   provide	   the	   public	   service	   without	   sexual	   orientation	   discrimination	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	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then	  the	  solution	  is	  that	  they	  should	  withdraw	  from	  the	  public	  activity’.91	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   an	   exemption	   can	   fulfil	   a	   symbolic	   role	   in	   favour	   of	   religious	  conscience,	  as	  well	  as	  against	  gay	  people.	  It	  may	  symbolically	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  work	   of	   religious	   charities	   is	   valued	   and	   that	   religious	   beliefs	   are	   given	   a	   space	  within	   an	   accommodationist	   and	  pluralist	   society	   and	   thus	   reduce	   (whether	  well	  founded	  or	  not)	  fears	  of	  marginalisation.	  	  
We	   should	   be	   careful,	   however,	   not	   to	   create	   false	   dichotomies.	   There	   does	   not	  necessarily	   have	   to	   be	   an	   either/or	   situation	   where	   the	   only	   options	   are	   no	  exemption	   and	   the	   closure	   of	   adoption	   agencies	   or	   an	   exemption	   and	  discrimination.	   A	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   situation	   arising	   after	   the	   legislation	   in	   fact	  demonstrates	   this.	   Although	   some	   did	   stop	   their	   adoption	   placement	   service,	  ultimately	   most	   organisations	   found	   a	   way	   to	   reconcile	   their	   religious	   message	  with	  the	   law.92	  Religious	  agencies	  run	  by	  the	  Church	  of	  England,	  although	  initially	  opposed	   to	   the	   legislation,93 	  decided	   that	   they	   could	   comply	   with	   it	   without	  compromising	   their	   religious	   mission.	   This	   was	   also	   the	   case	   for	   one	   Catholic	  charity,	   Nugent	   Care,	   which	   continues	   to	   provide	   adoption	   services	   and	   has	  maintained	  its	  official	  religious	  links.94	  	  	  In	  other	  cases	  the	  situation	  is	  more	  complex.	  Although	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Bishop	  of	   Lancaster	   strongly	   opposed	   the	   legislation	   and	   demanded	   the	   charity	   in	   his	  diocese,	   Catholic	   Caring	   Services,	   sever	   its	   links	   with	   the	   Church	   if	   it	   decided	   to	  comply	  with	   it,95	  this	  did	  not	   lead	  to	   the	  organisation’s	  closure	  and	   indeed	   it	   took	  over	   the	  work	   of	   another	   Catholic	   adoption	   agency	   that	   had	   felt	   forced	   to	   close.	  Apart	  from	  changing	  its	  name	  to	  Caritas	  Care,	  and	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  Bishop	  as	  a	  trustee,	   there	   appear	   to	   be	   no	   other	   organisational	   changes. 96 	  The	   Catholic	  Children’s	  Society,	  now	  renamed	  Faith	  in	  Families,	  has	  similarly	  severed	  its	  formal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  M.	  Malik,	  ‘Religious	  Freedom,	  Free	  Speech	  and	  Equality:	  Conflict	  or	  Cohesion?’	  (2011)	  17	  
Res	  Publica	  21,	  37.	  	  92	  T.	  Philpot,	  ‘Keeping	  the	  Faith’,	  Community	  Care,	  22	  January	  2009.	  93	  BBC	  News,	  	  ‘Churches	  Unite	  over	  Adoption	  Row’,	  24	  January	  2007	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6293115.stm	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  94	  Accounts	  and	  information	  on	  each	  charity	  is	  available	  from	  the	  Charity	  Commission’s	  website:	  http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/search-­‐for-­‐a-­‐charity/?txt=nugent+care	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  95	  R.	  Butt,	  ‘Bishop	  Hits	  Out	  at	  Adoption	  Agency	  over	  Gay	  Couples	  Rule’,	  The	  Guardian	  21	  Dec	  2008.	  96	  Details	  available	  from	  the	  Charity	  Commission’s	  website:	  http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/search-­‐for-­‐a-­‐charity/?txt=caritas+care	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	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links	  with	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  but	  continues	  to	  exist.97	  	  	  Father	  Hudson’s	  Society,	  which	  originally	  sought	  an	  exemption	  alongside	  Catholic	  Care,	   dealt	   with	   the	   legislation	   by	   hiving	   off	   its	   adoption	   work	   into	   a	   separate	  charity,	   Adoption	   Focus.	  Whilst	   Father	  Hudson’s	   Society	   is	   still	   run	   as	   a	   Catholic	  charity,	   Adoption	   Focus	   is	   not.	   The	   Catholic	   Children’s	   Society	   (Arundel	   and	  Brighton,	   Portsmouth	   and	   Southwark)	   has	   reacted	   similarly,	   severing	   its	   official	  links	   with	   the	   Church	   and	   renaming	   itself	   Cabrini	   Children’s	   Services	   but	  maintaining	  unofficial	  links.	  All	  gifts	  from	  parishes	  and	  schools	  go	  into	  a	  restricted	  fund,	  which	  does	  not	  fund	  adoption	  services.98	  	  	  This	   variety	   of	   reactions	   to	   legislation	   is	   reflected	   in	   other	   jurisdictions.	   In	  Massachusetts,	  Illinois	  and	  Washington	  DC,	  Catholic	  charities	  have	  stopped	  placing	  children	   for	   adoption.	  However,	   such	   laws	  have	  not	   necessarily	  meant	   the	   entire	  closure	   of	   religious	   adoption	   agencies.	   In	   San	   Francisco,	   Catholic	   Charities	  ‘withdrew	   from	   direct	   child	   placement	   services	   but	   joined	   with	   a	   nonprofit	  organization	  that	  manages	  an	  Internet	  database	  of	  children	  available	  for	  adoption,	  and	  assists	  with	  adoption	   referrals	   to	   any	  prospective	  parent,	   including	  gays	  and	  lesbians.’99	  In	  Massachusetts,	  Catholic	  Charities	  of	  Boston	   transferred	   its	  adoption	  staff	  and	  caseload	  to	  a	  private	  agency.100	  	  	  The	   various	   responses	   to	   the	   legislation	   have	   been	   highlighted	   because	   they	  indicate	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   achieve	   solutions	   whereby,	   most	   importantly,	  children’s	   needs	   are	   met,	   but	   where	   also	   the	   interests	   in	   non-­‐discrimination	   of	  prospective	  adopters	  and	  society,	  and	   the	   interests	  of	   religious	  organisations	  and	  their	  staff	  can	  be	  also	  protected.	  Too	  often	  this	  topic	  was	  merely	  used	  as	  a	  ‘banner’	  where	  the	  discourse	  was	  ‘reduced	  to	  simplistic	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  positions’	  rather	  than	  a	  discussion	  which	  took	  as	  its	  basis	  ‘the	  equal	  worth	  of	  each	  person	  and	  tolerance	  for	  different	  ways	  of	  life’.101	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  an	   exemption.	   In	   many	   cases	   the	   actual	   result	   is	   not	   far	   off	   what	   would	   have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Details	  available	  from	  the	  Charity	  Commission’s	  website:	  http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/search-­‐for-­‐a-­‐charity/?txt=faith+in+families	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  98	  http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/search-­‐for-­‐a-­‐charity/?txt=cabrini+childrens+services.	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  99	  M.	  Minow,	  ‘Should	  Religious	  Groups	  Be	  Exempt	  from	  Civil	  Rights	  Laws?’	  (2007)	  BCL	  Rev	  781,	  843.	  100	  Ibid.	  101	  Ibid.	  at	  843.	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happened	   if	   there	   had	   been	   an	   exemption	  with	   a	   referral	   requirement:	   religious	  organisations	   are	   co-­‐operatively	   working	   with	   and	   referring	   to	   non-­‐religious	  agencies	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  this	  has	  included	  the	  transfer	  of	  staff.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  Many	  of	  the	  court	  decisions	  and	  pieces	  of	   legislation	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  justifiable.	   They	   demonstrate	   respect	   to	   both	   parties	   by	   recognising	   the	   difficult	  nature	   of	   these	   decisions	   and	   weighing	   the	   particular	   interests	   at	   issue.	  Nevertheless	   it	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   those	   cases	   which	   use	   a	  proportionality,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  balancing,	  test	  are	  best	  able	  to	  account	  for	  and	  weigh	  the	  different	   interests.	   In	  assessing	   these	  conflicts	   this	  approach	  has	   rejected	  any	  absolute	  right	  to	  discriminate,	  although	  it	  has	  suggested	  that	  discrimination	  should	  be	  permitted	  in	  relation	  to	  religious	  membership	  and	  worship.	  In	  considering	  these	  issues,	   the	   courts	   have	   rarely	   suggested	   that	   there	   is	   no	   real	   conflict	   between	  religious	   precepts	   and	   the	   law	   as	   the	   religious	   organisation	   has	   a	   choice	   as	   to	  whether	  it	  provides	  the	  service.	  This	  idea	  is	  though	  apparent	  in	  the	  next	  issue	  to	  be	  considered:	  religious	  individuals	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  services.	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  This	   final	   substantive	   chapter	   addresses	   the	   question	   of	   when	   individuals	   can	  discriminate	  in	  providing	  services.	  A	  desire	  to	  control	  who	  can	  be	  the	  recipient	  of	  services	  is	  not	  just	  limited	  to	  religious	  organisations.	  Religious	  individuals	  may	  also	  claim	  that	  their	  freedom	  of	  religion	  is	  breached	  when	  they,	  or	  the	  businesses	  they	  run,	   are	   required,	   as	   they	   see	   it,	   to	   facilitate	   or	   aid	   acts	   contrary	   to	   their	   beliefs,	  such	  as	  relating	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  A	  florist	  may	  refuse	  to	  provide	  flowers	  for	  a	  gay	   couple’s	   wedding,	   saying	   that,	   ‘As	   a	   born-­‐again	   Christian,	   I	   must	   respect	  my	  conscience	  before	  God	  and	  have	  no	  part	   in	  this	  matter.’1	  A	   landlord	  may	  refuse	  to	  rent	   a	   flat	   to	   a	   gay	   couple	   because	   he	   believes	   that	   ‘same-­‐sex	   relationships	   are	  “unnatural	  and	  against	  nature”	  and	  “the	  Bible	  warns	  against	  being	  associated	  with	  such	  wickedness”’.2	  This	  area	  raises	  some	  very	  complex	  issues,	  including	  the	  extent	  of	   religious	   rights	   and	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   businesses	   can	   have	   rights	   to	  manifest	   religious	   beliefs,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   central	   question	   of	  whether	   and	   how	   to	  balance	   conflicting	   rights.	   As	   before,	   it	  will	   be	   demonstrated	   that	   proportionality	  provides	  a	  workable	  and	  nuanced	  method	  of	  deciding	  these	  cases.	  These	  issues	  will	  be	   considered	   in	   the	   context	   of	   healthcare,	   housing	   and	   general	   commercial	  services.	   The	   range	   of	   situations	   where	   conflicts	   can	   arise	   is	   immense	   as	   is,	  correspondingly,	   the	   potential	   width	   of	   any	   exemption.	   For	   this	   reason	   among	  others,	  as	  will	  be	  demonstrated,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  claim	  an	  exemption	  than	  in	  other	  contexts.	  	  
Interference	  	  	  The	   question	   of	   whether	   there	   is	   an	   interference	   with	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	  religion,	  where	  a	  person	  claims	  they	  are	  religiously	  obliged	  to	  refuse	  to	  provide	  a	  service,	  can	  be	  a	  particularly	  difficult	  one.	  The	  English	  approach	  is	  evolving,	  partly	  due	  to	   the	  ECtHR’s	  decision	   in	  Eweida	  v	  UK.3	  As	  previously	  outlined,	   the	  ECtHR	  in	  
Eweida	  rejected	   the	   ‘specific	   situation	   rule’	  which	  had	  held	   that	   if	   a	  person	   could	  avoid	  a	  conflict	  by	  resigning	  their	  employment	  or	  taking	  similar	  action	  then	  there	  was	   no	   interference	   with	   the	   right.	   However,	   this	   principle	   was	   never	   as	  straightforwardly	   accepted	   in	   the	   present	   context	   as	   it	   was	   in	   the	   employment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-­‐brunswick/story/2011/03/16/nb-­‐riverview-­‐florist-­‐1009.html	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  2	  Robertson	  and	  Anthony	  v	  Goertzen	  2010	  NTHRAP	  1	  (5th	  September	  2010).	  3	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  8.	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sphere,	  even	  though	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  a	  person	  could	  give	  up	  their	  business	  and	  find	  alternative	  employment	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  
These	   issues	   were	   raised	   in	   Bull	   v	   Hall	   and	   Preddy4	  (hereafter	   Bull),	   which	   was	  decided	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  November	  2013.	  A	  similar	  case,	  Black	  and	  Morgan	  
v	  Wilkinson	  (hereafter	  Black)5	  reached	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  July	  2013.	  The	  facts	  of	  both	  cases	  are	  simple.	  In	  Bull	  the	  owners	  of	  a	  Bed	  and	  Breakfast	  business	  refused	  to	  let	   a	   same-­‐sex	   couple	   in	   a	   civil	   partnership	   stay	   in	   a	   double	   room,	   although	   they	  would	  have	  allowed	   them	   to	   stay	   in	  a	   twin	  bedded	  room	  had	  one	  been	  available,	  because	   they	   felt	   this	   would	   be	   condoning	   sexual	   activity	   outside	   opposite-­‐sex	  marriage	  and	  this	  contravened	  their	  beliefs.	  In	  Black	  too	  the	  owners	  refused	  to	  let	  a	  same-­‐sex	  couple	  share	  a	  room,	  but	  the	  couple	  was	  not	  in	  a	  civil	  partnership.	  	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	   accepted	   that	   the	  Bulls’	   rights	  under	  Article	  9	  were	   engaged,	  although	   this	  may	   have	   been	   because	   the	   assumption	  was	   not	   challenged	   in	   the	  appeal.	  Lady	  Hale	  stated	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  had	  reached	  the	  same	  conclusion.	  	  However,	   this	   is	   slightly	   open	   to	   doubt.	   Rather,	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   gave	   two	  substantive	  judgments,	  which	  appear	  to	  reach	  different	  conclusions	  as	  to	  whether	  there	   was	   an	   interference,	   with	   the	   third	   judge	   agreeing	   with	   both	   judgments.	  6	  Rafferty	  LJ’s	  judgment	  appears	  to	  adopt	  the	  specific	  situation	  rule,	  that	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  interference	  with	  freedom	  of	  religion	  where	  a	  conscientious	  dilemma	  could	  be	  avoided	   by	   resignation	   or	   similar	   conduct.	   She	   quotes	   approvingly	   the	   Court	   of	  Appeal’s	  discussion	  in	  Ladele	  v	  Islington	  LBC7	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  case,	  Pichon	  and	  Sajous	  v	  
France,8	  which	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  interference	  with	  pharmacists’	  rights	  under	  Article	  9	  where	  they	  were	  fined	  for	  refusing	  to	  supply	  contraception	  because	  they	  could	  manifest	  their	  beliefs	  outside	  a	  professional	  context.	  However,	  since	  she	  runs	  this	   issue	   together	   with	   that	   of	   whether	   ‘the	   limitations	   are	   necessary	   in	   a	  democratic	  society	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  others’,	  whether	  she	  actually	  adopts	  the	  specific	  situation	  rule	   is	  unclear.	  Since	  she	  concludes	  that,	  ‘to	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  Regulations	   limit	   the	  manifestation	   of	   the	  Appellants’	  religious	  beliefs,	  the	  limitations	  are	  necessary’,9	  she	  avoids	  the	  important	  question	  of	   whether	   there	   is	   an	   interference.	   The	   concurring	   judgment	   of	   Morritt	   LJ	   did	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  [2013]	  UKSC	  73.	  5	  [2013]	  1	  WLR	  2490.	  6	  [2012]	  1	  WLR	  2514.	  7	  [2010]	  1	  WLR	  955.	  8	  App	  no.	  49853/99	  (2nd	  Oct	  2001).	  9	  Supra	  n.	  6	  at	  2531.	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however	  hold	   that	   there	  was	  an	   interference	  with	   the	  Bulls’	   religious	  beliefs,	   and	  this	   was	   also	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   in	   Black.	   In	   any	   case	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  was	   right	   to	   treat	   the	   two	   issues	   of	   interference	   and	   justification	  separately.	  Whether	  a	  right	  has	  been	  infringed	  is	  an	  analytically	  separate	  question	  from	   whether	   this	   infringement	   is	   justified.	   Moreover,	   as	   has	   been	   argued	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  even	  where	  a	  claim	  must	  fail	  because	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  conflicting	  right,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  acknowledge	   the	   loss	  caused.	  Separating	   these	  two	  questions	  can	  help	  to	  do	  this.	  	  
In	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  right	  that	  an	  interference	  should	  have	  been	  found	  because	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  link	  between	  the	  owners’	  belief,	  that	  sexual	  activity	  outside	  heterosexual	  marriage	   is	   immoral	   and	   that	   they	   would	   be	   facilitating	   it	   by	   providing	  accommodation,	  and	  their	  act	  in	  refusing	  to	  let	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  stay.	  If	  this	  were	  not	   the	   case,	   the	   dilemma	   they	   face	   between	   being	   asked	   either	   to	   violate	   their	  conscience	   or	   to	   give	   up	   their	   business,	   which	   may	   be	   very	   difficult	   financially,	  would	  be	  given	  no	  legal	  weight	  or	  recognition.	  	  
In	  Canada,	  under	  a	  proportionality	  test,	  it	  is	  recognised	  that	  there	  is	  an	  interference	  in	  such	  circumstances.	  In	  Ontario	  (Human	  Rights	  Commission)	  v	  Brockie,10	  a	  printer	  refused	  to	  print	  stationery	  for	  the	  Canadian	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Archives	  because	  he	  believed,	  ‘that	  homosexual	  conduct	  is	  sinful	  and,	  in	  the	  furtherance	  of	  that	  belief,	  he	  must	   not	   assist	   in	   the	   dissemination	   of	   information	   intended	   to	   spread	   the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  gay	  or	  lesbian	  lifestyle.’11	  Although	  he	  did	  not	  object	  to	  serving	  gay	  customers	  and	  had	  indeed	  provided	  services	  to	   ‘a	  commercial	  organization	  which	  produces	  underwear	  marketed	  to	   the	  gay	  male	  population’,12	  he	   felt	   that	   this	  was	  too	  direct	  a	  link	  and	  therefore	  violated	  his	  conscience.	  This	  was	  conceded	  to	  be	  an	  interference	  with	  his	  rights.	  
Compared	   to	   the	   straightforwardness	   of	   this	   conclusion	   under	   a	   proportionality	  test,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  religious	  freedom	  right	  is	  engaged	  under	  US	  law	  is	  very	  complex	  and	  may	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  under	  a	  number	  of	  legal	  tests.	  Firstly,	  it	   could	   be	   argued	   there	   is	   an	   infringement	   of	   a	   person’s	   free	   exercise	   rights.	  However,	  since	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Employment	  Division	  v	  Smith13	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  [2002]	  222	  DLR	  (4th)	  174.	  	  11	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  3.	  12	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  15.	  13	  494	  US	  872	  (1990).	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laws	   could	   only	   be	   challenged	   on	   this	   basis	   where	   they	   were	   not	   neutral	   or	  generally	  applicable,	  this	  is	  only	  a	  limited	  right.	  Evidently,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	   laws	  will	  be	  neutral	  and	  generally	  applicable,	   in	   that	   they	  prohibit	  everyone	  from	  discriminating	  on	  particular	  grounds,	  and	  do	  not	  target	  those	  who	  believe	  they	  should	  discriminate	  for	  certain	  religious	  reasons.	  	  
However,	   Smith	   does	   permit	   challenges	   where	   a	   ‘hybrid’	   right	   is	   infringed.	   As	  explained	   earlier, 14 	  this	   is	   where	   the	   Free	   Exercise	   Clause	   is	   considered	   ‘in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  constitutional	  protections,	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  of	  the	   press.’15	  What	   this	   means	   in	   practice	   is	   unclear.	   This	   concept	   has	   been	   the	  subject	  of	  much	  academic	  criticism16	  and	  indeed,	   ‘‘one	  circuit	  court	  of	  appeals	  has	  categorically	  declined	  to	  apply	  the	  hybrid	  rights	  doctrine,	  citing	  its	  unworkability,	  and	  several	  other	  federal	  appellate	  and	  trial	  courts	  have	  criticized	  it.’	  17	  It	  has	  been	  interpreted	   as	   meaning	   that	   there	   must	   be	   a	   ‘colourable’	   or	   ‘conjoined’	   claim	  regarding	  another	   right,18	  although	   this	  does	  not	  make	   its	  meaning	  much	   clearer.	  Nevertheless	  it	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  some	  cases	  in	  this	  context.	  	  
In	   Thomas	   v	   Anchorage	   Equal	   Rights	   Commission19	  a	   landlord	   claimed	   that	   being	  required	   to	   rent	  property	   to	  unmarried	  couples	   infringed	  his	   free	  exercise	   rights.	  The	  Ninth	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  held	  the	  claim	  was	  sufficiently	  associated	  with	  freedom	  of	  speech	  to	  make	  the	  claim	  a	  hybrid	  claim	  under	  Employment	  Division	  v	  
Smith,	   since	   landlords	  were	   forbidden	   to	   state	   that	   they	   preferred	   not	   to	   rent	   to	  unmarried	   couples.	   A	   compelling	   interest	   therefore	   had	   to	   be	   demonstrated.	   The	  case	  demonstrates	   the	   flawed	  and	   arbitrary	  nature	  of	   the	  hybrid	   right	   exception.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  landlord	  could	  state	  that	  he	  preferred	  not	  to	  rent	  to	  unmarried	  couples	  is	  only	  a	  peripheral	  concern.	  The	  real	  issue	  is	  not	  what	  he	  can	  say,	  but	  what	  he	   can	  do.	   It	   is	   also	   far	   from	  clear	  why	  an	  additional	   small	   interest	  of	   a	  different	  kind	  should	  make	  a	  case	  subject	  to	  strict	  scrutiny,	  while	  a	  great	   interference	  with	  one	  right	  does	  not	  require	  any	  justification.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  See	  supra	  at	  p57-­‐8.	  15	  Supra	  n.13	  at	  881.	  16	  See	  e.g.	  K.	  Greenawalt,	  ‘Quo	  Vadis:	  The	  Status	  and	  Prospects	  of	  "Tests"	  under	  the	  Religion	  Clauses’	  [1995]	  Sup	  Ct	  Rev	  323;	  D.	  Laycock,	  ‘The	  Remnants	  of	  Free	  Exercise’	  [1990]	  Sup	  Ct	  
Rev	  1;	  Note,	  ‘The	  Best	  of	  a	  Bad	  Lot:	  Compromise	  and	  Hybrid	  Religious	  Exemptions’	  (2010)	  123	  Harv	  L	  Rev	  1494.	  17	  S.	  Aden	  and	  L.	  Strang,	  ‘When	  a	  “Rule	  Doesn’t	  Rule:	  The	  Failure	  of	  the	  Oregon	  Employment	  
Division	  v.	  Smith	  “Hybrid	  Rights	  Exception”’	  (2003)	  108	  Penn	  St	  L	  Rev	  573.	  	  18	  Ibid.	  	  19	  165	  F.3d	  692	  (Alaska,	  1999).	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The	  second	  route	  by	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  right	  has	  been	  infringed	  is	  to	  bring	  a	   claim	  under	   the	   federal	  Religious	  Freedom	  Restoration	  Act	   (RFRA).	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  this	  reinstated	  the	  test	  under	  constitutional	  law	  before	  Smith	  and	  therefore	  requires	  a	  compelling	  state	  interest	  to	  be	  demonstrated	  when	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  burden	  on	  religious	  belief.	  However,	  it	  has	  limited	  coverage.	  Cases	  can	  only	  be	  brought	  against	  the	  state	  and	  not	  in	  disputes	  between	  private	  parties.	  It	  was	  also	  held	  in	  City	  of	  Boerne	  v	  Flores20	  that	  it	  could	  only	  constitutionally	  apply	  to	  federal,	   rather	   than	   state	   action.	   Since	   prohibitions	   against	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	  are,	  apart	  from	  rare	  exceptions,21	  state	  rather	  than	  federal	  laws,	  it	  is	  not	   relevant	   to	   this	   area	   of	   law.	   Some	   states	   do	   have	   a	   state	   RFRA,	   or	   have	  equivalent	  protection	  in	  the	  state	  constitution.	  These	  provide	  similar	  protection	  to	  the	   federal	  RFRA,	  but	   apply	   to	   state	   rather	   than	   federal	   law.	  While	   they	   could	  be	  used	   to	   challenge	   state	   anti-­‐discrimination	   legislation,	   these	   too	   do	   not	   apply	   in	  disputes	  between	  private	  parties.	  	  	  Under	  US	  law	  therefore	  it	  may	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  have	  a	  religious	  claim	  recognised	  as	   even	   infringing	   a	   right.	   For	   example,	   in	   Elane	   Photography	   LLC	   v	   Willock,22	  summary	  judgment	  was	  granted	  against	  a	  photography	  company	  which	  refused	  to	  photograph	   a	   same-­‐sex	   couple’s	   commitment	   ceremony	   because	   the	   owners	  believed	  that	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  was	  immoral.	  The	  owners,	  the	  Huguenins,	  had	  no	  claim	  under	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  clause	  because	  the	  law	  prohibiting	  discrimination	  in	  public	   accommodations	   did	   not	   ‘selectively	   burden	   any	   religion	   or	   religious	  belief’.23	  They	  had	  no	  claim	  under	  either	  the	  New	  Mexico	  RFRA	  or	  the	  federal	  RFRA,	  because	  the	  other	  party	  was	  a	  private	  individual.	  The	  Huguenins	  therefore	  have	  no	  opportunity	   to	   raise	   their	   claims	   at	   all	   and	   so	   the	   harm	   caused	   to	   them	   is	   not	  recognised.	  They	  are	  essentially	  told	  that	  they	  have	  suffered	  no	  injury	  even	  though	  they	   have	   been	   put	   to	   a	   difficult	   conscientious	   dilemma	   (although	   of	   course	   this	  may	  well	  be	  justified).	  	  Even	   if	   it	   is	   accepted	   that	   a	   RFRA	   applies,	   there	   have	   been	   further	   difficulties	   in	  establishing	   that	   being	  prohibited	   from	  discriminating	   in	  providing	   such	   services	  constitutes	   a	   substantial	   burden	   on	   a	   person’s	   free	   exercise.	   In	   Smith	   v	   Fair	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  521	  US	  507	  (1997).	  21	  E.g.	  federal	  government	  employees:	  Executive	  Order	  13087	  of	  May	  28,	  1998.	  22	  284	  P.3d	  428	  (N.M.App,	  2012),	  309	  P.3d	  53	  (N.M.	  2013).	  See	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  this	  case,	  M.	  Pearson,	  ‘Religious	  Claims	  vs.	  Non-­‐Discrimination	  Rights:	  Another	  Plea	  for	  Difficulty’	  Rutgers	  J	  of	  L	  &	  Relig	  (forthcoming	  2014).	  23	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  37.	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Employment	  and	  Housing	  Commission,24	  a	  woman	  refused	   to	   rent	  an	  apartment	   to	  an	  unmarried	  couple	  because	  she	  believed	  that	  sex	  outside	  marriage	  was	  immoral	  and	   ‘that	   God	   will	   judge	   her	   if	   she	   permits	   people	   to	   engage	   in	   sex	   outside	   of	  marriage	   in	   her	   rental	   units	   and	   that	   if	   she	   does	   so,	   she	  will	   be	   prevented	   from	  meeting	  her	  deceased	  husband	  in	  the	  hereafter.’25	  The	  Court	  though	  held	  there	  was	  no	   substantial	   burden	   because	   the	   law	   only	  made	   compliance	  with	   her	   religious	  beliefs	  more	   expensive	   and	   ‘investment	   in	   rental	   units	   [is	   not]	   the	   only	   available	  income-­‐producing	   use	   of	   her	   capital’26	  She	   could	   therefore,	   ‘avoid	   the	   burden	   on	  her	  religious	  exercise	  without	  violating	  her	  beliefs	  or	  threatening	  her	  livelihood.’27	  	  This	  is	  a	  similar	  analysis	  to	  the	  ‘specific	  situation’	  rule	  in	  ECHR	  and	  British	  law	  and	  like	   that	   rule	   it	   is	   severely	   restrictive.	   Firstly,	   as	   a	   practical	  matter	   it	   is	   perhaps	  questionable	  whether	  other	  forms	  of	  livelihood	  were	  easily	  available	  to	  an	  elderly	  woman	  whose	  income	  was	  based	  on	  the	  rent	  from	  four	  properties.	  Furthermore,	  as	  O’Neil	  puts	  it,	  ‘the	  potential	  impact	  is	  much	  deeper	  than	  simply	  making	  adherence	  to	   faith	  more	   expensive.	   Suggesting	   that	   rental	   property	  owners	   could	   find	  other	  lucrative	  investments	  has	  a	  callous	  ring,	  quite	  at	  variance	  with	  Sherbert’s	  solicitude	  for	  the	  conscientious	  Sabbatarian.’28	  Sherbert	  v	  Verner29	  was	  a	  Supreme	  Court	  case	  which	  held	   that	   a	  woman’s	   free	   exercise	   right	  was	   substantially	  burdened	  where	  she	   lost	   her	   job	   because,	   as	   a	   Seventh	   Day	   Adventist,	   she	   refused	   to	   work	   on	  Saturdays,	   and	   she	  was	   then	  denied	  unemployment	   benefit	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   she	  failed	   to	   accept	   suitable	   work	   without	   good	   cause.	   This	   was	   recognised	   even	  though	   she	  was	   not	   directly	   prevented	   from	  practising	   her	   religion,	   but	   rather	   it	  was	  only	  made	  ‘more	  expensive’.	  
Smith	  v	  Fair	  Employment	  and	  Housing	  Commission	   fails	   to	   take	   seriously	   rights	   of	  conscience.	   No	   justification	   is	   required	   to	   be	   given	   for	   acts	   which	   may	   place	  significant	  burdens	  on	  Smith’s	  ability	  to	  live	  in	  accordance	  with	  her	  beliefs.	  	  As	  Lin	  puts	   it,	   it	   is	   surprising	   to	   say	   that	   a	   person’s	   right	   of	   freedom	   of	   religion	   is	   not	  burdened	   in	   a	   situation	   where	   she	   is	   ‘preclude[d]	   entirely…	   from	   engaging	   in	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  12	  Cal.	  4th	  1143	  (Cal.,	  1996).	  25	  Ibid.	  at	  1194.	  26	  Ibid.	  at	  1175.	  27	  Ibid.	  	  28	  R.	  O’	  Neil,	  ‘Religious	  Freedom	  and	  Nondiscrimination:	  State	  RFRA	  Laws	  Versus	  Civil	  Rights’	  (1999)	  32	  UC	  Davis	  L	  Rev	  785.	  29	  374	  US	  398	  (1963).	  
	   208	  
particular	  type	  of	  commercial	  activity	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  [her]	  religious	  convictions,’30	  unless	  she	  violates	  her	  conscience.	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  she	  should	  not	  ultimately	   have	   to	   bear	   this	   burden,	   but	   the	   Court’s	   approach	   excludes	   this	   cost	  entirely	  from	  consideration.	  	  
Indeed,	   the	   extremely	   limited	   nature	   of	   religious	   freedom	   rights	   under	  US	   law	   is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  religious	  claimants	  have	  put	  forward	  often	  artificial	  arguments,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  have	   a	   case	  decided	  under	   a	  more	  beneficial	   test.	   In	  
Elane	  Photography	  the	  argument	  was	  made	  that	  the	  photography	  had	  an	  expressive	  element,	   and	   therefore	   the	   Huguenins’	   freedom	   of	   speech	   was	   violated	   because	  they	   would	   thereby	   be	   forced	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   they	   approved	   of	   same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  This	  argument	  was	  advanced	  because,	  in	  contrast	  to	  free	  exercise	  cases,	  an	   interference	   with	   freedom	   of	   speech	   would	   lead	   to	   strict	   scrutiny.	   However,	  both	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   of	   New	   Mexico	   and	   the	   New	   Mexico	   Supreme	   Court	  rejected	   this	   claim.	   The	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   held	   that	   ‘Elane	   Photography’s	  commercial	   business…	   is	   not	   so	   inherently	   expressive	   as	   to	   warrant	   First	  Amendment	   protections.	   The	   conduct	   of	   taking	   wedding	   photographs,	  unaccompanied	   by	   outward	   expression	   of	   approval	   for	   same-­‐sex	   ceremonies,	  would	   not	   express	   any	   message.’31	  It	   also	   stated	   that	   they	   could	   have	   placed	   a	  message	  on	  their	  website	  that	  they	  disapproved	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  	  	  The	  New	  Mexico	  Supreme	  Court’s	  argument	  was	  broader.	  It	  too	  considered	  that	  the	  Huguenins	  were	  unlikely	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  endorsing	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  but	  also	  held	  that	  in	  any	  case	  where	  a	  business	  is	  a	  public	  accommodation,	  being	  required	  not	  to	  discriminate	   in	   providing	   services	   to	   the	   public	   would	   not	   affect	   its	   free	   speech	  rights.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   state	   is	   not	   thereby	   forcing	   the	   business	   to	   express	   a	  particular	  message.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	   ‘this	  determination	  has	  no	  relation	  to	  the	  artistic	  merit	  of	  photographs	  produced	  by	  Elane	  Photography.’32	  Whichever	  route	  is	  taken	  to	  this	  conclusion,	  the	  Huguenins	  were	  not	  successful.	  	  While	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   argument	   is	   perhaps	   too	   broad,	   the	   conclusion	   is	  unsurprising.	  The	  Huguenins’	  claim	  was	  a	  claim	  of	  conscience	  not	  expression.	  Their	  real	   fear	   was	   not	   that	   people	   would	   misinterpret	   their	   beliefs,	   but	   that	   they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  A.	  Lin,	  ‘Sexual	  Orientation	  Antidiscrimination	  Laws	  and	  the	  Religious	  Liberty	  Protection	  Act:	  The	  Pitfalls	  of	  the	  Compelling	  State	  Interest	  Inquiry’	  (2001)	  89	  Geo	  LJ	  719,	  732.	  31	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  decision	  supra	  n.22	  at	  439.	  32	  Supreme	  Court	  decision,	  supra	  n.22.	  at	  66.	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believed	   aiding	   certain	   activities	   was	   wrong.	   Although	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   speech	  argument	   is	  recognised,	   it	   is	  a	   failure	  to	  appreciate	  the	  value	  of	  conscience	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  casting	  around	  for	  alternative	  arguments.	  
These	   issues	   demonstrate	   problems	   with	   finding	   an	   interference	   because	   of	   the	  limited	   coverage	   of	   rights	   protection	   under	   US	   law.	   Nevertheless,	   even	   under	   a	  proportionality	  approach,	  which	  takes	  a	  wide	  interpretation	  of	  rights,	  the	  objection	  could	  be	  raised	  that	  the	  disapproved	  of	  act	  is	  too	  remote	  from	  the	  action	  a	  person	  is	  being	   asked	   to	   do	   to	   count	   as	   an	   interference.	   Thus	   for	   example,	   by	   providing	   a	  wedding	   cake,	   a	   service	   provider	   is	   not	   directly	   facilitating	   a	   same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  still	   less	  being	  asked	   to	  enter	   into	  one	  herself.	   It	   could	  be	  argued	   that	  she	  cannot	  claim	   that	   her	   conscience	   is	   affected	  where	   she	   is	   not	  directly	   responsible	   for	   an	  ‘immoral’	  act.	  	  	  Whilst	  in	  some	  cases	  involving	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  the	  link	  will	  be	  too	  remote,	  this	   is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Generally,	  aiding	  an	   ‘immoral’	  act	  can	  be	  sufficient	   for	  both	  moral	  and	  even	  legal	  culpability.33	  If	  I	  sold	  a	  knife	  to	  someone	  knowing	  that	  he	  was	   going	   to	   use	   it	   to	   stab	   his	   partner	   it	   would	   not	   be	   an	   answer	   to	   my	  moral	  culpability	   that	   I	   sold	  knives	   in	   the	  ordinary	   course	  of	  my	  business.	  There	  would	  still	  be	  moral	  culpability	  even	  if	  there	  no	  were	  no	  causal	  link,	  for	  example	  if	  I	  knew	  that	   another	  provider	  would	   sell	   the	   knife.	   This	   is	   of	   course	   an	   extreme	  example	  but	  my	  point	  is	  only	  that	  facilitation	  or	  approval	  of	  particular	  acts	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  morally	  relevant.	  	  	  There	  should	  also	  be	  no	  automatic	  bar	  to	  finding	  an	  interference	  in	  the	  commercial	  sphere.	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   act	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   public	  sphere	  may	  be	  very	  relevant	   to	   the	  question	  of	   justification	  because	   it	  may	  affect	  the	  rights	  of	  others,	  but	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  should	  be	  an	  automatic	  bar	  on	  such	  claims	  or	   that	   interference	  should	  be	  assessed	  so	  narrowly	  as	   to	  exclude	  them.	  There	  is	  still	  a	  relevant	  conflict	  between	  a	  person’s	  perceived	  conscientious	  obligation	   and	   a	   state	   enforced	   legal	   obligation.	   It	   may	   be	   true	   that	   there	   is	   no	  infringement	  of	   ‘core’	   beliefs,	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   interference	  with	   religious	  worship,	  but,	   as	   has	   been	   demonstrated,34	  this	   is	   not	   a	   sufficient	   understanding	   of	   what	  freedom	  of	   religion	   requires.	   Although	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  Catholic	  teaching	  on	  cooperation	  with	  immoral	  acts	  see	  J.	  Garvey	  and	  A.	  Coney,	  ‘Catholic	  Judges	  in	  Capital	  Cases’	  (1997)	  81	  Marq	  L	  Rev	  303.	  34	  See	  Ch	  2.	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others,	  this	  can	  be	  resolved	  by	  the	  use	  of	  a	  proportionality	  test,	  rather	  than	  by	  its	  categorical	  exclusion.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	   as	   I	   have	   previously	   argued,	   there	   still	  must	   be	   a	   close	   connection	  between	  the	  act	  and	  the	  belief	  and	  not	  every	  act	  motivated	  by	  a	  religious	  belief	  will	  be	   an	   interference.	   Since	  whether	   or	   not	   there	   is	   an	   interference	  will	   depend	   on	  context,	   the	  exact	  point	  at	  which	   it	  becomes	   too	  remote	   is	  difficult	   to	  establish	   in	  the	  abstract	  and	  will	  depend	  on	  a	   fact-­‐specific	  analysis.	  An	  example	  of	  where	   the	  act	   is	   too	   remote	   is	   Blanding	   v	   Sports	   &	   Health	   Club.35 	  A	   gay	   man	   had	   his	  membership	   of	   a	   gym	   revoked	   because	   he	   performed	   ‘a	   quick,	   impulsive	   dance	  step’	   during	   a	   conversation	   with	   other	   members	   about	   a	   piece	   of	   music.36	  This	  action	  was	   taken	  against	  a	  background	  of	   conflict.	  After	  gay	  members	  of	   the	   club	  had	   ‘engaged	   in	  open	  sexual	  activity	  and	  sexual	  harassment’,	   the	  gym,	  which	  was	  run	   by	   Evangelical	   Christians,	   enforced	   a	   policy	   of	   ‘foreclosing	   opportunities	   for	  what	  it	  considered	  to	  be	  inappropriate	  behavior’,	  against	  its	  gay	  members	  and	  only	  against	   them,	   limiting	   opportunities	   to	   socialise	   and	   putting	   posters	   up	   entitled	  ‘What	  God	  thinks	  of	  Homosexuality’.37	  The	  owners	  claimed	  an	  exemption	  from	  the	  discrimination	  law	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  free	  exercise	  clause.38	  They	  claimed	  they	  had	  religious	  objections	  to	  same-­‐sex	  sexual	  activity	  but	  stated	  that	  they	  had	  a	  ‘heartfelt	  love	  for	  anybody…	  we	  can	  hate	  the	  sin	  but	  we	  love	  the	  sinner’.39	  	  	  As	  the	  Court	  held,	  since	  Blanding	  was	  discriminated	  against	  purely	  because	  of	  his	  sexual	   orientation,	   and	   this	   according	   to	   the	   owners’	   own	   testimony	   was	   not	  contrary	   to	   their	   religious	   beliefs,	   there	  was	   no	   interference	  with	   their	   religious	  rights.	   The	   act	   complained	   of	   was	   so	   remote	   from	   anything	   they	   had	   religious	  objections	  to	  that	  there	  could	  not	  be	  an	  interference.	  	  	  A	   separate	   issue	   is	   whether	   businesses	   themselves	   can	   have	   religious	   freedom	  rights.	  In	  Blanding,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  company	  could	  not	  raise	  a	  free	  exercise	  claim	  because	  the	  club’s	  purpose	  was	  to	  make	  a	  profit.	  It	  had	  no	  ‘institutional	  free-­‐exercise	   rights	   or	   derivative	   free-­‐exercise	   rights.’ 40 	  The	   question	   of	   whether	  businesses	   can	   have	   free	   exercise	   rights	   of	   their	   own	   is	   something	   that	   is	   hotly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  373	  N.W.	  2d	  784	  (Minn.App.,	  1985).	  36	  Ibid.	  at	  788.	  37	  Ibid.	  at	  787.	  38	  The	  case	  predates	  Employment	  Division	  v	  Smith.	  39	  Supra	  n.35	  at	  791.	  40	  Ibid.	  at	  790.	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debated	   in	   many	   of	   the	   cases	   challenging	   the	   ‘contraception	   mandate’	   currently	  being	   heard	   in	   US	   courts.	   The	   contraception	   mandate	   requires	   businesses	   to	  include	   contraception	   coverage	   (which	   includes	   the	   morning	   after	   pill)	   in	   their	  employees’	  health	  plans.	  Some	  organisations	  and	  corporations	  owned	  or	  controlled	  by	   people	   with	   religious	   objections	   to	   this,	   have	   claimed	   that	   this	   violates	   both	  their	   individual	   free	   exercise	   right	   and	   the	   free	   exercise	   right	   of	   the	   corporation.	  There	  are	  numerous	  cases	  currently	  before	  the	  courts	  on	  this	  matter.41	  	  	  In	   the	   Tenth	   Circuit’s	   decision	   in	   Hobby	   Lobby	   v	   Sebelius 42 	  the	   Court	   held,	  overruling	   the	  District	  Court’s	  decision,43	  that	  a	   company	  could	  raise	  a	  defence	  of	  its	  own	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  RFRA.	  Partly	  this	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  statutory	  analysis.	  The	   RFRA	   states	   that	   ‘the	   government	   shall	   not	   substantially	   burden	   a	   person’s	  exercise	  of	  religion’.44	  The	  Court	  argued	  that	   in	   interpreting	  statutes,	   the	  ordinary	  rule	  is	  that	  ‘person’	  can	  refer	  to	  a	  corporation	  or	  a	  business	  and	  it	  saw	  no	  reason	  to	  depart	  from	  this.45	  It	  also	  noted	  that	  corporate	  groups	  had	  been	  able	  to	  bring	  cases	  in	  the	  past	  and	  that	  Hobby	  Lobby	  engaged	  in	  religious	  proselytisation	  by	  taking	  out	  hundreds	  of	  newspaper	  advertisements	  ‘inviting	  people	  to	  “know	  Jesus	  as	  Lord	  and	  Savior.”’	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  District	  Court’s	  decision	  was	  that	  Hobby	  Lobby	  did	  not	  have	  its	  own	  religious	   freedom	   rights.	   Its	   explanation	  was	   that,	   ‘general	   business	   corporations	  do	   not,	   separate	   and	   apart	   from	   the	   actions	   or	   belief	   systems	   of	   their	   individual	  owners	   or	   employees,	   exercise	   religion.	   They	   do	   not	   pray,	   worship,	   observe	  sacraments	  or	  take	  other	  religiously-­‐motivated	  actions	  separate	  and	  apart	  from	  the	  intention	   and	   direction	   of	   their	   individual	   actors.’46	  This	   reasoning	   though	   is	   not	  completely	   persuasive.	   It	   could	   be	   said	   about	   a	   religious	   institution,	   such	   as	   a	  church,	   that	   it	   does	   ‘not	   pray,	   worship,	   observe	   sacraments	   or	   take	   other	  religiously-­‐motivated	  actions	  separate	  and	  apart	   from	  the	   intention	  and	  direction	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  Becket	  Fund	  has	  a	  list	  of	  the	  current	  cases:	  http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014]	  42	  D.C.	  NO.	  5:12-­‐CV-­‐01000-­‐HE	  (10th	  Cir.,	  27	  June	  2013).	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  will	  hear	  the	  case	  in	  March	  2014.	  43	  870	  F.Supp.	  2d	  1278	  (W.D.	  Okla.,	  2012).	  44	  42	  USC	  §	  2000bb–1.	  	  45	  Although	  the	  6th	  Circuit	  reached	  the	  opposite	  view	  in	  Autocam	  Corp.	  v	  Sebelius	  No.	  12-­‐2673	  (6th	  Cir.,	  Sept	  17th	  2013).	  46	  Supra	  n.43	  at	  1291.	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of	   their	   individual	   actors’.	   After	   all,	   apart	   from	   metaphorically,	   an	   institution	   is	  incapable	  of	  acting	  except	  through	  its	  members.47	  	  	  Is	  it	  therefore	  possible	  for	  the	  owners	  of	  a	  company	  to	  infuse	  an	  otherwise	  secular	  company	  with	  religion,	  such	  that	  the	  company	  can	  claim	  its	  own	  religious	  freedom	  rights?	   Hobby	   Lobby	   is	   run	   by	   a	   management	   trust	   the	   purpose	   of	   which	   is	   to	  ‘honor	  God	  with	   all	   that	  has	  been	   entrusted’	   to	   the	  Greens	   and	   to	   ‘use	   the	  Green	  family	  assets	  to	  create,	  support,	  and	  leverage	  the	  efforts	  of	  Christian	  ministries.’48	  Similarly,	  the	  US	  company	  Interstate	  Batteries’	  mission	  statement	  is	  ‘to	  glorify	  God	  as	   we	   supply	   our	   customers	   worldwide	   with	   top	   quality,	   value-­‐priced	   batteries,	  related	   electrical	   power-­‐source	   products,	   and	   distribution	   services.’49 	  Can	   the	  provision	   of	   batteries	   be	   turned	   into	   a	   religious	   activity	   by	   the	   intentions	   of	   a	  company’s	  owners?	  	  	  The	  issue	  of	  whether	  commercial	  organisations	  have	  their	  own	  rights	  under	  Art	  9	  has	  not	  yet	  been	   fully	   considered	  by	   the	  ECtHR.	  The	  ECtHR’s	  early	  approach	  was	  that	  Art	  9	  was	  only	  an	  individual	  right	  and	  even	  organised	  religions	  had	  no	  rights	  of	  their	  own.50	  This	   failed	   to	  perceive	   the	  communal	  nature	  of	  much	  religious	  belief,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  institutional	  support	  in	  maintaining	  religious	  practices.	  More	  recently	  though	  a	  range	  of	  types	  of	  religious	  organisations	  have	  been	  able	  to	  bring	  claims.	   For	   example,	   in	   Cha’are	   Shalom	   Ve	   Tsedek	   v	   France,51	  a	   complaint	   by	   a	  Jewish	   liturgical	   association	   which	   wished	   to	   have	   access	   to	   slaughterhouses	   in	  order	  to	  perform	  ritual	  slaughter	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  members’	  beliefs,	  was	  held	  to	   be	   admissible.	   Similarly	   in	  Verein	  Gemeinsam	  Lernen	  v	  Austria52	  a	   private	   non-­‐religious	  school	  could	  complain	  that	  it	  had	  been	  discriminated	  against	  compared	  to	  church	   schools.	  However,	   the	   Court	   has	   not	   yet	   accepted	   that	   purely	   commercial	  organisations	   can	   bring	   cases	   under	   Art	   9,53	  although	   cases	   may	   be	   considered	  under	  other	  Convention	  provisions	  such	  as	  Art	  10.54	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Colombo	  also	  makes	  this	  point	  in	  ‘The	  Naked	  Private	  Sphere’	  (2013)	  51	  Hous	  L	  R	  1.	  48	  Supra	  n.42.	  49Available	  at	  Interstate	  Batteries’	  website:	  http://corporate.interstatebatteries.com/mission/	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014]	  50	  Church	  of	  X	  v	  UK	  App	  No	  3798/68,	  29	  CD	  70	  (17	  December	  1968).	  51	  9	  BHRC	  27	  (2000).	  52	  (1995)	  20	  EHRR	  CD	  78.	  53	  Kustannus	  OY	  Vapaa	  Ajattelija	  AB	  et	  Al.	  v	  Finland	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  CD	  69.	  54	  E.g.	  Glas	  Nadejda	  EOOD	  v	  Bulgaria	  App	  No.	  14134/02	  (11	  Oct	  2007).	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Vischer	  contends	  that	  businesses	  should	  have	  free	  exercise	  rights.55	  He	  argues	  that	  corporations	  can	  and	  should	  express	  moral	  views	  and	  that	  conscience	  is	  developed	  in	  association	  with	  others.	  Therefore,	  he	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  have	  a	  ‘moral	  marketplace’	   which	   permits	   diversity	   of	   views	   through	   different	   providers,	  allowing	   customers	   to	   select	   those	   which	   have	   greatest	   affinity	   with	   their	   own	  beliefs.	  He	  states	  that,	  ‘when	  it	  comes	  to	  facilitating	  the	  living	  out	  of	  conscience,	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  local	  church	  and	  Wal-­‐Mart	  are	  different	  in	  degree,	  not	  in	  kind.’56	  	  
Evidently,	   institutions	   are	   important	   in	   the	  development	  of	   conscience	   and	  belief	  and	  potentially	  this	  can	  include	  for-­‐profit	  organisations.	  However,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  only	   in	  degree	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  businesses	  should	  be	  able	  to	  claim	   religious	   freedom	   rights.	   Even	   if	   they	   are	   not	   merely	   an	   aggregation	   of	  individuals’	   rights, 57 	  collective	   religious	   rights	   must	   ultimately	   derive	   from	  individual	   rights,	   otherwise	   an	   organisation	   could	   have	   rights	   even	   if	   it	   had	   no	  members.58	  	  
If	   rights	   are	   derived	   from	   individuals,	   then	   two	   things	   must	   be	   demonstrated.	  Firstly	   there	   must	   be	   an	   identifiable	   group	   of	   people	   from	   whom	   rights	   can	   be	  derived,	   and	   secondly,	   there	  must	  be	   some	  purpose	  which	   the	   individuals	   intend	  the	   organisation	   to	   perform.	  While	   in	   religious	   organisations,	  members,	   however	  this	   is	   defined,	   are	   the	   relevant	   original	   rights	   holders,	   in	   companies	   the	   rights	  could	   potentially	   derive	   from	   far	   more	   diverse	   groups	   with	   many	   more	   diverse	  interests,	   including	   directors,	   shareholders,	   employees	   and	   customers. 59 To	  consider	   just	   one	   of	   these,	   as	   Corbin	   points	   out,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   assume	   that	  employees	  share	  the	  religious	  views	  of	  their	  employer	  or	  have	  sufficient	  autonomy	  to	  move	  to	  employment	  run	  on	  religious	  lines	  of	  which	  they	  approve.	  As	  she	  argues,	  to	  ignore	  this	  affects	  the	  conscience	  rights	  of	  these	  employees.60	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  R.	  Vischer,	  Conscience	  and	  the	  Common	  Good:	  Reclaiming	  the	  Space	  Between	  Person	  and	  
State	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  and	  ‘Do	  For-­‐Profit	  Businesses	  Have	  Free	  Exercise	  Rights?’	  (2013)	  21	  J	  Contemp	  Legal	  Issues	  369.	  56	  Ibid.	  at	  205.	  	  57	  J.	  Rivers,	  ‘Religious	  Liberty	  as	  a	  Collective	  Right’	  in	  Law	  and	  Religion,	  R.	  O’Dair	  and	  A.	  Lewis	  (eds),	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  58	  L.	  Vickers,	  ‘Twin	  Approaches	  to	  Secularism:	  Organized	  Religion	  and	  Society’	  (2012)	  32	  
OJLS	  197.	  59	  This	  is	  a	  similar	  argument	  to	  J.	  Nelson,	  ‘Conscience,	  Incorporated’	  Mich	  St	  L	  Rev	  (Forthcoming	  2014).	  	  60	  C.	  Corbin,	  ‘Corporate	  Religious	  Liberty’,	  available	  from	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2327919	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  She	  therefore	  argues	  that	  granting	  free	  exercise	  rights	  to	  corporations	  would	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  elite	  at	  a	  cost	  to	  others.	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The	   question	   of	   function	   is	   also	   more	   complex.	   The	   purpose	   of	   religious	  organisations	   is	   normally	   to	   spread	   particular	   viewpoints,	   develop	   doctrines	   and	  maintain	  exclusionary	  communities.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  ordinary	  businesses:	  they	   do	   not	   normally	   do	   anything	   that	   is	   recognisably	   religious.	   Therefore	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   show	   that	   businesses	   have	   religious	   freedom	   rights	   of	   their	   own.	  However,	   this	   should	   not	   be	   an	   absolute	   rule.	   Some	   for-­‐profit	   organisations	   are	  designed	  around,	  and	  to	  spread,	  certain	  viewpoints.	  Since	  the	  right	  derives	  from	  its	  purposes,	  if	  an	  organisation	  has	  as	  one	  of	  its	  main	  aims	  the	  spreading	  or	  affirming	  of	   a	   religious	   viewpoint	   then	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   it	   can	  have	   free	   exercise	   rights.	  61	  However,	   this	   would	   not	   include	   the	   Interstate	   Battery	   example	   given	   above:	  although	  religion	  may	  be	  important	  to	  its	  owners,	  the	  business	  itself	  is	  not	  fulfilling	  any	   religious	   purpose.	   For	   Hobby	   Lobby	   too,	   although	   it	   does	   perform	   some	  religious	  activities,	  such	  as	  religious	  advertising,	  this	   is	   incidental	  compared	  to	  its	  major	  business	  of	  selling	  craft	  materials.	  	  
It	  should	  be	  stressed	  that	  this	  discussion	  is	  about	  how	  rights	  come	  to	  exist,	  rather	  than	  what	  the	  right	  entails.	  Even	  if	  an	  organisation’s	  rights	  are	  derived	  rather	  than	  freestanding,	   an	   organisation	   can	   still	   act	   to	   protect	   its	   own	   conception	   of	  conscience	   and	   autonomy.	   It	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   an	   organisation’s	   doctrines	   are	  contingent	  on	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  members	  or	  that	  it	  has	  to	  be	  at	  all	  democratic	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  its	  leaders	  or	  in	  the	  development	  of	  doctrine.	  
Interference:	  Conclusion	  	  This	  section	  has	  considered	  whether	  an	  interference	  can	  potentially	  be	  found	  when	  a	  person	  or	  business	   is	   required	  not	   to	  discriminate	   in	  providing	  a	  service.	   It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  in	  many	  circumstances	  it	  can	  be,	  with	  regard	  to	  individual	  claims,	  but	  this	  will	  occur	  more	  rarely	  where	  a	  business	  itself	  claims	  rights.	  This	  approach	  is	   theoretically	   sound	  and	  practical.	   It	   excludes	   claims	  where	   the	   claimed	   right	   is	  very	  remote	   from	  the	  act	   that	   is	  objected	  to,	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time	   it	  does	  not	  put	  formalistic	  barriers	  in	  the	  way	  of	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  conflict	  between	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Tyndale	  House	  Publishers	  v	  Sebelius	  904	  F.Supp.2d	  106	  (D.D.C.,	  2012)	  may	  be	  an	  example.	  Colombo	  supra	  n.47	  similarly	  argues	  that	  a	  business	  corporation	  can	  be	  ‘a	  genuine	  community	  of	  individuals—investors,	  owners,	  officers,	  employees,	  and	  customers—coming	  together	  around	  a	  common	  vision	  or	  shared	  set	  of	  goals,	  values,	  or	  beliefs.’	  I	  would	  agree	  that	  a	  business	  could	  have	  free	  exercise	  rights	  in	  such	  a	  situation.	  However,	  Colombo	  appears	  to	  claim	  that	  businesses	  should	  have	  free	  exercise	  rights	  much	  more	  widely	  than	  this,	  arguing	  that	  a	  free	  exercise	  claim	  arises	  where	  a	  corporation	  adheres	  to	  a	  set	  of	  beliefs	  and	  undertakes	  conduct	  on	  account	  of	  these	  beliefs	  and	  government	  action	  substantially	  burdens	  such	  conduct,	  thus	  including	  cases	  such	  as	  Hobby	  Lobby.	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person’s	  conscience	  and	  the	  law,	  since	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  can	  be	  considered	  at	  the	  justification	  stage.	  	  In	  permitting	  a	  broad	   interpretation	  of	   interference	  a	  proportionality	  approach	   is	  advantageous.	   Losing	   parties	   are	   explicitly	   held	   to	   have	   a	   constitutional	   interest	  that	   is	   worthy	   of	   protection,	   although	   outweighed	   in	   the	   current	   circumstances,	  rather	   than	   this	   interest	   simply	   being	   delegitimised	   in	   principle.62	  In	   doing	   so	  proportionality	   requires	   justification:	   even	   if	   a	   party	   has	   to	   lose	   because	   of	   the	  rights	  of	  others,	  they	  still	  have	  a	  right	  to	  adequate	  justification	  as	  to	  why	  the	  right	  cannot	  be	  protected	   in	  a	  particular	  situation.	  This	   is	  missing	   in	  many	  of	   the	  cases	  which	  do	  not	  use	  a	  proportionality-­‐type	  approach.	  The	  question	  of	  proportionality	  itself	  will	  now	  be	  considered.	  
Legitimate	  Aim	  	  In	  a	  case	  where	  an	  interference	  with	  a	  religious	  right	  is	  claimed	  the	  legitimate	  aim	  will	  normally	  be	  straightforward,	  since	  it	  will	  be	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  by	  enforcing	  non-­‐discrimination.	  Conversely,	   there	  will	  normally	  also	  be	  a	   legitimate	  aim	  in	  protecting	  the	  religious	  rights	  of	  others.	  
Rational	  Connection	  	  The	  next	  question	  is	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  rational	  connection	  between	  the	  legitimate	  aim	   and	   the	   action	   taken.	   Again,	   this	   is	   not	   generally	   an	   issue.	   However,	   in	   the	  Canadian	   case	   of	   Eadie	   and	   Thomas	   v	   Riverbend	   Bed	   and	   Breakfast63	  the	   British	  Columbia	  Human	  Rights	  Tribunal	  held	  that	  the	  refusal	  to	  let	  a	  gay	  couple	  stay	  had	  no	  rational	  connection	  to	  the	  function	  of	  the	  business	  and	  therefore	  there	  was	  no	  defence	   to	   the	   claim	   of	   unlawful	   discrimination.	   The	   version	   of	   the	   rational	  connection	   test	   it	  applied	  was	  whether	  a	   standard	  was	  adopted	   ‘for	  a	  purpose	  or	  goal	   that	   is	   rationally	   connected	   to	   the	   function	   being	   performed’.64	  Since	   the	  services	  the	  Bed	  and	  Breakfast	  provided	  were	  not	  religious	  in	  nature,	  the	  owners’	  religious	   beliefs	   were	   not	   relevant.	   As	  was	   discussed	   previously,	   the	   question	   of	  function	   is	  relevant	   to	  whether	  a	  right	  of	   freedom	  of	  religion	  can	  be	  claimed	  by	  a	  business.	  It	  is	  therefore	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  connection	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  C.	  Taylor,	  ‘Living	  With	  Difference’	  in	  A.	  Allen	  and	  M.	  Regan	  (eds),	  Debating	  Democracy’s	  
Discontent:	  Essays	  on	  American	  Politics,	  Law,	  and	  Public	  Philosophy	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  218.	  63	  2012	  BCHRT	  247.	  64	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  117.	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the	  business’s	  rights	  and	  the	  action	  taken.	  	  
However,	   this	   is	   not	   a	   full	   answer	   because	   the	   owners’	   individual	   rights	   are	   also	  relevant.	  The	  test	  of	  rational	  connection	  the	  Tribunal	  used	  comes	  from	  Meiorin:65	  a	  case	  about	  whether	  it	  amounted	  to	  sex	  discrimination	  to	  require	  all	  fire-­‐fighters	  to	  be	  able	   to	   run	  2.5	  kilometres	   in	  11	  minutes.	  This	   standard	  was	  easier	   for	  men	   to	  achieve	   than	  women.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   test	  was	   appropriate.	   It	  means	   that	   the	  employee	   has	   the	   right	   to	   be	   accommodated,	   unless	   it	   can	   be	   demonstrated	   that	  this	   imposes	   undue	   hardship	   on	   the	   employer.	   The	   functions	   of	   the	   job	   are	  therefore	  relevant:	  if	  a	  purpose	  is	  not	  rationally	  connected	  to	  the	  function	  of	  the	  job	  it	  cannot	  be	  undue	  hardship	  not	  to	  comply	  with	  it.	  	  
However,	  when	  applied	  to	  questions	  of	  individual	  rights	  of	  freedom	  of	  religion	  this	  test	  is	  unsuitable.	  A	  person’s	  individual	  right	  of	  conscience	  is	  not	  reducible,	  or	  even	  necessarily	  particularly	   related	   to,	   the	   functions	   she	  performs	   in	  her	  professional	  life.	   Issues	  raising	  a	  problem	  of	  conscience	  can	  arise	  whatever	   functions	  a	  person	  performs	   and	   indeed	   can	   arise	  because	   of	   a	   conflict	   between	   these	   functions	   and	  conscientious	  beliefs.	  Therefore	  in	  Eadie	  it	  should	  have	  been	  found	  that	  there	  was	  a	  rational	  connection	  between	  the	  action	  the	  owners	  took	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  religious	   conscience.	   If	   this	   was	   held	   not	   to	   be	   so,	   it	   gives	   those	   in	   employment	  unwarranted	   greater	   protection	   than	   those	   who	   are	   self-­‐employed	   by	   the	  application	  of	   the	   same	   test.	   In	   the	   employment	   cases,	   the	   employer	  must	   justify	  their	  treatment	  of	  an	  employee	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  function	  of	  the	  job:	  thus	  giving	  the	  employee	  a	  potentially	  extensive	  right.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  services,	  a	   focus	   on	   function	   could	   completely	   exclude	   the	   claim.	   This	   gives	   greater	  protection	  to	  employees,	  not	  because	  the	  interference	  with	  their	  rights	  is	  likely	  to	  be	   any	   greater,	   but	   because	   the	   test	   is	   unsuited	   to	   the	   situation	  of	   self-­‐employed	  people.	   This	   unsatisfactory	   conclusion	   is	   not	   reached	   in	   other	   cases,	   such	   as	  
Brockie,	  where	  the	  claimant	  refused	  to	  print	  materials	  for	  the	  Canadian	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Archives.66	  In	  one	  sense,	  Brockie’s	  purpose	  was	  to	  provide	  printing	  services,	  an	  entirely	  secular	  function,	  which	  could	  have	  no	  rational	  connection	  even	  to	  a	  refusal	  to	   print	   materials	   which	   directly	   denigrated	   his	   religious	   views.	   A	   rational	  connection	   should	   be	   found	   where	   the	   exemption	   would	   protect	   the	   owner’s	  religious	  conscience.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  British	  Columbia	  (Public	  Service	  Employee	  Relations	  Commission)	  v	  British	  Columbia	  
Government	  and	  Service	  Employees’	  Union	  (1999)	  3	  SCR	  3.	  66	  Supra	  n.10.	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No	  Less	  Restrictive	  Means	  	  It	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   as	   a	   less	   restrictive	   alternative	   to	   forbidding	   such	  discrimination	   completely,	   the	   state	   should	   only	   intervene	   and	   prevent	  discrimination	  if	  a	  person	  is	  unable	  to	  obtain	  a	  service	  elsewhere.	  Vischer	  argues,	  continuing	   the	   line	   of	   reasoning	   explained	   above,	   that	   it	   is	   important	   for	  companies,	   like	   other	   associations,	   to	   be	   able	   to	   develop	   a	   ‘distinct	   moral	  identity.’67	  Although	  he	   is	   in	   favour	  of	   non-­‐discrimination	   rights	   in	   the	   context	   of	  employment	   and	   housing,68	  because	   there	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   a	   truly	   equal	   readily	  available	   alternative	   in	   these	   areas,	   he	   states	   that	   in	   most	   other	   commercial	  contexts,	   organisations	   should	  be	  able	   to	   raise	  a	  defence	  of	   ‘market	   access’	  when	  providing	   services.	   This	   would	   mean	   that	   there	   would	   be	   no	   breach	   of	  discrimination	   law	   where	   a	   service-­‐provider	   could	   demonstrate	   that	   a	   person	  could	  obtain	  the	  service	  from	  an	  alternative	  provider.	  	  	  His	  starting	  point	  is	  that	  both	  the	  service	  provider	  and	  the	  customer	  have	  rights	  of	  conscience	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   ‘an	   individual’s	   capacity	   to	   develop	   and	   claim	   a	  moral	  worldview	  as	  her	  own…	  and	  her	  ability	  to	  live	  consistently	  with	  that	  worldview’.69	  To	   take	   the	   example	   of	  Elane	  Photography	  mentioned	   above,	   he	   argues	   that	   both	  Willock’s	   and	   the	   owners’	   consciences	   are	   relevant.	   The	   owners,	   the	   Huguenins,	  claim	  that	  they	  cannot	  provide	  photography	  for	  a	  same-­‐sex	  commitment	  ceremony	  because	  they	  wish	  to	  live	  out	  their	  Christian	  convictions,	  which	  tell	  them	  that	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  immoral	  and	  they	  should	  do	  nothing	  to	  approve	  it	  in	  every	  aspect	  of	  their	   lives.	   Willock	   also	   wishes	   to	   live	   out	   her	   convictions	   by	   marrying70	  her	  partner	  in	  a	  public	  ceremony	  with	  all	  the	  traditional	  trappings	  a	  wedding	  normally	  involves.71	  	  	  Clearly,	   they	  have	  very	  different	  beliefs	  about	   the	  morality	  or	  otherwise	  of	   same-­‐sex	  relationships	  and	  marriages.	  Vischer	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  should	  not	  take	  sides	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  these	  competing	  moral	  convictions	  and	  thus	  the	  state	  should	  not	  intervene	   if	  Willock	   can	   find	   an	   alternative	   photographer.	   He	   believes	   that	   if	   the	  Huguenins	  are	  forced	  to	  provide	  a	  service,	  when	  another	  provider	  could	  be	  found,	  then	  their	  conscience	  is	  unnecessarily	  trumped	  by	  an	  opposing	  claim	  of	  conscience,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Supra	  n.	  55	  at	  202.	  68	  Ibid.	  at	  28.	  69	  Ibid.	  at	  43.	  70	  This	  was	  not	  a	  legal	  marriage	  since	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  not	  recognised	  in	  New	  Mexico.	  71	  Vischer	  supra	  n.55	  at	  2.	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since	  Willock’s	  conscientious	  belief	   in	  the	  morality	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  could	  be	  protected	   by	   using	   another	   provider.	   He	   therefore	   criticises	   anti-­‐discrimination	  laws	   like	   California’s	   Civil	   Rights	   Act	   because,	   he	   argues,	   ‘it	   is	   not	   premised	   on	  securing	  individuals’	  access	  to	  essential	  goods	  and	  services.	  Instead	  it	  is	  premised	  on	   the	   expressive	   value	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   as	   a	   universal	   norm	   in	   the	  marketplace’.72	  	  	  Vischer’s	   argument	   is	   not	   straightforward.	   Unlike	  McConnell,73	  he	   does	   not	  make	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  state	  should	  not	  intervene	  because	  it	  should	  not	  take	  sides	  in	  the	  dispute	   or	   even	   that	   it	   cannot	   deliberately	   declare	   that	   non-­‐discrimination	   is	   a	  symbolically	   valuable	   norm.	   McConnell’s	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   state	   should	   treat	  views	   on	   homosexuality	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   it	   treats	   religion	   under	   the	   First	  Amendment:	   it	   ‘should	   not	   impose	   a	   penalty	   on	   practices	   associated	   with	   or	  compelled	  by	  any	  of	   the	  various	  views	  of	  homosexuality	   and	   should	   refrain	   from	  using	  its	  power	  to	  favor,	  promote,	  or	  advance	  one	  position	  over	  the	  other,’	  leaving	  ‘private	  forces	  in	  the	  culture	  to	  determine	  the	  ultimate	  social	  response’.74	  	  	  That	  argument	   is	  unpersuasive	  because,	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  the	  state	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  demonstrate	  equal	  concern	  and	  respect	   to	  all	  as	  part	  of	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  right.75	  Not	  intervening	  does	  not	  demonstrate	  neutrality	  on	  this	   issue.	   Since	   there	   is	   no	   place	   for	   the	   state	   to	   stand	  which	   is	   neutral	   on	   this	  issue,	  it	  is	  more	  than	  justifiable	  that	  it	  symbolically	  states	  it	  is	  against	  this	  harm.	  	  A	  failure	   to	   act	   to	   prevent	   systemic	   discrimination	   demonstrates	   at	   least	   a	   lack	   of	  interest	   in	   those	   being	   discriminated	   against	   and	   perhaps	   tacit	   approval	   of	   the	  policy.	  As	  Dworkin	   stated	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   system	  of	   racial	   segregation	  as	   it	  existed	  in	  the	  southern	  USA,	  a	  ‘political	  and	  economic	  system	  that	  allows	  prejudice	  to	  destroy	  some	  people’s	   lives	  does	  not	   treat	  all	  members	  of	   the	  community	  with	  equal	   concern.’ 76 	  While	   permitting	   discrimination	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   sexual	  orientation	  where	   there	   is	   a	  market	   access	   defence	   probably	  would	   not	   ‘destroy	  some	  people’s	   lives’,	   at	   least	  under	   the	   social	   situations	  as	   currently	   exists	   in	   the	  three	  jurisdictions,	  it	  clearly	  causes	  real	  harm	  to	  those	  affected.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Ibid.	  at	  306.	  73	  M.	  McConnell,	  ‘The	  Problem	  of	  Singling	  Out	  Religion’	  (2000)	  50	  DePaul	  L	  Rev	  1.	  74	  Ibid.	  at	  44.	  75	  R.	  Dworkin,	  Taking	  Rights	  Seriously	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1978).	  76	  R.	  Dworkin,	  ‘What	  is	  Equality?	  Part	  3:	  The	  Place	  of	  Liberty’	  (1987)	  73	  Iowa	  L	  Rev	  36-­‐7.	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Indeed,	   Vischer	   recognises	   this,	   permitting	   the	   state	   not	   only	   to	   ensure	   practical	  access	   but	   to	   embody	   an	   anti-­‐discrimination	   norm	   by	   ‘refusing	   to	   enter	   into	  contracts	  with	   discriminatory	   vendors,	   or	   by	   trumpeting	   the	   importance	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   through	   public	   awareness	   campaigns.’77	  The	   problem	   is	   then	   that	  Vischer’s	  argument	  does	  not	  persuasively	  answer	  why	  the	  state	  may	  act	  coercively	  in	  these	  contexts	  but	  not	  others.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test,	  once	  he	   has	   accepted	   that	   it	   is	   legitimate	   for	   the	   state	   to	   act	   in	   pursuit	   of	   a	   non-­‐discrimination	   policy,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   his	   approach	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   less	  restrictive	  alternative	  to	  forbidding	  discrimination	  completely,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  protect	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  	  	  Vischer’s	  argument	   is	  also	  problematic	  because	   it	   is	  also	  odd	  to	  say	  that	  a	  person	  has	   a	   right	   to	   a	   service	   which	   they	   need	   to	   live	   out	   their	   moral	   convictions.	   If	  Willock	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  find	  a	  photographer	  because	  none	  was	  available	  in	  the	  area,	   that	  would	   clearly	   be	   no	   concern	   of	   the	   state,	   even	   if	   she	   claimed	   this	  was	  necessary	  to	  live	  consistently	  with	  her	  worldview.	  Rather,	  in	  most	  situations,78	  she	  only	  has	   a	   right	  not	   to	  be	  discriminated	   against.	  Vischer’s	   argument	   turns	   all	   the	  relevant	   interests	   into	   one	   of	   conscience,	   but	   not	   every	   choice	   is	   a	   conscientious	  one.	   It	   is	   thus	  better	   to	  see	  Elane	  Photography	  as	  a	  clash	  between	  conscience	  and	  non-­‐discrimination,	  rather	  than	  between	  two	  ideas	  of	  conscience.	  
Balancing	  	  This	  section	  considers	  the	  final	  balancing	  stage	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  and	  situations.	  Even	   if	   claims	  have	  not	   failed	  before	   they	  reached	   this	   stage,	   they	  have	   not	   been	   noticeably	   successful.	   As	   will	   be	   demonstrated,	   these	   situations	  generally	   involve	   a	   minor	   interference	   with	   freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   a	   great	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  of	  non-­‐discrimination.	  Although	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion	  includes	  more	  than	  mere	  religious	  worship,	  the	  right	  to	  manifest	  religious	  beliefs	  in	  the	  commercial	  sphere	  is	  normally	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  religious	  right.	  In	   contrast,	   the	   effects	   on	   those	   discriminated	   against	   can	   be	   pervasive	   and	  extensive.	  However,	  whilst	   these	  cases	  have	  often	  reached	   justifiable	  conclusions,	  the	  reasoning	  could	  be	  improved,	  notably	  because	  a	  proportionality	  approach	  can	  recognise	  that	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  of	  rights	  at	  stake.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Supra	  n.55	  at	  306.	  78	  C.f.	  Griffin	  v	  County	  School	  Board	  of	  Prince	  Edward	  County	  377	  US	  218	  (1964)	  (impermissible	  to	  avoid	  order	  to	  de-­‐segregate	  schools	  by	  closing	  all	  public	  schools	  and	  providing	  vouchers	  to	  attend	  private	  segregated	  schools	  instead).	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  One-­‐off	  Commercial	  Services	  	  Conflicts	   can	   potentially	   result	   from	   a	   huge	   number	   of	   issues,	   and	   disputes	   have	  arisen	   over	   weddings	   cakes, 79 	  DJs, 80 	  rainbow	   coloured	   cupcakes	   to	   celebrate	  National	   Coming	  Out	  Day81	  and	   photography.82	  This	   section	  will	   consider	   ‘one-­‐off	  commercial	  services’:	  services	  with	  no	  intrinsic	  religious	  aspect,	  that	  are	  normally	  provided	  without	  restriction	  to	   the	  general	  public,	  and	  that	  do	  not	   involve	  an	  on-­‐going	   relationship.	  Often,	  but	  not	  necessarily,	   these	  are	  disputes	   related	   to	   same-­‐sex	  marriage.	   As	   always,	   in	   a	   proportionality	   enquiry	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   consider	  what	  interests	  are	  in	  question	  and	  how	  deeply	  they	  are	  affected.	  	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  some	  have	  seemed	  to	  suggest	  that	   the	   only	   interest	   opposing	   the	   religious	   one	   is	   that	   of	   practical	   access	   to	   a	  service.	  Laycock	  appears	  to	  see	  the	  opposing	  interest	  as	  one	  of	  ‘inconvenience’83	  in	  finding	   an	   alternative.	  He	   states	   that,	   ‘in	  more	   traditional	   communities,	   same-­‐sex	  couples	  planning	  a	  wedding	  might	  be	  forced	  to	  pick	  their	  merchants	  carefully,	  like	  black	  families	  driving	  across	  the	  South	  half	  a	  century	  ago.’84	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  why	  the	  analogy	   (although	   an	   imperfect	   one)	   does	   not	   lead	   Laycock	   to	   the	   opposite	  conclusion:	  that	  the	  symbolic	  harm	  caused	  by	  unequal	  treatment	  should	  at	  least	  be	  taken	   into	  account	  and	  may	  be	  decisive.85	  The	  harm	  caused	   to	   those	   families	  was	  not	   merely	   one	   of	   convenience.	   It	   was	   the	   constant	   reminder	   of	   a	   caste	   system	  which,	   by	   various	   mechanisms,	   highly	   circumscribed	   the	   life	   of	   black	   people.	  Although	   the	   situation	   for	   those	   discriminated	   against	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   their	  sexual	  orientation	   is	  not	  as	  extreme	  or	  pervasive	  as	   this,	  his	  analysis	  still	   ignores	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  L.	  Moran,	  ‘Baker	  Refuses	  to	  Make	  Wedding	  Cake	  for	  Lesbian	  Couple’	  New	  York	  Daily	  News,	  4th	  Feb	  2013,	  http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/baker-­‐refuses-­‐wedding-­‐cake-­‐lesbian-­‐couple-­‐article-­‐1.1254776	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  80	  In	  Posillico	  v	  Spitzer	  No.	  1300-­‐06	  (Sup.	  Ct.	  Nassau	  County)	  two	  Catholic	  DJs	  refused	  to	  accept	  a	  booking	  for	  a	  Gay	  Men’s	  Health	  Crisis	  event.	  The	  case	  was	  withdrawn.	  81	  N.	  O’Callaghan,	  ‘Death	  by	  a	  Thousand	  Cuts:	  Why	  Market	  Mechanisms	  Won’t	  Solve	  the	  Culture	  Wars’	  (2010)	  49	  Journal	  of	  Catholic	  Legal	  Studies	  335.	  82	  Engel	  v	  Worthington	  23	  Cal.	  Rptr.2d	  329	  (Cal.	  App.,	  1993).	  83	  D.	  Laycock,	  ‘Afterword’	  in	  D.	  Laycock	  et	  al.	  (eds),	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  and	  Religious	  Liberty:	  
Emerging	  Conflicts,	  (Lanham,	  Maryland:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2008)	  198.	  84	  Ibid.	  at	  199.	  85	  M.	  Curtis,	  ‘A	  Unique	  Religious	  Exemption	  from	  Antidiscrimination	  Laws	  in	  the	  Case	  of	  Gays?	  Putting	  the	  Call	  for	  Exemptions	  for	  those	  who	  Discriminate	  Against	  Married	  or	  Marrying	  Gays	  in	  Context’	  (2012)	  47	  Wake	  Forest	  L	  Rev	  173.	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‘the	   dignitary	   and	   equality	   harm	   inherent	   in	   discrimination	   against	   a	   historically	  vulnerable	  minority’.86	  	  	  Laycock	   has	   also	   suggested	   signage	   requirements	   alerting	   customers	   to	   the	   fact	  that	  they	  refuse	  to	  serve,	  for	  example	  gay	  couples,	  to	  minimise	  surprise.87	  However,	  it	   is	  questionable	  whether	  this	  would	  not	  in	  fact	  make	  the	  situation	  worse	  for	  gay	  people.	  In	  some	  areas	  it	  may	  mean	  more	  suppliers	  claim	  an	  exemption	  because	  of	  social	   pressure	   to	   conform	   to	   traditional	  mores88	  or	   because	   it	   may	   be	   easier	   to	  declare	   a	   discriminatory	   policy	   through	   a	   sign	   rather	   than	   face-­‐to-­‐face. 89 	  In	  addition	  a	  sign	  is	  an	  ‘embodiment	  of	  second	  class	  citizenship.’90	  Gay	  people	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  see	  it	  regularly,	  and	  this	  may	  act	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  discriminatory	  attitudes	  even	   if	   they	  are	  not	  seeking	   that	  service.	  Finally,	  whether	   told	  by	  an	  employee	  or	  through	   a	   sign,	   the	   end	   result	   is	   still	   the	   same:	   a	   person	   is	   still	   denied	   a	   service	  because	  of	  her	  sexual	  orientation.	  While	  taken	   in	   isolation	  these	   issues	  may	  seem	  comparatively	   trivial,	   and	   only	   a	   minor	   interference	   with	   the	   right	   of	   non-­‐discrimination,	   focusing	   only	   on	   practical	   access	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	  broader	   context	   of	   discrimination	   and	   marginalisation	   or	   the	   emotional	  consequence	  of	  repeated	  refusals.	  As	  Hunter	  puts	  it,	  these	  cases	  involve	  a	  claim	  to	  ‘cultural	  citizenship’:91	  part	  of	  a	  claim	  to	  access	  the	  public,	  social	  sphere.	  	  	  In	  Brockie92	  the	  Ontario	  Divisional	  Court,	  using	  a	  proportionality	  approach,	  held	  for	  these	   reasons	   that	   the	   interference	   with	   the	   religious	   right	   was	   justified	   and	  Brockie	  unjustifiably	  discriminated	  in	  refusing	  to	  print	  the	  stationery	  required.	  The	  Court	  argued	   that	  discrimination	  on	   the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation,	  demeaned	  ‘the	   self	   worth	   and	   personal	   dignity	   of	   homosexuals,	   with	   adverse	   psychological	  effects	  and	  social	  and	  economic	  disadvantages’93	  and	  avoiding	  this	  was	  a	  pressing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  T.	  Flynn,	  ‘Clarion	  Call	  or	  False	  Alarm:	  Why	  Proposed	  Exemptions	  to	  Equal	  Marriage	  Statutes	  Return	  Us	  to	  a	  Religious	  Understanding	  of	  the	  Public	  Marketplace’	  (2010)	  5	  Nw	  J	  L	  
&	  Soc	  Pol'y.	  236.	  87	  Supra	  n.86.	  88	  As	  Laycock	  admits.	  89	  Researchers	  posing	  as	  gay	  couples	  seeking	  accommodation	  for	  their	  honeymoon	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  refused	  if	  they	  emailed	  rather	  telephoned	  the	  owners.	  They	  concluded	  the	  personal	  nature	  of	  the	  contact	  made	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  refuse.	  D.	  Howerton,	  ‘Honeymoon	  Vacation:	  Sexual-­‐Orientation	  Prejudice	  and	  Inconsistent	  Behavioral	  Responses’	  (2012)	  34	  
Basic	  and	  Applied	  Social	  Psychology	  146.	  90	  Flynn	  supra	  n.89.	  	  91	  N.	  Hunter,	  ‘Accommodating	  the	  Public	  Sphere:	  Beyond	  the	  Market	  Model’	  (2001)	  85	  Minn	  
L	  Rev	  1591.	  92	  Supra	  n.10.	  93	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  47.	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and	  substantial	  objective.	  It	  pointed	  out	  that	  Brockie	  was	  acting	  in	  the	  commercial	  sphere	  and	  his	  actions	  were	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  religious	  freedom.	  This	  reasoning,	  although	   entirely	   correct,	   does	   perhaps	   overlook	   the	   fact	   that	   Brockie	   did	   not	  refuse	  to	  serve	  gay	  people	  as	  such,	  but	  rather	  an	  organisation	  with	  particular	  aims	  relating	  to	  sexual	  orientation.	  Nevertheless	  his	  refusal	  was	  still	   for	  discriminatory	  reasons	  and	  could	  still	  have	  a	  demeaning	  effect.	  Importantly	  and	  correctly	  though,	  the	  Court	  held	   that	   the	  balance	  of	   interests	  might	  be	  different	   in	  other	   cases	  and	  that	   ‘there	  can	  be	  no	  appropriate	  balance	  if	   the	  protection	  of	  one	  right	  means	  the	  total	  disregard	  of	  another.’94	  This	  case	  demonstrates	  that	  proportionality	  can	  take	  both	   rights	   seriously,	   but	   still	   protect	   important	  non-­‐discrimination	   rights	  where	  necessary.	   Here	   Brockie	   was	   only	   asked	   to	   print	   office	   stationery,	   but	   the	   Court	  indicated	  the	   outcome	  might	   be	  different	   if	   he	  were	   asked	   to	  print	  material	   ‘that	  conveyed	   a	  message	  proselytizing	   and	  promoting	   the	   gay	   and	   lesbian	   lifestyle	   or	  ridiculed	   his	   religious	   beliefs’.95	  Although	   the	   reference	   to	   a	   ‘gay	   and	   lesbian	  lifestyle’	  is	  somewhat	  perplexing,	  this	  does	  convey	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  balance	  to	  be	  made	  and	  both	  rights	  are	  important.	  	  In	  Elane	  Photography,	  although	  the	  link	  between	  the	  act	  objected	  to	  and	  the	  service	  required	   is	   limited,	   an	   interference	   should	   have	   been	   found.	   However,	   the	  Huguenin’s	  claim	  must	  nevertheless	  fail.	  They	  were	  providing	  a	  commercial	  service	  which	  did	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  any	  sort	  of	  approval	  for	  same-­‐sex	  marriage.	  Indeed	  it	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  for	  the	  Huguenins	  to	  employ	  another	  photographer	  to	  cover	   same-­‐sex	   weddings.96	  Although	   they	   may	   still	   argue	   that	   this	   would	   be	  contrary	  to	  their	  beliefs,	  and	  of	  course	  it	  might	  be,	  the	  interference	  would	  then	  be	  extremely	   limited.	  This	  case	   is	  also	  different	   to	  Ladele.97	  In	  Elane	  Photography	   the	  couple	  were	  directly	  confronted	  with	  a	  denial	  of	  service,	  rather	  than	  affected	  by	  a	  rearrangement	  of	  duties.	  Furthermore,	  the	  distance	  from	  the	  act	  objected	  to,	  same-­‐sex	   marriage,	   is	   much	   greater	   in	   Elane	   Photography,	   and	   therefore	   is	   less	   of	   a	  burden	  on	   the	   religionists’	   rights.	   Finally,	   since	   there	   is	  nothing	  distinctive	   about	  this	   case	   to	   distinguish	   it	   from	   any	   other	   supply	   of	   services	   case,	   granting	   an	  exemption	  would	   lead	   to	  an	  evisceration	  of	   the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  principle.	  The	  Huguenins	   are	   therefore	   left	   with	   a	   conflict	   between	   their	   legal	   obligations	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  Ibid.	  at	  para	  56.	  95	  Ibid.	  96	  As	  suggested	  by	  Chai	  Felblum,	  now	  an	  EEOC	  (Equal	  Employment	  Opportunity	  Commission)	  Commissioner.	  Noted	  in	  Vischer,	  supra	  n.55	  at	  303.	  	  97	  Supra	  n.7.	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their	  beliefs	  which	  cannot	  be	  lifted	  through	  the	  law.	  They	  must	  decide	  whether	  to	  give	  up	  their	  business	  or	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  antidiscrimination	  law.	  Deciding	  this	  case	   at	   the	   justification	   rather	   than	   at	   the	   interference	   stage	   though,	   as	   a	  proportionality	  test	  allows,	  at	  least	  recognises	  this	  conflict	  and	  focuses	  attention	  on	  the	  claims	  actually	  in	  issue.	  	  That	  no	  exemption	  can	  be	  given	  is	  even	  clearer	  in	  Blanding,	  the	  case	  involving	  a	  gay	  man	  who	  was	  banned	  from	  using	  a	  gym.	  Even	  if,	  which	  is	  extremely	  doubtful,	  there	  was	  an	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  of	  the	  company’s	  owners,	  permitting	  Blanding	  to	  use	  the	  gym	  only	  posed	  a	  very	  restricted	  burden	  on	  them.	  They	  were	  not	  required	  to	   facilitate	   or	   aid	   anything	   they	   were	   religiously	   opposed	   to:	   they	   were	   only	  required	  to	  let	  a	  gay	  man	  use	  a	  gym	  on	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  a	  heterosexual	  man.	  If	  an	  exemption	  was	  accepted	  here	  this	  would	  effectively	  prohibit	  all	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  laws	  where	  a	  person	  had	  religious	  objections	  to	  homosexuality.	  	  	  This	   section	   has	   considered	   the	   right	   to	   discriminate	   in	   the	   standard	   case	   of	  interchangeable	   services	   and	   concluded	   that	   such	   claims	   should	   not	   usually	   be	  successful	   because	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   interest	   and	   the	  peripheral	   nature	   of	   the	   religious	   interest.	   It	   has	   also	   demonstrated	   that	   a	  proportionality	   analysis	   deals	   with	   these	   issues	   fully	   and	   provides	   a	   coherent	  method	  of	  balancing	  the	  interests.	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  considers	  more	  complex	  situations	  that	  may	  involve	  a	  different	  balance	  of	  interests.	  	  	  Healthcare	  	  	  An	   area	   which	   involves	   different	   interests	   from	   straightforward	   commercial	  services	   is	   that	   of	   healthcare.	   Healthcare	   is	   understood	   as	   intrinsically	   involving	  ethical	   considerations.98 	  Doctors	   are	   not	   ‘mere	   technicians	   who	   will	   perform	  requested	   services	   on	   demand’ 99 	  and	   they	   are	   expected	   to	   apply	   ethical	  considerations	   to	  all	   their	  work.	   It	   is	   thus	  widely	  assumed	   to	  be	  acceptable,	   even	  required,	   for	   doctors	   to	   refuse	   to	   perform	   certain	   treatments	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	  conscience.	  In	  some	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  legal	  right	  not	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  any	  detriment	  for	  refusing	  to	  perform	  certain	  procedures.	  Thus	  in	  Britain,	  doctors	  and	  nurses	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  M.	  Wicclair,	  ‘Is	  Conscientious	  Objection	  Incompatible	  with	  a	  Physician’s	  Professional	  Obligations?’	  (2008)	  29	  Theor	  Med	  Bioeth	  171.	  99	  M.	  Wicclair,	  ‘Conscientious	  Objection	  in	  Medicine’	  (2000)	  3	  Bioethics	  205,	  215.	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not	  have	  to	  participate	  in	  providing	  abortions,	  unless	  the	  treatment	  is	  necessary	  ‘to	  save	  the	  life	  or	  to	  prevent	  grave	  permanent	  injury	  to	  the	  physical	  or	  mental	  health	  of	  a	  pregnant	  woman’.100	  In	  some	  jurisdictions,	  conscience	  is	  given	  extremely	  broad	  protection.	   In	   Mississippi	   for	   example,	   the	   Health	   Care	   Rights	   of	   Conscience	   Act	  gives	   any	   provider	   of	   medical	   care	   the	   right	   to	   refuse	   to	   provide	   any	   treatment	  (understood	  broadly)	  if	  they	  conscientiously	  object.101	  There	  is	  no	  exception	  even	  if	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  serious	  harm	  or	  death	  may	  result.	  This	  starkly	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  others.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  these	  ethical	  considerations	  may	  conversely	  mean	  that	  discrimination	  is	  particularly	   problematic.	   There	   is	   an	   important	   distinction	   between	   a	   refusal	   to	  provide	  a	  particular	  treatment,	  and	  a	  refusal	  to	  provide	  a	  treatment	  to	  a	  particular	  person	   or	   group:	   the	   first	   denies	   treatment	   because	   of	  what	   is	   to	   be	   done,	   the	  second	  because	  of	  who	  a	  person	  is,	  meaning	  that	  some,	  in	  a	  distinction	  not	  based	  on	  health	  needs,	   can	   access	   healthcare	  when	  others	   cannot.	  A	   fear	   of	   discrimination	  may	   also	   lead	   to	   withholding	   information	   which	   may	   have	   relevance	   to	  treatment.102	  Quite	   simply	   also,	   access	   to	   healthcare	   is	   extremely	   important	   and	  can	  literally	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  life	  or	  death.	  	  	  One	  example	  of	  a	  conflict	  is	  North	  Coast	  Women’s	  Care	  Med.	  Group,	  Inc.	  v	  San	  Diego	  
County	   Super.	   Ct. 103 	  In	   this	   case	   a	   lesbian	   woman,	   Benitez,	   sought	   to	   have	  intrauterine	  insemination	  (IUI)	  in	  order	  to	  conceive.	  The	  only	  licensed	  practitioner	  at	  North	  Coast	  Women’s	  Care	   for	   the	  particular	  procedure	  required	  had	  religious	  objections	   to	   performing	   it,	   although	   there	   was	   dispute	   about	   whether	   this	   was	  because	   Benitez	   was	   unmarried,	   which	   would	   have	   been	   legally	   permissible,	   or	  because	  she	  was	  gay,	  which	  would	  not.	  The	  doctor’s	  objection	  was	  that	  he	  would	  be	  directly	   responsible	   for	   creating	   life	   and	   could	   only	   countenance	   this	   within	  marriage.	  Benitez	  claimed	  the	  clinic	  had	  unlawfully	  discriminated	  against	  her.	  	  	  Although	  the	  clinic’s	  claims	  based	  on	  the	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  and	  free	  speech	  were	  rejected,	   the	   religious	   freedom	   arguments	  were	   considered	   under	   strict	   scrutiny	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Abortion	  Act	  1967	  s.4.	  101	  Discussed	  in	  B.	  Dickens,	  ‘Legal	  Protection	  and	  Limits	  of	  Conscientious	  Objection:	  When	  Conscientious	  Objection	  is	  Unethical’	  (2009)	  28	  Med	  Law	  337.	  102	  E.	  Cayton,	  ‘Equal	  Access	  to	  Health	  Care:	  Sexual	  Orientation	  and	  State	  Public	  Accommodation	  Antidiscrimination	  Statutes’	  (2010)	  19	  Law	  &	  Sexuality	  193.	  103	  189	  P.3d	  959,	  962	  (Cal.,	  2008).	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under	   the	   Californian	   state	   constitution. 104 	  The	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   California	  considered	   the	   compelling	   state	   interest	   for	   the	   interference	   with	   the	   doctor’s	  religious	   freedom	   to	   be	   ‘ensuring	   full	   and	   equal	   access	   to	   medical	   treatment	  irrespective	  of	   sexual	   orientation.’	   This	   is	   clearly	   a	   legitimate	   aim.	   In	   considering	  whether	  there	  were	  any	  less	  restrictive	  means	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal	  the	  majority	  held	  that,	  ‘defendant	  physicians	  can	  avoid	  such	  a	  conflict	  by	  ensuring	  that	  every	  patient	  requiring	   IUI	   receives	   ‘‘full	   and	  equal’’	   access	   to	   that	  medical	  procedure	   though	  a	  North	  Coast	  physician	   lacking	  defendants’	   religious	  objections’.105	  This	  alternative	  did	  not	  however	  apply	  because	  there	  was	  no	  such	  practitioner	  at	  North	  Coast	  and	  therefore	   even	   if	   strict	   scrutiny	   applied,	   ‘the	   Act	   furthers	   California’s	   compelling	  interest	  and	  there	  are	  no	   less	  restrictive	  means	  for	  the	  state	  to	  achieve	  that	  goal’.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  concurring	  judgment	  which	  argued	  that	  ‘at	  least	  where	  the	  patient	  could	  be	  referred	  with	  relative	  ease	  and	  convenience	  to	  another	  practice,	  I	  question	  whether	   the	   state’s	   interest	   in	   full	   and	   equal	  medical	   treatment	  would	   compel	   a	  physician	   in	   sole	   practice	   to	   provide	   a	   treatment	   to	  which	   he	   or	   she	   has	   sincere	  religious	  objections.’	  106	  
Both	  judgments	  take	  seriously	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  parties.	  The	  reasoning	   of	   the	   majority	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   approach	   I	   took	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   as	   it	  suggests	   considering	   accommodation	   by	   exchanging	   work	   between	   employees,	  where	   this	   is	   possible	   and	   as	   long	   as	   this	   does	   not	   inflict	   directly	   experienced	  discrimination.	  The	  concurring	  judgment	  in	  Benitez	  though	  understates	  the	  interest	  in	   non-­‐discrimination	   by	   confining	   it	   only	   to	   practical	   considerations,	   and	   even	  understates	   these.	   It	   underestimates	   the	   stress	   caused	   by	   referral,	   particularly	  where	   time	   is	   an	   important	   factor	   and	   overlooks	   the	   fact	   that	   there	  were	   health	  insurance	   restrictions	   on	  which	  medical	   practices	   Benitez	   could	   use,	   although	   in	  the	  end	  her	  insurance	  company	  made	  an	  exception	  for	  her.	  	  
Again,	   this	   case	   demonstrates	   that	   a	   proportionality	   approach	   works	   in	   this	  context.	  Providing	   this	  kind	  of	   service	  affects	  a	  person’s	   right	  of	   conscience	  more	  than,	   for	   example,	   providing	   flowers	   for	   a	   same-­‐sex	   wedding	   because	   the	   link	  between	  the	  act	   in	  question	  and	  the	  disapproved	  of	  conduct	  (either	  unmarried	  or	  gay	  parenting)	  is	  so	  close.	  The	  doctor	  is	  the	  direct	  facilitator.	  However,	  although	  it	  involves	  a	  greater	   infringement	  of	  rights	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   the	  believer,	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Although	  it	  was	  not	  conclusively	  decided	  that	  this	  was	  the	  appropriate	  standard.	  105	  Supra	  n.103	  at	  969.	  106	  Ibid.	  at	  971.	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also	   involves	   a	   greater	   infringement	   of	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   right,	   ironically	  because	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   issues.	   Reproductive	   healthcare,	   including	   the	  decision	   to	   have	   a	   child,	   is	   of	   crucial	   importance	   to	   a	   person’s	   aspirations	   and	  concerns,	   and	  potentially	   to	  a	  person’s	   sense	  of	   identity.	  To	  have	   this	   refused	   for	  discriminatory	   reasons	   is	   therefore	   a	   serious	   interference.	   For	   these	   reasons	   the	  case	  was	  correctly	  decided.	  
Housing	  	  Housing,	   like	   healthcare,	   raises	   issues	   separate	   from	   the	   general	   commercial	  provision	   of	   services,	   because	   it	   can	   simultaneously	   raise	   questions	   of	   forced	  association	  on	  one	  side	  and	  real	  need	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  question	  of	  exemptions	  to	  discrimination	  laws	  for	   landlords	  who,	  because	  of	  their	  religious	  beliefs,	  refuse	  to	  rent	  their	  properties	  to	  particular	  groups	  has	  especially	  arisen	  in	  the	  US	  in	  relation	  to	  discrimination	  against	  unmarried	  heterosexual	  couples.	  In	  the	  US,	  while	  the	  Fair	  Housing	   Act	   prohibits	   discrimination	   on	   many	   grounds,	   discrimination	   on	   the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  marital	  status	  is	  only	  prohibited,	   if	  at	  all,	  at	  state	  level.107	  Since	   these	   issues	   involve	   the	   interpretation	  of	   state	   law,	   different	   states	  have	   reached	   different	   conclusions,	   some	   holding	   that	   there	   is	   no	   burden	   on	   the	  religious	   landlord’s	   right	  at	  all	   and	  some	  holding	   that	   there	  has	  not	  only	  been	  an	  interference,	   but	   a	   violation.	   However,	   none	   of	   the	   cases	   are	   particularly	  satisfactory.	  	  	  It	  was	  argued	  above	   that	  not	   finding	  an	   interference	  with	   the	  right	  of	   freedom	  of	  religion	   in	   these	   contexts	   does	   not	   take	   this	   right	   seriously.	   Some	   cases	   though	  make	  the	  opposite	  mistake.	  In	  Thomas	  v	  Anchorage	  Equal	  Rights	  Commission108	  the	  value	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	   is	   entirely	  understated	  and	   is	   reduced	   to	   the	   level	   of	  minor	  inconvenience.	  Thomas	  refused	  to	  rent	  to	  unmarried	  couples	  because	  of	  his	  religious	  beliefs.	  Although	  the	  decision	  was	  withdrawn	  for	  technical	  reasons,109	  the	  majority	  held	  that	  ‘the	  only	  palpable	  injury	  suffered	  by	  an	  unmarried	  tenant	  turned	  away	  by	   a	   Christian	   landlord	   for	   religious	   reasons	   is	   a	  marginal	   reduction	   in	   the	  number	   of	   apartment	   units	   available	   for	   rent’.110	  It	   thereby	   even	   minimises	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  42	  U.S.C.	  §3601-­‐3619.	  It	  prohibits	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  race,	  color,	  religion,	  sex,	  familial	  status,	  or	  national	  origin	  but	  not	  sexual	  orientation.	  108	  Supra	  n.19.	  109	  Rehearing	  was	  granted	  and	  opinion	  withdrawn	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  dispute	  was	  not	  ripe	  for	  review:	  192	  F.3d	  1208	  (9th	  Cir.,	  1999).	  110	  Supra	  n.19	  at	  718.	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practical	   interest.	  As	  Failinger	  points	  out,	  housing	   is	  different	   from	  other	   sorts	  of	  goods	   because	   there	   is	   a	   restricted	   supply	   and	   it	   varies	   greatly	   in	   affordability,	  location,	   size	   and	   style.111	  To	   say	   that	   someone	   still	   has	   access	   to	   the	   housing	  market	   is	   not	   sufficient.	   More	   fundamentally,	   the	   majority	   in	   Thomas	   also	  completely	   failed	   to	   see	   the	   symbolic	   and	   accumulative	   effect	   of	   discrimination,	  including	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   prospective	   tenant	   ‘has	   no	   way	   of	   knowing	   the	   next	  landlord	  will	   see	   things	  differently,	   or	   the	  next,	   and	   that	  ultimately	  he	  will	   find	  a	  decent	  place	  to	  live,’112	  which	  can	  have	  a	  substantial	  effect	  on	  the	  tenant’s	  sense	  of	  inclusion	  and	  security.	  	  A	  similar	  Canadian	  case	  looks	  at	  the	  question	  differently.	  In	  Robertson	  and	  Anthony	  
v	  Goertzen113	  a	   landlord	   refused	   to	   rent	   to	   a	   gay	   couple,	   going	   so	   far	   as	   to	   retain	  their	  deposit	  and	  to	  threaten	  that	  he	  would	  not	  renew	  Anthony’s	  sister’s	  lease,	  who	  lived	  in	  another	  apartment	  owned	  by	  him,	  if	  they	  moved	  in.	  The	  legislation	  at	  issue	  forbade	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  but	  exempted	  conduct	  where	  there	  was	  a	  bona	  fide	  and	  reasonable	  justification.114	  In	  order	  for	  this	  to	  be	  established	  it	  had	  to	  be	  proved	  that	   ‘accommodation	  of	  the	  needs	  of	  an	  individual	  would	  impose	  undue	  hardship	  on	  a	  person	  who	  would	  have	  to	  accommodate	  those	  needs.’115	  Although	  this	   is	  a	  slightly	  different	  enquiry	  to	  a	  proportionality	  test,	   the	  case	  involves	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  discussion.	  The	  decision	  deals	  with	  the	  two	  interests	  fully,	   clearly	   highlighting	   the	   effect	   on	   the	   couple	   of	   both	   the	   symbolic	   effect	   of	  discrimination	   and	   of	   being	   denied	   the	   apartment,	   as	  well	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  claimant’s	  religious	  beliefs	  to	  him,	  but	  rightly	  holds	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  exemption.	  Quite	   clearly,	   even	   if	   the	   discrimination	   can	   be	   justified,	   the	   landlord’s	   acts	  went	  beyond	   a	   ‘mere’	   refusal	   and	   entirely	   failed	   to	   treat	   the	   couple	   with	   the	   respect	  owed	   to	   them.	   Since	   to	  permit	   such	  behaviour	  would	   interfere	  more	  deeply	  with	  the	   non-­‐discrimination	   right,	   whilst	   not	   giving	   any	   greater	   protection	   of	   the	  religious	   freedom	  right,	   it	   does	  not	  pass	   the	  no	   less	   restrictive	  means	  part	  of	   the	  proportionality	   test.	   Even	   if	   that	   were	   not	   the	   case,	   the	   negative	   effects	   on	   the	  prospective	   tenants,	   even	   given	   simply	   the	   practicality	   of	   finding	   alternative	  accommodation	   in	   a	   fairly	   remote	   part	   of	   Canada	   with	   a	   limited	   rental	   market,	  outweigh	  the	  harm	  caused	  to	  Goertzen.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  M.	  Failinger,	  ‘Remembering	  Mrs.	  Murphy:	  A	  Remedies	  Approach	  to	  the	  Conflict	  Between	  Gay/Lesbian	  Renters	  and	  Religious	  Landlords’	  (2001)	  29	  Cap	  U	  L	  Rev	  383.	  112	  Ibid.	  at	  398.	  113	  2010	  NTHRAP	  1	  (5th	  September	  2010).	  114	  Northwest	  Territories	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  ss.5	  and	  12,	  SNWT	  2002,	  c	  18.	  115	  Northwest	  Territories	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  s.12.	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  Of	   course,	   as	   has	   been	   argued	   throughout	   this	   thesis,	   consideration	   of	   the	  particular	   facts	   is	   essential,	   and	   a	  proportionality	   approach	   can	   always	   recognise	  this.	   To	   refer	   to	   a	   ‘landlord’	   as	   if	   the	   situation	   and	   interests	   did	   not	   vary	   is	   not	  appropriate.	  There	  can	  be	  a	  great	  difference	  between,	  as	  Knutson	  puts	  it,	  a	  ‘Donald	  Trump	  type	  landlord’116	  renting	  out	  a	  100-­‐unit	  apartment	  building	  and	  a	  widower	  who	   wants	   to	   rent	   out	   one	   bedroom	   in	   his	   home.	   This	   distinction	   was	   not	  recognised	   in	   Wisconsin	   ex.	   rel.	   Sprague	   v	   City	   of	   Madison. 117 	  Two	   women,	  Hacklander-­‐Ready	   and	   Rowe,	   rented	   a	   four-­‐bedroom	   house	   and	   wished	   to	   find	  housemates,	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  their	  landlord,	  to	  share	  the	  rent.	  Although	  they	  initially	   agreed	   to	   rent	   a	   room	   to	   a	   lesbian	  woman,	   Sprague,	   they	   changed	   their	  minds	  the	  next	  day.	  Sprague	  then	  sued	  and	  was	  successful.	  The	  Court	  dismissed	  the	  housemate’s	  privacy	  defence	  shortly,	  stating	  that	  privacy	  rights	  were	  not	  relevant	  as	   ‘appellants	   gave	   up	   their	   unqualified	   right	   to	   such	   constitutional	   protection	  when	  they	  rented	  housing	  for	  profit.’118	  	  	  This	  is	  unsatisfactory.	  Any	  profit	  seems	  very	  limited:	  the	  purpose	  was	  to	  share	  the	  rent	  rather	  than	  enter	  into	  commercial	  activity.	  There	  are	  legitimate	  concerns	  over	  privacy	   and	   intimate	   association.119	  The	   home	   is	   normally	   seen	   as	   a	   particularly	  protected	   space	   from	   outside	   intrusion,	   although	   of	   course	   this	   protection	   is	   not	  absolute.	  Selecting	  a	  housemate	  may	  be	  more	  akin	  to	  looking	  for	  friendship	  rather	  than	   the	   commercial	   provision	   of	   services,	   since	   in	   sharing	   living	   space	   there	   is	  inevitably	   some	  kind	  of	  personal	   relationship.	  Choosing	  a	   flatmate	  may	   therefore	  involve	   consideration	   of	   a	   huge	   range	   of	   concerns,	   some	   of	   which	   may	   be	  discriminatory.	   For	   this	   reason	   there	   are	  many	   services	  which	   find	   flatmates	   for	  particular	  groups	  such	  as	  students,	  Christians	  or	  gay	  people.	  Of	  course	  permitting	  such	   discrimination	   still	   limits	   available	   accommodation	   and	   may	   contribute	   to	  systemic	  discrimination,	  but	  these	  problems	  are	  outweighed	  by	  the	  other	  interests.	  	  	  An	  exemption	  in	  these	  situations	  is	  not	  unusual	  and	  indeed	  the	  ordinance	  at	  issue	  in	   Sprague	   was	   changed	   before	   the	   case	   was	   heard	   to	   add:	   ‘Nothing	   in	   this	  ordinance	  shall	  affect	  any	  person's	  decision	  to	  share	  occupancy	  of	  a	  lodging	  room,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  S.	  Knutson,	  ‘The	  Religious	  Landlord	  and	  the	  Conflict	  Between	  Free	  Exercise	  Rights	  and	  Housing	  Discrimination	  Laws	  –	  Which	  Interest	  Prevails?’	  (1996)	  47	  Hastings	  LJ	  1669.	  117	  1996	  WL	  544099	  (Wis.	  Ct.	  App.,	  1996).	  118	  Ibid.	  at	  1.	  119	  The	  seminal	  article	  on	  this	  concept	  is	  K.	  Karst,	  ‘The	  Freedom	  of	  Intimate	  Association’	  (1980)	  89	  Yale	  LJ	  624.	  
	   229	  
apartment	   or	   dwelling	   unit	  with	   another	   person	   or	   persons.’	   Indeed,	   in	   the	   later	  case	  of	  Fair	  Housing	  Council	  of	  San	  Fernando	  Valley	  v	  Roommate.com,120	  it	  was	  held	  that	   it	   would	   be	   unconstitutional	   to	   apply	   the	   federal	   Fair	   Housing	   Act	   to	  housemates.	   The	   Fair	   Housing	   Act	   already	   had	   an	   explicit	   exemption	   for	   owner-­‐occupied	   accommodation	   of	   less	   than	   five	   units.121	  Many	   US	   states	   also	   have	  legislative	   exemptions122 	  as	   does	   	   Britain123 	  and	   many	   Canadian	   provinces.124	  Although	  of	  course	  these	   include	  many	  cases	  where	  the	  objection	   is	  not	  based	  on	  conscience,	   privacy	   and	   associational	   interests	   nevertheless	   clearly	   make	   this	   a	  proportionate	  solution.	  The	  only	  complicating	  factor	  in	  Sprague	  is	  that	  Hacklander-­‐Ready	  and	  Rowe	  had	  accepted	  Sprague	  and	  then	  changed	  their	  minds.	  Since	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  cause	  greater	  harm,	  and	  does	  not	  protect	  an	  important	  opposing	  interest,	  it	  may	  have	  been	  proportionate	  to	  have	  permitted	  damages	  on	  this	  basis.	  	  There	  should	  therefore	  be	  a	  small	  landlord	  and	  housemate	  exemption	  where	  living	  space	  is	  to	  be	  shared.	  However,	  outside	  this	  context,	   in	  cases	  where	  there	  are	  not	  these	   privacy	   or	   associational	   interests,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   Thomas	   case	   described	  above,	   discrimination	   should	   not	   be	   permitted	   because	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  need	  for	  accommodation	  and	  the	  limited	  interference	  with	  religious	  rights,	  where	  there	   will	   only	   be	   limited	   contact	   with	   the	   tenant.	   In	   considering	   the	   balance	   of	  interests	   in	   different	   circumstances,	   proportionality	   thus	   provides	   workable	  solutions	  to	  this	  problem.	  	  Bed	  and	  Breakfast	  Accommodation	  	  If	   there	   is	   a	   justifiable	   claim	   not	   to	   share	   a	   house	   in	   some	   landlord	   and	   tenant	  situations,	  then	  is	  there	  a	  right	  to	  discriminate	  in	  allowing	  people	  to	  stay	  in	  bed	  and	  breakfast	   accommodation?	   Perhaps	   oddly,	   debates	   about	   the	   rights	   of	   bed	   and	  breakfast	   accommodation	   owners	   in	   England	   assumed	   a	   greater	   amount	   of	  attention	   than	   would	   be	   warranted	   by	   their	   number. 125 	  This	   is	   undoubtedly	  connected	   with	   ‘the	   powerful	   rhetorical	   imagery	   of	   the	   home,	   a	   particularly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  666	  F.3d	  1216	  (9th	  Cir.,	  2012).	  121	  	  42	  U.S.C.	  §	  2000a(b)(1).	  122	  Supra	  n.	  117	  at	  footnote	  1.	  123	  Equality	  Act	  Schedule	  5	  para	  3.	  
124	  E.g.	  British	  Columbia	  Human	  Rights	  Code	  [RSBC	  1996]	  s.10(2)(a).	  125	  N.	  Cobb,	  ‘”Gay	  couple’s	  break	  like	  Fawlty	  Towers”:	  Dangerous	  Representations	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Oppression	  in	  a	  Era	  of	  ‘Progressive’	  Law	  Reform’	  (2009)	  18	  Social	  &	  Legal	  
Studies	  333.	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important	   protected	   private	   space	   in	   liberal	   thought.’126	  The	   construction	   of	   the	  home	  as	   a	  private	   space	   though,	   although	   rhetorically	  useful	   for	   some,127	  is	   not	   a	  sufficient	  analysis	  of	  the	  issues.	  After	  all	  the	  owners	  have	  deliberately	  and	  for	  profit	  invited	  others	  into	  that	  space.	  In	  Bull,128	  the	  owners	  objected	  that	  when	  unmarried	  couples	  in	  their	  own	  family	  came	  to	  stay	  they	  made	  them	  sleep	  in	  different	  rooms.	  Evidently	  though,	  this	  is	  a	  very	  different	  situation	  as	  there	  is	  no	  commercial	  basis	  to	  it.	  Discrimination	  law	  tends	  not	  to	  intervene	  in	  personal	  situations	  such	  as	  this	  because	   of	   fears	   over	   infringing	   privacy	   and	   individual	   autonomy.	   Bed	   and	  breakfast	   accommodation	   cases	   also	   involve	   different	   considerations	   from	   the	  flatmate	  example	  given	  above,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  usually	  involve	  the	  same	  degree	  of	   intimacy	   and	   will	   normally	   be	   for	   a	   very	   limited	   duration.	   There	   is	   little	  expectation	  of	  forming	  personal	  relationships.	  	  Disputes	   have	   sometimes	   not	   been	   about	   complete	   refusals	   to	   provide	  accommodation	   to	   gay	   couples	   but	   about	   a	   refusal	   to	   provide	   double-­‐bedded	  accommodation.	   This	   is	   still	   discrimination	   since	   it	   treats	   gay	   couples	   differently	  from	  heterosexual	   couples.	   It	  may	  be	   experienced	   as	   prurient	   and	   an	   invasion	  of	  privacy	  and	  therefore	  particularly	  demeaning.	  	  No	  religious	  claim	  in	  any	  of	  the	  jurisdictions	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  this	  context.	  In	  
Bull,	  while	   the	   Bulls	  were	   considered	   to	   have	   directly	   discriminated	   against	   Hall	  and	   Preddy	   by	   treating	   them	   differently	   from	   a	   married	   couple,	   Lady	   Hale	  considered	  whether	  this	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  their	  Convention	  rights,129	  She	  pointed	  out,	   using	   a	  proportionality	   analysis,	   that	  Article	  9	   included	   the	   right	   to	  manifest	  beliefs	   in	   ‘worship,	   teaching,	   practice	   and	   observance’,	   held	   this	   right	   was	   of	  importance	  and	  that	  proportionality	  will	  require	  reasonable	  accommodation	  to	  be	  made	  for	  religious	  adherents	  in	  some	  cases.	  However,	  she	  held	  that	  the	  claim	  had	  to	  fail	  because	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  She	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  requirement	  for	  ‘very	  weighty	  reasons’	  to	  justify	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination	  and	   argued	   that	   discrimination	   involves	   an	   affront	   to	   gay	   couples’	   ‘dignity	   as	  human	   beings’.	   This	   analysis	   is	   an	   excellent	   example	   of	   how	   proportionality	   can	  pay	   close	   attention	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   both	   parties,	   acknowledge	   the	   importance	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  Ibid.	  127	  See	  for	  use	  of	  the	  ‘home’	  argument:	  	  The	  Christian	  Institute,	  ‘Christian	  B&B	  loses	  court	  case	  brought	  by	  gay	  couple’,	  18	  Oct	  2012	  http://www.christian.org.uk/news/christian-­‐bb-­‐loses-­‐court-­‐case-­‐brought-­‐by-­‐gay-­‐couple/	  [Last	  Accessed	  10	  Feb	  2014].	  128	  Supra	  n.4.	  129	  Ibid.	  at	  paras	  41-­‐55.	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each,	  and	  create	  a	  judgment	  which	  does	  not	  rest	  on	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  rights,	  but	  rather	  attempts	  to	  ‘harmonise’	  the	  rights,	  based	  on	  the	  particular	  situation.130	  	  Finally,	   as	   has	   been	   described,	   in	   Eadie	   and	   Thomas	   v	   Riverbend	   Bed	   and	  
Breakfast131	  the	  Tribunal	   held	   there	  was	  no	   rational	   connection	  between	   the	  Bed	  and	   Breakfast’s	   purpose	   and	   the	   restriction	   of	   accommodation.	   As	   has	   been	  demonstrated,	  this	  approach	  is	  flawed	  because	  it	  focuses	  only	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  business	   and	   ignores	   the	   individual	   rights	  of	   the	  owners.	  However,	   the	   judgment	  also	  went	  on	   to	   consider	   justification	  and	  here	   the	   reasoning	   is	  unassailable.	  The	  Tribunal	  held	   that	   the	  owners	  were	  engaged	   in	  a	   commercial	  activity,	   that	   it	  was	  their	   ‘personal	   and	   voluntary	   choice	   to	   start	   up	   a	   business	   in	   their	   personal	  residence’	   and	   that	   ‘there	   are	   occasions	   when	   the	   exercise	   of	   personal	   religious	  beliefs	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  may	  be	  limited	  or	  carry	  a	  cost.’132	  	  
There	   appears,	   quite	   rightly,	   to	   be	   a	   general	   conclusion	   that	   the	   right	   to	   non-­‐discrimination	   outweighs	   the	   right	   to	   religious	   freedom	   in	   this	   situation.	  Importantly,	  this	  does	  not	  rest	  on	  an	  easy	  assertion	  that	  the	  owners	  should	  simply	  give	  up	   their	  businesses	  or	   that	   their	   religious	  beliefs	  are	   irrelevant	   in	   the	  public	  sphere,	  but	  rather	  on	  a	  careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  interests	  in	  question.	  
Conclusion	  	  This	   chapter	  has	  addressed	  how	  religious	  claims	  should	  be	   treated	   in	   the	  secular	  marketplace.	  Again,	  it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  proportionality	  test	  provides	  a	   valuable	   way	   of	   resolving	   these	   claims,	   which	   is	   far	   more	   coherent	   than	   the	  varying	  tests	  used	  in	  US	  law,	  which	  often	  do	  not	  permit	  such	  claims	  to	  be	  raised	  at	  all,	  or	  which	  do	  not	  address	  the	  clash	  of	  rights	  directly.	  Although	  a	  proportionality	  test	  attempts	   to	   fully	  understand	  and	  set	  out	   the	   interests	   in	   issue,	   it	   leads	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  for	  religious	  individuals’	  interests	  to	  give	  way	  to	  non-­‐discrimination	  interests.	  These	  situations	  are	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  religious	   individuals’	   rights,	   but	   can	   greatly	   affect	   the	   right	   to	   be	   able	   to	   live	   in	  dignity,	  free	  from	  pervasive	  discrimination.	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  L.	  Cariolou,	  ‘The	  Search	  for	  an	  Equilibrium	  by	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  European	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  Human	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  Ibid.	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Chapter	  8:	  Conclusion	  	  There	  were	   two	   starting	  points	   to	   this	   thesis.	  The	   first	  was	   that,	   at	   least	   in	   some	  contexts,	  aspects	  of	  the	  conflict	  between	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  gay	  rights	  are	  part	  of	  a	  ‘culture	  war’.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  these	  issues	  are	  necessarily	  perceived	  by	  all	   as	   of	   fundamental	   importance,	   but	   rather	   that	   when	   disputes	   arise	   they	   are	  often	   characterised	   by	   rhetorical	   exaggeration,	   gain	   much	   media	   and	   other	  attention	   and	   are	   used	   to	   symbolically	   demonstrate	   fundamental	   cultural	   and	  political	   disagreements	   rather	   than	   being	   focused	   on	   the	   particular	   issue	   in	  question.	   The	   second	   starting	  point	  was	   that	   there	  was	   value	   in	   the	  broad	   rights	  being	  claimed:	   in	   the	  claims	   to	  protect	   religious	  conscience	  and	  autonomy	  and	   in	  the	  claims	  to	  non-­‐discrimination.	  There	  was	  therefore	  a	  need	  for	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  of	   deciding	   cases	  which	  would	   encourage	   a	   situation	  whereby	   ‘the	   irreconcilable	  can	   exist	   side	   by	   side,	   civilly,	   in	   the	   public	   sphere,	   and	   [find]	   ways	   of	   living	  together’,1	  and	  which	  would	  protect	  both	  rights	  as	  far	  as	  possible.	  The	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis	  has	  been	  that	  proportionality	  is	  an	  ideal	  method	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  In	   Chapter	   3,	   a	   number	   of	   claims	  were	  made	   about	   the	   specific	   benefits	   of	   using	  proportionality	   to	   resolve	   cases	   involving	   a	   conflict	   between	   non-­‐discrimination	  rights	   and	   freedom	   of	   religion.	   The	   four	   case	   study	   chapters,	   which	   applied	   the	  proportionality	   test	   to	   numerous	   situations,	   demonstrate	   that	   these	   claims	   have	  been	  justified.	  	  	  My	   first	   argument	  was	   that	   proportionality	   provides	   a	   fact-­‐specific	   and	   nuanced	  analysis	  for	  deciding	  these	  difficult	  issues.	  This	  point	  has	  been	  clearly	  illustrated	  in,	  for	  example,	  considering	  whether	  and	  when	  it	   is	  permissible	   for	  religious	  schools	  to	  apply	  discriminatory	  religious	  rules	  to	  the	  selection	  and	  dismissal	  of	  teachers.	  I	  argued	  that	  a	  proportionality	  approach,	  which	  could	  take	  into	  account	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  religiosity	  of	  the	  school	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  employee,	  provides	  a	  far	  more	  subtle	  and	  appropriate	  way	  of	  deciding	  whether	  discrimination	  should	  be	  permissible	  than	  a	  categorical	  approach	  as	  employed,	  for	  example,	  in	  English	  law,	  2	  where	  the	  only	  relevant	  issue	  is	  the	  type	  of	  school.	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This	   fact-­‐specific	  nature	  gives	  rise,	   it	  was	  argued,	   to	  a	  number	  of	  related	  benefits.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  proportionality	  does	  not	  try	  to	  answer	  whether	  one	  right	  generally	  is	  more	  important	  than	  another,	  but	  rather	  only	  provides	  an	  answer	  for	  a	  specific	  fact	   situation.	   It	   was	   argued	   that	   this	   is	   particularly	   significant	   given	   that	   both	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  are	  valuable	  rights,	  which	  should	  both	  be	  protected	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  but	  the	  weight	  to	  be	  given	  to	  each	  may	  not	  be	  equal	  in	   a	   particular	   case.	   This	   fact	   and	   context	   specific	   nature	   of	   proportionality	   is	  clearly	   evident	   from	   the	   number	   of	   different	   conclusions	   on	   particular	   cases	  reached	   throughout	   the	   thesis,	   some	   of	  which	   protect	   freedom	   of	   religion	   above	  non-­‐discrimination	   rights,	   and	   some	   the	   opposite.	   This	   also	   demonstrates	   the	  argument	  made	  that	  proportionality	  means	  that	  constitutional	  winners	  and	  losers	  are	  not	  created	  permanently	  because	  a	  decision	  is	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  Proportionality	  thus	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ‘hierarchy	  of	  rights’	  with	  either	  right	  being	   seen	  as	   the	  exception	   to	   the	  other,	   but	   rather	  demands	   consideration	  based	  on	  the	  particular	  facts.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  actual	  dispute	  in	  issue	  is	  highlighted,	  an	  important	  point	  when	  dealing	  with	  such	  potentially	  controversial	  matters.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  has	  also	  underlined	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  ‘constitutional	  losers’:	  those	  who	   raise	   a	   constitutional	   claim	   but	  who	   are	   unsuccessful.	   It	   has	   accepted	  Calhoun’s	   argument	   that	   these	   constitutional	   losers	   still	   possess	   ‘constitutional	  stature’	   and	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   such.3	  It	   was	   argued	   that	   proportionality	   is	   a	  conciliatory	  form	  of	  reasoning	  because	  losing	  claims	  can	  be	  accepted	  as	  in	  principle	  worthy	  of	  protection,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  unsuccessful	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  	  	  This	  point	  was	  particularly	   illustrated	   in	   the	   last	   chapter.	  Although	   it	  was	  argued	  that	   most	   of	   the	   claims	   of	   religious	   individuals	   to	   discriminate	   when	   providing	  services	   to	   the	  public	   should	  be	  unsuccessful,	   a	  proportionality	   analysis	  makes	   it	  clear	   that	   these	   losing	   claims	   are	   in	   principle	   legitimate	   and	   that	   it	   is	   a	   loss	   that	  these	   claims	   cannot	   be	   protected,	   even	   though	   they	   are	   outweighed	   by	   other	  factors	   in	   particular	   contexts.	   This	   is	   evident	   from	  Elane	  Photography	   v	  Willock,4	  where	  the	  owners	  of	  a	  photography	  business	  refused	  to	  photograph	  a	  gay	  couple’s	  wedding	   because	   they	   claimed	   that	   they	   would	   not	   photograph	   events	   to	   which	  they	   had	   religious	   objections.	   There	   was	   no	   easy	   basis	   under	   which	   to	   examine	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  Calhoun,	  Losing	  Twice:	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their	  defence	  to	  a	  discrimination	  law	  in	  US	  law.	  The	  owners	  of	  the	  company	  had	  no	  claim	   under	   the	   Free	   Exercise	   Clause	   because	   the	   law	   prohibiting	   discrimination	  was	   neutral	   and	   generally	   applicable	   and	   therefore	  was	   acceptable	   following	   the	  ruling	   in	  Employment	  Division	   v	   Smith.5	  They	   had	   no	   claim	   under	   the	   state	   RFRA	  because	   the	   case	   involved	   two	   private	   parties.	   They	   were	   left	   therefore	   with	   a	  rather	  weak	  argument	  that	  being	  required	  not	  to	  discriminate	  interfered	  with	  their	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  but	  again	  it	  was	  held	  that	  this	  right	  was	  not	  affected.	  In	  contrast,	  if	  this	  case	  had	  been	  decided	  under	  a	  proportionality	  approach,	  it	  could	  have	  been	  accepted	   that	  being	  required	  not	   to	  discriminate	  constituted	  an	   interference	  with	  their	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  therefore	  taken	  the	  loss	  caused	  to	  them	  seriously.	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   advantages	   related	   to	  proportionality’s	   fact	   specific	   and	   contextual	  nature,	  this	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  concept	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  justification.	  In	  particular	  it	  has	  argued	  that	  proportionality	  always	  requires	  justification	  where	  a	   right	   is	   infringed	   and	   that	   the	   justification	   required	   relates	   specifically	   to	   the	  injury	  at	  stake.	  This	  advantage	  can	  be	  seen	   in	  Ward	  v	  Polite,6	  where	  a	  counselling	  student	   wished	   to	   be	   permitted	   to	   refer	   a	   gay	   client	   if	   he	   required	   counselling	  about	   relationship	   issues.	   Since	   under	   US	   law	   the	   question	   was	   whether	   the	  university	  had	  a	  neutral	  and	  generally	  applicable	  policy	  in	  not	  permitting	  a	  referral,	  the	   principal	   argument	   in	   the	   case	   became	   whether	   other	   students	   had	   been	  permitted	   referrals	   for	   any	   reason.	   While	   a	   strict	   non-­‐referral	   rule	   would	   be	  accepted	   under	   this	   test,	   a	   policy	  which	   permitted	   exemptions	   for	   some	   reasons	  and	  not	  others	  would	  be	   far	  more	  difficult	   to	   justify.	  A	  proportionality	   test	  would	  have	   avoided	   this	  narrow	   focus	  on	   the	   stringency	  of	   the	  non-­‐referral	   rule,	  would	  have	   more	   easily	   allowed	   the	   university	   to	   put	   forward	   its	   interest	   in	   non-­‐discrimination,	  and	  could	  also	  have	  considered	  the	  interest	  of	  Ward’s	  future	  clients.	  	  	  A	   similar	   point	   was	   also	   evident	   in	   Christian	   Legal	   Society	   v	   Martinez,7	  which	  concerned	   whether	   a	   university	   should	   be	   required	   to	   allow	   an	   evangelical	  Christian	  student	  society	  to	  have	  discriminatory	  membership	  rules.	  Since	  under	  US	  law	  the	  issue	  was	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  reasonable	  and	  viewpoint	  neutral	  rule,	  the	  case	   concentrated	   on	   the	   rather	   tangential	   issue	   of	  whether	   the	   university	   really	  required	  student	  societies	  to	  have	  an	  ‘all	  comers’	  policy,	  as	  it	  claimed,	  rather	  than	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  494	  US	  872	  (1990).	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considering	  how	  great	  an	  interference	  the	  university’s	  policy	  was	  to	  the	  students’	  freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   how	   far	   an	   exemption	   would	   have	   affected	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   right.	   Again	   a	   proportionality	   approach	   would	   have	   focused	   far	  better	  on	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  interference	  with	  the	  society’s	  rights	  of	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  association,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  US	  approach.	  	  	  A	   further	   argument	   was	   made	   that	   rights	   can	   be	   defined	   broadly	   under	   a	  proportionality	  test,	  without	  overly	  restricting	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  state	  or	  other	  body,	  because	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  justification	  required	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  interference.	   For	   example,	   it	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   an	   interference	   with	  freedom	   of	   religion	   can	   be	   recognised	   under	   a	   proportionality	   analysis	   where	   a	  person	  is	  required	  to	  act	  contrary	  to	  their	  conscience	  in	  their	  employment.	  This	  is	  so	  even	  though	  the	  employee	  is	  only	  peripherally	  involved	  in	  an	  ‘immoral’	  act	  and	  the	  dilemma	  could	  be	  avoided	  by	   resignation,	  because	   these	   factors	   can	  be	   taken	  into	  account	  at	  the	  justification	  stage.	  	  It	   was	   argued	   that	   this	   broad	   interpretation	   of	   rights	   is	   advantageous	   since	   it	  means	  that	  claims	  are	  not	  rejected	  at	  a	  preliminary	  point	  before	  the	  state	  or	  other	  body	   is	   required	   to	   justify	   its	   actions.	   It	   also	   helps	   to	   ensure	   that	   obligations	   to	  ‘constitutional	   losers’	   are	  met	   since	  weaker	   claims	  can	  be	  accepted	  as	   interfering	  with	   a	   person’s	   rights	   and	   therefore	   the	   loss	   to	   them	   acknowledged,	   even	   if	   the	  claim	  fails.	  My	  argument	  was	  that	  justification	  was	  not	  only	  important	  in	  a	  practical	  sense	  since	   it	  ensured	  that	  rights	  are	  not	  unnecessarily	  restricted,	  but	  also	  that	   it	  has	   symbolic	   significance.	   I	   argued	   that	   giving	   justification	   treats	   each	   party	   in	   a	  dispute	   as	  worthy	   of	   justification:	   as	   people	   who	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   accept	   the	  process	  of	  adjudication,	  even	  though	  they	  disagree	  with	  the	  result.	  Justification	  also	  adds	   to	   a	  process	  of	  dialogue,	  meaning	   that	  decisions	  are	  not	   simply	   imposed	  on	  losing	  claimants.	  	  The	  advantages	  of	  a	  broad	   interpretation	  of	   rights	  have	  been	  particularly	  evident	  when	  comparing	  proportionality	  to	  the	  US	  approach	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion,	  which	  only	   requires	   justification	   to	   be	   given	   where	   a	   law	   is	   not	   neutral	   or	   generally	  applicable.	   In	   cases	  where	   a	   religious	   believer	   objects	   to	   providing	   a	   commercial	  service	   for	   discriminatory	   reasons,	   no	   justification	   is	   required,	   since	   religious	  rights	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  infringed.	  This	  is	  so	  even	  though	  the	  rule	  or	  law	  may	  have	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   her	   ability	   to	   live	   her	   life	   in	   accordance	   with	   her	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religious	   beliefs.	   In	   contrast,	   as	   can	   be	   seen	   from	   the	   Canadian	   case	   of	   Ontario	  
(Human	  Rights	  Commission)	  v	  Brockie,8	  proportionality	   is	  compatible	  with	  a	  broad	  understanding	  of	  rights	  and	  therefore	  does	  require	  justification	  to	  be	  given	  in	  these	  circumstances.	   Bull	   and	   Hall	   v	   Preddy9	  is	   also	   a	   good	   example	   of	   this,	   involving	  owners	   of	   a	   private	  hotel	  who	   refused	   to	   allow	  a	   gay	   couple	   to	   stay	   in	   a	   double-­‐bedded	   room.	   Even	   though	   the	   owners	   were	   unsuccessful,	   the	   Court	   clearly	  acknowledged	  their	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  that	   it	  was	  a	   loss	  to	  them	  to	  be	  required	  not	  to	  discriminate.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  demonstrating	  the	  advantages	  of	  proportionality,	  this	  thesis	  has	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  proportionality	  provides	  a	  better	  method	  of	  analysis	  than	  other	  tests.	  As	  I	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  to	  draw	  stark	  distinctions	  between	  action	  and	  belief	  or	  public	  and	  private	  in	  considering	  where	  the	  boundaries	  of	  religious	  freedom	  lie	  may	   lead	   to	  unfairness,	   since	   it	  does	  not	  consider	   the	  particular	  circumstances	   in	  which	   a	   right	   has	   been	   claimed	   and	  may	   both	   overly	   restrict	   and	   overly	   protect	  religious	   rights.	  These	  points	  have	  been	  demonstrated	   throughout	  my	   thesis.	   For	  example,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   a	   strict	   public/private	   distinction	   is	   not	   suitable	   for	  resolving	  the	  question	  of	  when	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  have	  discriminatory	  criteria	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  employees,	  or	  conversely	   for	  deciding	  when	  employees	  should	  be	  permitted	   religious	   exemptions	   from	   equality	   policies.	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   it	   is	  disproportionate	  for	  employees,	  even	  those	  at	  the	  core	  of	  organised	  religions	  such	  as	  clergy,	  not	  to	  receive	  some	  protection	  from	  discrimination	  law,	  even	  though	  this	  is	   clearly	   not	   ‘public’	   employment.	   The	   converse	   of	   this	   is	   demonstrated	   for	  example	  by	  my	  argument	  that	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  hold	  that	  because	  a	  person	  is	  a	  state	  official	  they	  can	  never	  be	  permitted	  a	  religious	  exemption,	  since	  this	  equates	  a	  person	  with	  the	  state	  in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  unwarranted,	  but	  rather	  that	  in	  each	  case	  a	  fact-­‐specific	   analysis	   should	   be	  made	  which	   considers	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   role,	   the	  exemption	  claimed	  and	  the	  effect	  this	  would	  have	  on	  the	  non-­‐discrimination	  right.	  	  This	   thesis	  has	  demonstrated	   the	  difference	  between	   the	  usually	  proportionality-­‐based	  reasoning	  of	  Canada	  and	  the	  UK,	  and	  the	  far	  more	  categorical	  approach	  used	  by	  the	  USA.	  While	  the	  UK	  uses	  proportionality	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  than	  Canada,	  there	  are	  numerous	  situations	  where	  proportionality	  is	  used.	  Indirect	  discrimination	  can	  be	   justified	   if	   it	   is	   a	   proportionate	   means	   of	   achieving	   a	   legitimate	   aim,	   thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  [2002]	  222	  DLR	  (4th)	  174.	  	  9	  [2013]	  UKSC	  73.	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incorporating	  a	  proportionality	  analysis	  into	  the	  decision.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  general	  justification	   available	   for	   direct	   discrimination,	   a	   proportionality	   requirement	   is	  relevant	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  whether	  a	  genuine	  occupational	  requirement	  to	  be,	  for	   example,	   of	   a	   particular	   sexual	   orientation	   has	   been	   shown.	   In	   charity	   law,	   a	  proportionality	  test	   is	  used	  to	  decide	  whether	  it	   is	  permissible	  to	  restrict	  benefits	  to	   those	   who	   share	   a	   protected	   characteristic.	   Finally,	   a	   proportionality	   test,	  although	  often	  not	   strictly	  applied,	   is	  used	   in	  assessing	  whether	   there	  has	  been	  a	  violation	  of	  Art	  9	  under	  Convention	  law.	  	  	  By	  contrast,	  analysis	  under	  the	  US	  Free	  Exercise	  Clause	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  requiring	  policies	   to	   be	   neutral	   and	   generally	   applicable,	   rather	   than	   considering	   whether	  there	   is	   sufficient	   justification	   for	   interference	   with	   the	   right.	   While	   there	   are	  serious	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  explanations	  as	   to	  why	  the	  US	  has	  not	  embraced	  proportionality,10	  a	  return	  to	  the	  pre-­‐Employment	  Division	  v	  Smith	  approach,	  which	  required	   strict	   scrutiny	  when	   considering	   freedom	  of	   religion	   claims,	  would	   go	   a	  long	  way	  in	  improving	  the	  law.	  There	  is	  though	  little	  sign	  that	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  occur.	  In	   addition,	   the	   complete	   lack	   of	   protection	   against	   sexual	   orientation	  discrimination	  in	  many	  US	  states	  is	  clearly	  problematic.	  	  	  Overall	   therefore	   this	   thesis	   has	   consistently	   shown	   that	   proportionality	   is	   a	  feasible	  and	  advantageous	  method	  of	  analysis	  which	  provides	  a	  superior	  evaluation	  of	   the	   issues	   than	   alternative	   tests.	   Furthermore,	   in	   doing	   so,	   it	   has	   reached	  numerous	   conclusions	   as	   to	   how	   to	   resolve	   specific	   conflicts	   between	   non-­‐discrimination	  rights	  and	  freedom	  of	  religion	  in	  four	  contexts:	  discriminatory	  acts	  or	   expression	   by	   employees	   in	   secular	   organisations;	   employment	   by	   religious	  organisations;	   the	   provision	   of	   services	   by	   religious	   organisations;	   and	   the	  provision	   of	   services	   by	   religious	   individuals.	   These	   conclusions	   will	   be	   briefly	  outlined	  here,	  although	  it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  summarising	  the	  thesis	   in	  this	  way	  may	  appear	   to	  minimise	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  process	  of	   analysis	   by	  which	  they	  were	  reached.	  	  Firstly,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   secular	   employment	   the	   thesis	   has	   argued	   that	   in	   some	  cases	   it	  may	  be	  proportionate	   to	  accommodate	  employees’	  religious	  objections	   to	  certain	  acts	  such	  as	  performing	  same-­‐sex	  marriages,	  where	  the	  discrimination	  will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  J.	  Bomhoff,	  Balancing	  Constitutional	  Rights:	  The	  Origins	  and	  Meanings	  of	  Postwar	  Legal	  
Discourse	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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not	   be	   directly	   experienced,	   and	   that	   an	   exemption	   should	   not	   be	   ruled	   out	  automatically	  solely	  because	  it	  will	  lead	  to	  discrimination	  or	  because	  a	  person	  is	  a	  state	  employee.	  Clearly	  this	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  exemptions	  should	  always	  be	  given,	  and	   where	   an	   obligation	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   is	   specifically	   related	   to	   the	  employment	   exemptions	   should	   not	   be	   granted.	   This	   chapter	   also	   demonstrated	  that	   the	   rejection	  of	   the	   specific	   situation	   rule	   in	  Eweida	  v	  UK,11	  meaning	   that	   the	  merits	  of	  Article	  9	  claims	  were	  fully	  assessed	  in	  employment	  cases,	  was	  a	  welcome	  development.	   In	   addition	   to	   considering	   religious	   exemptions,	   this	   chapter	   also	  dealt	  with	  the	  question	  of	  discriminatory	  speech	  within	  employment,	  holding	  that	  where	  speech	  amounted	  to	  hate	  speech	  it	   is	  always	  permissible	  to	  prohibit	   it	  and	  that	   for	   some	  positions	  greater	   interferences	  with	   freedom	  of	   expression	  may	  be	  proportionate.	  The	  chapter	  concluded	  by	  stating	  that,	  while	  in	  some	  cases	  it	  may	  be	  permissible	   for	   employers	   to	   require	   employees	   to	   have	   particular	   non-­‐discriminatory	   views,	   these	   cases	  would	   be	   very	   rare,	   and	   the	   employment	  must	  intrinsically	  require	  such	  beliefs.	  	  With	   regard	   to	   religious	   employment,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   an	   absolute	   rule	  permitting	   any	   form	   of	   discrimination	   for	   clergy	   is	   not	   proportionate,	   but	  discrimination	   that	   is	   based	   on	   religious	   rules	   or	   on	   the	   religious	   beliefs	   of	   a	  religion’s	   followers	   should	   be	   permissible.	   It	   argued	   in	   the	   context	   of	   other	  religious	  employment	  that	  discrimination	  is	  permissible	  where	  there	  is	  a	  bona	  fide	  occupational	   requirement	   for	   a	   person	   to	   follow	   discriminatory	   religious	   rules.	  Whether	   this	   is	   the	   case	   will	   depend	   on	   a	   number	   of	   factors,	   including	   the	  religiosity	  of	  the	  organisation	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  role.	  	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   provision	   of	   services,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   religious	  organisations	   should	   be	   able	   to	   discriminate	   in	   access	   to	   religious	   worship	   and	  similar	   activities.	   However,	   where	   the	   religious	   mission	   is	   far	   more	   attenuated,	  such	   as	   the	   hiring	   out	   of	   religious	   premises	   for	   profit,	   organisations	   should	   only	  have	  limited	  freedom	  to	  discriminate.	  The	  thesis	  also	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  the	  claim	  of	  Catholic	  adoption	  agencies	  to	  discriminate	  and	  concluded	  that,	  within	  the	  English	   context,	   there	   was	   no	   legal	   justification	   for	   discrimination	   where	   these	  activities	  were	  publicly	  funded,	  and	  that	  the	  facts	  demonstrated	  that	  most	  adoption	  agencies	   could	   find	   a	  way	   to	   both	   protect	   their	   religious	   conscience	   and	   provide	  services.	   The	   final	   chapter	   concluded	   that	   claims	   by	   religious	   individuals	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  8.	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discriminate	   in	  providing	  services	  will	  rarely	  be	  successful,	  particularly	   if	   there	   is	  no	  religious	  aspect	  to	  the	  service.	  	  
Concluding	  Thoughts	  	  Glendon	  argues	   that,	   ‘in	   its	   simplest	  American	   form,	   the	   language	  of	   rights	   is	   the	  language	   of	   no	   compromise.	   The	  winner	   takes	   all	   and	   the	   loser	   has	   to	   get	   out	   of	  town.	   The	   conversation	   is	   over.’	  12	  This	   thesis	   has	   demonstrated	   though	   how	   a	  particular	   type	  of	   ‘rights	   talk’13	  can	  be	  used	  to	  avoid	  such	  a	  stark	  analysis.	  As	   this	  thesis	  makes	  clear,	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  why	  a	  discussion	  of	  contentious	  moral	  and	  political	   issues	   in	  terms	  of	  rights	  should	  necessarily	   ‘lead	  one	  to	  think	  in	  absolute	  terms	  and	  to	  shun	  compromises’.14	  Rather,	  as	  Afridi	  and	  Warmington	  have	  argued,	  the	   ‘use	  of	  principles	   like	  proportionality	  has	   the	  potential	   to	   elevate	   the	   level	   of	  debate	  beyond,	  “I	  invoke	  my	  claims	  as	  a	  right	  and	  this	  trumps	  consideration	  of	  all	  other	  issues”.	  It	  can	  help	  to	  develop	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  all	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  all	   of	   the	   people	   affected	   by	   a	   conflict.’ 15 This	   thesis	   has	   explained	   how	  proportionality	  can	  achieve	  these	  outcomes.	  	  	  Stychin	   hopes	   for	   a	   situation	   ‘of	   accommodation	   and	   compromise	   which	   avoids	  intransigence	   and	   instead	   seeks	   out	   common	   ground’16	  in	   this	   context.	   Although	  legal	  methods	   like	  proportionality	   can	  only	  be	  part	  of	   the	   solution,	   and	  non-­‐legal	  mechanisms	   should	   also	   be	   pursued,17	  since	   courts	   are	   inevitably	   called	   on	   to	  resolve	   some	   of	   these	   disputes,	   the	   law	   has	   an	   indispensable	   role	   to	   play	   in	   this	  process.	   While	   it	   may	   be	   true	   that	   ‘you	   can’t	   hurry	   love’18	  proportionality	   can	  perhaps	  at	  least	  help	  to	  promote	  Stychin’s	  objectives.	  This	  thesis	  therefore	  ends	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  M.	  Glendon,	  Rights	  Talk:	  The	  Impoverishment	  of	  Political	  Discourse	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1991)	  9.	  13	  Ibid.	  	  14	  A.	  Etzioni,	  ‘Moral	  Dialogues:	  A	  Communitarian	  Core	  Element’	  in	  A.	  Allen	  and	  M.	  Regan	  (eds),	  Debating	  Democracy’s	  Discontent:	  Essays	  on	  American	  Politics,	  Law,	  and	  Public	  
Philosophy	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  15	  A.	  Afridi	  and	  J.	  Warmington,	  Managing	  Competing	  Equality	  Claims	  (London:	  Equality	  and	  Diversity	  Forum,	  2010).	  16	  Supra	  n.1	  at	  755.	  17	  Many	  commentators	  have	  made	  this	  point	  including:	  A.	  Donald,	  Religion	  or	  Belief,	  Equality	  
and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  (Equality	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  2012);	  J.G	  Brown,	  ‘Peacemaking	  in	  the	  Culture	  War	  Between	  Gay	  Rights	  and	  Religious	  Liberty’	  (2012)	  95	  Iowa	  L	  Rev	  747;	  J.D.	  Hunter,	  Before	  the	  Shooting	  Begins:	  Searching	  for	  Democracy	  
in	  America’s	  Culture	  War	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1994);	  J.	  Nedelsky	  and	  R.	  Hutchinson,	  ‘Clashes	  of	  Principle	  and	  the	  Possibility	  of	  Dialogue:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Same-­‐Sex	  Marriage	  in	  the	  United	  Church	  of	  Canada’	  in	  R.	  Moon	  (ed.)	  Law	  and	  Religious	  Pluralism	  in	  Canada	  (Vancouver:	  UBC	  Press,	  2008).	  18	  A.	  Koppelman,	  ‘You	  Can't	  Hurry	  Love:	  Why	  Antidiscrimination	  Protections	  for	  Gay	  People	  Should	  Have	  Religious	  Exemptions’	  (2006)	  72	  Brook	  L	  Rev	  125.	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a	  positive	  note:	  that	  these	  disputes	  need	  not	  be	  intransigent	  and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	   resolve	   these	   complex	  and	  difficult	   conflicts,	  which	  are	  at	   times	  politically	  and	  socially	  sensitive,	  in	  a	  way	  which	  respects	  both	  rights	  as	  far	  as	  possible.	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